Most of the recent empirical tests of the Black-Scholes option-pricing formula have been joint tests of three types of hypotheses:

1) mathematical structure of the formula,

2) measurement of formula inputs and outputs, and

3) the efficiency of the listed option market.

There have been a large number of tests assessing the performance of U.S. mutual funds. Most of the performance measures have been either explicitly or implicitly based on only two moments of the distribution of returns: the mean and variance. For example, the performance measure suggested and employed by Sharpe [10] is the fund's ex-post reward (return) to variability ratio, while the capital asset pricing measures employed by Treynor [11], Jensen [4] and others relate the fund's returns to those expected, given its level of systematic risk [β]. The risk [β] and excess return [α] measures themselves are directly derived from an underlying mean-variance model of asset choice. When these performance measures are used to compare fund performance vis a vis the market (index), no consensus of opinion appears to have materialized, although most studies find that funds in general perform worse than the market. Indeed, as Carlson ([2, p. 22]) notes in the conclusion of an article reviewing a number of U.S. mutual fund studies, “The issue of whether mutual funds outperform ‘the market’ depends in large degree on the selection of both the time period and market proxy.”

The purpose of this article is to extend both theoretical and empirical knowledge on: 1) the relation between accounting-based and market-based measures of systematic risk; and 2) the effect of financial structure on systematic risk.

In the late 1930s, Macaulay [7] and Hicks [6] independently introduced the concept of duration as a measure of the length of a stream of cash flows and a measure of the elasticity of the present value of the stream with respect to a change in the rate of discount, respectively. Approximately 15 years later, Reddington [8] and Heynes and Kirton [5] used the concept to develop interest rate immunization rules for the portfolio management of insurance companies. More recently, Fisher and Weil [1] have developed duration based rules to help investors find investments that will insure them of having some fixed amount of money available at a specific future point in time. In [2], Grove uses duration to link the investor's decision to speculate or immunize with his subjective forecast of future interest rate movements. Finally, Haugen and Wichern [3, 4] show the relationship between duration and the characteristics of bonds and stocks. Also, in analyzing the effect of financial leverage on interest rate risk, they demonstrate how the financial manager can manipulate the capital structure of his firm, so as to render the present value of the common stock insensitive to changes in the rate of interest.

Professors Kau and Keenen (K & K) explore in this paper the microeconomic foundations of the demand and supply of housing. In order to investigate these foundations, K & K adopt the standard neoclassical framework: the demand for housing arises from solution of a multiperiod consumption problem; and, the supply of new housing is derived from a one–period profit maximization problem. Within this general framework, K & K argue that owner–occupied housing is distinguished from other consumption goods by its durability. As a consequence of this durability, the stock of housing held enters into each period's budget constraint. The utility, on the other hand, from housing enters only as a flow of services in each time period. Because of the stock/flow nature of housing, the comparative statics of the model become interesting. K & K investigate the comparative statics of the model with special attention focused on the impact of changes in the real rate of interest. K & K show, by use of fairly elegant duality theory, that if consumers of owner–occupied housing are net debtors, then an increase in the real rate of interest leads to a fall in the immediate demand for housing. This result is as it should be, since an increase in the real rate of interest reduces the wealth of net borrowers for any given level of future income and, consequently, demand for normal goods falls. K & K argue that a similar net debtor condition must hold to produce the same result in the rental market. I am sure this is a stronger condition than is necessary since an increase in the real rate of interest lowers the price of future consumption and to the extent that current consumptions of rental housing are a substitute for future consumption, it would be expected that current demand for rental housing would fall.

Based on the theory of the pricing of capital assets developed by Sharpe [12], Lintner [9] and Mossin [11], Professor Jensen formulated a return-generating model to measure portfolio performance [5]. In a subsequent paper, Professor Jensen [6] investigated the impact of the investment horizon on the functional form of the model. Lee [8] has proposed a generalized specification of the model to resolve this problem. Alternative estimation methods for testing the linearity of the model in terms of time-series data have also been suggested by Lee. Moreover, the stability of the beta coefficient over time and the impact of the market's condition on both the alpha (or, Jensen's measure of performance [5]) and beta of the model have come under scrutiny in financial research.

