This paper presents data on the size and growth of general government expenditures and receipts relative to GDP in OECD countries over the 1960–81 period. A feature of these trends is the widespread appearance of budget deficits in the mid-seventies, following the sharp increase in government expenditures relative to GDP in the two years immediately after the first oil shock in 1973. Having presented these data, the paper tests several hypotheses relating the size and growth of government to macroeconomic performance using an international cross-section framework. The economic performance indicators used are the rate of economic growth, the rate of consumer price inflation and private sector employment growth. Overall, the results provide little evidence that government size and growth have been detrimental to economic performance, particularly in the period since 1975, although an inverse relation existed in the sixties between government size and economic growth.

Tax revenue is a function of laws and administration as well as economic activity. Four different theories purport to explain revenue-raising in contemporary Western nations: universal abstractions about economic systems; national culture: tax-specific characteristics; avoiding political costs through political inertia. OECD data on taxation in Western nations since 1955 show that national tax systems do not have sufficient in common to validate universalistic generalizations Tax-specific influences can be identified only for a few major sources of revenue. The inertia persistence of substantial national distinctiveness reflects a non-decision making approach to tax policy by politicians. The strategy is to rely primarily upon revenue-buoyant taxes authorized by past legislation rather than risk the political blame for introducing new taxes to raise large amounts of needed additional revenue.

This article seeks to acquaint the reader with the intellectual landscape of comparative policy studies, and to raise the level of self-consciousness of scholars active in the field. To this end it discusses why comparative policy studies emerged when and where it did in the 1970s. Then it grapples with the reasons and possible effects of the fact that the very term ‘comparative policy’ is so difficult to translate into non-English languages, and links this to a discussion of problems of conceptual cohesion. The last part assesses the prospects of a field which is seeking to gain and retain intellectual coherence and respect, though not nestled comfortably within a single discipline, and is subject to contending pulls from national and international academic, political and bureaucratic forces.

The publication of a major report on social expenditure under the auspices of the OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee raises many questions relevant to public policy. The report is distinctive in that it not only deals with public expenditure for the past two decades, but also projects to 1990 levels of public expenditure for income-maintenance, health, education and related programmes. Given the variety of questions raised by this report – analytic, methodological, comparative and prescriptive – the Journal of Public Policy is making it the subject of an international symposium, with comments from leading social scientists and policymakers of diverse experiences and orientations, who have been invited to examine the foundations of the report, and to consider its implications

A vigorous tradition in comparative politics argues that national policymakers develop characteristic and durable methods for dealing with public issues, that these can be linked to policy outcomes, and that they can be systematically compared. More recently, a number of scholars have suggested reversing the direction of causality, claiming that the nature of political issues themselves causes the politics associated with them. This policy sector approach implies that there should be cross-national similarities in the way issues are treated, whatever the styles particular nations adopt. The two approaches need to be integrated into a common framework built around a research strategy that investigates policymaking within specific sectors across multiple national cases. Such an approach can transcend the often sterile debate over whether the policies of nations are unique or are converging by seeking to explain how the nature of issues structures the variation among the policies of nations.

This paper explores intertemporal relations between innovations in government receipts and expenditures, by type and in total, at federal and state-local levels in the United States over the period 1955–82. A structural model is specified with tax and spending components as endogenous variables. After estimation with full information maximum likelihood techniques, residuals derived from the reduced form equations are used in causality tests. These tests show that where there is an indication of causality, spending tends to lead taxes. The lesson learned from past data thus appears to be that changing aggregate tax rates does not cause spending to change. Tax initiatives provide little leverage if changes in the growth of government are intended.

Economic actors command political power as well as economic power. It is used to the same effect to create monopolies and oligopolies. The two powers can be combined; e.g., aside from monopolies based only on economic power or only on government intervention, there are especially powerful monopolies that command both powers. The stability of the various power holders is related to the nature of their power base; pure economic power is particularly unstable. However, economic power can be more readily amassed than interventionist power, which violates norms, and has a sharply declining marginal utility. When the effects of interventionist power are added to those of economic power, economies such as America, which are often classified as quite competitive, turn out to be much less so.

