Geoffrey Best's article ‘Whatever Happened to Human Rights9 in the January 1990 issue of the Review touches upon many important questions which are well known to human rights scholars. These include such political, legal and philosophical difficulties as defining the concept of self-determination, the prospects for implementing certain economic and social rights and the role of international law in improving human right standards. By examining the work of René Cassin in his role as a member of the Commission for Human Rights during the early years of the United Nations, Best points to these difficulties while attempting to achieve two further objectives. The first is to provide an appreciation of Cassin's personal qualities, and the second, to demonstrate that had Cassin's views been more closely adhered to human rights would in some way be healthier today. Although Best's article is the edited text of a lecture, and is consequently not the tightly argued piece we might expect from a more considered paper prepared especially for publication, several of his claims are either questionable or mistaken.

The field of international relations (IR) theory is something of a misnomer; since it is constituted by two distinct, though not unrelated, scholarly enterprises. Its core consists of first order theorizing about the structure and dynamics of the international system, and as such it attempts to contribute directly to our understanding of world politics in the form of substantive theories like realism, liberalism, and so on. The proliferation of such theories in recent years, however, has been a cause for some disciplinary concern (or celebration as the case may be), not least because the substantive disagreements between them are as often over what kinds of questions and answers are important or legitimate as they are over the 'facts of the matter'. This has helped open the door since the mid-1980s to a wave of second order or meta-theorizing in the field. The objective of this type of theorizing is also to increase our understanding of world politics, but it does so indirectly by focusing on the ontological and epistemological issues of what constitute important or legitimate questions and answers for IR scholarship, rather than on the structure and dynamics of the international system per se.

J. A. Hobson died on April Fools’ Day in the first year of the Second World War. This, and a whimsical anecdote from A. J. P. Taylor, might appear to be enough to justify the portrayal of Hobson as an idealist. This paper critically assesses the work of J. A. Hobson and its relation to idealism as a category of international relations thought. An examination of Hobson’s writings on international relations shows that there are three distinct strands of thought, three modes of idealism. These modes of idealist thought differ on fundamental propositions about international relations as well as in their prescriptions for a reformed world order. In short, consideration of Hobson’s work destabilizes the monolithic category of idealism in international relations. Put another way, idealism blurs important distinctions in Hobson’s work.

If it is possible to measure interest in the European Community by the numbers of scholarly publications about that topic then interest today is probably greater than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War, particularly among European political scientists. But in the absence of any reliable counts of the numbers of such publications it is my guess that the increase is not much more than marginal. Indeed, those advocating or examining the prospects of a united Europe since the war ended could not have been called shrinking violets. And coincidentally, political scientists, particularly those interested in the problem of international integration have had a special interest in the European Community. It was, after all, when in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community 9 the first major attempt at regional integration which involved not only economic, but ultimately, political commitments. Such a research horn of plenty could not fail to interest the scores of political scientists, especially in the expanding American academic environment in the 1950s, looking for new questions to answer, as well as direct routes to tenure and promotion.

The agent-structure problem is not settled by deciding what proportions to put in the blender. Agents and structures do not blend easily in any proportions, and solutions to the problem tend to be unstable. Alexander Wendt's thoughtful review article makes this clear, identifies some of the difficulties, and boldly sketches a possible resolution of them. Since his relections are addressed in part to our recent book Explaining and Understanding International Relations, we welcome the chance to pursue them further. Greatly encouraged by his many friendly comments, we shall concentrate on those suggestive or critical points which have prompted us to think afresh.

The fading away of the Cold War has allegedly shifted the attention of the Western members of the United Nations, as demonstrated by General Assembly speeches, towards issues like the environment, drugs and terrorism. The new issues moving towards the top of the international security agenda are more elusive than the traditional Peace- and War-related ones; nobody has control of a ‘button’ regarding these issues. An overall assessment of the situation shows that there is a great variety of actors involved, both governmental and non-governmental. It is also increasingly recognized that the East has similar interests to the West. As a result, the East–West divide is being bridged to a significant extent, while the North–South divide is being defined in new ways.

Hold hard. Ten years on, the second wave is about to break. The ultimate Channel 4 documentary series is already in the can. It seems that the tributary of personal reminiscence from high and low (but chiefly high) has not run dry after all Recollected in tranquillity, it turns turbulent once more—as witness the fascinating collective testimony elicited by Michael Charlton in The Little Platoon (1989), at once pointer and landmark for the new wave. Already we have the Carrington memoirs, the Whitelaw memoirs, and even that most unlikely artefact, the Tebbit memoirs. From Washington come the Haig memoirs and the Weinberger memoirs, not to mention a shoal of smaller fry. Our man in Buenos Aires author of a prophetic complaint about the typical British approach to the Falklands, that is, ‘to have no strategy at all beyond a general Micawberism’ talked at length to Michael Charlton and to Peter Kosminsky (for the excellent Yorkshire TV documentary ‘Falklands—The Untold Story’). Our men in Washington and at the UN, both writers of distinction, have published revealing accounts of their stewardships. These British accounts can now be matched against the waspish reflections of Jeane Kirkpatrick, the dissentient US Representative at the UN, an exercise full of interpersonal and international interest. The generals and admirals of each side continue to be remarkably forthcoming, in one case from prison, in the other from retirement—such are the spoils of war.

Two issues have dramatized the revived potential for a decisive UN contribution to diplomacy in the 1990s. One is the rise of the environmental agenda as an issue at once, both genuinely global, and politically divisive. Conflict is generated because global warming, acid deposition, ozone depletion and marine pollution create real but also differential costs to the states of the world. The second issue, apparent since 1989, is the renewed opportunities for peacekeeping, and the credibility of economic sanctions created by the end of the Cold War and the onset of the Gulf Crisis. Some environmental threats, such as the potential consequences of rising sea-levels, also impinge on traditional military-territorial concepts of security. The fusion of these issues has given rise to the idea of environmental security which generates both an opportunity and a test for the UN's revival as a focus of multi-lateral diplomacy.