ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Chinese support for Pakatan Harapan (PH) not only remained strong in Malaysia's 14th General Elections (GE-14), consistent with voting trends of the 12th and the 13th General Elections, but was also decisive in rejecting Barisan Nasional's (BN) Chinese-based parties of Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. To understand this momentous swing in Chinese support for the former opposition coalition since 2008, we need to look beyond the election issues and campaign strategies of political parties running up to GE-14. This chapter contends that structural shifts in Malaysia's Chinese society—reflected in the profile and influence of civil society organizations and gravitation away from old, predominantly race-based political vehicles—have moved voters in general towards PH, and that allowed for the realignment of elections that took place in 2008 and 2013.

This chapter is comprised of four sections. After this introduction, the second section reviews the general trends of Chinese votes during general elections from 1959 to 2013 with a focus on the gains and losses of Chinese-based political parties in each election and scholarly interpretations of the results. The third section takes a close look at GE-14 by examining the key issues discussed among civil society groups and the campaign issues and strategies adopted mainly by the candidates belonging to the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP). The fourth and final section of the discussion looks at social changes within Malaysia's Chinese society.

TRENDS IN CHINESE VOTES (1959–2013)

1959–69: Flux and Contestation

In the years after Malaysia attained independence, political groupings of the Chinese were largely organized along ethnic and ideological lines and divided into MCA, pro-left parties and the underground Communist Party. The pro-left parties were mainly active in the states of Penang, Selangor and Perak where one finds large and concentrated populations of Chinese people (Lee and Heng 2000, pp. 206–7). DAP came onto the scene only after Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) was compelled to leave Malaysia in 1965.

The 1950s through the 1960s was a period during which Chinese votes were highly fragmented and distributed among national parties such as MCA, DAP, proleft parties and regional-based parties across the country. The 1969 general election was a watershed event which resulted in the suspension of local elections, banning pro-left parties and enacting several laws that curtailed the freedom of speech.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, Malaysia seems to have followed a global trend of countries with long-ruling regimes, in that its urban electorate has increasingly voted for opposition parties. At the same time, a majority of rural Malay voters remained loyal to the ruling coalition, Barisan Nasional (BN). Heading into GE-14, searching questions arose: how would the growing number of Malays in urban areas vote, and what would be the consequences of potentially changing preferences?

There have been several attempts in the past to explain the urban-rural divide in Malaysian elections and their wider implications. One example is a study of the 1986 general election, when the opposition won 29 out of 177 federal seats, with the Democratic Action Party (DAP) alone winning 24 urban seats. This result, namely the concentration of opposition footholds in urban areas, and the Alliance-BN's strongholds in rural districts, led many to talk of a political rural-urban divide in place since the 1960s (Ramanathan and Adnan 1988).

In a follow-up study analysing the 1990 and 1995 general elections, Ramanathan (1996) noted that rural Malay voters on one hand, and urban Malay and non-Malay voters on the other, were divided based on their access to the media—implying that rural Malays were more reliant on government-controlled Malay newspapers like Utusan Malaysia and Berita Harian for information. The same study also noted that in the rural east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu, the Islamist party, Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) managed to strengthen its position through the publication and distribution of its party newsletter Harakah.

Most recently, Maznah (2015) discussed the outcome of the 2013 General Elections (GE-13) in urban and semi-urban Malay constituencies in a study of parliamentary seats with Malay agricultural settlements managed by the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA). In that year's General Election, BN, through UMNO, won six of the eight urban constituencies with FELDA settlements. The other two seats were won by PAS, which was then part of the opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR). Regarding Malay-majority urban and semi-urban constituencies, BN won only seventeen of forty such seats in GE-13.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The general election of 9 May 2018 was a watershed in Malaysian history. The Star newspaper described the outcome as a night when the “earth moved as one Barisan parliamentary seat after another tumbled …” (Star Online, 10 May 2018). Driven by rising dissatisfaction with the Barisan Nasional (BN) rule, a deteriorating economy, anger with corruption and the 1MDB scandal, and unhappiness with the goods and services tax (GST), different segments of Malaysians voted across racial lines “sweeping away what many people in the country have for long regarded as an invincible political behemoth” (Lim, Thayaparan, and Netto 2018, p. 3).

