This paper argues that changes in the financial and monetary regimes since the early 1980s may have made it more likely that financial factors in general, and the booms and busts in credit and asset prices in particular, act as drivers of economic fluctuations. As a result, the current environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build-up of financial imbalances, ie. overextensions in (private sector) balance sheets that herald economic weakness and disinflation down the road, as they unwind, raising also the risk of financial strains and possibly even broader financial instability. Achieving simultaneously monetary and financial stability may call for some significant refinements to current policy frameworks, based on closer cooperation between prudential and monetary authorities. These refinements include a strengthening of the macroprudential orientation of regulatory and supervisory frameworks ensuring that monetary frameworks allow enough room for manoeuvre to lean pre-emptively against the build-up of the imbalances.

This paper summarises the results of a major revision of the data underlying a previous study of Britain's productivity position in an international perspective (O'Mahony, 1999). Thus it examines the productivity record of the UK relative to the US, France, and Germany. There have been a number of changes since the original study which necessitated a revision rather than a mere updating of previous estimates. These included changes to national accounts definitions of value added to include immaterial investments following the adoption of SNA93 by these countries, labour input revisions which allow the distinction between jobs and persons employed, extensive revisions to industrial classifications and the desire to present estimates for unified Germany rather than the former West Germany. In addition the data series were extended to include a division of capital stocks by asset type which allows for a more refined treatment of capital input in explaining relative labour productivity performance. Hence the first aim of this paper is to see if these changes have significantly altered perceptions of Britain's relative productivity position. The evidence on the extent to which Britain has improved its relative productivity position in the past decade is presented and the paper re-examines the issue of the impact of its investment record in both physical and human capital on Britain's labour productivity shortfall. Since the publication of the original study, much of the productivity literature has focused on the new economy and, in particular, the impact of information and communications technology (ICT) on productivity trends. The association between ICT and sector productivity growth rates is also considered below.

This note analyses the recent experience of the United States electronics industry in terms of a ‘product cycle’ view of international competitiveness. This view starts from the observed fact that, as a product passes from invention to maturity, the rate of growth of demand will vary ; it will begin slowly, accelerate for a time, and then slow down again when the product becomes mature. The proposition put forward here is that these phases of growth tend to be accompanied by changes in the relative importance of the various factors of production-skilled and unskilled labour, capital, and management ability. These changes-set out in abbreviated form in table 1 and chart 1-have implications for international competitiveness.

A multicountry econometric model and stochastic simulation are used to estimate the stabilization costs of the European Monetary Union (EMU). A measure of the variability of output and other variables is computed for the current regime and for the EMU regime. The results show that Germany is hurt the most in terms of increased output variability in moving from the current regime to the EMU regime.

Macroeconomic policy in Europe is now oriented to creating a stable environment in which the scope for output growth is enhanced. However, we maintain that not all dimensions of a stability-oriented policy framework appear to be in place. Fiscal policy rules and arrangements have been much discussed, but their design is not yet settled. The Single Market Programme has transformed competition in Europe, but its full implications for macroeconomic stability, especially its implications for financial market stability in combination with the Single Currency, have not yet been fully appreciated by policymakers. Future pension issues in the context of population ageing will pose a major challenge. We discuss the design of fiscal policy in (a Single Market) Europe, looking at fiscal pacts and the need for Europe-wide financial regulation in an integrated financial market as well as pension reform aspects.

I argue that the offsetting effect of public pension contributions on household retirement saving depends on how closely the public pension programme imitates a private retirement saving plan (i.e. the ‘actuarial’ content of the public pension programme) — the closer the design of the programme to a private retirement saving plan, the higher the offset. I estimate the determinants of household saving rates in a cross-country panel, augmenting standard measures of public pension programme generosity and cost by indicators that proxy the actuarial component of the programme. These indicators affect saving rates as predicted.

One of the main aims of short-term economic policy in Britain has been to regulate the pressure of demand for labour, and to keep the fluctuations of the unemployment percentage within fairly narrow limits. High unemployment is obviously undesirable; at the other end of the scale, if the pressure of demand for labour is too strong, this tends to lead to excessively high wage increases and to balance of payments difficulties. It is for the Government to decide at what pressure it wishes to run the economy, and to try to keep it there.

