Following the covid-induced lockdowns, many commented on the role the German model of Kurzarbeit could play in reducing unemployment. Other countries emulated the model. Looking at the experiences of Germany, the UK, Sweden and the USA, the article analyses the strengths and weaknesses of short-time working (STW) schemes. It asks whether STW has been well designed to have optimal short and longer run impact. It is quite effective as a short-term palliative, but in longer downturns, its weaknesses come to the fore. It is by no means clear that the UK needs a permanent replacement for the furlough.

In the UK already bad output figures for the first quarter were revised down in June to show a contraction of 2.4 per cent. While the national accounts indicate a larger fall (2.6 per cent) for the second quarter of 1958, methods of measurement were then different and it is probable that, were current statistical techniques used for the whole of the ONS quarterly data set which starts in 1955, the first quarter of this year would be the sharpest output fall recorded. It was probably the worst quarterly economic performance in the UK since the 1926 General Strike.

In times of decreasing mortality, one way to stabilise a PAYG pension system is to interrelate the retirement age to the anticipated average lifespan. This paper investigates two approaches for Germany: one is to keep the average retirement duration constant, the other to define a constant share of the total lifespan for the retirement period. Our simulation model uses a Leslie matrix population projection, a Solow-Swan growth model and a detailed calculation of the German pension insurance budget. Our results show quite a significant impact on the insurance level and a rather small effect on the contribution rate, which is characteristic of a Bismarckian system.

This paper examines the background to calls for further fiscal decentralisation in Scotland in the light of theories of fiscal federalism. In particular, it examines whether spatial differences in preferences, which are central to ‘first generation’ theories of fiscal federalism can be argued to play a central role in the case for granting Scotland further tax and spending powers. ‘Second generation’ theories of fiscal federalism draw attention to the political economy of allocating tax powers to different levels of government. Some of the authors in this strand of theory argue that the case for allocating tax powers to subnational governments can be made in terms of ‘accountability’ – the notion that local politicians can be better held to account for the outcomes of policy actions. Our empirical analysis suggests that there is no clear difference in preferences between Scotland and the rest of the UK along a number of key political dimensions. However, the Scottish parliament enjoys substantially higher levels of trust among the Scottish electorate than does the UK parliament.

Oil and gas from the North Sea will make the United Kingdom a net exporter of energy in the 1980s and supply a substantial portion of its needs through the 1990s. In value terms, the benefits are principally to the balance of payments and government revenue. The former is improved slightly relative to the pre-oil price rise position, but significantly compared with either the present balance or that of other industrial countries. The absolute size of these benefits and the share of the government in the total are extremely sensitive to the assumptions made about changes in the exchange rate, including those which result from the improvement in the balance of payments. Many decisions about the distribution of the benefits are already being taken, for example in policies for the energy sector and the exchange rate. It is therefore too late to plan to allocate all the benefits to a single purpose, and it may be undesirable to do so.

Since the mid-1990s the growth performance of the Euro Area as a whole, despite some good individual country performances, has failed to keep pace with developments elsewhere in the EU (including the UK) and also in the US. This is especially the case for a number of the larger Euro Area economies. Despite an encouraging performance in terms of its labour input trends, there has been a significant, offsetting, deterioration in the Euro Area's underlying productivity performance. This is driven in large part, worryingly, by a marked downward shift in the growth rate of total factor productivity. Looking to the future, no significant recovery is predicted in the Euro Area's underlying economic performance over the period 2007–11. While the policy challenge is a serious one, the Euro Area as a whole can take comfort from the fact that the gains from a successful refocusing of its overall reform agenda could be considerable. For example, the progressive introduction of the five key measures linked to the Lisbon strategy (i.e. the services directive; reduction of the administrative burden; improving human capital; 3 per cent R&D target; and increases in the employment rate) could boost the Euro Area's economic and employment growth rates by more than ½ a percentage point annually for more than a decade. Such an outturn would give the Euro Area a potential growth rate of around 2½ per cent, a rate of growth which in per capita terms would be broadly comparable to that of the US over the 2007–15 time period and, on the basis of current trends and policies, slightly better than that of the UK.

There is much debate at present about trends in public expenditure. The recent Green Paper on the longer-term outlook for public spending describes how public expenditure has risen faster than GDP in the past and raises the question whether total public spending need grow at all, in real terms, in future although the growth of GDP is projected at over 2 per cent a year. This article is not intended to offer any normative comment on future policy for government spending. Its purpose is to describe some preliminary results of a study of the growth of government spending and its relationship to GDP in the United Kingdom; it also makes some comparisons, in rather broad terms, of the experience of this country with that of some other countries.

Restoring sustainable public finances in the aftermath of the Great Recession is a key challenge in most EU countries. In order to learn from history, our paper examines consolidation episodes in the EU since 1970. We shed light on the factors that favour the start of a consolidation episode and determine its success. Compared to the existing literature, we add a number of new dimensions in the analysis. First, we explore a broader set of potential ingredients of the ‘recipe for success‘, including the quality and strength of fiscal governance and the implementation of structural reforms. Secondly, we check whether the ‘recipe for success’ changed over time. Our analysis broadly confirms received wisdom concerning the conditions triggering a consolidation episode and the role of the composition of adjustment for success, with some qualifications related to the role played by government wages. In addition it provides evidence that well-designed fiscal governance as well as structural reforms improve the odds of both starting a consolidation episode and achieving a lasting fiscal correction. We also show that, over time, successful and unsuccessful consolidation episodes have become more similar in terms of adjustment composition.

