This paper deals with the relation between statistical analysis as applied in economic inquiry and history as written or interpreted by economic historians. Although both these branches of economic study derive from the same body of raw materials of inquiry—the recordable past and present of economic society—each has developed in comparative isolation from the other. Statistical economists have failed to utilize adequately the contributions that economic historians have made to our knowledge of the past; and historians have rarely employed either the analytical tools or the basic theoretical hypotheses of statistical research. It is the thesis of this essay that such failure to effect a close interrelation between historical approach and statistical analysis needs to be corrected in the light of the final goal of economic study.

An econometric model is here used to estimate the price and output effect of the Limitation of the Vend, a mineowners' cartel. It is found that when a formal regulation existed the price of coal rose significantly in the London market, whereas there was little output effect. The price effect was relatively small, however, especially when compared to the per unit tax on coal. Although the cartel was deemed to be successful, the existence of substantial monopoly profits was questioned.

Since agricultural history first acquired independent status it has been carried forward without much theoretical direction. So much research has been done in the field, however, that possibly a tentative general theory for further work may now be advanced. To be useful, an historical hypothesis should probably center on some common denominator of human experience. One possible common denominator is that all men are located within, or are a certain definite distance from metropolitan unit. All those who live within a certain given zone around the metropolis have at least one common experience: they are all some specific distance from the metropolis. Furthermore, for any given group of people this one common experience may have shaped many of their ideas and actions. Since human events take place in time and space, a theory based primarily on these dimensions might be at least roughly applicable to most history.

Italy's rapid industrial growth, which began in the mid-1890's, was preceded and accompanied by important developments in her financial institutions, including in particular the establishment of several industrial credit banks on the German model. The role of such banks in French and German industrial growth before 1914 has been the subject of considerable study. It is the purpose of this article to examine the effects of these banks on the rate and direction of Italian development between 1894 and 1914, and to consider the relation between their near-monopoly of industrial credit and the emergence of concentration of ownership and control in the new and rapidly growing sectors of the industrial structure.

The case for government involvement in the provision of elementary education in nineteenth-century England is assessed by presenting estimates of the rate of return to literacy. Before government involvement, the estimated rate of return to male literacy was considerably above the return on most alternative investments in the English economy. The differential narrowed with the onset of government involvement. The evidence is much weaker for any initial underinvestment in female literacy. The contribution to national income from correcting any initial underinvestment in literacy appears to have been modest.

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 imposed a binding minimum wage on the southern seamless hosiery and lumber industries. However, the process of adjusting to the new minimum differed across the two industries. Seamless hosiery firms substituted capital for labor and converted or replaced old machinery. Southern lumber firms employed fewer workers relative to northern and western firms, however, changes in their resource base and war-related government purchases prevented an absolute decrease in employment levels. Numerous southern lumber firms continued to pay less than minimum rates by illegally evading the act or taking advantage of the intra-stage exemption.

The discovery of vast oil fields in Texas after 1901 encouraged competition in an industry previously dominated by Standard Oil of New Jersey. The manner in which the state of Texas enforced its antitrust and corporation laws hastened the growth of several major new oil companies, most notably Gulf Oil and The Texas Company, by constraining the activities of Standard in the new fields. In so doing, these Texas laws shaped the transition from near monopoly to near oligopoly in the oil industry. Such beneficial results of state laws were, however, largely accidental, since weaknesses in the government's capacity to monitor changes in the burgeoning industry undermined its ability to define and implement systematic regulatory policies. Problems of adjustment that accompanied government's early efforts to regulate market structure in oil have continued to hamper subsequent efforts to regulate other aspects of the industry's operations.

Abundant land and strong property rights are conventionally viewed as key factors underpinning U.S. economic development success. This view relies on the “Pristine Myth” of an empty undeveloped land, but the abundant land of North America was already made productive and was the recognized territory of sovereign Indigenous Nations. We demonstrate that the development of strong property rights for European/American settlers was mirrored by the attenuation and increasing disregard of Indigenous property rights. We argue that the dearth of discussion of the dispossession of Indigenous nations results in a misunderstanding of some of the core themes of U.S. economic history.

The American Civil War fractured communities in border states where families who would eventually support the Union or the Confederacy lived together prior to the conflict. We study the subsequent migration choices of Civil War veterans and their families using a unique longitudinal dataset covering enlistees from the border state of Kentucky. Nearly half of surviving Kentucky veterans moved to a new county between 1860 and 1880. We find strong evidence of sorting along ideological dimensions for veterans from both sides of the conflict. However, we find limited evidence of a positive economic return to these relocation decisions.

