After Lehman’s collapse in 2008, investors ran from risky money market funds. In 27 funds, outflows overwhelmed cash inflows, thus forcing asset sales. These funds sold their safest and most liquid holdings. Funds were thus left with riskier and longer maturity assets. Over the subsequent quarter, however, the hard-hit funds reduced risk more than other funds. In contrast, money funds hit by idiosyncratic liquidity shocks before Lehman did not alter portfolio risk. The result suggests that moral hazard concerns with the Treasury Guarantee of investor claims did not increase risk taking. Funds that benefited most from the government bailout reduced risk.

We test the relevance of technical and fundamental variables in forming currency portfolios. Carry, momentum, and value reversal all contribute to portfolio performance, whereas the real exchange rate and the current account do not. The resulting optimal portfolio produces out-of-sample returns that are not explained by risk and are valuable to diversified investors holding stocks and bonds. Exposure to currencies increases the Sharpe ratio of diversified portfolios by 0.5 on average, while reducing crash risk. We argue that besides risk, currency returns reflect the scarcity of speculative capital.

We document the wide dispersion of private equity investment returns and examine performance determinants using a newly constructed database of 7,500 investments worldwide. One in 10 investments does not return any money, whereas 1 in 4 has an internal rate of return (IRR) above 50%. Quick flips are associated with the highest returns. Performance does not appear scalable: Investments held by private equity firms in periods with a high number of simultaneous investments underperform substantially. Results are consistent with the theoretical literature on organizational diseconomies linked to firm structure. Private equity firms’ actions do not appear to be mechanical or easily scalable.

This paper advances the proposition that share restrictions engender potential conflicts of interest between fund managers and investors. Fund flows predict future fund returns for share-restricted funds, especially among funds with low levels of governance and funds managing insiders’ wealth, providing managers incentive to trade in advance of their clients. Some direct evidence for such managerial action is presented, using proprietary data on managerial investment in their own funds. The evidence suggests that private information about a fund, not necessarily its holdings, may constitute material information, with implications for proper fund governance and disclosure policy concerning managerial actions.

We study managerial turnover for both internally managed mutual funds and those managed externally by subadvisors. We argue that turnover of subadvisors provides sharper tests and helps address several unresolved issues and puzzles from the previous literature. We find dramatically stronger inverse relations between subadvisor departures and lagged returns, and new evidence on how past flow predicts turnover. We find no evidence of improvements in return performance related to departures, but flow improvements are associated with departures of poor past performers. Our findings represent new evidence on how investors, sponsors, and boards learn about and evaluate mutual fund management performance.

Do happy people predict future risk and return differently from unhappy people, or do individuals rely only on economic facts? We survey investors on their subjective sentiment-creating factors, return and risk expectations, and investment plans. We find that noneconomic factors systematically affect return and risk expectations, where the return effect is more profound. Investment plans are also affected by noneconomic factors. Sports results and general feelings significantly affect predictions. Sufferers from seasonal affective disorder have lower return expectations in the autumn than in other seasons, supporting the winter blues hypothesis.

This study examines the informational content of options trading on acquirer announcement returns. We show that implied volatility spread predicts positively on the cumulative abnormal return (CAR), and implied volatility skew predicts negatively on the CAR. The predictability is much stronger around actual merger and acquisition (M&A) announcement days, as compared with pseudo-event days. The prediction is weaker if pre-M&A stock price has incorporated part of the information, but stronger if the acquirer’s options trading is more liquid. Finally, we find that a higher relative trading volume of options to stock predicts higher absolute CARs. The relation also exists among the target firms.

We utilize the decennial U.S. Census to study social effects in housing consumption across 4 million households from 126 ethnic groups and 2,071 geographic locations in the United States. We find that the homeownership decisions within ethnic groups are locally correlated, after controlling for the homeownership rates within the group and the region. Social influence is stronger for younger, less educated, and lower-income individuals; immigrants; and Americans with ancestors from more unequal, uncertainty-avoiding, and collectivistic cultures. Our results suggest that both status and information considerations play an important role in the social comparison process in capital markets.

We make use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to test an extended version of Brennan and Hughes’ (1991) information production theory of stock splits. We compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, assess the private information held by them, and relate the informativeness of their trading to brokerage commissions paid. We show that institutions make abnormal profits net of brokerage commissions by trading in splitting stocks. We also show that the information asymmetry faced by firms goes down after stock splits. Overall, our empirical results support the information production theory.

In this paper I investigate the role of activist hedge funds in the restructuring of a sample of 469 firms that attempted to resolve distress either out of court, in conventional Chapter 11, or via prepackaged restructuring. Activist hedge funds strategically gain a position of influence in the restructuring of economically viable firms with contracting problems that prevent efficient restructuring without outside intervention. I find that hedge fund involvement is associated with a higher probability of completing prepackaged restructurings, faster restructurings, and greater debt reduction. Overall, the evidence in this article suggests that activist hedge funds can create value by enabling more efficient contracting.

