We examine how local political corruption affects firm innovation in the United States. We find that firms located in highly corrupt areas are less innovative as measured by their patenting activities. The results are robust to the inclusion of a broad set of regional characteristics, instrumental variable analysis, matching analysis, difference-in-differences test, and alternative proxies for local corruption. Further analysis shows that reduced innovation incentives due to high extortion risk and decreased threat of competition could be the possible economic channels through which corruption affects innovation. Overall, our results indicate that local political corruption impedes corporate innovation in the United States.

We show that the dividend growth rate implied by the options market is informative about i) the expected dividend growth rate and ii) the expected dividend risk premium. We model the expected dividend risk premium and explore its implications for the predictability of dividend growth and stock market returns. Correcting for the expected dividend risk premium strengthens the evidence for the predictability of dividend growth and stock market returns both in and out of sample. Economically, a market-timing investor who accounts for the time-varying expected dividend risk premium realizes an additional utility gain of 2.02% per year.

This article studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and increases corporate investment. Using mergers between lenders participating in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier, I find that the firms affected by the mergers become more likely to renegotiate the loans and increase capital investment. The effect is stronger for firms with higher Q and firms in financial distress, supporting the hypothesis that the lender mergers mitigate the debt-overhang problem.

We study the dynamics of cash-and-carry arbitrage using the U.S. crude oil market. Sizable arbitrage-related inventory movements occur at the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) futures contract delivery point but not at other storage locations, where instead, operational factors explain most inventory changes. We add to the theory-of-storage literature by introducing two new features. First, due to arbitrageurs contracting ahead, inventories respond to not only contemporaneous but also lagged futures spreads. Second, storage-capacity limits can impede cash-and-carry arbitrage, leading to the persistence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities. Our findings suggest that arbitrage-induced inventory movements are, on average, price stabilizing.

Firms strategically borrow in different locations. Approximately one-quarter of Peruvian companies with operations in multiple areas source their financing from more than one province. Mining windfalls generate finance supply shocks, leading to the provision of more credit at lower average rates, and we show that firms exploit geographic financial flexibility by concentrating their borrowing in booming locations. Firms are less likely to initiate borrowing in new markets when their current borrowing provinces are thriving. The pursuit of flexibility in borrowing markets, however, degrades a firm’s relationships with its existing lenders, thereby heightening its risk of future financial distress.

We show that cross-border leveraged buyout investments involving U.S. rather than non-U.S. private equity (PE) investors are more likely to have a successful exit (initial public offering or acquisition). Exogenous increases in effective proximity following the signing of “open sky agreements” between the United States and target firms’ home countries increases both the propensity of U.S. PE firms to invest in these firms and the value addition by these investors. We show that such increases in value addition by U.S. PE investors following proximity increases are at least partially due to better monitoring, facilitated by the more efficient allocation of experienced U.S. PE managers to cross-border deals.

Investors may underdiversify their portfolios by overweighting securities in which they perceive an informational advantage or by underweighting securities to hedge risks outside the portfolio. We investigate underdiversification in institutional portfolio construction by examining the under/overweighting of industries in U.S. property–liability (PL) insurers’ equity portfolios. We find that PL insurers underweight both their own industry and highly correlated industries in their portfolios. This underweighting is larger for PL insurers exposed to higher underwriting risk. Although PL insurers have an informational advantage in investing in their peers, their underwriting risk drives them to underweight stocks in their industry.

We provide evidence on market structure and the cost of raising capital by examining changes in market structure in U.S. equity markets. Only the Order Handling Rules (OHR) of the Nasdaq, the one reform that reduced institutional trading costs, lowered the cost of raising capital. Using a difference-in-differences framework relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that exploits the OHR’s staggered implementation, we find that the OHR reduced the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings by 1–2 percentage points compared with a pre-OHR average of 3.6%. The effect is the largest in stocks with the largest reduction in institutional trading costs after the OHR.

This paper investigates hedge funds’ ability to time industry-specific returns and shows that funds’ timing ability in the manufacturing industry improves their future performance, probability of survival, and ability to attract more capital. The results indicate that the best industry-timing hedge funds in the manufacturing sector have the highest return exposure to earnings surprises. This, together with persistently sticky earnings surprises, transparent information environment in regards to earnings releases, and large post-earnings-announcement drift in the manufacturing industry, explain to a great extent why best-timing hedge funds can generate significantly larger future returns compared to worst-timing hedge funds.

