It is commonly thought that income distribution among people became more concentrated after the Civil War and that this direction continued until the turn of the century. We can look methodically at the income tax distributions from the Civil War period and compare them directly with the distributions arising from the income tax after 1912. We also have some data from the abortive income tax of 1894. After examining the various blocks of evidence, the conclusion will be made that inequality among upper-income groups did not increase during this period. It is necessary to emphasize that the present investigation is one of income and not of wealth. It might have been possible for the nonhuman wealth distribution among people to remain constant or to increase in inequality while the personal income distribution was decreasing in inequality.

Organized markets in public lands enabled large slaveholders to establish a foothold on the frontier, often in advance of their actual settlement. Their “pre-emptive” purchases of prime cotton lands fostered the regional differentiation of territory by displacing yeoman households to more marginal soils. An analysis of the land market in western Georgia in the 1820s demonstrates the regional patterning of the new territory at the very onset of settlement. The state's land policy, a lottery system, ordained this outcome, as it instituted markets in public lands to which wealthy slaveholders had greater access.

This multiple regression study of male and female wages in the clothing and textile industries finds that the standardized pay gap has changed against women from 1910 to 1970. The cross-section study of wages in 1909-1910 finds a very small residual in favor of men; but when the English-speaking variable is interpreted as screening many able women (but not men) from manufacturing, the residual shifts to one slightly favoring women. The cross-section study of pay in substantially the same industry group during 1969 finds very substantial residuals in favor of men after standardizing earnings. Hypotheses suggested for explaining these contrary findings include a decline in women's investment in human capital relative to that of men, and changing government and union tax and benefit patterns that discriminate against female investment in human capital.

Were intracity motor buses economically inferior to electric streetcars and electric buses in the late 1930s and l940s? The contention that they were has recently served as the basis for allegations that the decline of urban public transit was attributable, in large part, to an organized campaign intent on eliminating viable public transit. Aggregate data from trade sources allows a comparative cost and profit analysis of motor buses, electric buses, and electric streetcars for the years 1935–1950. The analysis supports the contention that motor buses were inferior. Questions regarding the applicability of criticisms of market foreclosure theory are also considered.

Integration in the American foreign-exchange market under the nineteenthcentury specie standard is examined using a newly developed series of the dollar- sterling exchange rate and estimates of specie-point spreads. A distinction is made between internal and external integration. The latter is much more important over the entire 1791 to 1900 time span, but by 1881–1900 the market is tightly integrated in both senses. The long-term trend of improved integration is interrupted only by wartime.

Tradition depicts American business as the chiefexploiter of our national free immigration policy during the latter defender andhalf of the nineteenth century. The contribution of immigrant labor to the building of the American industrial empire is much discussed. The interest of employers in recruiting cheap labor and strikebreakers from Europe is a familiar story. That industrialists and their allies in the years of rapid expansion and mechanization of the American economy stood to gain as much as any other group, even including the aliens themselves, from the maintenance of large-scale immigration has appeared so obvious as to demand little careful investigation. Historians have ordinarily described the succession of laws after 1882, gradually narrowing the “open door” the United States offered to Europe and pulling in the welcome mat as well, as a series of labor and nativist victories in the face of dogged resistance by the business world. Yet such an interpretation fails to explain the fact that the period which saw the growth of strong anti-immigrant feeling among native workers witnessed a strikingly similar development in the ranks of businessmen. During the 1880's and 1890's, while labor leaders protested the competition of alien workers, business publications were criticizing no less bitterly the impact of immigration upon American society. When nativists sought financial support for their efforts to restrict immigration they found many businessmen in sympathy with their aims. Measures presented to Congress for regulating and limiting the admission of aliens were frequently concurred in by prominent business leaders. Indeed, a notable development in American business thought after 1880 was the rise of hostility toward the swarms of cheap foreign laborers which employers had long considered essential to their own, and the nation's, prosperity.

The Panama Canal was one of the largest public investments of its time. In the first decade of its operation, the canal produced significant social returns for the United States. Most of these returns were due to the transportation of petroleum from California to the East Coast. The United States also succeeded in leveraging the threat of military force to obtain a much better deal from the Panamanian government than it could have negotiated otherwise.

Analysis of British capital market operations before 1914 has focused on institutional and investor behavior without fully considering entrepreneurial conduct. Consequently, those who argue that industrial performance was impaired because capital flows were obstructed by information blockages have overlooked the role company owners could play in shaping communication lines. The fund-raising techniques used by shipowners reveal that private capital attracted through preferential communication channels supported the rise of large-scale enterprise. Founders were not motivated by supply constraints, nor did they forego profits to retain control. Rather, shipowners created asymmetric information flows to attract resources and shape institutional development.

