We examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.

A critical response to Bart Wilson's (2022) theory of property, focusing on his assertion of a final cause in the evolution of property. It argues that while Darwin's great achievement was to remove final causes from earthly evolution and thus move the question of how biological life is organized from theology to science, Wilson's apparent restoration of a final cause to the evolution of property would move the question of how social life is organized from science back to theology, a clear step backward.

This article combines cross-national statistical analysis and in-depth historical case studies of Argentina and Chile to explore the relationship between two crucial dimensions of state capacity. We show that information capacity contributes to the development of fiscal capacity. When states have accurate information about their subject populations, territories, and economies, they are more effective at mobilizing revenues. In developing this argument this article makes three broader contributions. First, while existing scholarship either treats distinct dimensions of state capacity as separate entities, or simply assumes that they complement each other, our findings urge scholars to treat state development as sequential and to further investigate how multiple dimensions of state capacity are interrelated. Second, the paper suggests a broader underlying set of mechanisms – economies of scope – which connect these dimensions, and explores them in the specific context of how information capacity facilitates fiscal capacity. Third, we join the scholarship on the importance of societal compliance in the creation of the fiscal state, but with a focus on elite cooperation with the state's information collection efforts, which we show to be crucial to tax state development.

Bart Wilson suggests that economists interested in property rights have it all backwards when they define ownership as a bundle of rights. Rather he argues that ownership comes first in the form of an abstract concept. I claim there is a small element of truth to this, but the bulk of what he argues is already understood through the concept of economic property rights. Wilson's consternation is mostly the result of a failure to appreciate this latter concept.

The objective of this study is to show how contract-intensive economic institutions can promote diversity and inclusion of social and political groups in economic and business opportunities provided by governments. Building on the interdisciplinary political economy and governance literatures, two types of economic institutions are identified: rent-seeking and contract-intensive. It is argued that rent-seeking economic activities can reinforce in-group norms, gift-giving practices, and governments' discrimination of groups. However, when contract-intensive activities increase in an economy, they can enhance diversity and inclusion of groups in the marketplace creating opportunity structures outside the state and as businesses press governments toward greater impartiality. Analyses of 165 countries from 1961 to 2011 show that a one standard deviation increase in contract-intensive economic activity is associated with a substantial 18 percent increase in the equality of access to state business opportunities for both social and political groups in the long run.

Discovering individuals' internal motivations for paying taxes is essential to a tax system since the basic assumption of any tax system is that most of the population pays their taxes voluntarily. This article examines the existence of a social aversion towards tax offenders in Israel as well as the variables that affect tax law compliance and increase tax payments. In this respect, the article presents quantitative questionnaire data collected by the author, which is based on a sample of 189 participants from Israel. The study shows that the social response to tax evaders exerts a greater impact on increasing tax law compliance than the fear of punishment per se and clarifies the importance of education for paying taxes.

James Buchanan was a fervent advocate of a non-discriminatory politics. However, he translated his views on constitutional political economy into (de jure) constitutional design in an insufficiently thoughtful way. Simply writing non-discriminatory politics into a Constitution is unlikely to have the desired effect. All Constitutional language is open to interpretation and political entrepreneurs will be ready to push interpretation in their favoured directions. The history of US Constitutional law bears this out. This does not necessarily discount Buchanan's quest for constitutionalized non-discriminatory politics. However, it does mean that it must be tempered by realistic concerns regarding constitutional design. With this in mind, I suggest that focusing on procedural, rather than substantive, Constitutional provisions may be more fruitful.

Left-leaning and right-leaning governments hold opposing views on economic policy, resulting in disparities in economic behaviours and outcomes. Given this context, we explore the effect of political ideology on domestic credit using an unbalanced panel data of 29 countries from 1960 to 2014. Our empirical analysis shows that left-leaning governments reduce total domestic credit allocations. Also, we find that right-leaning governments provide more credit to the private sector, while left-leaning governments prefer to boost domestic credit to the public sector. In a further analysis, we show that political parties and their domestic credit strategies remain unchanged even during electoral periods. Our novel insights, that are robust to alternative measures, samples, and a set of econometric identifications, contribute to the literature on partisan politics and lending behaviour.

