We find direct evidence that institutions increase round-trip stock trades, increase average commissions per share, and pay unusually high commissions on some trades in order to send abnormally high commissions to the lead underwriters of profitable initial public offerings (IPOs). These excess commission payments are a particularly effective way for transient investors to receive lucrative IPO allocations. Our results suggest that the underwriter’s concern for their long-term client relationships limits the payment-for-IPO practice. We estimate that abnormal commission payments are large for the most profitable issues, and that an additional $1 excess commission payment to the lead underwriter results in $2.21 in investor profits from allocated shares.

Funding risk measures the extent to which a fund can borrow money by posting collateral. Using a novel measure of funding risk based on futures margins, we are able to empirically identify the mechanism by which changes in funding risk affect the likelihood of contagion. An increase in margins of the order of magnitude observed during the subprime crisis increases the probability of contagion among certain types of funds by up to 34%. Our analysis shows that some types of hedge funds are more vulnerable to contagion than others. Our results also suggest that policies that limit the magnitude of changes in margins over short periods of time may reduce the likelihood of contagion among hedge funds.

This paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.

We examine the association of a venture capital (VC) firm’s reputation with the post-initial public offering (IPO) long-run performance of its portfolio firms. We find that VC reputation, measured by the past market share of VC-backed IPOs, has significant positive associations with long-run firm performance measures. While more reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, more reputable VCs continue to be associated with superior long-run performance, even after controlling for VC selectivity. We find that more reputable VCs exhibit more active post-IPO involvement in the corporate governance of their portfolio firms, and this continued VC involvement positively influences post-IPO firm performance.

Using a large loan sample from 1990 to 2006, we examine why firms form new banking relationships. Small public firms that do not have existing relationships with large banks are more likely to form new banking relationships. On average, firms obtain higher loan amounts when they form new banking relationships, while small firms also experience an increase in sales growth, capital expenditure, leverage, analyst coverage, and public debt issuance subsequently. Our findings suggest that firms form new banking relationships to expand their access to credit and capital market services, and highlight an important cost of exclusive banking relationships.

We propose a model that links a firm’s decision to go public with its subsequent takeover strategy. A private bidder does not know a firm’s true valuation, which affects its gain from a potential takeover. Consequently, a private bidder pursues a suboptimal restructuring policy. An alternative route is to complete an initial public offering (IPO) first. An IPO reduces valuation uncertainty, leading to a more efficient acquisition strategy, therefore enhancing firm value. We calibrate the model using data on IPOs and mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The resulting comparative statics generate several novel qualitative and quantitative predictions, which complement the predictions of other theories linking IPOs and M&As. For example, the time it takes a newly public firm to attempt an acquisition of another firm is expected to increase in the degree of valuation uncertainty prior to the firm’s IPO and in the cost of going public, and it is expected to decrease in the valuation surprise realized at the time of the IPO. We find strong empirical support for the model’s predictions.

This paper derives closed-form solutions for values of debt and equity in a continuous-time structural model in which the demands of creditors to be repaid cause a firm to be put into bankruptcy. This allows discussion of the effect of creditor coordination in recovering money on the values of debt, equity, and the firm, as well as on optimal capital structure. The effects of features of bankruptcy codes that prevent coordination failures between creditors, such as automatic stays and preference law, are also considered. The model suggests that such features, while preventing coordination failures, can decrease welfare.

We consider a Lucas-type exchange economy with two heterogeneous stocks (trees) and a representative investor with constant relative risk aversion. The dividend process for one stock follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant and known parameters. The expected dividend growth rate for the other tree is stochastic and in general unobservable, although there may be a signal from which the investor can learn about its current value. We find that the equilibrium quantities in our model significantly depend on the information structure and on the level of risk aversion. While an observable stochastic drift mainly makes the economy more risky, a latent expected growth rate process with learning significantly changes the equilibrium price-dividend ratios, price reactions to dividend and drift innovations, expected returns, volatilities, correlations, and differences between the stocks. These effects are the more pronounced the more risk averse the representative investor.

We study individual portfolio choice in a laboratory experiment and find strong evidence for heuristic behavior. The subjects tend to focus on the marginal distribution of an asset, while largely ignoring its diversification benefits. They follow a conditional 1/n diversification heuristic as they exclude the assets with an “unattractive” marginal distribution and divide the available funds equally between the remaining “attractive” assets. This strategy is applied even if it leads to allocations that are dominated in terms of first-order stochastic dominance and is clearly irrational. In line with these findings, we find that framing and problem presentation have substantial influence on portfolio decisions.

This paper documents the existence of a slowly evolving trend in the log dividend-price ratio, DPt, determined by a demographic variable, MYt: the middle-aged to young ratio. Deviations of DPt from this long-run component explain transitory but persistent fluctuations in stock market returns. The relation between MYt and DPt is a prediction of an overlapping generation model. The joint significance of MY and DPt in long-horizon forecasting regressions for market returns explains the mixed evidence on the ability of DPt to predict stock returns and provide a model-based interpretation of statistical corrections for breaks in the mean of this financial ratio.

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986–2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations.