In recent years a number of papers have appeared offering explanations of the long-noted, long-unresolved note issue paradox in both the free and national banking eras. Some have argued that previous profit calculations overstate the true cost of note issue because they fail to account for risks and costs that are not easily modeled. Others have argued that profit calculations are reasonably accurate and demonstrate that the bankers acted irrationally in failing to reap easily gathered profits. Yet another approach radically modified the basis of the calculation and found potential profits to be quite small. This note offers an explanation overlooked by most previous studies: that although note issue was profitable, a more profitable avenue existed. Because of legal and institutional restrictions, banks found it more profitable at the margin to create deposits rather than issue notes in extending credit.

The main purpose of this paper is to compare the rates of industrial A growth in various periods of Russian history from the middle of the eighties until the end of the interwar period and to describe briefly the specific factors that promoted or obstructed the process of industrialization of the country. While no definitive conclusions are reached, some of the similarities and differences between industrial developments before and after 1914 are pointed out in the last section of this paper. History in the conditional mood is an enticing pastime. However, I have successfully withstood the temptation to concentrate on estimates of the relative level of industrial output that Russia might have attained in the absence of a revolution.

This article estimates the contribution of farm household members to agricultural output in the antebellum northern United States. I reject the hypothesis that children contributed more in the least settled regions. The contribution of young children and teenage females was greatest in the Old Northwest; teenage boys made their largest contribution in the Northeast. In the Midwest young males and females performed the same tasks, namely market production and land clearing, but in the Northeast males were more likely to specialize in market production and females in household production.

We approach the issue of the economic effects of democracy by examining which expectations investors held about the effect of democratization in the Kingdom of Saxony in 1896 and 1909. We do this by linking their investment behavior on the Berlin Stock Exchange to political events in Saxony. Here the electoral law was changed twice: In 1896 a very restrictive franchise was introduced, which was abolished in 1909 and replaced by a more democratic electoral law. Our study reveals that the Berlin Stock Exchange reacted to political changes and elections in Saxony. This is an important finding since historical research has claimed that the increased democratization in the German Kaiserreich measured in a larger participation of the population was not accompanied by a larger political influence of the parliaments. Furthermore we can show that for capital owners the possible negative effects seemed to outweigh possible positive effects of democratization. This is the first time that it has been possible to provide quantitative evidence for such antidemocratic sentiments.

This article analyzes asset pricing behavior during the period leading up to the Crisis of 1873. Evidence is presented that equities, options, and bonds priced risks consistently, suggesting that investors were actively monitoring the risk of investing and were not caught up in an irrational, speculative mania. Implied probability density functions for stock returns suggest that option markets exhibited growing concern about substantial price declines prior to the crash. Concerns were concentrated on riskier, more leveraged firms. Deteriorating balance sheet fundamentals for the riskiest U.S. railroads set the stage for a market disruption in 1873 as information asymmetries worsened.

Labor productivity in German manufacturing lagged persistently behind the United States in the early twentieth century. Traditionally, this is attributed to dichotomous technology paths across the Atlantic. However, various industry case studies suggest rapid diffusion of U.S. technologies in Germany. We develop a novel decomposition framework based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to reconcile these findings. We conclude that by 1936 inefficient assimilation of modern production techniques—and not the use of different techniques—accounted for most of the U.S./German labor-productivity gap. Our findings call for a reappraisal of the drivers behind cross-country differences in manufacturing performance.

The invention of the airplane by Wilbur and Orville Wright in 1903 marked the beginning of an industry which has grown to be the largest single manufacturing employer in the United States. Once the airplane was invented, there was wide-spread expectation that producing aircraft would be a very profitable business.

This article examines the economic costs to the British nation of the Seven Years War. Drawing upon manuscript records and secondary studies, the author analyzes in detail the diversion of resources to the Navy and the effect of increased debts on the economy. Finding that the burden was great but the impact apparently slight, the author suggests that the English may have drawn substantially upon extra-national sources of capital, labor and materials.

