The Healing of Nations: The Promise and Limits of Political
Forgiveness. By Mark R. Amstutz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
2005, 296p. $79.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
International Governance of War-Torn Territories: Rule and
Reconstruction. By Richard Caplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005, 304p. $99.00 cloth.
In the late 1990s, the World Bank conducted a far-reaching research
program on the causes of civil war. Were civil wars inspired mainly by
genuine unresolved political grievances, or were they precipitated by
predatory groups (including governments) seeking to profit monetarily from
violence and instability? Among the bank's myriad findings, many of
them hotly disputed, came one assertion around which there was almost
universal consensus: that the single factor that made future conflict
likely was past conflict concluded within the previous five years. This
finding, based on exhaustive empirical research, has two profound
consequences for thinkers and practitioners engaged in formulating and
assessing the transition from war to peace. On the one hand, it shows that
the risks and costs of failure are high. Failure to foster political
reconciliation, to tackle the root causes of conflict, to rebuild
shattered economies and (among other things) provide a secure environment
is more likely to lead to the outbreak of war and oppression than any
other factor. On the other hand, the World Bank findings show
that—contra some skeptics who argue that third parties have no part
to play and that political conflicts are best resolved
violently—long-term success need not be a chimera: Build peace
effectively for over five years and the chances of future conflict
decrease dramatically. There are clear lessons for Iraq here—civil
war need not be inevitable, but to avoid it requires getting a wide
variety of things right that are currently going wrong.