It is commonly accepted that innovation and economic prosperity after World War II were really spurred by the tremendous benefits of public investments. While public funding was crucial, a missing component of the historical analysis is a synthesis of the effects of these investments with changes in financial regulations enacted during the Great Depression, specific economic and employment policies, and the infusion of intellectual capital from scientists and engineers fleeing Nazi Germany and the turmoil of the war. The purpose of this article is to synthesize and analyze the effect of these three components—public polices, changes in private financial structures, and highly skilled immigration. This analysis will allow us to explore the broader impact and interdependence of knowledge creation, human and financial capital, and innovation.

This article addresses the origins of the immigration restriction movement in the late 19th century United States, a movement that realized its aims in the early 20th. It critiques the dominant scholarly interpretation, which holds that the movement sprang from a racism that viewed the new immigrants of this period as biologically inferior. It argues first that activists did not have at hand a biological theory sufficient to this characterization and did not employ one. It argues second that the movement arose as an adroit political response to labor market competition. The Republican Party recognized the discontent of resident workers (including those of older immigrant origin) with competition from new immigrants. The Party discerned ethnic differences among new and old immigrants and capitalized on these conditions in order to win elections. Ethnocentrism and middle-class anxiety over mass immigrant added to a movement that depended on bringing working class voters into the Party.

Public works spending was an integral component of John F. Kennedy’s fiscal policy. Drawing on a wide range of archival evidence from the Kennedy Presidential Library, we show how the administration worked to pass a $2.5 billion infrastructure bill that would give the presidency unilateral authority in determining where and when those funds would be spent. Contrary to recent accounts that emphasize Kennedy’s role in promoting massive tax cuts in 1963–64, the 1962 Public Works Acceleration Act was a key fiscal instrument that Kennedy advocated prior to the administration’s push for tax reform. Moreover, the public works policy was strictly Keynesian—designed as a proactive countercyclical “stabilizer” that would generate budget deficits in order to make up for slack in a recession. Kennedy’s plan faced stiff resistance in Congress and the history of the law offers important lessons for why infrastructure programs are often disregarded as countercyclical instruments.

Using federalism as a guide, this research explores the conflicted, complementary and unique natural gas policy paths of the U.S. federal government, Wyoming and Colorado and analyzes how policies facilitate and respond to booms. Federal policymaking has consistently focused on gas ownership, leasing, interstate dispute resolution and fiscal mechanisms to stimulate and manage development. At the state level, policies are designed to enable exploration and production while protecting fuel mineral rights, minimizing waste and generating revenue. During the most recent gas boom, driven in part by technological advances like fracking, policies are being tested from local to national levels. Colorado demonstrates that states can balance economic benefits with environmental and social costs of gas booms, thus providing an example for other gas producing states. Whether states serve as stewards or laggards is a function of federalism and choice, but the direction of federal and state natural gas policy remains a long-term play.

The victim has become among the most important identity positions in American politics. Victimhood is now a pivotal means by which individuals and groups see themselves and constitute themselves as political actors. Indeed, victimhood seems to have become a status that must be established before political claims can be advanced. Victimhood embodies the assertion that an individual or group has suffered wrongs that must be requited. What seems new is that wounded groups assert a self-righteous claim that they stand for something larger than their particular injury. The article explores how and why victimhood has become such a powerful theme in American politics. It suggests that victimhood as politics emerged from the contentious politics of the 1960s, specifically the civil rights movement and its aftermath. Key factors include the reaction to the minority rights and women’s movements, as well as internal dynamics within the rights movements.