This paper analyzes the characteristics and impact of loans made to executives for stock purchase, option exercise, and relocation. We find that loans made to assist executives in purchasing stock or exercising options are larger and have higher interest rates than relocation loans. All types of loans, however, are issued at below-market interest rates, on average. We also find that while stock purchase loans are given to managers with low existing ownership, option exercise loans are given to managers with high existing ownership and high cash compensation. Finally, our results indicate that executive stock ownership increases following stock purchase and option exercise loans. For managers as a whole, a loan that enables a manager to buy 100 shares of stock results in only an eight share increase in ownership. However, the relation between ownership changes and stock purchase loans is much stronger for low ownership managers.

The literature offers many explanations for why the IPO market cycles from hot to cold. These include theories in which hot markets represent clusters of IPOs in a new industry, and signaling models that predict that hot markets draw in better quality firms. Others suggest hot market IPOs' stock returns reflect their poor quality. We compare IPOs over cycles during 1975–2000 and find that hot and cold IPO markets do not differ so much in the characteristics of the firms that go public as in the quantity of firms that go public. Both hot and cold IPOs are largely concentrated in the same narrow set of industries and they have few distinctions in profits, age, or growth potential. Our results suggest that hot markets are not driven primarily by changes in adverse selection costs, managerial opportunism, or technological innovations, but more likely reflect greater investor optimism.

Data from the Taiwan Stock Exchange identify the originator of each submitted order, and there are no designated dealers or specialists. We study marketable order imbalances, i.e., the net order flow resulting from trades that demand immediacy. We distinguish imbalances by trader type (individuals, domestic institutions, foreign institutions) and by the usual size of each trader's order. Day-to-day persistence in order imbalance is strongest for small foreign institutions and weakest for large individual traders. Such persistence emanates both from splitting orders over time and from herding, and there is little evidence that aggregate price pressures from such persistence last beyond a trading day, indicating that de facto market making is quite effective. We attempt to discern which types of traders are de facto liquidity providers, which are likely to be informed, and which trade for liquidity reasons. The evidence indicates that all trader classes are successful market makers, large domestic institutions conduct the most informed trades, and large individuals are noise or liquidity traders.

This paper studies the link between population age structure, net outflows (dividends plus repurchases less net issues) from the stock market, and stock market returns in an overlapping generations framework. I find support for the traditional lifecycle models—the outflows from the stock market are positively correlated with the changes in the fraction of old people (65 and over) and negatively correlated with the changes in the fraction of middle-aged people (45 to 64). Changes in population age structure also add significant explanatory power to equity premium regressions. The population structure adds to the predictive power of regressions involving the investment/savings rate for the U.S. economy. Finally, international demographic changes have some power in explaining international capital flows.

This paper explores risk and return relations in six Asian equity markets affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. After the start of the crisis, national equity betas increased and average returns fell substantially. Beta increases due to leverage linked to exchange rates. The increase in expected return needed to accompany this rise in beta is made possible through the creation of capital losses that lower average returns. We propose a new probability-based asset pricing model that captures leverage effects using valuation ratios. Results show the role of leverage in explaining the likelihood of the financial crises. Crosssectional evidence supports time-series findings.

We document by several methods that trading in Nasdaq stocks is localized, but find little evidence that cloudy weather in the city in which a company is based affects its returns. The first evidence of localized trading is that the time zone of a company's headquarters affects intraday trading patterns in its stock. Second, firms in blizzard-struck cities see a dramatic trading volume drop compared to firms in other cities. Third, the Yom Kippur holiday dampens trading volume in companies located in cities with high Jewish populations. Despite the strong evidence of localized trading, cloudy conditions near the firm's headquarters do not provide profitable trading opportunities.

Standard predictive regressions produce biased coefficient estimates in small samples when the regressors are Gaussian first-order autoregressive with errors that are correlated with the error series of the dependent variable. See Stambaugh (1999) for the single regressor model. This paper proposes a direct and convenient method to obtain reduced-bias estimators for single and multiple regressor models by employing an augmented regression, adding a proxy for the errors in the autoregressive model. We derive bias expressions for both the ordinary least-squares and our reduced-bias estimated coefficients. For the standard errors of the estimated predictive coefficients, we develop a heuristic estimator that performs well in simulations, for both the single predictor model and an important specification of the multiple predictor model. The effectiveness of our method is demonstrated by simulations and empirical estimates of common predictive models in finance. Our empirical results show that some of the predictive variables that were significant under ordinary least squares become insignificant under our estimation procedure.

I argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering (IPO). I show that, when there is weak demand, it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand.

This paper examines intra-day trading data from the inter-dealer broker market for U.S. Treasury securities and measures the degree of price pressure in the off-the-run Treasury market. As is well known, securities that would appear to be very close substitutes, i.e., on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury bonds, behave as if there is some degree of market segmentation. This is the first systematic study of the off-the-run Treasury note and bond market focused entirely on a price pressure effect using intra-day data. The paper analyzes price pressure through matched pairs of securities that differ only in liquidity.