Using a large hand-collected database of chief executive officer (CEO) bonus structures, we find that when a CEO’s bonus is directly tied to earnings per share (EPS), his company is more likely to conduct a buyback. This effect is especially pronounced when a company’s EPS is right below the threshold for a bonus award. Share repurchasing increases the probability the CEO receives a bonus and the magnitude of that bonus, but only when bonus pay is EPS based. Bonus-driven repurchasing firms do not exhibit positive long-run abnormal returns.

This paper investigates the optimal sequencing of debt issues. Our theoretical model suggests that once firms issue debt with one level of seniority, they may have an incentive to alternate seniorities, because of violations of the priced absolute priority rule (APR). When we introduce explicit costs of class conflict, the model yields cases of alternating seniorities and other cases in which firms issue only one class of debt. The implications of the model are consistent with the observed regularities in a large database of debt issues. We test several other implications of our model as well.

We examine the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm value using a dynamic model with firm fixed effects. To estimate the model, we employ the long-difference technique, which is shown by our simulation to deliver the least biased estimates. Based on a large sample of U.S. companies, we document a significantly negative and causal effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value after taking into account omitted variables, reverse causality, and highly persistent endogenous variables. Additional analysis suggests that the causality running from managerial entrenchment to firm value is more pronounced than that for reverse causality.

This study examines whether religiosity at the county level is associated with future stock price crash risk. We find robust evidence that firms headquartered in counties with higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower levels of future stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the view that religion, as a set of social norms, helps to curb bad-news-hoarding activities by managers. Our evidence further shows that the negative relation between religiosity and future crash risk is stronger for riskier firms and for firms with weaker governance mechanisms measured by shareholder takeover rights and dedicated institutional ownership.

The enterprise multiple (EM) predicts the cross section of international returns. The return predictability of EM is similarly pronounced in developed and emerging markets and likewise strong among small and large firms. An international portfolio of low-EM firms outperforms a portfolio of high-EM firms by about 1% per month. The EM value premium is individually significant for the majority of countries, remains largely unexplained by existing asset pricing models, is robust after controlling for comovement with the respective U.S. premium, and is highly persistent for up to 5 years after portfolio formation, making it a promising strategy for investors.

We propose a model of volatility tail behavior in which investors display aversion to both low-volatility and high-volatility states, and hence, the derived pricing kernel exhibits an increasing and decreasing region in the volatility dimension. The model features investors who have heterogeneity in beliefs about volatility outcomes and maximize their utility by choosing volatility-contingent cash flows. Our empirical examination suggests that the model is better suited to reproduce data features in the left tail of the volatility distribution, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

A growing literature finds that firm asset growth rates are negatively correlated with subsequent stock returns. We show that the poor post-deal returns that have been documented for stock acquisitions are more precisely explained by the return effects associated with systematically larger asset growth rates for stock deals. We find a similar result for other cross-sectional and time-series acquisition effects, including poor returns for glamour deals, weakly monitored deals, and deals done during high-valuation periods. We suggest that the distinguishing characteristic associated with poor performing acquisitions is simply their tendency to grow assets.

Researchers in empirical corporate finance often use bounded ratios (e.g., debt ratios) as dependent variables in their regressions. Using the example of estimating the speed of adjustment toward target leverage, we show by Monte Carlo and resampling experiments that commonly applied estimators yield severely biased estimates, as they ignore that debt ratios are fractional (i.e., bounded between 0 and 1). We propose a new unbiased estimator for adjustment speed in the presence of fractional dependent variables that also controls for unobserved heterogeneity and unbalanced panel data. This new estimator is suitable for corporate finance applications beyond capital structure research.

We explore the determinants of equity price risk of nonfinancial corporations. Operating and asset characteristics are by far the most important determinants of risk. For the median firm, financial risk accounts for only 15% of observed stock price volatility. Furthermore, financial risk has declined over the last 3 decades, indicating that any upward trend in equity volatility was driven entirely by economic risk factors. This explains why financial distress (as opposed to economic distress) was surprisingly uncommon in the nonfinancial sector during the 2007–2009 crisis even as measures of equity volatility reached unprecedented highs.

Stock liquidity has improved over the recent 4 decades. This improvement was accompanied by a dramatic increase in trading activity. The net effect on the liquidity premium is ambiguous. We show that the characteristic liquidity premium of U.S. stocks has significantly declined over the past 4 decades. In recent years, characteristic liquidity is significantly priced only for the smallest common stocks. This decline stems from an improvement in liquidity and from a lower sensitivity of expected returns to liquidity. By contrast, systematic liquidity has not been trending down and is still significantly priced primarily among NASDAQ stocks.