This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found a possible resolution to what he calls the Anglo-German industrial productivity puzzle, which arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced in an earlier paper by the same author. Projection back from a widely accepted 1935/36 benchmark using the Ritschl index showed German industrial labor productivity in 1907 substantially higher than in Britain. This presented a puzzle for at least two reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre—World War I period, such as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher German labor productivity at this time. Second, a direct benchmark estimate produced by Stephen Broadberry and Carsten Burhop, using production census information for Britain and industrial survey material of similar quality for Germany, suggested broadly equal labor productivity in 1907. Broadberry and Burhop also showed that if Walther Hoffmann's industrial output index was used instead of the Ritschl index for Germany, the puzzle largely disappeared.

France has been well characterized by Raymond Aron, following de Tocqueville, as Immuable et changeante. Nowhere does variability (across space) combine more strongly with stability (in time) than in the economy of rural France in the nineteenth century. Judging again by titles, we must give higher marks to the author of The Eternal Order of the Fields than to the man who argued that Capitalism and Agriculture were growing ever closer, to the advantage of the former.

When examining the various aspects of Soviet society, and looking back at its antecedents in pre-revolutionary Russia, a certain continuity in institutions and economic policies emerges. This is in particular true in the area of banking and credit. The Soviet banking system, as it evolved after the October revolution, and, more specifically, after the credit reforms of 1930–1932, is unique in many respects. Surely, there are examples in non-socialist countries of banking institutions which combine central banking and commercial banking. In many cases, central banks of the less developed countries have assumed a leading role in implementing development programs and in creating the required financial institutions, instruments, and markets. In some leading industrial countries, such as France and Italy, as well as in a number of the newer countries, large commercial banks are owned by the government. The uniqueness of the Soviet banking system lies in the complete integration of monetary processes within the system of central planning, the credit monopoly of the State Bank of the Soviet Union (Gosbank) and its broad control powers over the performance of the entire state-owned segment of the economy.

Germany introduced compulsory industrial accident insurance in 1884. The accident-insurance system compensated injured workers and survivors for losses, but initially failed to limit the growth of accident rates. We trace this failure to the 1884 law's faulty incentives and to an initial unwillingness to use the tools built into the law. The government regulator increasingly stressed rules that forced firms to adopt specific safety-enhancing innovations and practices. Econometric analysis shows that more consistent use of the rules and the limited incentives available under the law would have reduced industrial accidents earlier and more extensively.

Economic historians have traced the origin of the uniform property tax in the United States to the insertion of uniformity clauses into state constitutions in the Northwest and to efforts to tax commercial wealth. This article shows that the tax was created by legislation in the Northeast and that the first constitutional clauses were adopted in the South to protect slaveholders. It is time for historians of the U.S. political economy to abandon the dated paradigms of the “progressive history” tradition.

Turnpike trusts were private organizations that financed road improvements by levying tolls and issuing mortgage debt. They were established by Acts of Parliament throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. The acts transferred authority from parishes to a body of trustees, composed of local landowners and merchants. Parishes financed road improvements with local property taxes; but they could not levy tolls. This article uses a new data set to show that turnpike trusts increased road expenditure, rather than replacing existing or forthcoming parish expenditure. It also illustrates how institutional changes contributed to the process of economic development in England.

Scholars have long debated whether ownership matters for firm performance. The standard view regarding Victorian Britain is that family-controlled companies had a detrimental effect on performance. In this article, we examine this view using a hand-collected corporate ownership dataset. Our main finding is that it was not necessarily the broad structure of corporate ownership that mattered for performance, but whether family blockholders had a governance role. Large active blockholders tended to increase operating performance, implying that they reduced managerial expropriation. Contrastingly, we find that directors who were independent of large owners were more likely to increase shareholder value.

This article examines the forces that appear to have driven long-term trends in American urban inequality. The changing structure of consumer goods' prices is shown to have played a significant—but not dominant—role in every phase of increasing and decreasing nominal inequality from 1820 to 1929. The revealed symmetry in movement between the urban price and income structure suggests that a successful macro-distribution model must explain both historical phenomena. Finally, the article concludes that technological imbalance was a crucial element in shaping peacetime patterns of income distribution.

Distinct diffusion curves are identified by model type and significant differences in regional motor car ownership in the interwar U.K. economy. We assess the viability of applying mass production strategies such as Ford and General Motors pursued in America. Given the demand-side constraints present in the U.K. market, the price reductions made possible by the exploitation of economies of scale were insufficient to create a mass market. Hence, the relatively low levels of ownership achieved can be seen as a rational response to the constraints perceived by firms.