The long and glorious commercial history of Amalfi, which began some time about the middle of the eighth century, came to an abrupt end on November 24, 1343. On that day a raging storm accompanied by a tidal wave destroyed the lower town and swallowed all the harbor installations, including the famed sea fortifications. From that blow Amalfi never recovered. The present lovely resort appears as a most unlikely setting for a republic which was once a great maritime town in the western Mediterranean.

The traditional view of cotton mechanization, first advanced by rural sociologists in the 1920s, is that southern agrarian institutions impeded progress. Recently their view has been questioned. New studies attribute much of the southern lag to factors like small-scale production, cheap labor, the cotton crop, and environment. I contribute to the debate by emphasizing how the structure of the southern economy encouraged landlords to use annual labor contracts that hindered attempts to mechanize. I present evidence that supports the traditional view and suggest how the incentive structure of annual labor contracts delayed invention of the mechanical cotton picker.

The Dictionary of American Biography contains 1,464 biographies of eminent American businessmen. Among them are most of the wellknown financial and business figures, as well as many others never widely known or else long forgotten. The announced criterion for inclusion in the D.A.B. is that the person “did something notable in some field of American life.” Over 100 “consulting specialists” handled the various lists of candidates for inclusion; these specialists included economic and business historians.

Between 1880 and 1939 Burma, Malaya, and Thailand received inflows of migrants from India and China comparable in size to European immigration in the New World. This article examines the forces that lay behind migration to Southeast Asia and asks if experience there bears out Lewis's unlimited labor supply hypothesis. We find that it does and, furthermore, that immigration created a highly integrated labor market stretching from South India to Southeastern China. Emigration from India and China and elastic labor supply are identified as important components of Asian globalization before the Second World War.

The security of property rights is fragile under dictatorships. This is particularly so if economic agents are uncertain as to whether the regime will last. As a result, private investment is withheld and economic performance is poor. Spain was in such a situation after World War II. However, as the Cold War intensified the United States became interested in Spain as a military ally, thereby helping to consolidate Franco's regime. This led to an increase in economic confidence and helps to explain why economic growth resumed in Spain ahead of significant changes in its autarkic economic policies.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. tobacco manufacturers were not forging ahead of their leading European counterparts in technology, productivity, or managerial techniques. On some indicators, including per capita cigarette consumption, the United States strikingly lagged. Fiscal discrimination against cigarettes, amplified by the monopoly pricing, strategic choices, and organizational overload of the American Tobacco trust, were among the retarding factors.

“Of all things American, nothing is more so than the cigarette.”Written by an enthusiastic booster of the addiction (with the assistance of the American Tobacco Company) in 1916. See Young, Story, p. 4.

This article uses an original dataset to test the effects of government monopoly service, competition, and regulation on the development of the telephone industry in Europe in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Like today, there were stateowned monopolies in some countries, vigorous competition in others, and others with private firms operating under restrictive concessions. The main determinant of government control of the telephone sector was the state's involvement in the telegraph. Countries with competition between telephone providers and whose governments did not threaten to expropriate firms' assets saw higher telephone penetration and lower prices, even in rural areas.

It is often suggested that an agricultural revolution, currently defined as a rise in the output of arable workers, was a necessary precursor to industrialization and improved living standards. This article provides the first direct measurement of arable workers' average labor productivity for pre-industrial England. Rates are assessed for those production conditions that it is thought resulted in the lowest agrarian labor productivity rates in the pre-industrial period: c.1300–1348. The rates for English workers before the Black Death either surpassed or met the literature's best estimates for English workers until 1800, well after industrialization was underway.

An economic downturn coincided with the start of the epidemic but the recession was short and moderate, compared with that of 1920/21. Cross-sectional high-frequency data indicate that the epidemic affected the labor supply sharply but briefly with no ensuing spill-overs; most of the recession, brief as it was, was due to the end of the war. I analyze weekly city-level mortality data and economic indicators with time series methods and structural estimation of an economic-epidemiological model: interventions to hinder the contagion reduced mortality at little economic cost, probably because reduced infections mitigated the impact on the labor force.

Technology shocks and declining productivity have been advanced as important factors driving the Great Depression in the United States, based on real business cycle theory. We estimate an improved measure of technology for interwar manufacturing, using data from the U.S. census reports. There is clear evidence of increasing returns to scale and we find no statistical proof that technology shocks led to changes in hours worked or other inputs. This contradicts a key prediction of real business cycle theory. We find that increasing returns to scale are not due to market power but to labor and capital hoarding.

The causation of the American Civil War has been one of the largest issues in the historiography of this nation's past. Explanations for the question have been offered, debated, and reinterpreted ever since the time of the war; indeed, even before 1860 some individuals were setting forth reasons why an “irrepressible conflict” must come. Furthermore, the debate among scholars does not appear to be diminishing or approaching any consensus of interpretation. New hypotheses and critiques appear to be emerging as fast today as during preceding periods. Some of these proffered explanations prove to be more popular than others but none has won substantial favor to the exclusion of others and few have been completely discredited. As a result, there now exists a large inventory of previously suggested interpretations building upon such diverse mechanisms as slavery, sectionalism, political ineptitude, a slave-power conspiracy, economic conflicts and abolitionist activism. Many of these explanations have been thoughtfully prepared and then further polished by cross-examination, yet when all these efforts have been objectively considered they yield few definitive conclusions.