In a recent paper in this Journal Francis [3] has examined the intertemporal systematic cross dependence between the monthly returns of securities and those of a market index. Based on the monthly price behavior of a sample of 770 common stocks listed continuously on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1958 to 1967 he concludes that, relative to the general market movement, there is no consistent pattern of leads or lags for securities' monthly returns. In other words, the monthlyreturns of securities do not precede or follow the monthly returns on the market index.

Several people have attempted to evaluate the performance of mutual funds. Treynor [17] and Sharpe [15] have developed performance measures which make it possible to establish relative rankings for such funds. Treynor and Mazuy [18] have devised a statistical test for determining whether mutual funds successfully anticipate major fluctuations in the stock market. Jensen [7] has provided an absolute measure of performance which can be used to determine whether mutual funds earn higher or lower returns than those expected for the level of risk associated with their portfolios. McDonald [11] has employed the measures of performance developed by Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen to evaluate the objectives, risk, and return of mutual funds in the period 1960–1969. Although these studies have examined mutual fund performance, none has employed an analytical framework for dealing explicitly with the nonstationarity which is likely to exist in the risk-return relationships for such funds [13].

In placing a new security issue, an investment banker has an opportunity to obtain private information by conducting preselling activities during the registration period. The task of the issuer is to design a contract that both induces the banker to use this information to the issuer's advantage and provides a disincentive for the banker to price the issue too low in order to reduce the effort required to sell the issue. This paper characterizes the class of price response functions that the issuer can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrates that delegating the pricing decision to the banker can be optimal.

There are two well-known distinct aspects to the behavior of a risk-averse individual towards a risky proposition: the position he takes, long or short, with regard to the gamble, and the scale of the position taken–the amount by which he goes long or short. On one hand, the first aspect depends only on the individual's assessment of the expected return from the gamble relative to a safe return. The second aspect, on the other hand, will be influenced by the individual's degree of risk aversion and the level of risk of the gamble.

The market for underwriting services provides a valuable opportunity to test two competing hypotheses in monopsony theory. When applied to the area of investment banking, the theory implies that spread behavior ought to be influenced not only by the average costs of providing underwriting services, but also by the extent of vigorous competition. In competitive markets the prices of products and services tend to reflect minimum average costs in the long run. When competition declines, spreads can be expected to widen. A number of empirical studies have established that spread behavior is in fact dependent on the extent of bidding competition [5, 8, 9, 2]. “The intensity of competition in underwriting new issues of tax exempts has the expected effect on underwriters' spreads, that is, the difference between buying and selling prices; spreads decrease as the degree of competition increases” [2, p. 707].

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate mathematically that the skewness of securities' returns--the ratio of the third moment to the standard deviation cubed--is sensitive to the length of the differencing interval over which returns are measured. Empirical observations of this so-called intervaling effect on skewness have been reported in at least three articles in this Journal. There have been no attempts, however, to examine this effect analytically. The empirical evidence presented in the literature is often contradictory and remains unexplained because of a lack of an analytical insight into the causes of the intervaling effect.

This paper (1) constructs a signaling model with a weaker existence condition than in most signaling models, (2) demonstrates that, using a popular model of innovation under uncertainty, an equilibrium signaling schedule exists for a broad range of boundary conditions and parameter values. These results are derived in a model of a firm possessing private information about an investment opportunity, where the firm issues new equity to finance the investment. The proprietary information cannot be explicitly disclosed to potential investors without also disclosing it to potential competitors, but if investors are unaware of the firm's prospects, shares will have to be issued at a price less than their “intrinsic” value.

The question of stock market efficiency has received considerable play in the financial press in recent years and understandably so. Not only is this a topic of interest to national policymakers charged with monitoring and promoting market efficiency, but answers to this question have rather important implications for the management of market participants' portfolios. Our interest in this subject focuses on a subsegment of the larger question of market efficiency, in particular on so-called technical theories of stock market behavior.

