I introduce a minimum innovation size required for patents into a Schumpeterian growth model. We show that to satisfy the patentability requirement for minimum innovation size, each research and development (R&D) firm targets only industries in which the incumbent's technology is of sufficient obsolescence. This is because the technological gap between innovator and incumbent is greater in industries using older technologies. Although the increase in minimum innovation size reduces the number of industries targeted for R&D, it also increases the amount of R&D investment directed at those targeted industries. Consequently, introducing a minimum innovation size has a nonmonotonic (or negative) effect on the aggregate flow of innovations. Further, by deriving the endogenous long-run distribution of innovation size, we show that an increase in minimum innovation size reduces the mean innovation size. This implies that even if the patent office only grants patents for superior innovations, it causes innovators to produce generally inferior-quality innovations.

We identify international output and inflation uncertainty and analyze their impact on individual countries' macroeconomic performance. Output and inflation uncertainty on an international level is measured through the conditional variances of common factors in inflation and output growth, estimated from a bivariate dynamic factor model with GARCH errors. The impact of international and country-specific uncertainty is analyzed by including the conditional variances as regressors. We find increases in uncertainty during the first and second oil crisis, the 1980s and 1990s recessions as well as the recent Great Recession to be confined to the international level. The effect of international uncertainty results to be highly significant and unambiguously negative on countries' output growth and inflation rates whereas the impact of country-specific uncertainty is very mixed.

We build a two-country model of endogenous growth to study the welfare effects of taxes on tradable primary inputs when countries engage in asymmetric trade. We obtain explicit links between persistent gaps in productivity growth and the incentives of resource-exporting (importing) countries to subsidize (tax) domestic resource use. The exporters' incentive to subsidize hinges on slower productivity growth and is disconnected from the importers' incentive to tax resource inflows—i.e., rent extraction. Moreover, faster productivity growth exacerbates the importers' incentive to tax, beyond the rent-extraction motive. In a strategic tax game, the only equilibrium is of Stackelberg type and features, for a wide range of parameter values, positive exporters' subsidies and positive importers' taxes at the same time.

The events driven by the financial crisis have highlighted limits and drawbacks of current paradigms. Economists began to rethink the role and impacts of financial factors and standard policies. At the same time, a more general sentiment of revision has challenged several consolidated “dogmas.” Accordingly, this special issue of Macroeconomic Dynamics aims to refresh the debate on some important macroeconomic topics from new and fresh perspectives. A number of questions relating to the challenges faced by macroeconomic theory and policies are raised. The issue, first, discusses some topics that stemmed from the financial factors, such as overleveraging, forward guidance, bank regulation; it then explores other “waters” related to price-setting behavior, productivity, and growth.

This special issue of Macroeconomic Dynamics presents a timely and fresh body of high-quality research on the complexity and evolution of the international oil markets, the dynamics of the price of oil, and the financialization and the interconnections of oil, energy, and nonenergy commodity markets.

We analyze the consequences of external debt collaterals on the optimal growth path of a country. We develop a small open economy model of endogenous growth where public spending can be financed by borrowing on imperfect international financial markets, where the country's borrowing capacity is limited. In contrast to the existing literature, which assumes that debt is constrained by the stock of capital, we investigate the consequences of gross domestic product (GDP)-based collaterals. First, we demonstrate that the economy may converge in a finite time, which is determined endogenously, to the regime with binding collaterals. Second, in such regime the steady-state public expenditures-to-GDP ratio is greater than that of the existing literature's models. Finally, we show that the degree of financial openness rises welfare if the collateral constraint is nonbinding and reduces welfare if the constraint binds. The first effect prevails always over the second and total intertemporal welfare increases.

This short note gives an overview of recent research on topics concerning Financial, Housing, and Monetary markets. In particular, I introduce a special issue that includes a selection of papers presented at the second International Workshop on Financial Markets and Nonlinear Dynamics (FMND) held in Paris in June 2015 (www.fmnd.fr). The papers investigate various issues and discuss hypotheses that help us to understand asset price dynamics and their impact on real activity, as well as the new rules governing financial markets. Furthermore, their conclusions can help us to improve the forecasting of market trends in the future.