This paper explores Elinor Ostrom's account of practical reason through the conceptual lens provided by a typology of dimensions of rational conduct advanced by Amartya Sen. On Sen's view, self-interested behaviour has three independent, and separable, features: self-centred welfare, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. We suggest that Ostrom is committed to a version of rational choice theory that retains the assumptions of self-welfare goal and self-goal choice but, by acknowledging that people's welfare is affected by factors beyond their material consumption, departs from the assumption of self-welfare goal. We argue that this departure is not necessarily driven by an acknowledgement, along Senian lines, that people may have reasons for action other than the single-minded pursuit of their own goals, but rather by Ostrom's belief that the decision problem people face is so complex that maximising behaviour is rendered impossible. We illustrate this argument by analysing how Elinor Ostrom's position differs not only from Sen's but also from that of her husband and long-time collaborator Vincent Ostrom, who in his analysis of the covenantal aspects of rule-making seems to depart from the assumptions of instrumental rationality and preference-satisfaction.

The arguments that property rights and taxation positively affect development are well established in separate literatures, but the link between property rights and taxation is under-studied. To address this gap, we theorize, in the fiscal contract tradition, that property rights assigned and upheld by the state, as opposed to other political authorities, increase individual assent to taxation. We apply this argument to property rights on land in sub-Saharan-Africa, where the majority of land is governed by traditional authorities. Empirically we examine (1) the link between the state-assinged property rights on land and assent to taxation using individual-level data from Afrobarometer, and (2) the effect of state-led formalization, measured through novel data on state-produced cadastral records, and revenue from taxes on individuals in a panel of 37 sub-Saharan African countries across 35 years. We find support for our argument that there is no taxation without state-assigned property rights.

In a recent article Wilson explores the origins and explanation of ownership (property) as a custom, and argues that the custom of ownership is the primary concept and that property rights are subordinated to ownership. I argue that Wilson's subordination argument is unpersuasive; the linguistic evidence used by Wilson fits better with the concept of possession; and ownership is not a human universal.

A growing strand of literature relates pro-market institutions to business and overall employment creation. However, the effects of pro-market institutions on industry-specific employment creation still need to be better understood. Employment creation in some industries may be more sensitive to pro-market institutions. Moreover, if these industries employ a large proportion of the population, the role of local-level institutions becomes more critical for boosting employment creation across industries. Therefore, we disentangle the effects of local-level pro-market institutions on employment creation across nine major industries by using 5-year balanced panel data of 374 US metropolitan areas from 1972 to 2017. Our fixed-effects results indicate that pro-market institutions boost employment creation only in the manufacturing, retail, and construction sectors. Furthermore, our findings reveal that local public policies can benefit or harm local employment creation, depending on the concentration of industries in the area.

Bart Wilson argues that property is based on custom, not rights. Wilson (2022) further argues for the primacy of property over property rights. Wilson's research, including the recent book, The Property Species: Mine, Yours, and the Human Mind (2020), is a significant and arguably pathbreaking contribution to the vast literature on property and property rights. It also falls into the trap of economic arguments that unnecessarily devalue legal rights. I ague that we can all agree that ideas about property are always important to understanding property rights but that property rights still rule. This is in part because those who have property typically care most about property rights. I also argue that Wilson's concept of property is too focused on private ownership, rather than shared ownership or even government ownership of property. I suggest that considering the idea of sharing and other legitimate forms of property ownership alongside private ownership would generalize Wilson's constructivist theory of property and improve our ability to explain the diversity of property rights.

‘The Primacy of Property’ is a deep discussion of property as an evolved institution and should stimulate useful discussion of how property rights and transaction costs economists should ply their trade.