For some six years now the Federation of British Industries has been circulating a questionnaire to its members on industrial trends and prospects. The aim of this article is to assess the usefulness of the answers. The only practicable way to do this is to find a method of comparing the FBI results with official economic statistics. The FBI results will be helpful if they can be used to anticipate, confirm, supplement or on occasions correct the official series.

We all recognise environmental problems—the pollution of air and rivers, the destruction of rain forests, global warming. The article argues that environmental problems are less the result of inappropriate values than of an incorrect calculus, and that economic evaluation and economic instruments have a major role to play in the correction of that calculus.

The green prescription of lower growth as a means of reducing environmental damage is dismissed—if higher output is often the cause of the problem, it is also what enables us to afford to deal with it. Policy should start from an adequate evaluation of the costs and benefits of action and inaction; the article instances nitrate in water, where the costs of rectification seem out of proportion to any likely benefit. Market mechanisms—such as taxes and tradeable licences—are often the best way of tackling environmental problems; but economists are sometimes as naive about their general applicability as non-economists about the effectiveness of prescriptive regulation.

After the fall of the Conservative Government in February 1974, at the end of that period of incomes policy, the rise in average earnings in the UK went up to a figure of 30 per cent in the year to mid-1975. In the first stage of the incomes policy which followed, that figure was brought down to 14 per cent and in the second stage to 8 per cent. There can be no reasonable doubt that this deceleration was the consequence of the incomes policies adopted. None of the equations which have been put forward to represent the ‘normal’ movement of wage rates or earnings would have produced a deceleration of this kind. The third stage of incomes policy, now coming to an end, differed significantly from the first two. In the first two stages, the numerical limit set for earnings increases had the explicit backing of the General Council of the TUC. The third stage did not have this backing (although the General Council did support the twelve-month rule); it was left to the Government to try to hold the figure of a 10 per cent rise in average earnings, with a variety of ad hoc sanctions on employers who exceeded the figure, and with a number of exceptions for productivity agreements of varying degrees of genuineness. The resulting rise in average money earnings is likely to be of the order of 15 per cent.

This note looks at estimates of the current scale of the output gap in the UK and at the factors that affect estimates of the trend rate of growth. These issues are central to the debate on macroeconomic policy, both in the short and the long run. The speed at which the economy returns to full capacity, along with the scale of the output gap, will be important factors affecting average growth over the next five years. In the longer term, trend growth at full capacity is not immutable, but rather depends upon the rate of labour augmenting technical progress and the growth of the labour force. In the medium term these factors can be added to by temporary bursts of capital augmenting technical progress and by changes in the user cost of capital that may change the optimal capital-output ratio. Other factors, such as the cost of materials, also affect potential output. Over the past few months there has also been a significant rise in oil prices, and we judge this to have a strong permanent component which will reduce trend growth in the short term and trend output in the longer term. Its implications are more fully discussed in Barrell, Delannoy and Holland in this Review.

I summarise new facts on hours worked differences across countries and their driving forces. The facts are derived from a comprehensive analysis of micro data sets. First, hours worked are substantially higher in poor than in rich countries. Second, lower hours worked in Europe than in the US can partly be explained by differences in vacation weeks and partly by differences in the demographic structure. Moreover, employment rates tend to be higher and weekly hours worked lower in Western Europe and Scandinavia than in the US, with the opposite being true in Eastern and Southern Europe. Last, among core-aged individuals, married women form the group that exhibits the largest differences in hours worked across countries. International differences in taxation, and especially in the tax treatment of married couples, are an important driver of these differences.

It is now widely recognised in advanced industrialised countries that ability to exploit technological innovation competitively is dependent upon the levels of skill available in the working population. In the early 1960s, both France and Britain took steps to remedy the problem of levels of craft and technician-level skills which were inferior to those of Germany. In the intervening twenty years, these intermediate skill levels have become increasingly important, in particular for manufacturing efficiency as micro-electronic control equipment and the efficient logistical organisation of production demand a new and wider range of technical services to maximise machinery utilisation and to combine it with the satisfaction of more sophisticated consumer requirements.

In this note we discuss the behaviour and determinants of UK imports of manufactured goods, focusing particularly on the period since the end of 1979. The behaviour of imports has important short and long-run implications for the rest of the economy. Attention is frequently focused on imports of manufactured goods and the UK's worsening net trade position in such goods, which has moved from a surplus of about 22 billion in 1982 to a deficit of around £4 billion (or a balance of payments basis) in 1984. One of the outstanding features of import behaviour is the persistent upward trend in the ratio of manufactured imports to ‘final demand’ (chart 1). We hope to throw some light on whether this long-term trend is due merely to increased international specialisation in production and lower tariff barriers or is indicative of an endemic weakness of the UK manufacturing sector in terms of non-price competitiveness.