In a model where banks face a capital sufficiency requirement, we demonstrate that news about a fall in the expected return on a portfolio of international long bonds held by a bank leads to an immediate and persistent fall in economic activity. Even if the news never materializes, economic activity falls below steady state for several periods, followed by a recovery. The portfolio adjustment induced by the capital sufficiency requirements leads to a rise in loan rates and tighter credit conditions, which trigger the fall in activity. We contribute to the news-shock literature by showing that imperfect signals about future financial returns can create business cycles without relying on the usual suspects—shocks to technology, preferences, or fiscal policy—and to the emerging economy business cycle literature in that disturbances in world financial markets can cause domestic business cycles without shocks to the world interest rate or to country spreads.

The perception that inflation targeting (IT) runs a high risk of indeterminacy when a significant share of households are too poor to save is an artifact of the closed economy. In the open economy, the Taylor principle is generally valid for both contemporaneous and forward-looking IT. Active policy in contemporaneous IT guarantees determinacy, eccentric cases aside. In forward-looking IT, the scope for active policy is constrained by an upper bound on the Taylor coefficient. The upper bound is insensitive, however, to the share of poor, nonsaving households. Moreover, it can be increased substantially–to a level that does not bind–through reserve sales/purchases that limit exchange rate volatility.

We add agency costs into a two-country, two-good international business-cycle model. In our model, changes in the relative price of investment arise endogenously. Despite the fact that technology shocks are uncorrelated across countries, the relative price of investment is positively correlated across countries in our model, much as it is in detrended U.S./Euro-area data. We also find that financial frictions tend to increase the volatility of the terms of trade and the international correlations of consumption, hours worked, output, and investment. We then compare this model to an alternative model that also includes risk shocks. We use credit spread data (for the United States) to calibrate the AR(1) process for risk shocks. We find that risk shocks are too small to significantly impact the model's dynamics.

This paper explores the growth effects of both consumption- and wealth-induced social comparisons in a unified small open endogenous growth model. We analytically show that in an open economy not only do these two distinct status-seeking motives have very different growth effects, but these growth effects are also quite different from the conventional wisdom based on a closed economy. Status-seeking behavior need not favor economic growth. The asset portfolios of households and the imperfection of the international asset market both play an important role and jointly govern the growth effects of social status seeking. We also perform a quantitative experiment, showing that our analytical findings are robust and empirically plausible. Our analysis provides novel implications for social comparisons and new insights into the literature.

We study whether monetary authorities in the G7 countries were changing their responses to inflation in a similar manner during and following the Great Inflation era. We find that the common to the G7 countries inflation pattern during the Great Inflation period could be associated with a common pattern in the monetary policy response to inflation: we find that until the early 1980s monetary authorities in the G7 countries responded mildly to inflation, systematically fought it throughout the 1980s and lessened again their response during the 2000s. The estimated Taylor rule coefficients on inflation are co-integrated, implying the existence of a long-run relationship in the responses to inflation during and after the Great Inflation period. At the same time, principal component analysis of the residuals of the estimated Taylor rules indicates that the shocks' structure cannot account enough for the monetary policies' co-movements. We interpret these findings as suggestive of common monetary policy patterns.

The October 1929 crash led to a complete freeze of New York open markets. Studying the Fed monetary policy conduct in a nonlinear framework, using credit spreads between open market rates and the Fed's instrument rates as a proxy for liquidity risk, we present econometric evidence that the Fed was well aware of such risks as early as 1930, reacted to the financial stress and altered its monetary policy in consequence. Our outcomes revisit conventional wisdom about the presumed passivity of the Fed throughout the 30s.

In this paper we investigate the relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices and also examine the effect of oil price uncertainty on gasoline prices. The empirical model is based on a structural vector autoregression that is modified to accommodate multivariate GARCH-in-Mean errors. We use monthly data for the United States over the period from January 1976 to September 2014. We find that there is an asymmetric relationship between crude oil and gasoline prices, and that oil price uncertainty has a positive effect on gasoline price changes. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and alternative measures of the price of oil.

