Within the last decade a number of British workplaces have signed agreements incorporating final-offer arbitration (FOA), a well known procedure in the US but unusual in British industrial relations. This is the first thorough study of recent British experience. Data are drawn from a postal survey of 72 plants, yielding information on nearly 300 wage bargaining rounds, and from interviews with eight managers at FOA plants which had disputes under the procedure. A full picture of the style and impact of FOA procedures in British workplaces is documented.

This paper analyses the domestic performance of UK multinational firms from two perspectives: (i) their productivity relative to foreign multinationals, domestic exporters and non-exporters, and (ii) their ability to benefit newly acquired affiliates. Nonparametric analysis shows that the productivity distribution of UK multinationals is dominated by their foreign counterparts (especially US firms), and quantile regressions reveal that the performance disadvantage of UK multinationals is more pronounced at the higher end of the productivity distribution. Using a difference-in-differences methodology, it is found that, unlike foreign acquisitions, take-overs of domestic non-exporting firms by UK multinationals do not appear to lead to any productivity improvements.

The world's non-renewable resources are obviously finite—and the renewable ones are also limited—and without scientific and technological advance mankind would long ago have been facing serious material shortages. Earlier anxieties, however, did not materialise since new materials have been discovered or new methods introduced to produce and process them. This study surveys the history of some three dozen materials which are new, or were ‘new’ at the time of their introduction in general use. Many of them were developed or discovered as the outcome of a need—wartime or market pressure—whilst others were the result of spontaneous and random scientific/technological push. The conclusion suggests that whilst history does not necessarily repeat itself in solving future problems of material shortages it provides basis for the hope that progress will overcome possibly emerging scarcities.

This article examines the movement of output per employee in one hundred and sixty industries between 1968 and 1979. It concludes that the slowdown in productivity and output growth rates observed for aggregate manufacturing industry since 1973 was fairly typical of the experience of most individual industries; and that no shift in the relation between productivity and output growth could be identified.

This paper seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the long-term factors that explain divergent price levels across developed and emerging European countries. We provide stylised facts about the structural factors that influence market and non-market-based service, house and goods prices. The stylised facts show that there is much more behind differences in price levels among European countries than the much heralded Balassa-Samuelson effect and that prices other than those of market services are potential determinants of price levels and inflation rates in emerging Europe. Finally, we sketch out the possible mismatches between price level convergence and inflation rates.

The debt-deflation theory of Irving Fisher has received renewed attention recently as analysts have attempted to provide an explanation for the behaviour of the UK economy over the current business cycle.

Fisher (1933) asserted as part of his ‘creed’ on business cycle theory that ‘in the great booms and depressions, each of [a set of other factors] has played a subordinate rôle as compared with two dominant factors, namely over-indebtedness to start with and deflation following soon after … In short, the two big bad actors are debt disturbances and price level disturbances.’ (Italics in original.)

This paper presents new data series designed to yield a more complete picture of the growth in average skill levels embedded in the EU workforce, comparing with competitor countries such as the US and China. Harmonised data from EU surveys are employed to extend coverage in existing databases to more countries, to cover the period of the financial crisis, and to skills acquired through informal workforce training. The results indicate growth in labour quality in the EU15 marginally below the US, convergence of the group of new member states to the EU15 but no sign of convergence of China to more developed regions. There is evidence of a pronounced rise in labour quality in most countries after 2007, consistent with theories of labour hoarding, but with some notable exceptions. Expanding the conventional measures of labour quality to include informal training leads to small but significant increases in the growth of human capital in some EU15 member states.

The occasion for this conference is the 50th anniversary of the white paper on Employment Policy, Cmnd. 6527, presented by the Minister of Reconstruction to Parliament in May 1944. It is a short paper, just 3 pages long, and much of that length is devoted to the special difficulties in the labour market that were expected during the transition from war to peace. The detailed policy proposals set out in the white paper were not implemented in quite the way that was foreseen. Nevertheless this slim document did signal a new approach to economic policy quite different to the approach of governments pre-war. The most important sentence is the first. ‘The Government accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment after the war’. The paper would have been a landmark in the history of economic policy if it had said no more than that.

The article begins with an account of the way in which the value of the pound has changed over the last 1300 years or so. This is indicated in terms of silver and, for the last 7–800 years, also in terms of gold, wheat and Phelps-Brown's general cost of living basket. It is shown, for example, that the whole of the increase in the price of silver since 1000 has occurred in the last 60 years. These prices are used to indicate how the real wage of a building labourer has changed since the 13th century. The article then proceeds to an account of the evolution of the currency itself, from its beginning as a pound of silver cut into 240 pennies (following continential practice) to the move to a gold currency and the introduction of paper money. It concludes with a discussion of whether the whole concept of currency will eventually become obsolete.

Private sector employment rose by over a million in the past three years. Commentators often interpret this number – which is a net figure – as ‘job creation’. But how many jobs really are created each year, and conversely how many are lost? How has this changed with the downturn and what does it imply for the recovery?

This article uses findings from business and workplace-level data to map i) job creation and destruction over recent years, ii) its components in accounting terms, iii) the relative contribution by firms of different size and age, and iv) the reallocation of resource between firms and to workplaces within firms. There are four main points:

1. a) Job churn far outweighs net change. Before the downturn, an average of 4.0 million jobs were created each year and a slightly smaller number lost (3.7m), resulting in a net increase of about 300,000 per year.

