Two major domestic terrorist groups have plagued Peru over the past 20 years, the Sendero Luminoso or “Shining Path” (SL) and the Revolutionary Movement Túpac Amaru (MRTA). On 28 August 2003, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission reported that an estimated 69,280 persons were killed in the internal conflict in Peru from 1980 to 2000. Most of the victims were farmers (56%), most attacks occurred in rural settings (79%), and the SL was responsible for mostof the deaths (54%). Aggressive anti-terrorism efforts by police and military during this period, often at the expense of basic human rights, also contributed to this large burden of terrorism on Peru. During the 1990s, terrorist attacks in Peru had spread to its urban areas. On 17 December 1996, 22 members of MRTA took over the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, holding 72 hostages until the grounds were stormed by Peruvian special forces on 23 April 1997.

Until recently, emergency planning and preparedness for terrorism-related events in Peru were largely underdeveloped. In the last five years, Peru has taken two key steps towards developing a mature emergency response system, with the establishment of the country's first emergency medicine residency training program and the construction of the first dedicated trauma center in Lima.

Penetrating cardiac injuries commonly occur secondary to gunshot or stab wounds. This is a report an unusual case of a patient who sustained a penetrating cardiac injury due to a nail from a terrorism-related, nail-bomb explosion. Associated problems included pericardial tamponade, penetrating cardiac injuries, acute, traumatic, myocardial infarction, and a penetrating lung injury. Prompt diagnosis and aggressive surgical intervention resulted in full recovery of the patient.

Residents of a community who are intentionally exposed to a hazardous biological, chemical, or radiological agent (including medical first-responders and other civil defense personnel who live in that community) will exhibit a spectrum of psychological reactions that will impact the management of the incident. These reactions will range from a variety of behaviors of normal people under abnormal circumstances that either will help or hinder efforts to contain the threatening agent, deliver medical care, and reduce the morbidity, mortality, and costs associated with the disaster, to the development of new, or exacerbation of preexisting, mental disorders.

Anticipating the decisions that people will make and actions they will take as the crisis develops is hindered by the limited number of previous disasters that bear crucial similarities to a terrorist attack with a weapon of mass destruction. Such actions, therefore, could serve as models to predict community reactions. One result of a study that attempted to fill in these gaps suggested that medical first-responders and their spouses/significant others may require separately crafted information and advice to reduce the potential for disharmony within the family that could affect job performance during the crisis.

For those persons who exhibit emotional lability or cognitive deficits, evaluation of their psychiatric signs and symptoms may be more difficult than imagined, especially with exposure to nerve agents. Appreciation of these difficulties, and possession of the skill to sort through them, will be required of those assigned to triage stations. The allocation and utilization of mental health resources as the incident unfolds will be the responsibility of local consequence managers; these managers should be aware of the results of a recently-held workshop that attempted to reach consensus among experts in disaster mental health, based on the peer-reviewed literature, on the efficacy and safety of various approaches to early psychological interventions for victims of mass trauma and disasters.

Thus, psychological factors are likely to be significant in the management of a terrorist incident that involves an agent of mass destruction. Emergency medical workers with managerial responsibilities, whether limited in scope or community-wide, should be aware of these factors, and should train to handle them through effective risk communication as part of their planning and preparation.

The Republic of China on the island of Taiwan has experienced at least 20 terrorist events since 1979, including 13 aircraft hijackings and five bombings. Factors responsible for the relatively small burden of terrorism on Taiwan in the past include tight military control over political dissent until 1987, a warming relationship with the People's Republic of China in the 1990s, political inclusion of major internal cultural groups, geographic isolation, and a lack of other significant international enemies. Nevertheless, today Taiwan faces a new prospect of terrorism by adversaries of the United States and its allies and by an international paradigm shift in the types of weapons used by terrorists.

National emergency management has been enhanced significantly since the Ji Ji earthquake in 1999, including the assignment of lead government agencies to the planning and preparedness for specific types of terrorist events involving nuclear, biological, and/or chemical releases. Other significant improvements at the operations level, include the establishment of two national disaster medical assistance teams, four urban search and rescue teams, 13 local disaster medical assistance teams, and eight chemical emergency response hospitals. Future challenges include improving the coordination of inter-agency response at the national level and the quantity and quality of local disaster response assets.

The Republic of South Africa lies at the southern tip of the African continent. The population encompasses a variety of races, ethnic groups, religions, and cultural identities. The country has had a turbulent history from early tribal conflicts, colonialisation, the apartheid period, and postapartheid readjustment.

Modern terrorism developed mainly during the apartheid period, both by activities of the state and by the liberation movements that continued to the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, which saw South Africa evolve into a fully representative democratic state with equal rights for all.

Since 1994, terrorist acts have been criminal-based, evolving in the Cape Town area to political acts, largely laid at the feet of a predominantly Muslim organisation, People against Gangsterism and Drugs, a vigilant organisation allegedly infiltrated by Muslim fundamentalists. Along with this, has been terrorist activities, mainly bombings by disaffected members of white, right-wing groups.

