Contemporary international criminal law suggests that head of state immunity does not extend to atrocity crimes, but the executive's office continues to be the safest place for suspected perpetrators. Moreover, indicted suspects can use the threat of international accountability to win democratically contested elections. This article asks how suspects and their surrogates translate an indictment from an international criminal tribunal into an electoral victory and suggests that the path between an indictment and electoral victory unfolds in one of two ways: (1) the consolidation of existing coalitions around the indicted suspects and their allies; or (2) the creation of new coalitions that span existing cleavages. The article evaluates these assumptions through two cases: Lebanon and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and Kenya and the International Criminal Court. These two decidedly different cases exemplify the ways in which coalitional politics shield suspects international accountability and reward them with high office.

When I started out as a law professor in 1998, I had the extraordinary good fortune to be invited to join a law, culture, and society reading group hosted at Amherst College. This group was fundamental to my development as a scholar in a great many ways, but among the most important was that it brought me into contact with Sally Engle Merry. And Sally, being the incredibly friendly and generous person that she was, extended herself to me from the start, offering her mentorship, providing advice, and generally serving as a bright-spirited and supportive academic comrade. Over the next two decades, we stayed in regular contact. We participated in panels and workshops together. Sally commented on my work, both formally and informally. And nearly every book or article I have published over the past 15 years cites Sally at least once. Finally, I am honored that perhaps Sally's last published work appeared in print shortly after her death in a volume I edited, The Oxford Handbook of Global Legal Pluralism (Berman 2020a). The last email I have from her was typical. She offered enthusiastic congratulations to me on finishing this book, with no reference to her own role as a crucial contributor. Even as her own strength was ebbing, she was a cheerleader for others.

Conservatives—both political and religious—are more likely than liberals to support laws regulating traditional or religious morality. The current study applies a moral psychological framework to argue that the association between conservatism and moral regulation law support can be explained in part by binding morality, or a moral orientation that privileges group needs above individual needs and includes concerns about absolutism, collectivism, and purity. Binding morality may directly promote support for moral regulation laws, which enforce traditional rules, discourage deviance, and require adherence to customs regarding bodily and spiritual purity. Binding morality may also indirectly promote support for moral regulation laws by motivating perceptions that “immoral” behaviors are harmful to innocent victims. I test these hypotheses using three analytic samples drawn from the General Social Survey (N = 3669, 7120, 369). Results show that, as expected, binding morality (especially purity) mediates the effects of political and religious conservatism on laws regulating pornography, marijuana, abortion, and euthanasia. Additional analyses exploring views about pornography show that binding morality (especially collectivism) is associated with perceptions of immorality as harmful, which in turn is associated with support for regulation.

Drawing on in-depth interviews with 50 Latin American immigrants in Dallas, Texas, this article uncovers systematic distinctions in how immigrants holding different legal statuses perceive the threat of deportation. Undocumented immigrants recognize the precarity of their legal status, but they sometimes feel that their existence off the radar of the US immigration regime promotes their long-term presence in the country. Meanwhile, documented immigrants perceive stability in their legal status, but they sometimes view their existence on the radar of the US immigration regime as disadvantageous to their long-term presence in the country. The article offers the concept of system embeddedness—individuals' perceived legibility to institutions that maintain formal records—as a mechanism through which perceived visibility to the US immigration regime entails feelings of risk, and perceived invisibility feelings of safety. In this way, the punitive character of the US immigration regime can overwhelm its integrative functions, chilling immigrants out of opportunities for material and social well-being through legalization and legal status. More broadly, system embeddedness illuminates how perceived visibility to a record-keeping body that combines punitive and integrative goals represents a mechanism of legal stratification for subordinated populations—even absent prior punitive experiences with other social control institutions that might otherwise be thought to trigger their system avoidance.

Our article provides an in-depth analysis of the framing processes and outcomes associated with a petition submitted by Inuit communities in the arctic on the human rights violations caused by climate change before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights in 2005. Drawing on semi-structured interviews conducted in two different Inuit communities in Canada that have ties to the petition and with lawyers and activists in the transnational climate justice movement, we process-trace the role that the petition has played in promoting discursive and collective action frames related to the recognition of the “right to be cold.” We argue that the Inuit petition articulated a novel “climate rights” frame through an innovative combination of legal argumentation, scientific research, and the oral testimony of Inuit communities concerning the ways in which climate impacts were affecting their human rights and traditional practices. Our findings reveal that the resonance of this frame has varied significantly among different actors, influencing the ideas and strategies of climate activists and lawyers around the world, but having limited resonance among policymakers in the United States or Canada or among Inuit communities themselves. Our research thus speaks to the complex challenges and ethical responsibilities that must be addressed in initiatives that seek to draw on international human rights law to influence policy decisions and empower Indigenous communities in the context of climate change.

At the very beginning of her career, Sally Engle Merry focused on the legal relations of nonlegally trained people—often members of the working class, marginalized or racialized groups. She explored the disjuncture between those people's understandings of disputing and the concepts, language, and procedural distinctions of legal professionals (Merry 1979, 1990, and more). That work brought her into contact with a number of scholars working on what Merry (1988) would call “new legal pluralism”: taking legal pluralism beyond the colonial and postcolonial contexts in which it had predominantly been deployed (“old legal pluralism”) and portraying it as a characteristic of virtually all societies and all law.

Constitutions are an important feature of many authoritarian regimes. But what role do they in fact perform in processes of authoritarian regime stabilization and legitimation? Much of the contemporary literature focuses on authoritarian constitutionalism in transitions away from constitutional democracy. This article considers the opposite scenario: pre-emptive constitution-making as a mechanism of authoritarian constitutionalism to contain a potential transition toward constitutional democracy. This is illustrated through the case of Myanmar. Since the 1960s, Myanmar has experienced successive periods of direct military rule without a constitution, followed since 2011 by a new constitution. Adding to the comparative literature on constitutions in authoritarian regimes, this article explains how pre-emptive constitution-making limits a transition to liberal democracy and contributes to authoritarian-regime resilience. This article further identifies “military-state” constitutionalism as a variation of authoritarian constitutionalism in Myanmar. The case of Myanmar offers comparative insights into the ways constitutions are used to contain transitions to constitutional democracy and illustrates the varieties inherent in authoritarian constitutionalism.

Sally Merry was a brilliant intellectual, a prolific researcher, and a generous, gentle person. Her passing is a great professional and personal loss, and I am deeply saddened.

Powerful corporations leverage the law to shape the regulatory environments in which they operate. A key strategy for achieving this is litigation. I ask under what conditions corporations litigate, and specifically, what happens when two repeat players, transnational agribusiness firms and local governments, face each other in court. I compare outcomes of two cases—Hawaii and Arica, Chile—documenting how different sociopolitical contexts and legal systems shape how actors engage the law. Interviews with firm managers, unions, government officials, lawyers, and advocacy organization leaders and document analysis reveal that firms seize on existing institutional norms and politics to define their localized legal strategies. Through strategic legalism, a defensive legal strategy that is outcome-oriented and context-specific, firms accomplish legal compliance and political containment of their opposition. In Hawaii, firms rely on preemptive legality, a strategy that moves controversial issues like pesticide safety from one domain of democratic politics to another that is largely incontestable because it is preempted by a higher authority. In Chile, firms use authoritarian legality, an approach that draws on authoritarian structures and policies within the state, to sway legal outcomes. These cases reveal the mechanisms that corporations draw on to institutionalize their power advantages through the law, offering a typology for future scholars to better understand how the strategic behavior of corporations shapes regulatory outcomes.

I knew the outside Sally. We walked together for over 21 years, mostly around Lake Waban at Wellesley College; we could turn a 40-minute walk on the path around the lake into an extended 75-minute excursion by going off the path, then bush whacking our way back. In the winters, we walked on the nearby golf course and into the woods; and when we were pressed for time, we walked in a small neighborhood park near her home in Wellesley. As her breathing became more labored and she was no longer able to walk easily during these past few months, we sat in her backyard in our COVID masks, talking and taking in the sunshine.

Media and scholastic accounts describe a strong backlash against attempts to advance gay rights. Academic research, however, increasingly raises questions about the sharply negative and enduring opinion change that characterizes backlash among the mass public. How can we reconcile the widespread backlash described by the media with the growing body of academic research that finds no evidence of the opinion change thought to be its hallmark trait? We argue that rather than widespread opinion change, what appears to be backlash against gay rights is more consistent with elite-led mobilization—a reaction by elites seeking to prevent gays and lesbians from achieving full incorporation in the polity. We present evidence from what is widely considered to be a classic case of anti-gay backlash, the 2010 Iowa Judicial Retention Election. Analysis of campaign contribution data in Iowa versus other states between 2010 and 2014, and voter roll-off data exploiting a unique feature of the 2010 retention election supports this argument. The results simultaneously explain how reports of backlash might occur despite increased support for gay rights, and an academic literature that finds no evidence of backlash.

Sally Merry was a remarkable scholar and her loss will make a profound impact on the scholarship that shapes the intersection between international human rights law and the local sphere. Hence, the aim of this essay is to make a small tribute to a selected part of her scholarship that connects law and anthropology. Merry shifted the understanding of international law from a global and utopian perspective to something tangible and feasible, which has a direct influence on people's lives and communities.

Allegations of sexual assault and sexual harassment by prominent entertainment and media figures and politicians in the United States have brought renewed attention to a political debate that earlier had been focused on universities and the military: the apparent failure of institutions to address and punish cases of sexual assault by their members. In light of this debate, we consider how cases fare in an institution that is perennially accused of gender bias and of tolerating rape: the US military. Through the analysis of 585 sexual assault report summaries from the US military bases in Japan, we find that the military often tries to punish cases of sexual assault. However, many cases do not have sufficient evidence for prosecution as sexual assault cases. Low conviction rates at court-martial for reported sexual assaults may indicate systemic problems with the nature of the cases themselves and the circumstances in which the cases arise. Low conviction rates may also reflect the military's legal mandate to prioritize mission, and its legal system's multiple options for addressing crime outside of trial procedures. Case characteristics interact with the primary concerns of command authority and complainants, within a highly institutionalized, closed context, to affect the military's handling and disposition of reported sexual assault cases.