Studies which deal with portfolio efficiency analysis can be divided into two main categories: (a) those concerned with the development of normative decision rules; and (b) those that discuss the application of the normative rules to empirical data. Most of the research on portfolio efficiency analysis uses some set of empirical data, without considering the possible errors which may arise when a sample rather than the entire population is examined. The prevailing neglect of the sampling errors is a clear reflection of the complexity of the issue.

Where rates of return are perfectly correlated, risk reduction through diversification cannot be achieved. Where rates of return are less than perfectly correlated, however, then, to the extent that these interrelationships can be known, modern portfolio theory provides a framework in which risk reduction through diversification can be achieved. Markowitz was the first to give rigorous content to the concept of portfolio diversification [14], and to introduce a formulation for treating portfolio selection as a mathematical optimization problem. In order to facilitate application of his own covariance approach, Markowitz first suggested [15, pp. 96–101], and Sharpe later developed a market model formulation according to which it is assumed that the rates of return on various securities “are related only through common relationships with some basic underlying factor” [18, p. 281]. More than 25 years have passed since Markowitz introduced his original formulation, and the literature dealing with the portfolio selection problem that he identified has grown considerably since then. Unfortunately, many problems remain which prevent full and effective implementation of this framework for investment analysis.

In a world characterized by perfect and complete capital markets, the success (or failure) of a merger is judged by the merger's impact on stockholder wealth. With completeness, the merger's impact on the probability distribution generating stockholder returns is unimportant. The perfect market assumption guarantees that the stockholder not satisfied with the consolidated firm's return distribution can frictionlessly sell his shares and reorder his portfolio; hence his only concern is the merger's impact on wealth. However, if we acknowledge the existence of commissions, taxes, and other frictions, or if markets are not complete, the merger's impact on the stockholder return distribution becomes relevant. In this study we will analyze 149 mergers involving large N.Y.S.E. firms. We will examine four different hypotheses related to the impact of merger on attributes of the stockholder return distribution. We focus our analysis on risk-related attributes including beta, total variance, residual variance, and several other risk-related attributes. In a companion paper, merger's impact on wealth is calculated for the same sample but will not be reported here.

The mean-variance portfolio model of Markowitz and Tobin has been the most substantive contribution to the theory of individual asset demand under uncertainty, in terms of comparative static results and testable implications. Although subject to a number of criticisms at the axiomatic level, it still stands as the classic portfolio model. The general equilibrium extension of the Tobin-Markowitz model due to Sharpe [14], Lintner [9], and Mossin [11] has led to important propositions about the nature of risk in general equilibrium and its effect on the pricing of assets, and the model has subsequently been subjected to extensive empirical testing. It has been used for a variety of purposes in areas ranging from corporate-finance theory to the debate on the social discount rate.

Unequal costs of obtaining and processing information may lead to trading of securities and wealth redistributions among investors. Those investors with easy access to information about a firm may be able to profit from prior knowledge of the information before public release. Public policy making bodies such as the SEC have attempted to alleviate this phenomenon by promoting public disclosure of information through litigation and regulation of the trading activities of insiders. Whether these procedures have been successful in curtailing trading due to privileged information is still open to debate. Academicians have also been concerned with resolving the existence of asymmetrically distributed information and “efficient markets.” In spite of the social and academic importance of this phenomenon, there has been little empirical work in this area. This is primarily due to a lack of a testable theoretical framework explaining investor behavior in securities markets with asymmetric information distribution. The ensuing paper provides a tentative testable theory on trading in markets with asymmetrically distributed information as well as an empirical investigation of this theory.

Managerial aversion to reduce dividends is not only an assertion to be found in the financial literature (see, for example, [2], [4], [8], [9]), but is also the basis for the informational content of dividends hypothesis (see [8]). Furthermore, its existence, if known to investors, can explain dividend payments which involve tax and transaction related costs. Surprisingly, the empirical evidence on this assertion is less than satisfactory. This study examines the existing empirical evidence on this assertion and points out its limitations. A new test, that can refute the informational content associated with the reluctance to cut dividends, is then performed.