2. b) Most job creation (over 70 per cent) is within existing firms; but within that, over a third comes from the creation of new workplaces set up within those firms.

3. c) The net reduction in jobs in 2008–11 was not, in contrast to earlier recessions, due to higher rates of job loss; instead it reflects a sustained period of lower job creation in new workplaces, especially in SMEs (figure 1). This is consistent with ongoing credit constraints hitting SMEs particularly hard, as discussed in Armstrong et al. (2013), or could simply be in line with lack of confidence to invest at this time.

4. d) Looking at the years 2008–11 individually, the downturn begins with reduced levels of entry, followed by a peak of job destruction in 2009 in line with reduced aggregate demand, and then a continuation of low levels of entry of new SMEs, and lower levels of destruction too (figure 2).

Research on anti-immigrant attitudes in the United Kingdom in the past has focused primarily on feelings of prejudice driven by local concentrations of ethnic minorities. The immigration debate, however, has arguably changed since the EU expansions and the economic crisis of the past decade. This paper tests whether public support for immigration restriction is empirically driven by factors such as resource scarcity and economic stagnation, skill supply of native and immigrant workers, and the origin of immigrants from poorer countries within and outside the EU. Survey data from the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2010 are matched with regional level indicators calculated using the UK Labour Force Surveys. Findings suggest that support for immigration restriction is higher in regions where more immigrants are unemployed, but lower in regions where more natives are unemployed for longer than a year. Both the origin and ethnicity of the immigrant population appear to play a role in immigration policy preferences among native respondents.

We apply insights from the political economy of secession to analyse the early years of the Irish Free State (IFS). The IFS was fortuitous in a debt settlement that enabled it to begin its existence debt free while also receiving financial assistance to quell civil unrest. Yet the IFS was unable to continue to provide the welfare spending inherited from the old regime thereby exacerbating inequality. The IFS also maintained a sterling peg, which led to a milder experience of the depression era. Ultimately, however, the benefits of independence were not forthcoming in the early years of the IFS.

Unanimity on the question of UK exit from the EU is not within reach, but this does not mean that the House of Commons or the population at large can not find a way out of the current Brexit impasse that is fair and legitimate. We discuss different voting procedures which satisfy some important principles of democracy and which can select the option that can win a majority against all other alternatives in a head-to-head majority vote. We argue that strategic considerations play an important role and we propose a procedure that works well and can help break the impasse when voters act strategically. The procedure requires (1) that all options with some minimum support are on the agenda, (2) that voting takes place in multiple rounds and (3) that in each round the alternative with the least support is eliminated until in the last round only two alternatives are left and the majority winner is selected. We discuss how this procedure can be modified to take into account that some voters may vote non-strategically and how it, in practice, could be used either in the House of Commons or in a new referendum.

This article shows how new time series models can be used to track the progress of an epidemic, forecast key variables and evaluate the effects of policies. The univariate framework of Harvey and Kattuman (2020, Harvard Data Science Review, Special Issue 1—COVID-19, https://hdsr.mitpress.mit.edu/pub/ozgjx0yn) is extended to model the relationship between two or more series and the role of common trends is discussed. Data on daily deaths from COVID-19 in Italy and the UK provides an example of leading indicators when there is a balanced growth. When growth is not balanced, the model can be extended by including a non-stationary component in one of the series. The viability of this model is investigated by examining the relationship between new cases and deaths in the Florida second wave of summer 2020. The balanced growth framework is then used as the basis for policy evaluation by showing how some variables can serve as control groups for a target variable. This approach is used to investigate the consequences of Sweden’s soft lockdown coronavirus policy in the spring of 2020.

In this article, I evaluate the challenges related to the European Commission's output gap method of calculating the structural budgetary position, and assess its bottom-up alternatives in the EU's fiscal framework using the Finnish data for the years 1984–2014. The results reinforce the impression of the limited capacity of the output gap method to predict cyclical changes in real time and suggest that using the output gap method to steer fiscal policy tends to lead to a procyclical policy (stimulus in upturns and austerity in downturns). The bottom-up assessment methods that are based on discretionary fiscal policy measures appear to work better, and using them to steer fiscal policy could make the policy more effective.

This article examines changes in the pattern of the United Kingdom's visible trade with the original members of the European Economic Community and with Ireland, Denmark and the EFTA countries since her entry to the EEC in January 1973. It is concluded that UK-EEC trade has grown faster than might have been expected in the absence of entry, with little or no loss of non-agricultural trade in the other markets.

Fiscal pacts and automatic stabilisers are widely discussed in the policy debate. Pacts put bounds on borrowing, and the bounds have to be evaluated. We use our model, NiGEM, to set safe targets for European deficits. Although there are many issues to consider, we conclude that cyclically adjusted target deficits of 1 per cent of GDP would ensure that governments seldom had to borrow more than 3 per cent of GDP, especially if they stood ready to raise taxes when the deficit deteriorated either for reasons separate from cyclical developments or because supply shocks had occurred. Offsetting the automatic stabilisers when supply shocks occur is shown to help stabilise output volatility.