This article challenges the widely held view that slave prices in Africa fell substantially and permanently after Britain abolished its slave trade in 1807. Examination of slave-price data shows that, when allowance is made for movements in prices of trade goods bartered for slaves, real slave prices fell sharply between 1807 and 1820 but that the fall was confined to West Africa. In West Central Africa prices remained steady before 1820. Thereafter, prices rose strongly in both areas, and between 1830 and 1850 prices were generally close to the levels reached between 1783 and 1807, the height of the Atlantic slave trade.

An important change in the structure of U.S. institutions occurred when the government under the Articles of Confederation was replaced by a new government under the Constitution. In 1913, Charles A. Beard proposed a view of the formation of the United States Constitution—an economic interpretation—that remains a much discussed yet unresolved explanation of the behavior and motives of the men who wrote the document. This paper provides the first rigorous statistical test of this issue. We summarize the preliminary results of a statistical analysis of the relationship between the voting behavior of individual delegates involved in the making of the Constitution and their economic and personal characteristics. Contrary to current historical wisdom, significant patterns related to economic interests are found in the voting, with the division of interests generally consistent with that outlined by Charles A. Beard seventy years ago.

Of The many tasks confronting economic history, none are more shrouded in uncertainty than those encompassed in the theme “Institutional and Cultural Factors in Economic History.” We have in general treated these factors respectfully, but as a profession we have preferred to work in areas more clearly defined and with tools more fully developed. As a result few areas have received less sustained attention than the zones where we must seek the interplay of economic, social, and cultural forces.

In this article we document a reversal of fortune within the Western agricultural core, showing that regions which made early transition to Neolithic agriculture are now poorer than regions that made the transition later. The finding contrasts recent influential works emphasizing the beneficial role of early transition. Using data from a large number of carbon-dated Neolithic sites throughout the Western agricultural area, we determine approximate transition dates for about 60 countries, 280 medium-sized regions, and 1,400 small regions. Our empirical analysis shows that there is a robust negative, reduced-form relationship between years since transition to agriculture and contemporary levels of income both across and within countries. Our results further indicate that the reversal had started to emerge already before the era of European colonization.

When private incentives are insufficient, a big push by government may lead to industrialization. This article uses mobilization for WWII to test the big push hypothesis in the context of postwar industrialization in the American South. Specifically, I investigate the role of capital deepening at the county level using newly assembled data on the location and value of wartime investment. Despite a boom in manufacturing activity during the war, the evidence is not consistent with differential postwar growth in counties that received more investment. This does not rule out positive effects of mobilization on firms or sectors, but a decisive role for wartime capital deepening in the South's postwar industrial development should be viewed more skeptically.

The purpose of this article is to examine a significant change that took place in American public policy during the nineteenth century. For many decades American governments, especially those of states and localities, had engaged in extensive programs for the promotion of economic development by the construction or support of works of internal improvement. It may now be pertinent, at a time when so many of the less industrialized countries are engaged in programs of economic development, to ask why and when and by what processes governments in the United States came to withdraw from direct participation in the promotion of canals and railways.

The trend in mean height in the Russian province of Saratov is estimated for birth cohorts from 1755 to 1892 on the basis of newly gathered archival data and published sources. Heights fell in the late eighteenth century due an increasing burden of taxes and feudal dues. Stature increased slowly throughout the nineteenth century, offering no support for the hypothesis of an agrarian crisis that provoked or followed from the abolition of serfdom in 1861. Improving living conditions can be attributed to economic development, rising productivity in agriculture, and diversification of peasant economic activity into other sectors.

This article tests whether smaller domestic markets can explain why France industrialized more slowly than Britain. To do so, it uses the Tableauxdu Maximum. It begins by presenting this source and then checks if the data from the source are plausible using a logit theoretical gravity equation. The results of this gravity equation are then employed to compute the expected market size of specific supply centers. Even if differences in real, nominal, and disposable income are taken into account, some French supply centers had access to domestic markets that were larger than the whole of Britain.

The Great Reform Act of 1832 was a watershed for democracy in Great Britain. We study the vote on 22 March 1831 in the House of Commons to test three competing theories of democratization: public opinion, political expedience, and threat of revolution. Peaceful agitation and mass-support for reform played an important role. Political expedience also motivated some members of Parliament to support the reform, especially if they were elected in constituencies located in counties that would gain seats. Violent unrest in urban but not in rural areas had some influence on the members of Parliament. Counterfactual scenarios suggest that the reform bill would not have obtained a majority in the House of Commons in the absence of these factors.