The shockwaves were not confined to states in Peninsular Malaysia, but also spilled over to East Malaysia. In Sarawak, the ruling coalition Sarawak Barisan Nasional (Sarawak BN) lost an unprecedented twelve out of thirty-one parliamentary constituencies. This was the first time that opposition parties secured more than onethird of the state's parliamentary seats, leading Pakatan Harapan (PH) to conclude that a Sarawak tsunami had occurred (Borneo Post Online, 10 May 2018).

Just as most observers were taken aback by Pakatan Harapan's stellar performance at the national level, the outcomes of the 2018 General Elections in Sarawak were unexpected. The Sarawak state election, held in 2016, had indicated strong backing for Sarawak BN, who won that election resoundingly. In subsequent months, the state government also made progress on a number of hot-button local issues, including negotiations of the Malaysia Agreement to restore Sarawak's rights, recognition of English as a state language, and recognition of the Unified Examination Certificate (UEC) (Star Online, 1 February 2018). Consequently, the sitting Chief Minister, Abang Johari Tun Openg, expected Sarawak BN to retain at least twenty-five constituencies, and possibly acquire an additional parliamentary seat or two.

The eventual political realignment after the 14th General Elections (GE-14) was momentous, as the component parties of Sarawak BN departed from the national BN coalition. At present, this grouping—named Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS)—is still in power at the state level. Abang Johari has stated that GPS “will cooperate and collaborate with the federal government for national interest, and state rights and interests based on the Federal Constitution and the Federation of Malaysia” (Lee 2018b). Where interests do not coincide, GPS can choose to go their own way and protect Sarawak's interests.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The outcome of Malaysia's 14th General Elections (GE-14) in May 2018 was an almost universal surprise, not least to its two main protagonists, incumbent Prime Minister Najib Razak and challenger Mahathir Mohamad. The source of Najib's confidence is clear: he inherited a vast political machine that consistently delivered electoral victories to the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its coalition partners over Malaysia's six-decade-long independent history. Mahathir's doubts were likewise well founded: as one of the primary architects of that political machine during his two decades as UMNO president and prime minster, he understood well how grossly the odds were stacked against the party's challengers.

In its six decades at the helm of Malaysia's high-capacity state, UMNO strategically reshaped the electoral process in ways that reinforced its dominance of Malaysian politics. In doing so, it created a quintessential single-party dominant regime (Case 1996) in which elections were held regularly and contested by opposition parties, but were also biased to a degree that effectively prevented the transition of power. The electoral process, in short, was designed to prevent an outcome like Pakatan Harapan's (PH) unlikely victory in GE-14.

How the Mahathir-led PH coalition achieved this victory against seemingly impossible odds has already drawn significant scholarly attention. This chapter acts as a backdrop for those explanations by systematically examining the partisan bias in Malaysia's electoral process, including in the run-up to GE-14. In doing so, it provides comprehensive context for making sense of both UMNO's defeat and the myriad reform challenges facing the new government.

The first section of the chapter reviews Malaysia's institutional structure and electoral history. The second section brings Malaysia's electoral process into comparative perspective using recent data from the Electoral Integrity Project (Norris and Grömping 2017a). By these and other measures, Malaysia's electoral process was significantly more biased than other countries with comparable levels of development and institutionalization. The third section uses a theoretical framework from Birch (2011) to provide a structured overview of manipulations in each phase of Malaysia's electoral process. The final section briefly discusses the ongoing costs entailed by the electoral manipulations, including significantly impeding the reform process.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Regardless of events in years to come, 9 May 2018 will be regarded as a crucial juncture in Malaysia's history, as the 14th General Elections (GE-14) reconfigured the country's political context in many and far-reaching ways. What from afar looks like a binary preference between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Harapan (PH) is actually a mosaic of changes in the country's increasingly diverse electorate. From their base in urban areas in Peninsular Malaysia, PH expanded into semi-urban areas at the expense of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and, particularly, smaller BN component parties. Support for Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) spread outwards from Kelantan into Terengganu, as well as parts of Pahang and Kedah. In East Malaysia, the newcomer Warisan made substantial inroads into BN heartlands in Sabah. And, Sarawak, while not experiencing the same local-level swing against the incumbent, was nonetheless carried along by the momentum.