After fitting a topic model to 40,927 COVID-19–related paragraphs in 3,581 earnings calls over the period Jan. 22–Apr. 30, 2020, we obtain firm-level measures of exposure and response related to COVID-19 for 2,894 U.S. firms. We show that despite the large negative impact of COVID-19 on their operations, firms with a strong corporate culture outperform their peers without a strong culture. Moreover, these firms are more likely to support their community, embrace digital transformation, and develop new products than those peers. We conclude that corporate culture is an intangible asset designed to meet unforeseen contingencies as they arise.

We use hand-collected data from acquisition press releases to investigate how acquisition experience affects the career outcomes of non-CEO senior managers. To address the non-random nature of gaining experience, we separately use manager and firm-year fixed effects, as well as an instrumental variable analysis. Acquisition experience is positively related to compensation, the likelihood of a future board seat, and the likelihood of promotion to chief executive officer. Further tests suggest that the effects of experience decay over time, have diminishing returns, and do not depend on deal quality. Finally, we search Securities and Exchange Commission filings to document novel information on managerial roles in mergers and acquisitions.

This article investigates how the asset-return variance risk premium changes leverage. I find that the premium reduces leverage by increasing risk-neutral bankruptcy probability and costs in a model where asset returns have stochastic variance with the risk premium. Empirically, the model calibrations verify a significant reduction in optimal leverage, closer to observed leverage than the model without the premium. In model-free regressions, I document that leverage correlates negatively with the variance premium. The highest negative correlation is among investment-grade firms with low asset beta and historical variance but high variance premiums because their assets have high exposure to the market’s variance premium.

Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning from past toehold acquisitions.

By integrating staggered interstate banking deregulation into a gravity model following Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), (2016), we construct a time-varying, bank-specific instrument for geographic diversification and investigate its causal effect on corporate innovation via the lending channel. We find that bank geographic diversification spurs corporate innovation and enhances the economic value of innovation. We identify relaxing debt covenants and alleviating borrowers’ financial constraints as the two underlying mechanisms explaining the documented effects. Moreover, by offering lenient covenants, geographically diversified banks provide greater financial and operational flexibility to borrowing firms, enabling them to engage in future mergers and acquisitions.

This article investigates the role external advice plays in the board’s determination of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We show that CEO incentive pay increases with the degree of compensation consultant independence using a quasi-natural experiment provided by the creation of an independent consultant after separation from an affiliated consultant. Specifically, switching to an independent consultant significantly increases the pay–performance sensitivity and relative performance evaluation of CEO contracts. Despite the benefits of independent advice, independent consultants may not be hired due to the influence of powerful CEOs or because boards already possess adequate expertise.

We exploit exogenous legislative changes that alter the priority structure of different classes of debt to study how debtholder monitoring incentives affect bank earnings opacity. We present novel evidence that exposing nondepositors to greater losses in bankruptcy reduces earnings opacity, especially for banks with larger shares of nondeposit funding, listed banks, and independent banks. The reduction in earnings opacity is driven by a lower propensity to overstate earnings and is more pronounced among larger banks and in banks with more real estate loan exposure. Our findings highlight the importance of creditors’ monitoring incentives in improving the quality of information disclosure.

Banks open more branches and make more lending near their CEOs’ childhood hometowns. The effects are stronger among informationally opaque borrowers and among CEOs who spend more time in their childhood hometowns. Furthermore, loans originated near CEOs’ hometowns contain more soft information and have lower ex post default rates, implying that hometown loans are more informed. Hometown lending does not affect aggregate bank outcomes, suggesting that credit is being reallocated from regions located farther away to regions proximate to bank CEOs’ hometowns.

We use a text-based measure of popular sentiment toward finance to study how finance sentiment responds to rare historical disasters and to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Finance sentiment declines after epidemics and earthquakes but rises following severe droughts, floods, and landslides. These heterogeneous effects suggest finance sentiment responds differently to the realization of insured versus uninsured risks. Finance sentiment declines at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, but recovers in countries that experienced high stock markets returns and that responded with large fiscal spending. Finance sentiment seems to depend on the insurance provided by private markets and by public finance.

We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.

Publicly listed firms respond to capital supply conditions shaped by local investing preferences. Public firms headquartered in areas with higher proportions of senior citizens and women use more debt financing. These demographics are associated with conservative investing, leading to a higher and more stable local supply of debt capital. The demographics–leverage relation is more pronounced for firms that cannot easily tap public bond markets, which is the majority of public firms. Changes in firms’ financing activities around exogenous shocks to credit supplies, including interstate banking deregulation and the 2008–2009 financial crisis, support the local capital supply hypothesis.