More than a century after its termination the slave trade in Africa remains a controversial topic. In particular, disputes continue to wax strong over the profitability of the Atlantic slave trade, on three major dimensions: first, the degree of competition characteristic of the market in slaves; second, the typical magnitude of the rate of profit achieved by enterprises engaged in the “peculiar” industry; third, the status of Eric Williams's hypothesis on the contribution of the slave trade to European industrialization.

Investors in new stock issues in Germany in the 1880s experienced low spreads between the price they paid for stock and the price at which they could sell the stock in the market. Stock issuing companies paid substantial fees to underwriting banks, and these costs increased with the underwriter's market share. Bank's faced lower issuing costs than did nonfinancial firms. These patterns are consistent with a situation in which underwriters exploited their access to better information (agency problems) and had market power, but do not support the supposed lemons problems that motivated the imposition of stringent regulations in 1896.

With use of innovative proxies and new annual data, I demonstrate that relatively high legal capacity and regulatory activity of the early-modern Polish parliament, the Seym, was positively associated with deeper domestic commodity market integration. Conversely, the lack of effective law-making, caused by the right of a single delegate to discontinue the Seym’s sessions, fostered market fragmentation. This indicates that early parliamentary regimes required legal capacity to harmonize domestic institutions and reduce the transaction costs. The Polish case suggests a hypothesis that the pre-1800 “Little Divergence” between European parliamentary regimes could be explained by differences in their governments’ capacities.

We explore the dynamics of the agricultural ladder for black farmers in the U.S. South using individual-level data from a retrospective survey conducted in 1938 in Jefferson County, Arkansas. We develop and test hypotheses to explain the time spent as a tenant, sharecropper, and wage laborer. The most striking result of our analysis is the importance of individual characteristics in career mobility. In all periods—pre–World War I; the war years, and subsequent boom; the 1920s; and the Great Depression years—some farmers moved up the agricultural ladder quite rapidly while others remained stuck on a rung.

Movement from rung to rung has been predominantly in the direction of descent rather than ascent. … [There is] an increasing tendency for the rungs of the ladder to become bars—forcing imprisonment in a fixed social status from which it is increasingly difficult to escape.National Resources CommitteeNational Resources Committee, “Report.”

One should distinguish from the start between the economic interpretation of imperialism and economic imperialism. The one is an explanation, an essentially monistic explanation, of an historical phenomenon. The latter is an aspect of the phenomenon itself: if imperialism is the dominion of one group over another, economic imperialism is the establishment or exploitation of such dominion for continuing material advantage. The definition assumes that economic imperialism is more than simple, once-for-all pillage; rather that it tries to cultivate relationships that yield a recurrent harvest of profit, as the ground its corn. Moreover, it makes no distinction between dominion established for economic motives and dominion that, for whatever reasons established, is maintained and exploited primarily for material ends. Finally, it does not confine imperialism to cases of formal rule or protectorate, but includes that “informal” dominion that is often far more effective and lucrative than direct administration.

In this article we use a unique source—a 30-year time series of the share transactions of two joint-stock companies—to examine the growth of the London capital market prior to and immediately after the Glorious Revolution. We argue that the London experience with open capital markets was not solely the result of 1689. Rather it was the learning by private individuals and goldsmith bankers which took place in the decades before 1689 that allowed the market to take full advantage of the property rights changes which occurred with the change in regimes.

Applications of the staple approach by the late Harold Innis d by others influenced by Innis have produced many studies which, taken together, provide a remarkably coherent, plausible, and apparently consistent account of Canada's economic growth and history. In this paper I distinguish between the staple theory as a theory of economic development and as an economic interpretation of history and argue that the staple theory of Canada's economic development breaks down after 1820. In the conclusion I suggest an alternative, complementary approach to the study of the country's economic growth.

This paper uses a simple economic model of contract choice to explain the growth of sharecropping in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century France—a topic that figures in much of the social and economic history of the period. The theory turns out to fit both qualitative and quantitative evidence, and although the results are as yet only preliminary, the theory does provide a better account of the spread of sharecropping than the explanations upon which early modern historians have tended to rely.