Through a multipronged approach to GE-14, this book has sought to shed light on the various factors behind these shifts in voter sentiment. It has done this by, first, looking at the context within which voters act, in terms of: the institutional rules of the game; the wider economic environment; and the availability of financial inducements. From there, it explored the perspectives of different interest groups, seeking to identify key issues facing them and the means used by the competing coalitions to attract their support. This was then complemented by an analysis of political issues and trends in key states, including three on the Peninsula (Selangor, Johor and Kelantan), and the two East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Lastly, essays from a selection of “players” in the election provided personal perspectives on the lead-up to the election and its immediate aftermath.

In addition to seeking to deepen our understanding of GE-14 through these four approaches, this book has also sought to explore the question of whether the generalized surprise at the results was due to: signs being overlooked or misread; or the result of a late surge in support for PH and PAS at the expense of BN. While important for guiding the research carried out for this book, the question is not actually binary. Indeed, the answers that have emerged from the preceding chapters indicate a complicated and changing reality with elements of both.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The study of Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) settler voting behaviour is nascent but growing. This chapter first outlines the national significance of the FELDA vote, concurrently surveying extant scholarship that has scrutinized the factors influencing FELDA settler voting decisions. It then turns to FELDA parliamentary constituency voting results in 2018, placing them in the context of three previous general elections—a longer term perspective that has been somewhat neglected in previous scholarship. Seen in this manner, the 2018 voting results in FELDA wards—defined here as parliamentary seats hosting at least one FELDA scheme—are both unusual in some ways, and not particularly remarkable in others. Four explanations for the decline in FELDA ward support for Barisan Nasional (BN) since 2004 are discussed: the popularity of Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) in northern Malaysia; ethnic disparities in voting patterns; schisms within the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), coupled with the rise of alternative Malay-majority parties and their champions; and the uneven distribution of FELDA settlements across Malaysia. To date, support for UMNO remains significant in some FELDA constituencies, but mostly in the southeast region of the Peninsula, where FELDA settlement clusters are especially dense.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FELDA VOTE

From the late 1950s to 1990, roughly 120,000 low-income households were recruited by FELDA into over 300 agency-led land development schemes, occupying over half a million hectares of farmland (Figure 9.1). Virtually no Malaysian state has been left untouched by these endeavours, save Penang, Sarawak, and the Federal Territories. The principal beneficiaries of these mostly rubber and oil palm cultivation schemes have been land-starved Malay households, supposedly selected on the basis of age, economic need, agricultural background, physical fitness, functional nuclear family unit, and prior military/security service (FAO 1966, pp. 18–19). Historian Tim Harper has noted that federally subsidized land schemes from the outset were also political creatures, not just in their underlying aims of rejuvenating the Malay rural economy, but as exemplified by the increasingly centrist bureaucratic structures used to perpetuate rural development, themselves the offspring of anti-Communist Emergency campaigns during the late 1940s and 1950s (Harper 1999, pp. 366–67).

Summary

ENTERING PARTY POLITICS

On 6 January 2017, I decided to join the Democratic Action Party (DAP) because of its commitment to the struggle of women in Malaysia. DAP had demonstrated sincerity and resolve in empowering women in politics.