I analyze the impact of competition on the risk premia of R&D ventures engaged in a multiple-stage patent race with technical and market uncertainty. After solving in closed form for the case of a two-stage race in continuous time, I show that a firm's risk premium decreases as a consequence of technical progress and increases when a rival pulls ahead. Compared to the case where firms collude, R&D competition erodes the option value to mothball a project, reduces the completion time and the failure rate of R&D, and causes higher and more volatile risk premia. Numerical simulations reveal that competition can generate risk premia up to 500 annual basis points higher and up to three times more volatility than in a collusive industry.

This paper examines the price dynamics in the S&P 500 and Nasdaq-100 index futures contracts. By utilizing transactions data with attached trader type identification codes, we are able to analyze price dynamics for trades initiated by exchange locals and off-exchange customers. The empirical results show that price discovery appears to be initiated in the E-mini index futures contracts and that trades initiated by exchange locals seem to be more informative than those initiated by off-exchange traders. Furthermore, results show that exchange locals appear to make informed trades on the E-mini contracts around large trades that occur on the open outcry floor. We maintain that the exchange locals' ability to observe pit dynamics may contribute toward explaining the price leadership of the Emini contracts. Overall, the results are consistent with the notion that exchange locals are informed traders who derive their informational advantage from the proximity to order flow.

Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

We use a database of recent high tech IPOs to estimate opportunity cost of capital for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs face the risk-return tradeoff of the CAPM as the opportunity cost of holding a portfolio that necessarily is underdiversified. For early stage firms, we estimate the effects of underdiversification, industry, and financial maturity on opportunity cost. Assuming a one-year holding period, the entrepreneur's opportunity cost generally is two to four times as high as that of a well-diversified investor. With a 4.0% risk-free rate and 6.0% market risk premium, for the sample average, we estimate the cost of capital of a well-diversified investor to be 11.4%, which equates to 16.7% before the management fees and carried interest of a typical venture capital fund. For an entrepreneur with 25% of total wealth invested in the venture, our corresponding estimate of cost of capital is 40.0%.

Pricing in the euroyen market is based on LIBOR, the London Interbank Offered Rate, set at 11:00AM London time or TIBOR, the Tokyo Interbank Offered Rate, set at 11:00AM Tokyo time. The changing TIBOR-LIBOR spread reflects the credit risk associated with Japanese banks or the “Japan premium”. The spread is modeled as a function of determinants of bank default and firm value. Systematic variation in the spread can be explained by interest rate and stock price effects along with public information flows of good and bad news regarding Japanese banking, with a separate role for bank credit downgrades and upgrades.

Using a sample of emerging market closed-end funds, I find evidence that indirect investment barriers exert powerful effects on asset pricing differences across countries. I show that not only do indirect investment barriers contribute to international capital market segmentation, but also they can lead to segmentation even in the absence of strong capital inflow restrictions. This result is consistent with Bekaert and Harvey's (1995) conclusion that “other markets appear segmented even though foreigners have relatively free access to their capital markets” (p. 403). The empirical results of this paper provide a rational market segmentation explanation of both premiums and discounts in emerging market closed-end funds, and they are consistent with the deterrent effect of indirect barriers on equity flows to emerging markets found in the capital flow literature.

We study a financial market where risk-neutral traders are endowed with a signal that perfectly reveals the direction (but not the exact amount) of the liquidation value of a normally distributed risky asset. The impact of order flow on prices is nonlinear with a bullish/bearish information structure, which is broadly consistent with empirical evidence. Also, private information is revealed quicker than in a strategic oligopoly.

In this paper, we analyze the economic value of predicting stock index returns as well as volatility. On the basis of simple linear models, estimated recursively, we produce out-of-sample forecasts for the return on the S&P 500 index and its volatility. Using monthly data, we examine the economic value of a number of alternative trading strategies over the period 1970–2001. It appears easier to forecast returns at times when volatility is high. For a mean-variance investor, this predictability is economically profitable, even if short sales are not allowed and transaction costs are quite large. The economic value of trading strategies that employ market timing in returns and volatility exceeds that of strategies that only employ timing in returns. Most of the profitability of the dynamic strategies, however, is located in the first half of our sample period.

This paper analyzes the optimal quality decision of a producer in a multi-period setting with reputation effects. Using a unique database of returns on real estate limited partnerships (RELPs), we empirically examine alternative theoretical predictions of optimal producer strategy. In particular, we test whether the producers in our market invest in reputation building by initially selling high quality goods and then lowering quality. Using a variety of statistical tests, we find evidence consistent with reputation building, both in the aggregate and for individual developers.