The controversial gambling decision of the Appellate Body is mostly important because of examination of the nature of Access under Article XVI GATS, the relationship of that Article to Articles XIV and XVII GATS, and the parallels with Articles III, XI, and XX GATT. Notably, the Appellate Body took the position that an apparant internal regulatory measure, which, nonetheless, had equivalent effect to a zero quota, violated Article XVI GATS. A similar measure in the area of goods would have been examined under Article III GATT and require a showing of discrimination. The facts of the case would have allowed the decision to be based on Article XVII GATS. Most of this paper deals with this issue. We agree with this interpretation of Article XVI by the Appellate Body but are critical of its hermeneutics, suffering from a textual fetish and a policy phobia. Some other elements in the decision are also examined critically.

This paper addresses the issues that came before the Appellate Body in the Softwood V dispute, concerning an affirmative antidumping determination by the US Department of Commerce. The paper addresses both the original Appellate Body opinion in the dispute, and the later opinion reviewing the compliance panel findings. We focus primarily on the ‘zeroing’ issue in ‘transaction-to-transaction (T–T)’ calculations of dumping, and briefly on two other cost-allocation issues. In general, we are ambivalent about the Appellate Body's approach to the zeroing issue. On the one hand, zeroing inflates dumping margins without any sound economic rationale for doing so. On the other hand, zeroing has been a standard administrative practice for many years and the ADA does not clearly prohibit it. The Appellate Body's legal analysis of the matter in T–T cases, in particular, rests on shaky premises. We also consider the wisdom of addressing the zeroing issue in piecemeal fashion through what has proven to be a lengthy sequence of narrow decisions.