Gangs are widely considered major contributors to the high levels of violence afflicting Latin America, including in particular Central America. At the same time, however, the vast majority of individuals who join a gang will also leave it and, it is assumed, become less violent. Having said this, the mechanisms underlying this ‘desistance’ process are not well understood, and nor are the determinants of individuals’ post-gang trajectories, partly because gang desistance tends to be seen as an event rather than a process. Drawing on long-term ethnographic research carried out in barrio Luis Fanor Hernández, a poor neighbourhood in Nicaragua's capital city Managua, and more specifically a set of ‘archetypal’ gang member life histories that illustrate the occupational options open to former gang members, this article offers a longitudinal perspective on desistance and its consequences, with specific reference to the determinants of individuals’ continued engagement with violence (or not).

Fatherhood is a key but missing component of research on welfare regimes. What do states formally demand from fatherhood across Latin America? Using a novel data set of coded legal and policy provisions for 19 Latin American countries, this article offers a conceptual framework to examine state interventions targeting biological, caregiving and breadwinning dimensions of fatherhood. My findings show that, regardless of how robust their social policies are, most countries presume fatherhood to be complementary rather than co-responsible to motherhood. By making a conceptual, empirical and practical contribution to studying the state regulation of fatherhood, this article contributes to a more comprehensive view of welfare regimes.

This article analyses efforts by the state of Oaxaca to mark its border from 1856 to 1912. State officials hoped to demarcate a permanent border along the frontier as a way to delineate a peaceful ending to on-going boundary disputes, some of which allegedly dated to pre-Columbian times. The activity of marking Oaxaca's boundary effectively represented a literal process of Mexican state formation. Oaxaca officials attempted to negotiate the state's jurisdictional limits in cooperation with other federations as well as with their own citizens as they located the parameters of the state and the limits of its authority during the era.

This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty of Peru during the four years between the arrival of José de San Martín's invasion force in September 1820 and the battle of Ayacucho of December 1824. It pays particular attention to royalist policy from July 1821, when viceroy José de la Serna evacuated Lima, the viceregal capital, leaving the city open to San Martín, who declared independence there on 28 July. Its focus differs, therefore, from that of most previous commentators on Peru's transition to independence, who have tended to neglect royalist policy and activity during these crucial final years in favour of a concentration upon the activities of San Martín, Antonio José de Sucre, Simón Bolívar and their Peruvian allies. The article begins with a brief contextual discussion of the historiography of Peruvian independence and subsequently analyses the main features of historical developments in the viceroyalty in the period 1810–20. Following substantive discussion of the period 1820–4, it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in 1822–4.

A late-comer in the privileged corporate structure of New Spain, the army struggled to wrest a position and to gain recognition. Other jurisdictions such as the merchant consulados, the Acordada, the Mining Guild, and the jealous creole-dominated ayuntamientos, contested military pretensions and triggered numerous judicial and jurisdictional disputes over how far the military could extend its legal powers. Representatives of the reformed Bourbon civil administration, unsure in some instances of the limits of their own authority, did not welcome a dynamic and grasping presence. For their own part, the army officers dispatched to command Mexican regular and militia units often represented the aggressively haughty airs of the European Spaniard – attitudes that rasped at the deep-rooted inferiority of the creoles and left them enraged. Little wonder that there was a constant stream of disputes, misunderstandings, and challenges directed against the army and the fucro militar.1