This symposium is based on a workshop organized (online) on 24–25 February 2021 and sponsored by World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research (WINIR). In this introduction, we stress the institutional dimension of repugnance, and show how it is dealt with in the papers gathered in the symposium. Kimberly Krawiec analyses repugnance in connection with externalities, and shows that contrary to what the ‘corruption theorists’ say, creating repugnant markets does not undermine social values. Peter Cserne shows that, in order to ensure a fully efficient regulation of repugnant behaviours, a transversal view combining the economic and legal approach to repugnance is necessary. The last two papers focus on entrepreneurship. Erwin Dekker and Julien Gradoz analyse the management of repugnance: how two firms, producing goods considered repugnant, adopt strategic behaviour to offset the costs generated by repugnance. Darcy W. E. Allen, Chris Berg and Sinclair Davidson take the analysis one step further and examine how ‘evasive entrepreneurs’ use repugnance as profit opportunity. Their innovations challenge social norms and the boundaries of what is viewed as repugnant in the society at large.

This article argues for the need for the empirical analysis of how firms manage repugnance and core-stigmatization. To develop our empirical perspective, we compare the work on repugnance with the existing empirical literature in management on core-stigma and argue that core-stigmatization results from the mobilized repugnance. The core-stigmatized firm faces higher transaction costs. We demonstrate, through a case-study of the strategies of MindGeek/Pornhub in the online pornography market, how transaction costs economics can explain the choice of strategies to deal with core-stigma. Under most conditions, the increased transaction costs lead to vertical and lateral integration of the firm. In a dynamic setting, rival firms might use stigmatization to prevent the entry of a new competitor. Our second case-study on the early decades of the mail-order company Sears, Roebuck, and Company illustrates that repugnance, including racial discrimination, was mobilized by competitors to block the entry of the firm into the market.

The current approach to the study of property cannot distinguish the causes of human action from the consequences of human action. It also cordons off morality thereby opening a hole in how property rights work. The scientific difficulty is that our analysis must constantly shift between the individual, their local community, and the larger polity in which both are embedded, in order to explain simultaneously different levels of consequences with different kinds of causes. The difficulty is made worse when we construct mental models without the human mind. My framework leaves the human mind in. Since Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, the study of property rights has had a decidedly external stance: the institution imposes itself on the individual from the outside. The problem of property rights, however, also calls for inquiry from the inside out of human agency, because in the study of property, ideas are primary.

Repugnant innovation is a form of evasive entrepreneurship that occurs in repugnant markets. Repugnance is an informal institution – controlled by long-lived norms, attitudes, customs and traditions – and repugnant innovation acts to shift institutions at the lowest level of the institutional stack. The paper considers three examples of repugnant innovation: e-cigarettes, online gambling, and webcam modelling. Each repugnant innovation challenges the complex mixture of material and moral concerns that contributes to repugnance in their respective markets. The paper adds to and expands on a body of evidence about innovation in apparently unsupportive institutional environments.

Economic accounts of repugnance concern two broad questions: the rationalisation of sentiments of repugnance (do emotional and visceral reactions of repugnance track valid reasons for not engaging in or condemning certain (trans)actions?) and institutional design (how to institute, regulate, or restrict markets in response to reasonable objections). If repugnance expresses valid practical reasons for regulating or limiting markets, our institutions should acknowledge and express these. If attitudes of repugnance are not rationalisable in the sense of instrumental or moral values, we should disregard or eventually counteract or reduce them. Focusing on a special case of repugnance, when commodification, i.e., the sale of goods or services for money meets societal disapproval, this paper identifies three characteristic ways to combine conceptual, empirical, and normative arguments and map repugnance into a disciplinary ‘epistemic frame’ of economics: repugnance as taste; repugnance as proxy for market failures or moral reasons; repugnance as hypocrisy or contingent cultural fact. Correspondingly, economists advise to (1) work around; (2) make sense of; and (3) explain away people's sentiments of repugnance.