As any seasoned litigator knows, occasionally one interposes an evidentiary objection not simply for the sake of preventing this or that from occurring in court, but also for the purpose of alerting a court to and educating it about the likelihood that it will have to rule on what may prove to be a substantial evidentiary dispute. Instead of waiting until a trial has begun and somebody else’s expert witness is ready, willing, able and - most of all - present to testify, it can be useful to file a motion in limine, a pre-trial motion that seeks to bar or set limits to an expert’s testimony.

These are indeed dangerous times. In the name of “cost-effectiveness,” we cut back health benefits to the poor, who are more likely to be sick than the nonpoor. We miss our chance to heal. In the setting, we’re told, of “scarce resources,” we imperil the health care safety net. In the name of expedience, we miss our chance to be humane and compassionate.’

Medicaid is again - still - the subject of reform discussions in Washington and in state capitals. The program has been subject to varying, sometimes conflicting pressures since its inception. Its primary purpose has been serving the health care needs of the poor and disabled. It was structured, however, to appeal to (or at least to not alienate) private health care providers. In addition, its mix of state and federal funding and control was intended to draw in the states as partners.

Advances in science and technology frequently raise new ethical, legal, and social issues, and developments in neuroscience and neuroimaging technology are no exception. Within the field of neuroethics, leading scientists, ethicists, and humanists are exploring the implications of efforts to image, study, treat, and enhance the human brain.

This article focuses on one aspect of neuroethics: the confidentiality and privacy implications of advances in functional magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”). Following a brief orientation to fMRI and an overview of some of its current and proposed uses, this article highlights key confidentiality and privacy issues raised by fMRI in the contexts of health care, research, employment, insurance, criminal justice, litigation, and cognitive privacy.

One of the most challenging and rewarding roles for in-house hospital attorneys is serving as a member of their hospital’s Bioethics Committee (the “Committee”). As a member of the Committee, an attorney assists in developing institutional ethics policies and guidelines, and also participates in ethics consultations involving disputes about patient care. Institutions such as the Author’s employer, Texas Children’s Hospital, promote open and honest communications between members of a patient’s health care team and the patient’s parents and family; however, when communications break down, the Committee’s goal is to provide an objective forum where disputes can be discussed and hopefully resolved in a professional, ethical manner.

The Institute of Medicine’s 2005 publication, Dietary Supplements: A Framework for Evaluating Safety, is authoritative and thorough, and thus representative of other reports by the Institute of Medicine (IOM). What makes this report particularly interesting, however, is the rich political subtext that exists in the interstices of the report, popping up here and there in brief comments and barely suppressed yelps of exasperation. To understand this context, it is useful to reflect for a moment on the special nature of the IOM and its relationship to government.

IOM is part of the National Academy of Sciences, and is a private, non-governmental organization that does not receive direct federal funding for its work. Rather, IOM studies are often funded by contract with governmental entities that request reports on particular topics. As a case in point, the dietary supplement study was requested and paid for by the FDA.

For years, legal scholars and environmental activists have maintained that traditional tort proof requirements create insurmountable obstacles to recovery for most plaintiffs in chemical exposure cases, be they pharmaceutical suits or environmental toxic tort cases. Generally, tort law requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant owed a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that the breach of that duty caused the injury that is the subject of the suit. In some cases those requirements can be relaxed, as for example, when an injury is of a type that does not occur except as a result of negligence (under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor).