A topic of some current interest to forecasters and policymakers is the extent to which the high levels of corporate indebtedness observed throughout the late-1980s contributed to the recession and whether the still substantial debts of the corporate sector are likely to make the recovery from recession slower than normal. The purpose of this note is to present and provide an interpretation of the evidence bearing on this issue.

When the Labour Party came to power in 1997, it had an agenda for reforming the functioning of the UK economy. It planned to introduce a stability-oriented macroeconomic policy that would enhance growth. It was critical of the high level of borrowing that the previous Government had undertaken, and promised to be more prudent. It wanted to increase participation and employment in the economy as a means of both increasing output and reducing poverty. It also aimed to improve the quality of the labour force by enhancing the educational standard of the population and to close the productivity gap between Britain and other European countries.

This paper reviews UK supply-side policies since 2010 in terms of their impact on growth and considers medium-term growth prospects in the context of the puzzle of disappointing post-crisis TFP performance. It is argued that there is no reason to believe that growth prospects have deteriorated significantly compared with the pre-crisis period. Changes in policy under the Coalition government are unlikely to have made a big difference to growth potential. On the one hand, this means opportunities for radical reform have been ignored; on the other hand, there has been no repeat of the 1930s’ debacle.

Parental beliefs are recognised by psychologists as an important causal influence on child development. A two-period model of human capital accumulation in the framework of Becker and Tomes (1986) is presented. In the first period parents transfer their beliefs, distinct from genes, to children by signalling their ‘belief in a just world’ or their perceived return to effort. Children respond by choosing effort, irrespective of the real world returns, which combines with their genes to create early ability. This determines the rate of return to second-period investment and final attainment. If parents are credit constrained, both beliefs and income determine attainment. Empirical analysis using the second generation of the NCDS shows that beliefs are a strong predictor of early attainment and significantly reduce the importance of parental income. The identifying assumption is that parent beliefs are slow-moving and not conditioned on the child.

Since our last forecast in April 2008 there have been further increases in oil prices, as is illustrated in figure 1, which tracks oil price projections in our forecasts this year, and compares them to the projection we made in January and July 2007. Over the past eighteen months oil prices have risen from around $60 per barrel to a currently projected level of $123 in 2009. Oil prices have recently reached a peak of $145.6 a barrel before falling back to around $134. Our projection for the short term is based on those of the US Energy Information Agency and uses information from forward markets as well as an evaluation of supply conditions. In the longer term we presume that real oil prices will rise in line with the real interest rate, as is discussed on pp. 4–7 of this Review. This note looks at the impacts of recent increases in oil prices on the path for real wages by investigating the share of fossil fuels in costs. It also evaluates the impact of the rise in prices since our last forecast, and investigates the impact on oil prices of the growth in demand outside the OECD.

We analyse TFP growth in the US business sector using a basic unobserved component model where trend growth follows a random walk and the noise is a first order autoregression. This is fitted using a Kalman-filter methodology. We find that trend TFP growth has declined steadily from 1.5 to 1.0 per cent per year over the past 50 years. Nevertheless, recent trends are not a good guide to actual medium-term TFP growth. This exhibits substantial variations and is quite unpredictable. Techno-optimists should not give best to productivity pessimists simply because recent TFP growth has been weak.

In this article we compare the determination of bank advances to UK industrial and commercial companies (ICC) in three forecasting models of the British economy: those developed at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), at the Treasury (HMT) and at the Bank of England (BOE). In each of these models the private sector's demand for loans is an important element in the determination of the broadly-defined money stock (£M3), the rate of growth of which has been an important intermediate target of macroeconomic policy in recent years.

The relative decline of British industry has prompted some suggestions that Britain should model its planning and industrial policies on Japanese and French experience. This article considers the role of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan and the Commissariat Général du Plan in France and examines the mechanisms through which planning and industrial policy have operated. It concludes with a discussion of the relevance of this experience for the UK where government policy appears to have been less successful.

Housing finance and, specifically, the subprime private label securitisation market in the US, was at the epicentre of the global financial crisis. Excessive debt expansion in the run-up to the crisis resulted in credit risk, under-identified and mispriced ex ante, and in systemic risk. This paper considers the role of financial innovation in debt markets and the changing market structure of securitisation in the evolution of the US housing price bubble. New financing vehicles contributed to growing risk, but the more salient factor was the change in the structure of securitisation, which led to unsustainable levels of debt.

This article describes the centralised nature of the UK, briefly describes the changes now under way in Scotland and Wales and then analyses differences in output per head as between nations and regions. It then considers the scope for devolution, including fiscal devolution within England. The United Kingdom today is one of the most fiscally-centralised of all OECD countries, but there will soon be reform in Scotland and Wales, with significant devolution of tax-raising powers to Edinburgh and Cardiff. In England, there is currently no ‘state’ or ‘regional’ tier of government. There have been significant differences in GDP/GVA per head of the nations and regions of the UK for many decades. Efforts to ‘rebalance’ the GDP/GVA totals shown above have involved public expenditure and investment programmes over several decades. The results of the UK's centralised distribution of resources, if any, on changes in regional and sub-regional performance are little studied. A highly-centralised system of taxation and public expenditure is not, it would appear, a guarantee of territorial economic equalisation. In a potentially radical policy departure, George Osborne has moved further than any minister in recent times towards a form of city-regional devolution within England. In the first instance, any devolved power is likely to be over public expenditure, though in the longer term fiscal devolution may become possible. The move towards a quasi-federal UK is now well under way.

The US experienced a considerable increase in inequality between skilled and less-skilled workers during the early 1980s—a period which corresponds with a large temporary appreciation of the dollar. This article investigates the reasons behind this rise in inequality by evaluating the impact of trade with low-wage countries (LWCs) and technological change on the wage bill share of skilled workers (which is designed to capture movements in inequality arising from changes in both the relative wage and employment opportunities of the less-skilled). We find that an increase in US imports from LWCs—encouraged by the large appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s—seems to explain some of the rise in US inequality in low-skill-intensive sectors, but that technological change (proxied by R&D expenditure) explains the rise in inequality in high-skill-intensive sectors. However, given that the timing of the sudden rise in US R&D expenditure corresponds with the appreciation of the dollar, it may be the case that the deterioration in US trade competitiveness during this period contributed to the rapid increase in the rate of technological change via mechanisms such as ‘defensive innovation’. Hence one might also argue that the technology-based explanation for the rise in US inequality could actually be a trade-based explanation.

This paper looks at the urgent and ongoing need to change the business models of global systemically important banks — particularly those that dominate the OTC derivatives markets which carry massive counterparty risk via collateralisation practices. It explores the three main lessons of the financial crisis: too big to fail, excess leverage and conflicts of interest. While regulatory reforms have been plentiful, none have adequately addressed the main source of the problems which lie in the very nature of the business models of large interconnected banks.

Interest in examining the financial linkages of economies has increased in the wake of the 2008/9 global financial crisis. Applying the concepts of beta- and sigma-convergence of stock market returns, we assess changes over time in the degree of stock market integration of Russia and China with each other, as well as with respect to the United States, the Euro Area, and Japan. Our analysis is based on national and sectoral data spanning the period September 1995 to October 2010. Overall, we find evidence for gradually increasing convergence of stock market returns after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1998 Russian financial crisis. Following a major disruption caused by the 2008/9 global financial crisis, the process of stock market return convergence resumes between Russia and China, as well as with world markets. Notably, the episode of sigma-divergence from the 2008/9 crisis is stronger for China than for Russia. We also find that the process of stock market return convergence and the impact of the recent crisis have not been uniform at the sectoral level, suggesting the potential for diversification of risk across sectors.

Last year was marked by what appears to have been an unprecedented improvement in the productivity of manufacturing industries. The previous half-decade was distinguished by a productivity slowdown. This article considers recent movements in productivity at Industrial Order level, and reports the results of a survey, carried out at the end of 1981, on the factors which had been important in determining companies' productivity growth through the seventies.

Global banks are changing. With a new set of rules come new business models. We review the international dimension of the financial crisis, centring on cross-border losses and cross-currency funding problems that prompted authorities to adopt wide-ranging rescue measures and liquidity operations. Against this background, we proceed to examine the regulatory response, focusing on the Basel III framework and the ongoing work of the Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board regarding the amount of capital banks are required to hold, restrictions on maturity transformation on banks' balance sheets and proposals to mitigate the risks posed by systemically important financial institutions. Our conclusion is that capital and liquidity regulation will have distinctly different effects on the international organisation of banks. Liquidity regulation, especially when applied locally, has the greatest potential to reshape the global banking landscape.

The British economy has performed well since the recession of the early 1990s. How much of this is due to the revolution in information and communications technology (ICT)? We find that the stock of computing equipment has grown at a similar rate to that seen in the US, but there appears to have been no similar ICT-induced pick-up in productivity growth. We suggest that any underlying improvement in productivity growth has been obscured by a slowdown in manufacturing and by the need for the unemployed to be absorbed into employment. We find no evidence yet of any clear effect of ICT on pricing and suggest that any benefit of greater competition is likely to come about by encouraging productivity growth rather than by reducing margins. We argue that the main cause of Britain's improved performance lies in the labour market. Looking forward, we are optimistic that the benefits of ICT will become more apparent as the factors that have obscured it become less important.

The purpose of this paper is to bring together in comparable form some published and unpublished estimates of the effects on the United Kingdom balance of payments of entry into the EEC, and the resource costs associated with them. The effects referred to are the ‘static’ effects measured at the end of the transition period, no account being taken of any ‘dynamic’ effects, nor of the transitional arrangements.