The area of interest of this paper is recursively enumerable vector spaces; its origins lie in the works of Rabin [16], Dekker [4], [5], Crossley and Nerode [3], and Metakides and Nerode [14]. We concern ourselves here with questions about maximal vector spaces, a notion introduced by Metakides and Nerode in [14]. The domain of discourse is V∞ a fully effective, countably infinite dimensional vector space over a recursive infinite field F.

By fully effective we mean that V∞, under a fixed Gödel numbering, has the following properties:

(i) The operations of vector addition and scalar multiplication on V∞ are represented by recursive functions.

(ii) There is a uniform effective procedure which, given n vectors, determines whether or not they are linearly dependent (the procedure is called a dependence algorithm).

We denote the Gödel number of x by ⌈x⌉ By taking {εn ∣ n > 0} to be a fixed recursive basis for V∞, we may effectively represent elements of V∞ in terms of this basis. Each element of V∞ may be identified uniquely by a finitely-nonzero sequence from F Under this identification, εn corresponds to the sequence whose n th entry is 1 and all other entries are 0. A recursively enumerable (r.e.) space is a subspace of V∞ which is an r.e. set of integers, ℒ(V∞) denotes the lattice of all r.e. spaces under the operations of intersection and weak sum. For V, W ∈ ℒ(V∞), let V mod W denote the quotient space. Metakides and Nerode define an r.e. space M to be maximal if V∞ mod M is infinite dimensional and for all V ∈ ℒ(V∞), if V ⊇ M then either V mod M or V∞ mod V is finite dimensional. That is, M has a very simple lattice of r.e. superspaces.

The notion of the next admissible set has proved to be a very useful notion in definability theory and generalized recursion theory, a unifying notion that has produced further interesting results in its own right. The basic treatment of the next admissible set above a structure ℳ of urelements is to be found in Barwise's [75] book Admissible sets and structures. Also to be found there are many of the interesting characterizations of the next admissible set. For further justification of the interest of the next admissible set the reader is referred to Moschovakis [74], Nadel and Stavi [76] and Schlipf [78a, b, c].

One of the most interesting single properties of is its ordinal (ℳ). It coincides, for example, with Moschovakis' inductive closure ordinal over structures ℳ with pairing functions—and over some, such as algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0, without pairing functions (by recent work of Arthur Rubin) (although a locally famous counterexample of Kunen, a theorem of Barwise [77], and some recent results of Rubin and the author, show that the inductive closure ordinal may also be strictly smaller in suitably pathological structures). Further justification for looking at (ℳ) alone may be found in the above-listed references. Loosely, we can consider the size of to be a useful measure of the complexity of ℳ. One of the simplest measures of the size of —and yet a very useful measure—is its ordinal, (ℳ). Keisler has suggested thinking of (ℳ) as the information content of a model—the supremum of lengths of wellfounded relations characterizable in the model.

Every recursively enumerable extension of arithmetic which obeys the disjunction property obeys the numerical existence property [Fr, 1]. The requirement of recursive enumerability is essential. For extensions of intuitionistic second order arithmetic by means of sentences (in its language) with no existential set quantifiers, the numerical existence property implies the set existence property. The restriction on existential set quantifiers is essential. The numerical existence property cannot be eliminated, but in the case of finite extensions of HAS, can be replaced by a weaker form of it. As a consequence, the set existence property for intuitionistic second order arithmetic can be proved within itself.

In this paper we are going to consider experimental logics introduced by Jeroslow [4] as models of human reasoning proceeding by trial and error, i.e. admitting changes of axioms in time (some axioms are deleted, some new ones accepted). Jeroslow's notion is based on the idea that events which may cause changes in axioms and rules of reasoning are mechanical. Suppose a finite alphabet Γ to be fixed and let Γ* be the set of words in the alphabet Γ. N denotes the set of natural numbers.

0.1. Definition. An experimental logic is a recursive relation H ⊆ N × Γ*; H(t, φ) is read “the expression is accepted at the point of time t”. φ is recurring w.r.t. H (notation: RecH(φ)) if H(t, φ) holds for infinitely many t; is stable w.r.t. H (notation: StblH(φ)) if H(t,φ) holds for all but finitely many t. In symbols:

H is convergent if every recurring expression is stable.

0.2. We have the following facts: Let X ∈ Γ*. (1) X ∈ iff there is an experimental logic H such that X = {φ; RecH(φ)}- (2) X ∈ iff there is an experimental logic H such that X = {φ; StblH(φ)}. (3) X ∈ iff there is a convergent experimental logic H such that X is the set of all expressions recurring ( = stable) w.r.t. H. (See [4], [3], [7]; cf. also [5].)