In the apartheid era, a Draconian series of laws was enacted to suppress liberation activities. After 1994, most of these were repealed and new legislation was enacted, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001; this legislation allows the government to act against terrorism within the constraints of a democratic system. Disaster management in South Africa has been largely local authority-based, with input from provincial authorities and Civil Defence. After 1994, attempts were made to improve this situation, and national direction was provided. After 11 September 2001, activity was increased and the Disaster Management Act 2002 was brought into effect. This standardized disaster management system at national, provincial, and local levels, also facilites risk assessment and limitation as well as disaster mitigation.

The potential still exists for terrorism, mainly from right wing and Muslim fundamentalist groups, but the new legislation should stimulate disaster management in South Africa to new and improved levels.

Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are defined as operationally quantifiable management tools that provide a means for measuring effectiveness, outcome, and performance. No clear MOEs exist for determining success or failure of the management of a bioterrorism response. This is especially critical because management requires a multi-agency and multi-disciplinary decision-making and evaluation process. It is suggested that the minimum MOEs required to operationally measure outcome must contain a measuring response capacity for: (1) real-time public health surveillance system; (2) full coverage health information system; (3) capacity to measure variance across management timelines; (4) demonstrated decline in mortality and morbidity; (5) control of transmission rates of communicable agents; and (6) resource distribution across the entire population.

South Korea has experienced >30 suspected terrorism-related events since 1958, including attacks against South Korean citizens in foreign countries. The most common types of terrorism used have included bombings, shootings, hijackings, and kidnappings. Prior to 1990, North Korea was responsible for almost all terrorism-related events inside of South Korea, including multiple assassination attempts on its presidents, regular kidnappings of South Korean fisherman, and several high-profile bombings. Since 1990, most of the terrorist attacks against South Korean citizens have occurred abroad and have been related to the emerging worldwide pattern of terrorism by international terrorist organizations or deranged individuals.

The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games provided a major stimulus for South Korea to develop a national emergency response system for terrorism-related events based on the participation of multiple ministries. The 11 September 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks and the 2001 United States of America (US) anthrax letter attacks prompted South Korea to organize a new national system of emergency response for terrorism-related events. The system is based on five divisions for the response to specific types of terrorist events, involving conventional terrorism, bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, radiological terrorism, and cyber-terrorism. No terrorism-related events occurred during the 2002 World Cup and Asian Games held in South Korea. The emergency management of terrorism-related events in South Korea is adapting to the changing risk of terrorism in the new century.

Inter-agency coordination in humanitarian assistance dates as a discipline from the 1960s. The United Nations, Red Cross, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies have evolved different mechanisms to achieve it. Present practices in field-based, inter-agency coordination of the health sector remain variable and non-standardized. International experiences in coordination of humanitarian assistance reveal numerous issues of jurisdiction, authority, capacity, and competency. New tools to help overcome these issues in the health-sector coordination include binding principles of engagement, protocols for the assumption of responsibilities, standardized minimum essential data sets, and health-sector component summaries.

A terrorism movement has been active in Spain during the last 20 years, with a painful number of victims. Civil Defense is in charge of the coordination of all the structures that are implicated in a terrorist incident. There are three typical patterns of attacks: (1) individual attacks; (2) group attacks; and (3) mass attacks. The individual attacks are done with guns, usually 9 mm, fired from a short distance; victims die from serious intracranial damage. Collective attacks are done using explosives under vehicles, tramp bombs, or “bomb vehicles;” victims are of different severity with wounds, burns, and blast injuries. With mass attacks with “bomb vehicles” in buildings or crowded public places, the numbers of victims are elevated and produce brutal social consequences.

Emergency Medical Services integrated in to “Civil Defense” try to minimize the damage by initializing treatment on-scene and with the rapid provision of definitive care. During the last year, post-traumatic stress disorder treatment groups have been providing care to the victims and personnel. Chemical or biological weapons have not been used, although this is a great concern to the authorities.

The world is becoming ever more interconnected via the Internet, creating both benefits and disadvantages for human communities. This article examines cyber-terrorism, one of the major negative consequences of the Internet. It also examines the potential impact of cyber-terrorism on the health of populations, its possible perpetrators, and its prevention and control.

Over the past two decades, terrorism has exacted an enormous toll on the Republic of Turkey, a secular democracy with a 99.8% Muslim population. From 1984 to 2000, an estimated 30,000 to 35,000 Turkish citizens were killed by a nearly continuous stream of terrorism-related events. During this period, the Partiya Karekeren Kurdistan (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group (re-named KADEK in 2002), was responsible for the vast majority of terrorism-related events (and casualties), which disproportionately affected the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, in which the PKK has focused its activities. Most terrorist attacks over the past two decades have been bombings or shootings that produced <10 casualties per event. From 1984 to 2003, 15 terrorist attacks produced ≥30 casualties (eight shootings, five bombings, and two arsons). The maximum number of casualties produced by any of these events was 93 in the Hotel Madimak arson attack by the Tu r kish Islamic Movement in 1993.

This pattern suggests that terrorist attacks in Turkey rarely required more than local systems of emergency medical response, except in rural areas where Emergency Medical Services (EMS) are routinely provided by regional military resources. The last decade has seen the development of several key systems of local emergency response in Turkey, including the establishment of the medical specialty of Emergency Medicine, the establishment of training programs for EMS providers, the spread of a generic, Turkish hospital emergency plan based on the Hospital Emergency Incident Command System, and the spread of advanced training in trauma care modeled after Advanced Trauma Life Support.