In 2015, the party's leadership made a constitutional change to set a minimum quota of 30 per cent of women at the Central Executive Committee (CEC) level. It was a positive step to encourage more women to participate in politics, especially at decision-making levels—an initiative many women saw as a turning point for DAP's campaign. At the ground level, party leaders consciously started to appoint women leaders in all Sabah parliamentary seats where DAP is active, and to hold talks with women leaders to engage their participation. These women leaders, in turn, mobilized other women, especially in Sandakan, Penampang and the state's interior, to be actively involved in gearing up for GE-14.

In March 2017, DAP Sabah appointed me Ketua Wanita (Women's Chief) and a member of the DAP State Committee, because there were vacancies following the crossover of seven DAP committee members to Parti Warisan Sabah. Although I had worked in the non-governmental organization (NGO) sphere for more than thirty years, as someone who was new to politics, I still had to lot to learn about internal party dynamics. The crossovers, coupled with recently concluded and divisive party elections, posed major challenges to DAP Sabah's preparation for GE-14. However, thanks to the firm advice by Lim Kit Siang to immediately appoint replacements, DAP Sabah was able to move forward.

I had no idea about party structure when I joined, but there was speculation that state elections might be held as early as May 2017, so I immediately began to mobilize support from women voters. My forte is in building networks, so organizing existing Sabah women leaders into campaign teams was easy enough, especially with very supportive DAP state and national leaders. A personal challenge then was the internal friction between the DAP Sabah chairman and the then Kapayan Assemblyman and DAP Sabah deputy chairman, Edwin Bosi, which already existed when I joined DAP.

Summary

The Secretary of State's semiofficial note of January 12 in regard to the control of certain islands in North Borneo was duly forwarded by His Majesty's embassy to Sir Edward Grey, who has now replied, giving the views of the British North Borneo Company on the four points raised in that note.

In regard to the first point, the company deprecate having to submit a chart showing the line dividing North Borneo from American territory. They point out that to prepare such a chart would necessitate the dispatch of a joint delimitation commission, which would involve considerable expense. His Majesty's embassy is, however, authorized to communicate to the State Department the inclosed map as showing the limits within which the company desire to carry on the administration.

Summary

Convention signed at Washington January 2, 1930: exchanges of notes

at Washington January 2, 1930 and July 6, 1932

Senate advice and consent to ratification February 11, 1930

Ratified by the President of the United States February 21, 1930

Ratified by the United Kingdom November 2, 1932

Ratifications exchanged at Washington December 13, 1932

Entered into force December 13, 1932

Proclaimed by the President of the United States December 15, 1932

47 Stat.2198; Treaty Series 856

CONVENTION

The President of the United States of America and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

Being desirous of delimiting definitely the boundary between the Philippine Archipelago (the territory acquired by the United States of America by virtue of the Treaties of December 10, 1898, and November 7,1900, with Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain) and the State of North Borneo which is under British protection,

Have resolved to conclude a Convention for that purpose and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States of America,

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State of the United States of America; and

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India,

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

The Right Honorable Sir Esme Howard, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., C.V.O., His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Washington;

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I

It is hereby agreed and declared that the line separating the islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago on the one hand and the islands belonging to the State of North Borneo which is under British protection on the other hand shall be and is hereby established as follows:

Summary

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Your note of November 6 reminded me that a respond has not yet been forthcoming to the memorandum which you left with me on the 23rd June last in relation to the administration or leasing of certain small islands on the North Bornean coast by the British North Borneo Company.

The matter has required much consideration and involved delay which I regret, and even at this late day I am not at all clear as to the most practical way to give effect to the desire of your Government by a formal agreement.

I apprehend that the difficulty in the way of a conventional delimitation of the boundary between the former possessions of Spain in the Sulu Archipelago, now belonging to the United States, and the North Bornean territories on or adjacent to the mainland of Borneo, may lie in the circumstance that the North Bornean domain is not an imperial possession of Great Britain, but is held by a British Chartered Company under grant of the native Sultans and under the protection of the Crown in virtue of such grant. If this be so, I can discern impediments to an international convention between our two countries for establishing a boundary line between their respective sovereignties—and I can equally see that objections might be raised to undertaking to fix that boundary by agreement between this Government and a chartered corporation having per se no national status.