We use plant-level data from the Census of Manufactures to study collusion in the United States macaroni industry during the Great Depression. The National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in 1933 to promote recovery through industry coordination of economic activity. While there is no change in the price-cost margin after the law is passed, a variety of markers of anti-competitive conduct suggest that collusion indeed increased. Prices became less responsive to changes in cost, the dispersion of prices decreased, and the persistence in prices increased.

The businesses of developed Europe—transporting freight by a more advantageous mix of ships, trains, and horses—encountered logistic barriers to trade lower than those in the sparsely populated United States. Economically integrated, compact northwest Europe was a multinational market space larger than the United States, and, arguably, as open to interstate commerce as the contemporary American domestic market. By the early twentieth century, the First European Integration had enabled its manufacturers to build more than half the world's giant plants—many more than in the United States—as variously required by factor endowments, consumer demand, and scale economies.

Has the golden age of U.S. agricultural productivity growth ended? We analyze the detailed patterns of productivity growth spanning a century of profound changes in American agriculture. We document a substantial slowing of U.S. farm productivity growth, following a late mid-century surge—20 years after the surge and slowdown in U.S. industrial productivity growth. We posit and empirically probe three related explanations for this farm productivity surge-slowdown: the time path of agricultural R&D-driven knowledge stocks; a big wave of technological progress associated with great clusters of inventions; and dynamic aspects of the structural transformation of agriculture, largely completed by 1980.

The demand for land in the United States was shaped by inherited attitudes and modern asset creation. Immigrants inherited the view that landowners had an enhanced chance of survival in a “starving time.” But the United States farmer also found that by clearing his unimproved acres he could create assets from otherwise idle time between seasonal peaks in the use of family labor. Public land sales in the South from 1820 to 1860 correlate well with variables that reflect expected money return and supply price. Substantial residuals for 1835–1837 chiefly trace to specific policy actions in Washington.

Wage gaps between farm and city are used to assess whether industrialization in late nineteenth-century France was choked off by peasants' alleged reluctance to move. If industry suffered due to labor scarcity, wage gaps should have been large and rising. It turns out that the wage gap, when adjusted for costs of living and computed as an average of 20 regional wage gaps, was nil in 1852 and about 25 percent in 1892. Thus wage gaps were rising but were far smaller throughout the late nineteenth century than they were in England during similar stages of industrialization.

In any economic system, whether medieval or modern, “money, banking, and credit,” are so closely connected and interwoven that they cannot be separated. Banking involves the extension of credit, and credit leads to the creation of additional purchasing power or, to use a different phrase, of money substitutes. The importance of credit and banking in medieval times should not be underrated, as is sometimes done by placing undue emphasis on later developments in England. Professor Usher is preparing a treatise on the early history of banking in Italy and Spain. This paper, which summarizes the results of a similar investigation into the origins of banking in Bruges, will therefore supplement Professor Usher's work, as far as the development of banking in the Low Countries is concerned.

Virtually all sectors of the nineteenth-century American economy were less capital-intensive than their British counterparts. This resulted from persistently higher American interest/profit rates, due in turn to American land abundance. The paper adduces the evidence in support of these propositions, and explores their interrelationships through the use of a linear model inspired by the writings of David Ricardo.

Prices rose in most years between 1933 and 1941 even though output was substantially below trend. This inflation cannot be explained as simply the effect of devaluation and changes in expectations. Rather, because prewar price changes depended significantly on the growth rate of real output, the extraordinarily rapid growth after 1933 was an important force leading to inflation. At the same time, the NIRA, by encouraging minimum wages and collusive pricing arrangements, caused a crucial diminution of the usual deviation-from-trend effect. The conjunction of these forces caused inflation at a time when the U.S. economy remained depressed.

Interest rates in the Civil War South were quite stable and even declined a bit during the war. In this article we explain the mechanism that produced this puzzling result. The existence of a fixed-rate call certificate redeemable at par anchored interest rates expressed in terms of Confederate dollars. When expressed in terms of gold, they were volatile, high, and reflected war events.

We show that the sale of state-owned firms in dictatorships can help political corporations to emerge and persist over time. Using new data, we characterize Pinochet’s privatizations in Chile and find that some firms were sold underpriced to politically connected buyers. These newly private firms benefited financially from the Pinochet regime. Once democracy arrived, they formed connections with the new government, financed political campaigns, and were more likely to appear in the Panama Papers. These findings reveal how dictatorships can influence young democracies using privatization reforms.