By reason of the war, a report to the Social Science Research Council more extensive than any I have hitherto submitted seems appropriate. The war has affected us in several ways. Our “terms of reference” reflected the international situation, since they directed our attention to the economic history of countries embraced in the Western Hemisphere; it has steadily diminished the speed with which our research work has gone forward, until that work is now largely at a standstill; and it lately has begun to make us think and plan in terms of a more effective postwar period. Inasmuch as the Committee has definitely selected the areas of special research interest that will probably engage its full attention in the years immediately ahead and inasmuch as the period of its present appointment may extend hardly beyond the war period itself, there appears to be particular reason why I should lay before you the general scheme of its research plans, the specific projects that it has thus far sponsored within its chosen fields, and a series of outlines of what might be attempted in these general areas by research people released sooner or later from war services. In a sense, this report of mine is an effort at postwar planning.

Late nineteenth-century immigrants tended to concentrate in large cities despite the fact that they experienced less occupational mobility there than they did in small cities. This paper suggests that variation across cities in labor management systems and in the associated froms of discrimination may help to explain this apparent paradox. Analysis of data from Michigan's agricultural implements and iron-working industries in 1890 indicates that discrimination in hiring made it more difficult for immigrants to break into the small-city labor force. But in large cities, immigrant mobility was restricted by discriminatory barriers to entry into higher level jobs.

In following the paths of historical development … the analyst finds himself … engaged in the rather thankless task of trying to derive known from unknown or, at least, better-known from less well-known facts. Would it not be much more efficient to reverse this procedure? By establishing the base of his operations, that is, the principal store of primary factual information in the present or a very recent past, and then moving on backward with the help of theoretical weapons step by step toward the more and more distant past, the analytical historian could make most effective use of the limited amount of direct factual information to which he usually has access.

Mortality differentials for 122 cities in the United States in 1910 are examined with specific attention given to the influence of public works projects. Sewage systems are found to have significantly reduced mortality, while water filtration systems had no impact. This runs counter to the theories and beliefs of many public health officials and sanitary engineers of the era. Other factors, including the racial and immigrant composition of the population, urban density, number of physicians, and the standard of living, are also examined.

More than half the variance in length of school session in a cross section of 329 localities in Massachusetts in 1855 can be explained by the share of Irish in.the town's population, the family per dwelling ratio, and a proxy for the share of male merchants over 15 in the population, all of which enter regression equations with strong positive coefficients. This paper considers what these results may tell us about a number of hypotheses that link industrialization and educational revitalization in antebellum Massachusetts, discusses independent confirmation of these basic relationships, and concludes with a more general discussion of the implications of this Massachusetts evidence.

In Lancashire cotton spinning in the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism the labor market did not operate as an auction market. Evidence on piece-rate flexibility, length of tenure, and seniority is consistent with Okun's contract approach. Both workers and firms incurred initial set-up costs. Workers wanted to protect their initial investments in training, and firms, faced with a labor supply that varied in reliability and regularity, had a desire to cover initial hiring and tryout costs. The need to maintain long-term attachments had implications for wage and employment adjustment and the age structure of the labor force.

Lance E. Davis, writing in the March 1960 issue of The Journal of Economic History, found that comparatively low interest rates were paid by eight “Massachusetts-type” cotton textile mills on loans from 1840 to 1860. These firms were voracious borrowers throughout the period, and the textile industry as a whole was a major user of credit. Davis attributed the continued low interest rates primarily to well-enforced usury laws and to the influence of nonprofit lending agencies, with occasional references to effects of the New York money market (not important before 1853). Many other factors—for example, the Tariff of 1846, removing protection from important classes of cotton textiles, die general business cycle, technological changes, alternative investments in railroads and other industries, the relation of increased savings to increased investment demands—should all be explored for an adequate explanation. Of these factors, only the general business cycle is taken up by Davis in a brief reference. The purpose of this note is to suggest that interlocking directorates between financial and textile firms rather than usury laws were probably chiefly responsible for the low rates paid.

At thirty-seven John Luccock was looking forward with quiet assurance to a gentle transition into the comfortable middle age of a sedentary merchant. Napoleon and Jefferson spoiled his view, and before he was thirty-eight he had gone rolling down to Rio. There for ten years he imported and exported; watched a sleepy colonial outpost transform itself painfully into an imperial capital city; rambled, notebook in hand, around the almost trackless interior of Brazil, studying the remnants of an aboriginal culture and the way of life of those who had come to conquer. At forty-eight he returned home, leaving his health and middle age behind him. At fifty-six he died.

If replacing welfare with private charity has increased the self-reliance of the poor, the benefits would be observed in the charity organization movement of the late nineteenth century. Inebriation would subside, the heart would be cheered, earnings would rise, the “broken” would be “complete,” dependence would wither, and the classes would converge. If the benefits were large, they would have been large in Indianapolis—the beacon of charity in a Coasean landscape. The hypotheses are tested in hazard models using a sample from 25 years of household-level caseworker manuscripts. The evidence is not suggestive in the direction of hope.