A long-standing debate in the field of international relations concerns the relationship between power and conflict. While balance of power (BOP) theorists view parity as a condition preserving peace, power transition (PT) theorists argue that parity (and transitions) between the dominant (global or regional) power and a dissatisfied challenger make war more likely. Kelly Kadera asserts that empirical evidence on whether parity is peaceful or dangerous is quite mixed. She attempts to reconcile these seemingly disparate theories by developing a dynamic model of power and conflict. She argues that the empirical puzzle stemming from the BOP-PT debate can be resolved by “defining three types of power distribution: approximate parity, a decisive advantage, and overwhelming preponderance” (p. 81). She develops a series of dynamic models that apply under each of these conditions. The key variables in each model are a state's power and the conflict it sends and receives from its rival. She assumes that 1) a state's power is generated by a dynamic process (capturing internal growth); 2) a state's power is negatively affected by the conflict a rival directs against it; and 3) more powerful states are able to direct increasing amounts of conflict toward their rivals.

What is just and fair in international politics? Attempts to answer this question are increasingly prominent. The present work is another addition to this literature, with special attention to the processes and outcomes of international negotiations.

Several years ago during a meeting at the United States Department of Defense on the implications of national missile defense plans, I and a few collaborators asked U.S. officials how they anticipated that India would react. The initial answer was that they had not given it any serious thought, since their main focus was managing Russian concerns about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Ashok Kapur would not be surprised by this anecdote. In Pokhran and Beyond he argues forcefully that key among a number of variables explaining India's nuclear behavior was the sense that countries, particularly the United States and China, “did not take Indian security concerns seriously, and [that] Indian pleas for a strategic dialogue [went] unheeded” (p. 7).

The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform according to the editor David Lampton, endeavors to provide the reader with an in-depth understanding of the decision-making process in China as it relates to formulating China's external and strategic policies. It is the third of three books edited by Lampton that aim at the same goal.

In a globalized world where states are opening up and borders becoming more porous, one may ask what is foreign and what is foreign policy. This question is even more relevant in the case of European states where European policies certainly are not foreign policies. Within the states of the European Union, socalled domestic ministries, the Ministries of Finance or the Ministries of Agriculture, primarily, conduct “foreign policy,” while the influence of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs seems to be dwindling. The outside is inside and Europe is part of us: European policies are devised by networks of various actors at all levels, European and national, governmental and societal. In other words, foreign policy in Europe is indeed a curious beast—which is the reason that a number of authors have in the past years delved into this topic.

Theories of political realism have lost their luster in recent years: Both the classical variant and structural realist adjustments are, it has been argued, deeply flawed. An oversimplified view of what motivates states, an unwillingness to recognize the part domestic political arrangements and ideas play, and an insufficient appreciation of institutional constraints and of networks of economic interdependence undermine, it is said, the theory's foundations. Moreover, many doubts have been raised about its predictive power.

The demise of Cold War bipolarity has led to dramatic changes in the geopolitical position of Germany, as it has gone from being divided between two blocs to a reunified economic powerhouse in the space of only a few years. Germany might therefore be expected to display dramatic changes in its foreign policy behavior, and thus makes an excellent test case for putting scholarly speculations to the test. This volume presents the results of a research project designed to evaluate the explanatory power of three theoretical approaches—neorealism, utilitarian liberalism, and constructivism—as they pertain to the case of German foreign policy after reunification.