Increasing attention has been paid in Europe in recent years to the question of why firms invest abroad. This reflects both the rapid growth in foreign direct investment within Europe, along with recent improvements in the quality and availability of data. At the heart of the debate is a focus on the costs and benefits of foreign investment, such as whether inward investment affects employment and economic growth and whether outward investment is simply ‘job exporting‘, with firms moving to low-cost, labour-abundant locations. An understanding of the motives behind firms’ decisions to invest overseas is of particular importance for the UK, whose aggregate stocks of outward and inward foreign direct investment reached 30 per cent and 21 per cent of GDP respectively at the end of 1995.

If current demographic trends continue, the combined population of the twenty-five countries that currently make up the European Union will age rapidly and decline in size in the coming decades. As the EU population ages and declines, so will its labour force, which will likely constrain the labour market and generate lower rates of economic growth. Data from the most recent round of United Nation population projections is used to illustrate the scale of these changes.

In recent years continued disparities between countries in economic performance combined with the rapid pace of technological change have led to growing interest in comparisons of ‘national systems of innovation’. The development of this concept reflects increased awareness of both the cumulative, informal nature of much innovative activity—especially the interaction between producers and prospective users of new products—and the ways in which national-institutional structures condition the decisions taken by key actors in the innovative process such as enterprises, universities, and individual engineers, scientists and other members of the labour force (Lundvall, 1988; Freeman, 1988; Westney, 1993; Soskice, 1993).

Childcare provision in the UK has evolved alongside the expansion of mothers' employment, transforming the experiences of successive generations. This paper reviews some mixed evidence on child outcomes of maternal employment and offers a detailed examination of the working mothers' use of childcare. In particular, it looks at the differential use of formal and informal childcare provision using the first survey of the Millennium Cohort Study, which is compared, as far as possible, with evidence from the earlier birth cohort studies in 1970 and 1958. The affordability and trustworthiness of formal childcare remains a constraint on its use and indirectly on labour supply for some mothers.

The UK economy has suffered through two deep recessions over the last decade and, as a consequence, its productive structure has undergone a major transformation. The most visible consequences of these events include two waves of large scale job shedding (with profoundly different regional impacts) accompanied by persistently high unemployment throughout the 1980s and early-1990s. This time period has also seen steeply rising small and large firm failure rates, a major reshuffling in the ownership of many businesses, severe imbalances between the supply of and demand for certain types of skills exacerbated by regional immobilities in labour, a crisis of consumer confidence coupled with a reluctance by consumers to take on (or add to) their long-term debt, and a general decline in the authority and confidence with which demand management policies have been pursued.

As the tenth anniversary of EMU is approaching, a debate is underway as to whether the single currency has promoted or hindered convergence among the countries of the Euro Area. On the one hand, there is wide agreement that asymmetric shocks have subsided after the creation of the single currency, but if one moves to examine the catching-up process between the more and less affluent countries of the Euro Area, the evidence is waning. Another worrying development in the Euro Area is the emergence of unprecedented current account deficits in the southern Euro Area countries, while the northern ones enjoy substantial surpluses. To counter these new imbalances, new well-framed policy priorities are required in the Euro Area that put more emphasis on convergence and competitiveness than before.

The policy regime in Europe has put the economy on ‘auto-pilot’. We investigate different designs for the required feedback mechanisms. The uncertainty facing an economy depends on the pattern of shocks it faces, the response of the private sector to those shocks and also the policy reactions of the authorities. Two ‘ideal type’ policy regimes are investigated, and inflation targeting is compared to nominal aggregate targeting. In general it is suggested that targeting a nominal aggregate reduces the variability of the price level, and stabilises the price level more quickly over time. Inflation outcomes are also less variable for the Euro Area, and they are less asymmetric when a nominal aggregate is targeted. The new European fiscal framework requires that countries set deficit targets close to balance. We show that there is plenty of space for automatic stabilisers to work, but the room available depends in part on the monetary policy framework chosen.

This article examines the conditions under which social policy would be constrained by European economic integration and assesses whether a Social Charter is needed. It provides a framework for interpreting the ‘principle of subsidiarity’, examines the potential for a direct effect of social benefits on the movement of people within the EC, investigates the impact of the taxes used to finance social policy on the location of businesses and people and the incidence of these taxes. As the degree of labour mobility in response to differences in real wages between EC countries is demonstrated to be crucial in deciding whether a Social Charter is necessary, a substantial part of the paper examines the evidence on the responsiveness of labour mobility, and it suggests little need for a Social Charter.

