In this article, I argue that looking at lesser known intellectuals can help the history of economics to uncover new ways of seeing the world. My focus is the beginnings of “Indian economics” and its conceptualization of development. The Indian economists, despite their elite status in India, were from an imperial context where they were never considered economists. Studies throughout the twentieth century continued to treat them only as nationalists, rarely as contributors to economic knowledge. My research gives agency to these economists. I show how the position of Indian economics from the margins of discursive space offered a unique perspective that enabled it to innovate at the margins of development discourse. Indian economics redefined the concept of universality in the existing nineteenth-century idea of development by rejecting the widely accepted comparative advantage model and assertion that progress originated in Europe. Moreover, the economists pushed for universal industrialization, even for imperial territories, arguing that universal progress was beneficial to all.

This article questions the articulation between John Stuart Mill’s initial project of creating a new science dedicated to the means of improving individual character, a science named “ethology,” and the treatise of political economy that he published instead. My claim is that his defense of free competition as well as some of the arguments he opposes to it, and which have often puzzled his readers, actually reveal the moral agenda of his political economy and of some of his political principles, specifically his ambivalent position towards paternalism.

This article is an attempt to offer an assessment of the main coordinates of Simon Nelson Patten’s views on democracy and biological determinism. This will allow us to better delineate the differences—as well as the affinities—between Patten and the core of progressives discussed by Thomas C. Leonard in a series of path-breaking contributions, culminating in his Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era. It is our contention that even within the persisting intricacies, ambiguities, and contradictions of Patten’s expository style, it is possible to trace a shift in some aspects of his ideas—a gradual evolution that makes his peculiar brand of progressivism different from that of his most “illiberal” counterparts.

The work of Walter Eucken (1891–1950), founder of German ordoliberalism, is often described as being in direct opposition to that of John Maynard Keynes. Our paper challenges this claim by making two main arguments. First, we show that Eucken supported a proto-Keynesian stimulus program at the height of the Great Depression, the so-called Lautenbach plan of 1931. Second, we analyze his critique of full employment policy, which reveals that Eucken’s approach to solving macroeconomic problems is fundamentally different from, if not necessarily contrary to, that of Keynes.

The article examines an early and idiosyncratic version of behavioral economics or “empirical socio-economics,” which the German economist and taxation expert Günter Schmölders developed in the postwar decades. Relying on both his published papers and his lecture notes and correspondence, it scrutinizes Schmölders’s intellectual upbringing in the tradition of the Historical School of Economics (Historische Schule der Nationalökonomie) and his relation to the emerging ordoliberalism, demonstrating that the roads that led to dissatisfaction with the emerging neoclassical mainstream and the unrealistic behavioral assumptions of macroeconomic models were manifold. Accordingly, it shows that behavioral economics is compatible with various intellectual and political backgrounds and convictions. Yet, it still forms a distinct entity: comparing Schmölders with contemporary and later behavioral economists, I will show that they shared essential methodological assumptions as well as an understanding of human beings as decision-making organisms.

In his Treatise on Probability John Maynard Keynes criticized the tools of statistical inference derived from probability that were coming into use in the early twentieth century, and outlined an alternative approach to statistical inference based on the logic of induction. This essay argues that Keynes’s ideas were embraced and echoed by several leading US economists during the 1920s and 1930s, including those developing and applying the most sophisticated statistical methods of the day. These economists expressed views regarding statistical inference that were quite similar to those found in Keynes’s Treatise, often citing Keynes as an authority in support. Also, the inferential methods recommended and actually employed by these writers were consistent with Keynes’s ideas about the proper methods of statistical inference.

When scholars investigate the legacy of John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921) for the development of Keynes’s thinking, the attention usually focuses on the connections among Keynes’s probability theory, his conception of decision-making under uncertainty, and the theory of the functioning of the macroeconomic system that derives from it—through the marginal efficiency of capital, the preference for liquidity, and the self-referential functioning of financial markets. By contrast, this paper aims to investigate the connections between Keynes’s probability theory, on the one hand, and his economic policy recommendations, on the other. It concentrates on the policy recommendations defended by Keynes during the Great Depression but also after the General Theory. Keynes’s economic policy can be understood as a framework for decision-making in situations of uncertainty: fiscal policy aims to induce private agents to change their “rational” probability statements, while monetary policy aims to allow more weight to these statements.

As we celebrate the centenary of John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability (1921), we are still faced with unresolved, fundamental questions about his foray into the philosophy of probability. One of these unresolved questions concerns whether Keynes (1931) later changed his mind in response to intense criticism from Frank Ramsey (1922, 1931) and abandoned the logical theory of probability. This essay draws from Cheryl Misak’s recent biography of Frank Ramsey (2020) to argue that Ramsey had an even wider influence on Keynes’s work than has been recognized, and that this influence was not just on his philosophy of probability but also on his economics. Understood in this fuller context, it seems even more clear that Keynes embraced and built upon Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability in The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (1936).