Nearly every OECD country has faced a scissors crisis in public finance since the worldwide depression of the mid-1970s; in slow growth economies public spending has been rising faster than tax revenues. In response, a great variety of methods have been employed to control public spending. Governments have sought to: impose global ceilings on spending; modify indexation rules; decentralize decremental decisions among government agencies; improve cash flow management; devise balanced packages; introduce new constitutional rules; provide incentives for retrenchment; and privatize public sector activities. Efforts to impose cuts in spending have been directed at the bureaucracy; transfer payments; subsidies; local and regional government; and quangos. The conclusion emphasizes that retrenchment policy presupposes a shift in the balance of power between guardians and spenders.

The campaign in Britain to reduce official secrecy has had a number of broad and ill-defined objectives. This article argues that four basic values underpin demands for more open government: to promote more ethical conduct; to enhance executive accountability; to advance more informed policy-making; and to help individual citizens and groups advance particular rights and interests. This analytical framework is then applied to the three main strategies of open government that have so far been pursued. First, it is argued that the reform of Section 2 of the 1911 Official Secrets Act, while legally desirable, will not promote any of the above values. Second, a freedom of information act would principally satisfy the fourth objective, while providing more executive accountability on a pragmatic basis. Finally, an analysis of official publications released under the Croham Directive reveals that the British interpretation of open government, the discretionary release of consultative documents, has been designed and implemented to reinforce the dominant policy style of bureaucratic accommodation.

This article presents the findings of a public opinion survey of the level of taxation in Sweden. The study demonstrates that opinions depend to a large extent on the framing of the problem. On general questions regarding taxes, the answers are usually negative. But when asked about both taxes and benefits, people normally express a positive attitude to both. The opinions about different kinds of taxes vary greatly, but the variation does not correspond to the predictions of the fiscal illusion theory. Opinions about taxes can be assigned to three underlying attitude dimensions. A comparison with an earlier Swedish survey shows that discontent with the level of taxation has not increased since the 1960s, with but one exception, marginal taxes.

This paper attempts to place the role of defense spending within the overall context of the budgetary process. Using an extended version of the ‘Competing Aspirations Level Model’ based on the behavioral theory of decision-making, major budgetary aggregates, total spending, defense spending, exhaustive civilian expenditures, and capital outlays, are modelled as outcomes of independently generated aspirations, based on parochial organizational and environmental influences, and a reconciliation process reflecting the bargaining power of budgetary agents. An empirical assessment of the model's performance is conducted using the experience of thirteen national governments, including seven western industrialized states and six developing states. The results of this statistical analysis suggest that the model provides a useful basis for understanding and comparing budgetary processes and outcomes.

The paper considers the size and the implications of the errors made by the British Treasury in forecasting the budget over the period 1951–84. On average the Treasury underestimated the public sector fiscal deficit by 0.5 per cent of GDP; this is about half the average amount by which Chancellors attempted to change aggregate demand by means of their budgets. The general pattern was for tax revenue to be under-predicted, but for public expenditure to be under-predicted by even more. The government's fiscal deficit and thus the reflationary effect of government policy was therefore greater than the Treasury intended.

A decomposition exercise carried out on the Treasury's own model for the fiscal year 1980/81 suggests that only about half of this error is due to errors in the specification of the model; the other half is due to errors in data estimation and in forecasting exogenous variables. Hence, the scope for improving forecasts by improvements to the model is limited. The paper considers three alternative methods by which forecasts could be improved: the application of realisation functions relating forecast to actual values; more frequent budgeting; and an attempt to derive more tax revenue from those categories (such as excise duties on alcohol, petrol and tobacco) whose yield is easiest to predict.

The relationship between the state and its own enterprises may be analyzed at three different levels: a rational-economic level, where what is good for the state-owned enterprise may oppose what is good for the state as a whole; an organizational level, where such conflicts are aggravated by a power struggle; and a political level, where the arbitrating authority is seen as an individual member of the government. If state-owned enterprises are to serve national goals and be efficiently managed, their relationship with the state must be improved. First, the state should set the state-owned enterprise's general objectives, approve its proposed strategy, and refrain from intervening any further in its management. Second, the state-owned enterprise should report to one authority only for an approval, and submit to effective strategic control. Third, political interventions should be few, and should consist of middle-range agreements signed between a member of government and the state-owned industry's top manager, avoiding partisan or too detailed considerations.