Something of the same difficulty might arise in the case of the United States undertaking to lease the islands to a chartered company not having the standing of a government. The third condition of your memorandum illustrates this point, suggesting, as it does in effect, that such a lease should carry with it power to the company to grant titles and concessions binding upon the United States and to make valuable improvements, which would be an eventual charge upon this Government should the United States terminate the lease and reenter upon the property.

Summary

Introduction

Indonesia advanced its claim to Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Ligitan based on a number of arguments. The linchpin of its submissions was that it held a legal title over these two islands as a result of historical circumstances; the Anglo-Dutch Boundary Convention of 1891; and the process of ratification of the said Convention which involved proceedings in the Dutch Parliament, especially those pertaining to the Explanatory Memorandum Map of 1891. To Indonesia, possession of a legal title was paramount, and no amount of subsequent effectivités could displace such a title; they could only enhance it. Indonesia built its case on four major bases as stated below:

Summary

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note No. 151 of the 3d instant, by which you inform me that His Majesty's Government, acting at the request and on behalf of the British North Borneo Company, are prepared to acquiesce in the last proposal stated in the letter of December 19, 1906, from the Secretary of State to Sir H.M. Durand, respecting the administration of certain islands on the east coast of Borneo and that you are therefore instructed by His Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs to place the proposed arrangement formally on record without further delay.

The understanding of His Majesty's Government of the terms of the arrangement is stated by you to be as follows:

Firstly. That the said company be left undisturbed in the administration of the islands in question without any agreement specifying details, the United States Government simply waiving in favour of the said company the right to such administration in the meantime; in other words, that the existing status be continued indefinitely at the pleasure of the two Governments concerned.

Secondly. That such privilege of administration shall not carry with it territorial rights, such as those of making grants or concessions in the islands in question to extend beyond the temporary occupation of the company; and any grant, concession, or license made by the company shall cease upon the termination of the company's occupation.

Thirdly. That the temporary waiver of the right of administration on the part of the United States Government shall cover all the islands to the westward and southwestward of the line traced on the map which accompanied Sir H.M. Durand's memorandum of the 23rd of June, 1906, and which is annexed to and to be deemed part of this note.

Fourthly. That the British North Borneo Company, through His Majesty's Government, shall agree to the exemption of the United States Government from any claim or allegation that the latter Government has incurred any responsibility in respect of acts done in or from any island within the said line.

Fifthly. That the understanding shall continue until the said two Governments may by treaty delimit the boundary between their respective domains in that quarter or until the expiry of one year from the date when notice of termination be given by either to the other.

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PART IV - PERSONAL PERSPECTIVES

10 - Social Transformation and the Consolidation of Chinese Votes for Regime Change

Summary

8 - From Council Flats to Government Quarters: GE-14 in Urban Malay Constituencies

Summary

15 - Sarawak: An Electoral Tremor with Far-Reaching Consequences?

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2 - Against the Odds: Malaysia’s Electoral Process and Pakatan Harapan’s Unlikely Victory

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23 - Missed Signs or Late Surge?

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9 - The Making and Breaking of Malaysia’s FELDA Vote Bank

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PART III - STATES

Acknowledgements

18 - Kapayan, Sabah: Silent Winds of Change

Summary

Appendix D - H.M. Durand's Memorandum 1906. Memorandum, H.M. Durand, British Ambassador to the United States, to the Secretary of State, U.S.A., 23 June 1906

Summary

Appendix H - Boundary Convention between Great Britain and the United States, 2 January 1930, and Exchange of Notes, 2 January 1930 and 6 July 1932

Summary

Acknowledgements

Appendix E - The Secretary of State (U.S.A.) to the British Ambassador, 19 December 1906

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Index

Bibliography

6 - The Bases of Indonesia's Claim

Summary

Appendixes

Appendix G - Exchange of Note of 10 July 1907 between Britain and the United States

Summary

List of Abbreviations

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