Any firm choosing a chief executive officer (CEO) faces a double problem: candidate selection and choice of a compensation scheme. We derive sufficient conditions where the unique optimal compensation scheme is a capped-bonus contract in a pure moral-hazard environment, while equity is used when the firm also faces adverse selection. Then, we provide a rationale for the simultaneous increases in CEO pay, use of equity in compensation, and external hiring of CEOs. Our results are consistent with empirical evidence that shows externally hired CEOs earn more than those internally hired and that externally hired CEOs get a higher fraction of their compensation equity based.

The large deviation of the actual return of a leveraged exchange-traded fund (LETF) from the leveraged multiple of the underlying index return has drawn considerable attention from investors, regulators, and the financial media. Despite this attention, the sources and fundamental determinants of the LETF return deviation remain unidentified. This study constructs a clear, unified, objective, and executable framework that addresses the behaviors, sources, and determinants of the LETF compounding and noncompounding deviations. Our theoretical predictions and empirical results hold the promise of guiding investors, regulators, financial advisors, and portfolio managers toward a thorough understanding of the return behavior of LETFs.

We test the relationship between takeover protection and voluntary disclosure in a setting of antitakeover laws in a firm’s state of incorporation. After correcting for the endogeneity of firms’ incorporation choices, we find that firms incorporated in states with more antitakeover laws have higher levels of voluntary disclosure and stock market liquidity. Further tests do not support shareholder demands being the driving force for this association. Our findings are consistent with takeover protection and poor disclosure serving as substitute mechanisms for deterring takeovers. Therefore, as antitakeover statutes mitigate takeover threats, they enhance managers’ incentives to disclose more in order to realize capital market benefits.

We examine the impact of influenza on stock markets. For the United States, a higher incidence of flu is associated with decreased trading, decreased volatility, decreased returns, and higher bid-ask spreads. Consistent with the flu affecting institutional investors and market makers, the decrease in trading activity and volatility is primarily driven by the incidence of influenza in the greater New York City area. However, the effect of the flu on bid-ask spreads and returns is related to the incidence of flu nationally. International data confirm our findings of a decrease in trading activity and returns when flu incidence is high.

We investigate whether and how government interventions in the U.S. banking sector influence the stock market performance of corporate borrowers during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We measure firms’ exposures to government interventions with an intervention score that is based on combined information on the firms’ structure of bank relationships and their banks’ participation in government capital support programs. We find that government capital infusions in banks have a significantly positive impact on borrowing firms’ stock returns. The effect is more pronounced for riskier and bank-dependent firms and for those that borrow from banks that are less capitalized and smaller.