Recent empirical research stresses the importance of foresight in tax policy analyses, because failing to model foresight adequately leads to two types of biases: a bias that relates to a mismatch of information sets in the presence of foresight, and one that arises when time variation in foresight is ignored. This paper incorporates tax foresight into a framework of time-varying structural vector autoregression models with stochastic volatility to account for both types of biases. This reveals the effects of changing degrees of tax foresight on U.S. tax policy. Two findings stand out: First, anticipated and unanticipated tax shocks show considerable time variations, suggesting that some tax reforms were more anticipated than others. Second, the time-varying bias reveals that tax foresight was higher during the 1980s and 1990s than during the 1960s and 1970s. The results compare well with the literature and find support in documented U.S. tax episodes.

We analyze the consequences of overleveraging and the potential for destabilizing effects from financial- and real-sector interactions. In a theoretical model, we demonstrate that, in the presence of regime-dependent macro feedback relations, a highly leveraged banking system can result in instabilities and downward spirals. To investigate this question empirically, we analyze time series from eight advanced economies on industrial production and the components of the country-specific financial stress indices constructed by the IMF. Employing nonlinear, multiregime vector autoregressions, we examine how industrial production is affected by the individual risk drivers making up the indices. Our results strongly suggest that financial-sector stress has a substantial, nonlinear influence on economic activity and that individual risk drivers affect output rather differently across stress regimes and across groups of countries.

Many oil industry analysts believe that there is predictive power in the product spread, defined as the difference between suitably weighted refined product market prices and the price of crude oil. We derive a number of alternative forecasting model specifications based on product spreads and compare the implied forecasts to the no-change forecast of the real price of oil. We show that not all product spread models are useful for out-of-sample forecasting, but some models are, even at horizons between one and two years. The most accurate model is a time-varying parameter model of gasoline and heating oil spot price spreads that allows for structural change in product markets. We document mean-squared prediction error reductions as high as 20% and directional accuracy as high as 63% at the two-year horizon, making product spread models a good complement to forecasting models based on economic fundamentals, which work best at short horizons.

For the United States, the supply and wages of skilled labor relative to those of unskilled labor have grown over the postwar period. The literature has tended to explain this through “skill-biased technical change” (SBTC). Empirical work has concentrated around two variants: (1) capital-skill complementarity, (2) skill-augmenting technical change. Our purpose is to nest and discriminate between these two explanations. We do so in the framework of multilevel Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, where factors are disaggregated into skilled and unskilled labor, and capital into structures and equipment capital. Using a five-equation system approach and several nesting alternatives, we retrieve estimates of the substitution elasticities and technical changes. Our estimations can produce results in line with capital-skill-complementarity hypothesis. However, those results are outperformed where the only source of the widening skill premium has been skill-augmenting technical change. We also show that the different explanations for SBTC have different implications for projected developments of the premium.

We apply a structural dynamic factor model to a large quarterly data set covering 38 countries between 2002 and 2011 to analyze China's role in global inflation dynamics. We identify Chinese supply and demand shocks and examine their contributions to global price dynamics and the transmission mechanism. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Chinese supply and demand shocks affect prices in other countries significantly. Demand shocks matter slightly more than supply shocks. Producer prices tend to be more strongly affected than consumer prices by Chinese shocks. The overall share of international inflation explained by Chinese shocks is notable (about 6 percent on the average over all countries but not more than 13 percent in each region). (ii) Direct channels (via import and export prices) and indirect channels (via greater exposure to foreign competition and commodity prices) both matter. (iii) Differences in trade and in commodity exposure help explain cross-country differences in price responses.

This article presents a Ricardian model of trade with learning-by-doing to study the effect of barriers to trade in products with low growth potential on the long-run economic growth. The model shows that, when elasticity of demand for the product with a lower learning potential is greater than unity, a tariff imposed on this product can shift the demand toward the product with a higher learning potential, thus enhancing growth in the exporter economy. Therefore, although with some possible negative effect on the welfare in the short run, barriers for the export of natural luxury goods may be beneficial for developing economies in the long run, since they increase their incentive to develop sectors with higher growth potential.