Beginning with Ramsey's theorem of 1930, combinatorists have been intrigued with the notion of large cardinals satisfying partition relations. Years of research have established the smaller ones, weakly ineffable, Erdös, Jonsson, Rowbottom and Ramsey cardinals to be among the most interesting and important large cardinals in set theory. Recently, cardinals satisfying more powerful infinite-exponent partition relations have been examined with growing interest. This is due not only to their inherent qualities and the fact that they imply the existence of other large cardinals (Kleinberg [2], [3]), but also to the fact that the Axiom of Determinacy (AD) implies the existence of great numbers of such cardinals (Martin [5]).

That these properties are more often than not inconsistent with the full Axiom of Choice (Kleinberg [4]) somewhat increases their charm, for the theorems concerning them tend to be a little odd, and their proofs, circumforaneous. The properties are, as far as anyone knows, however, consistent with Dependent Choice (DC).

Our basic theorem will be the following: If k > ω and k satisfies k→(k)k then the least cardinal δ such that has a δ-additive, uniform ultrafilter. In addition, if ACω is assumed, we will show that δ is greater than ω, and hence a measurable cardinal. This result will be strengthened somewhat when we prove that for any k, δ, if then .

In this paper we show that certain notions of consistency currently in use in illative combinatory logic are not always necessary nor always sufficient for the acceptability of the system.

The three notions of consistency we will consider are:

(A) Not all terms of the system are assertible.

(B) Not all propositions of the system are assertible.

(C) The system is Q-consistent, i.e. if Q (for equality) is in or is added to the system as a primitive with axioms such as

Post defined a system of propositional calculus to be inconsistent if all propositions were assertible. In a more general system where there may be terms which are not propositions (although all propositions are terms), we need to distinguish notions (A) and (B) as two possible consistency notions “in the sense of Post”.

In [3] Curry and Feys assume that Q is in the system defined as λxλy.Ξ(C*x)(C*y) or as a primitive, but Seldin in [5] also talks about Q-consistency of a system (F22) to which Q has to be added. We therefore consider the definition of Q-consistency that includes all three possibilities.

In [3] Curry and Feys state that Q-consistency is essential for acceptability. This is because there the purpose was to have an assertional system of illative combinatory logic in which combinatory equality was represented by the assertion of QXY. However if Q is to represent some other form of equality, Q-consistency may become inessential for acceptability or even incompatible with it.

The main purpose of this note is to present new semi-model-theoretic proofs of some axiomatization results. Principally, we prove the result of [van Dalen and Statman] on the axiomatization of the equality fragment of the intuitionistic theory of apartness by ω-fold stability axioms. Further examples are also discussed.

The intuitionistic theories of equality and apartness are given by the following nonlogical axioms:

EQ .

AP .

In AP, one can define a notion of equality by means of the abbreviation:

.

The corresponding interpretation of E Q in AP is not faithful — since equality is a negation, we have stability of equality:

.

The equality fragment of AP is axiomatized by a suitable generalization of the stability of equality. To state it, one first defines a sequence of partial apartness relations:

.

A simple induction shows, for all n,

whence

.

One of the most interesting aspects of the theory of computational complexity is the speed-up phenomenon such as the theorem of Blum [6, p. 326] which asserts the existence of a 0, 1-valued total recursive function with arbitrarily large speed-up. Blum and Marques [10] extended the speed-up definitions from total to partial recursive functions, or equivalently, to recursively enumerable (r.e.) sets, and introduced speedable and levelable sets. They classified the effectively speedable sets as the subcreative sets but remarked that “the characterizations we provided for speedable and levelable sets do not seem to bear a close relationship to any already well-studied class of recursively enumerable sets.” The purpose of this paper is to give an “information theoretic” characterization of speedable and levelable sets in terms of index sets resembling the jump operator. From these characterizations we derive numerous consequences about the degrees and structure of speedable and levelable sets.

Let IPC be the intuitionistic first-order predicate calculus. From the definition of derivability in IPC the following is clear:

(1) If A is derivable in IPC, denoted by “⊦IPCA”, then A is intuitively true, that means, true according to the intuitionistic interpretation of the logical symbols. To be able to settle the converse question: “if A is intuitively true, then ⊦IPCA”, one should make the notion of intuitionistic truth more easily amenable to mathematical treatment. So we have to look then for a definition of “A is valid”, denoted by “⊨A”, such that the following holds:

(2) If A is intuitively true, then ⊨ A.

Then one might hope to be able to prove

(3) If ⊨ A, then ⊦IPCA.

If one would succeed in finding a notion of “⊨ A”, such that all the conditions (1), (2) and (3) are satisfied, then the chain would be closed, i.e. all the arrows in the scheme below would hold.

Several suggestions for ⊨ A have been made in the past: Topological and algebraic interpretations, see Rasiowa and Sikorski [1]; the intuitionistic models of Beth, see [2] and [3]; the interpretation of Grzegorczyk, see [4] and [5]; the models of Kripke, see [6] and [7]. In Thirty years of foundational studies, A. Mostowski [8] gives a review of the interpretations, proposed for intuitionistic logic, on pp. 90–98.