This article presents somewhat-more-direct evidence than has been available on the supply price of labor during the Depression. The new data comprise wages asked from situations-wanted ads for female clerical workers. Between 1929 and 1933 annual average clerical wages asked fell nominally by nearly 58 percent, markedly lower than wages of new or existing employees. Neither changes in labor quality nor self-selection explains the decline. Clerical wages asked fell by roughly the same percentage as did wages paid in agriculture. The data are strongly inconsistent with the market-clearing view of Depression-era labor markets.

We study a period of Javanese history when the consumption of opium was legal, but the supply of it was undergoing substantial institutional transformation. Through most of the nineteenth century the opium trade was organized into a system of “revenue farms,” which were privately owned local monopolies that bought raw opium from the government, refined it, and sold it to consumers. After 1893 this system was replaced by a government monopoly, the so-called opium regie, which controlled importation, refining, and retailing. Our main conclusion is that this change in policy substantially reduced opium consumption.

How did the Prussian three-class franchise, which politically over-represented the economic elite, affect policies? Contrary to the predominant and simplistic view that the system allowed the landed elites to capture most political rents, we find that members of parliament from constituencies with a higher vote inequality support more liberal policies, gauging their political orientation from the universe of roll call votes cast in parliament during Prussia’s rapid industrialization (1867–1903). Consistent with the characteristics of German liberalism that aligned with economic interests of business, the link between vote inequality and liberal voting is stronger in regions with large-scale industry.

The role of cultural distance in market integration, particularly in the developing world, has received relatively little attention. Using prices from more than 200 South Asian markets spanning 1861 to 1921, we show that linguistic distance correlates negatively with market integration. A one-standard-deviation increase in linguistic distance predicts a reduction in the price correlation between two markets of 0.121 standard deviations for wheat, 0.181 for salt, and 0.088 for rice. While factors like genetic distance, literacy gaps, and railway connections are correlated with linguistic distance, they do not fully explain the correlation between linguistic distance and market integration.

The institutions that governed most of the rural population in British colonial Africa have been neglected in the literature on colonialism. We use new data on local governments, or “Native Authorities,” to present the first quantitative comparison of African institutions under indirect rule in four colonies in 1948: Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Nyasaland, and Kenya. Tax data show that Native Authorities’ capacity varied within and between colonies, due to both underlying economic inequalities and African elites’ relations with the colonial government. Our findings suggest that Africans had a bigger hand in shaping British colonial institutions than often acknowledged.

Automobile manufacture is generally regarded as the paradigmatic mass production industry, with large plants able to exploit scale economies. We argue that the radio industry also sheds important light on evolving production technology and determinants of competitive success in inter-war manufacturing. Timothy F. Bresnahan and Daniel M.G. Raff (1991) showed that productivity differences resulting from scale in the auto industry translated into differences in exit rates during the Depression. We find that technical scale economies did not play a large role in the radio industry. Instead selection during the Depression was on non-“technical” productivity factors, including whether or not a plant's parent company owned a brand.

State intervention as an obstacle to economic growth and development is a proposition that is especially intriguing in connection with the Habsburg monarchy of the eighteenth century. The posing of the question forces the historian to consider whether it can be applied to the problem of a static society ruled by a dynasty and controlled by a large agglomeration of urban-corporate and rural-manorial structures. What is a state in this context and what are obstacles to economic progress?

From the end of the Civil War down to 1900, the American agricultural sector was subject to continuous political and social upheaval. While the South and Far West were a part of this movement, the heartland of protest remained in the Midwest. The traditional view has been that this unrest and protest was at least partially based on the worsening economic position of the farmer. Farmers complained of being exploited by moneylenders, victimized by railroads and other middlemen, cheated by speculators and faced with prices received falling faster than prices paid, thus reducing real purchasing power. This last view is put forth by Faulkner: “While the prices of farm commodities declined, those of manufactured products, dominated by monopoly practices, remained high or did not decline proportionally.”

The quantitative international comparison of financial structure and development involves three levels of problems: first, what is the purpose of such comparisons; second, given these objectives, what are the concrete features of the financial system to be compared; and, third, how are these comparisons to be carried out, that is, what data can be used and how should they be processed and arranged?

Climatic and dietary changes may have reduced the incidence of mold poisoning in England and France, 1750–1850, thereby stimulating fertility and reducing mortality. Because mold poisons developed in cereals, the staff of life was often the scepter of death. When people ate less rye and more wheat or less wheat and more potatoes, even without increasing their caloric intake or improving their nutrient balance, their chances of survival improved.

It is unnecessary to insist on the differences between the communism of Plato's political writings and the modern political systems and theories of the same name. Politically, economically, and geographically the world of Marx and his followers is different from that of Greece in the fourth century b.c., and even modern Utopias are founded on modern technology.

The Glass-Steagall Act may have increased the cost for corporations of raising external funds for investment spending. Significant differences are found in the way financial institutions influenced corporate investment spending. Investment regressions for a sample of companies affiliated to financial institutions are estimated and compared to those for a control sample. Prior to Glass-Steagall, affiliated companies do not display any sensitivity between investment spending and internal measures of liquidity, whereas the control sample does.