Many states nationalized portions of their railroad network between 1860 and 1912. This article uses new cross-country data to examine which factors contributed to nationalizations and how nationalizations influenced network expansion. I find evidence that nationalizations were greater in countries with low constraints on the executive branch, with French and German civil law systems, and where neighboring countries had higher military capability. I also find evidence that nationalizations reduced mileage growth. The results suggest that external military threats increased the appeal of nationalizations, while legal and political institutions influenced their costs. They also suggest that nationalizations reduced investment incentives.

By combining new archival and existing data, this article provides estimates of the economic impact of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, the largest natural catastrophe ever recorded in Europe. The direct cost of the earthquake is estimated to be between 32 and 48 percent of the Portuguese GDP. In spite of strict controls, prices and wages remained volatile in the years after the tragedy. The recovery from the earthquake also led to a rise in the wage premium of construction workers. More significantly, the earthquake became an opportunity to reform the economy and to reduce the economic semi-dependency vis-à-vis Britain.

Farms stood at an ecological frontier in the 1930s. With new and better agricultural machinery, more farms than ever before made the leap to thousand acre enterprises. But did they abandon mixed husbandry in the process? This article explores the origins of the modern relationship between scale and diversity using a new sample of Kansas farms. In 25 townships across the state, between 1875 and 1940, the evidence demonstrates that relatively few plains farms were agents of early monoculture. Rather than a process driven by single-crop farming, settlement was shaped by farms that grew more diverse with each generation.

Age data frequently display excess frequencies at attractive numbers, such as multiples of five. We use this “age heaping” to measure cognitive ability in quantitative reasoning, or “numeracy.” We construct a database of age heaping estimates with exceptional geographic and temporal coverage, and demonstrate a robust correlation of literacy and numeracy, where both can be observed. Extending the temporal and geographic range of our knowledge of human capital, we show that Western Europe had already diverged from the east and reached high numeracy levels by 1600, long before the rise of mass schooling or the onset of industrialization.

Managerial firms and cartels were central components of the German economy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Based on stochastic frontier regressions, we show for a sample of coal mining corporations and the period 1881–1913 that cartelization did not affect productive efficiency. Bonuses paid to board members, however, did increase the efficiency of coal mining firms. Thus, one pillar of the German economic model did not negatively affect economic efficiency, whereas another pillar had a positive impact. Furthermore, our results suggest that coal was mined with slightly decreasing returns to scale.

Between 1850 and 2000 Spain's real output and labor productivity grew at average rates of 2.5 and 2.1 percent. The sources of this long-run growth are investigated here for the first time. Broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains appear as complementary in Spain's long-term growth. Factor accumulation dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while total factor productivity (TFP) led thereafter and, especially, during periods of growth acceleration. The main spurts in TFP and capital coincide with the impact of the railroads (1850s-1880), the electrification (the 1920s and 1950s), and to the adoption of new vintage technology during the Golden Age.

Why is it that some countries adopted growth enhancing institutions earlier than others during the early modern period? We address this question through a comparative study of the evolution of French and Ottoman fiscal institutions. During the sixteenth century, both countries made extensive use of tax farming to collect revenue, however, uncertain property rights caused by fiscal pressure led to different paths of institutional change in each state. In France, tax collectors successfully overcame the collective action costs of imposing constraint on the king. In the Ottoman Empire, tax collectors faced prohibitive transaction costs to organizing in a similar manner.

Historians disagree about whether geographic mobility on the frontier reflected economic hardship or opportunity because of the inability to observe the outcomes of non-persisters. This article uses a new sample of frontier families linked between the 1860, 1870, and 1880 U.S. censuses to study mobility and wealth accumulation. Using the incidence of Confederate guerilla warfare in frontier counties to generate exogenous migration, I find the effect of persistence on wealth accumulation is insignificant. Also, young, blue-collar, and landless families—those with the highest net benefits of migration—were the most likely to move. These findings reflect widespread economic opportunity on the frontier.

When did Germany become economically integrated? Based on a large new data set on trade flows within and across the borders of Germany, I explore the geography of trade costs across Central Europe, 1885–1933. The key finding is that the German Empire before 1914 was a poorly integrated economy. This internal fragmentation resulted from cultural heterogeneity, from administrative borders, and from natural geography that divided Germany into eastern and western parts. After World War I and again with the Great Depression, internal integration improved, while external integration worsened in part because of border changes along the lines of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity. By the end of the Weimar Republic in 1933, Germany was reasonably well integrated.

Modern currency originates in the inconvertible, legal tender paper money that Massachusetts devised in 1690. The circumstances that led to its creation are more complex than the typical story of wartime specie shortage. Due to temporary political constraints of that turbulent period, the currency could be neither backed by land nor imposed on anyone, as was then standard. Instead, it had to be disguised from England as a simple, private-seeming IOU. By pleasing both its pay-demanding troops and England, the government maximized its probability of survival subject to the constraints.

Using a new historical data set on the availability of schools, I analyze why there was so little primary education in British India, where as late as 1911 there were fewer than three primary schools for every ten villages. The findings show that greater caste and religious diversity contributed to both low and misguided private spending. Indeed more diverse districts had fewer privately managed primary schools and a smaller ratio of primary to secondary schools. Given primary schools were correlated with subsequent literacy, local factors that disrupted primary school provision had important consequences for India's limited achievement in basic education.

This article presents a new series of monthly equity returns for the British stock market for the period 1825-1870. In addition to calculating capital appreciation and dividend yields, the article also estimates the effect of survivorship bias on returns. Three notable findings emerge from this study. First, stock market returns in the 1825-1870 period are broadly similar for Britain and the United States, although the British market is less risky. Second, real returns in the 1825-1870 period are higher than in subsequent epochs of British history. Third, unlike the modern era, dividends are the most important component of returns.