This paper examines two ways in which competition works in modern capitalist economies to improve productivity. The first is through incentives: encouraging improvements in technology, organisation and effort on the part of existing establishments and firms. The second is through selection: replacing less-productive with more productive establishments and firms, whether smoothly via the transfer of market shares from less to more productive firms, or roughly through the exit of some firms and the entry of others. We report evidence from the UK suggesting that selection is responsible for a large proportion of aggregate productivity growth in manufacturing, and that much of this is due in turn to selection between plants belonging to multi-plant firms. We also investigate whether the nature of the selection process varies across the business cycle and report evidence suggesting that it is less effective in booms and recessions. Finally, although in principle productivity catch-up by low-income countries ought to be easier than innovation at the frontier, in the absence of a well functioning competitive infrastructure (a predicament that characterises many poor countries), selection may be associated with much more turbulence and a lower rate of productivity growth than in relatively prosperous societies. We report results of a survey of firms in transition economies suggesting that, particularly in the former Soviet states (excluding the Baltic states), poor output and productivity performance has not been due to an unwillingness on the part of firms to change and adapt. On the contrary, there has been a great deal of restructuring, much new entry and large reallocations of output between firms; but such activity has been much more weakly associated with improved performance than we would expect in established market economies.

Most students do not follow the ‘academic track’ (i.e. A-levels) after leaving school and only about a third of students go to university before the age of 20. Yet progression routes for the majority that do not take this path but opt for vocational post-compulsory education are not as well-known, which partly has to do with the complexity of the vocational education system and the difficulty of deciphering available data. If we are to tackle long-standing problems of low social mobility and a long tail of underachievers, it is essential that post-16 vocational options come under proper scrutiny. This paper is a step in that direction.

We use linked administrative data to track decisions made by all students in England who left compulsory education after having undertaken the national examination – the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) – at age 16 in the year 2009/10. We track them up to the age of 21, as they progress through the education system and (for some) into the labour market. We categorise the many different types of post-16 qualifications into several broad categories and we look at the probability of achieving various educational and early labour market outcomes, conditional on the path chosen at age 17. We also take into account the influence of demographics, prior attainment and the secondary school attended. Our findings illustrate the strong inequality apparently generated by routes chosen at age 17, even whilst controlling for prior attainment and schooling up to that point

Both the physical and transition-related impacts of climate change pose substantial macroeconomic risks. Yet, markets still lack credible estimates of how climate change will affect debt sustainability, sovereign creditworthiness and the public finances of major economies. We present a taxonomy for tracing the physical and transition impacts of climate change through to impacts on sovereign risk. We then apply the taxonomy to the UK’s potential transition to net zero. Meeting internationally agreed climate targets will require an unprecedented structural transformation of the global economy over the next two or three decades. The changing landscape of risks warrants new risk management and hedging strategies to contain climate risk and minimise the impact of asset stranding and asset devaluation. Yet, conditional on action being taken early, the opportunities from managing a net zero transition would substantially outweigh the costs.

The level of private sector labour productivity has been particularly weak since the start of the crisis. In this paper we explore whether impairment to capital reallocation has been contributing to this weakness. The recent increase in the dispersion of output, prices and rates of return across firms and sectors is stark, and suggests that resources have had incentives to move. Efficient allocation requires that capital moves to firms and sectors where rates of return are relatively high. And the change in capital levels across sectors has been particularly low, suggesting there has been an unusually slow process of capital reallocation since 2008 compared to previous UK recessions and other banking crises. This result is also apparent within sectors. We use a simple and general model to show that increased price dispersion can be a consequence of frictions to efficient capital allocation. And the size of this dispersion can usefully inform us about the size of the associated output and productivity loss. We then find that – using firm level data – the relationship between rates of return and subsequent capital movements has changed since the financial crisis. Overall, our results suggest that impaired capital reallocation across the UK economy is likely to have been one factor contributing to the recent weakness in productivity growth.

The idea that economic developments can affect births is an old one, going back to Malthus' Essay on Population in the early 19th century. In more recent times, the economic analysis of fertility was resurrected by Becker (1960) and developed by Easterlin (1980), Willis (1973), Becker (1981) and others. This article reports on an application of this economic approach to the analysis of fluctuations in births in Britain during the post-war period, building on previous work by De Cooman, Ermisch and Joshi (1987).