This article attempts to analyze the reorganization of local government, perceiving it as a general phenomenon in the modern state. While occurring in most developed societies, the reforms at the sub-national level do not seem to have followed a common pattern; they have been introduced and combined in different ways. Accordingly, two main questions have to be raised. Why have so many developed societies gone through some kind of reorganization? And why has the reorganization taken place at different stages and in different forms? A general, but somewhat unsatisfactory answer is that this trend reflects the expansion of the public sector. A more specific answer requires a differentiation between (a) various categories of reform, (b) different stages in the development of the welfare state and (c) varying ideological perspectives. After an elaboration of these analytical tools, the article illustrates such a structural approach through a description of the reorganization process in Norway and Sweden.

The effects of political and macroeconomic influences in determining the principal taxes in the United Kingdom since 1948 are examined here. Basic models of tax determination – policy initiative, macroeconomic determination and consumer preference – are tested. Causal path analysis is used to answer the question: Which is more important in determining tax revenues: the policy initiatives of governments, or circumstances in the economy which in the short term may be outside governmental control? The results demonstrate that for most taxes policy initiatives to alter tax rates and bases are much less important to revenue yield than underlying trends in the economy. The continuing strength of these macroeconomic secular trends circumscribes attempts by British policymakers to depart radically from the existing pattern of taxation.

Drawing primarily from the Turkish example, this essay examines the fit of the input-output policy model, widely used in West, to less developed countries (LDCs). Three hypotheses are explored. In LDCs, compared to the West: (1) Policy patterns are more subject to political penetration; (2) once implemented, policies have a higher probability of penetrating social conditions; and (3) implementation structures and practices are less penetrable by policy directives.

The major bottleneck to innovative policy formation and delivery in LDCs is the implementation process. Bureaucratic resistance and hesitancy to innovate are due to a control rather than service orientation, stemming from the peculiar sequencing of development of state apparatuses vis-a-vis the marketplace. These historical-institutional peculiarities do not appear to detract from the input-output model's ability to spot targets of opportunity for useful policy inquiry in LDCs.

This paper attempts to explain what influenced efficient decisions in the adoption of important technology in the steel industry. An index of efficient decisions for the adoption of the basic oxygen furnace and for continuous casting is discussed theoretically and then empirically developed for the steel industries of 28 and 27 countries respectively. Statistical tests are performed to determine the influence of government ownership of the steel industries, central planning of the economies and involvement in international competition on efficient decisions regarding technology adoption. The tests reveal that both government ownership and central planning retarded efficient decisions regarding the adoption of technology.

After a sharp increase, the public debt of French local communities has been stabilized in real terms: its amount reached 54 per cent of total public debt in 1980. In the French institutional framework, local government borrowing policy is under the tight control of central agencies. An econometric model of the borrowing behaviour of local governments since 1965 is presented; it emphasizes the role of internal determinants of local debt (needs for investment, self-financing ability of governments), external constraints (e.g. interest rates and the financial resources of lenders, such as households savings), and finally the impact of macroeconomic policy measures from the central government.

Law is an instrument which can be used by central government to influence its environment, including other levels of government. This paper examines a number of fundamental questions about the nature of legal influence upon local authorities in Britain. Legislation affects local authorities in a variety of ways: through making direct reference to local authority organisations and the services they provide; through affecting all large organisations, public or private; and through affecting the organisations and individuals with which local authorities interact. In the 1970s a large proportion of legislation was concerned with the financial aspects of local services. Relatively few laws make substantive changes in the legal framework within which local authorities operate and much legislation can be categorised as ‘anodyne’. However, particular items of legislation can produce such substantive changes in public policies and in the powers of different organisations within government.

The most basic question about the structure and organization of government is Why we should be concerned about this question at all?' Many of us trained in political science programs during the behavioral revolution were taught to believe that the structures of government were insignificant as a focus for research. The structures ofgovernment became encapsulated in an opaque black box; that part of the political system where decisions were made. Fortunately, this view no longer prevails and there is increasing interest in structural questions, in part generated by the increasing interest in the state as a focus for political inquiry (Dyson, 1980; Benjamin and Elkin, 1985). Much of the work on the state as yet, however, leaves that concept largely undifferentiated and has not dealt systematically with the structure of the state apparatus. Thus, concern for the development of state theory, as well as the concerns of those interested in public policy, has returned structural questions to a more central position in political science.