Judging from the behaviour of ordinary Muslims, as well as the rulings issued by the religious elite (ulama), observers have expressed concerns about the rise of Islamic conservatism in Malaysia. They also note the rise of “Arabization” among the Malay/Muslims—their preference for Arabic culture, lifestyle and ideas at the expense of Malay culture, heritage and intellectual tradition. They also worry that there are groups promoting Saudi Arabian puritan Islamic ideology—namely, Salafi- Wahhabism—which counters Malaysia's Shafii School of jurisprudence and Sufi leanings. Not totally unrelated to these broad observations, some have complained that officials in the religious bureaucracy— particularly those bending towards conservatism—have been becoming more powerful since the turn of the millennium. These officials restrict the circulation of different viewpoints in public. Islamic NGOs, academics and politicians promoting alternative views complain about the extensive reach of federal religious institution JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia). The institution has the power to decide who has authority to speak on Islam, to define what the “correct” version of Islam is and to clamp down on progressive groups.

This chapter highlights the challenges facing groups promoting progressive Islamic discourse in Malaysia and examines how these groups have been marginalized. It also analyses the issues that the religious authorities seek to restrict from being discussed in public. The basis for these restrictions goes beyond theological differences, but includes power play as well. While most of the examples here cover issues from during the Barisan Nasional (National Front) government—the Abdullah Badawi government (2003–9) and the Najib Razak government (2009–18)—the chapter also analyses issues discussed during the Pakatan Harapan (Coalition of Hope) government. At the general election of 9 May 2018 (GE14), former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad led the Pakatan Harapan coalition to topple the six-decade-old Barisan Nasional government.

Is there room for progressive voices to be aired in contemporary Malaysia? Can the Pakatan Harapan government undo the Barisan Nasional's policies and approaches to the progressives and ensure the religious bureaucracy does not overstep its role? In the following, a conceptual definition of progressivism will be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of JAKIM and the muftis (official ulama) as religious authority in the country.

In the last three decades, frequent reference had been made to Islam in the plural. For example, some years ago a book appeared with the title Islams and Modernities by Aziz Al-Azmeh. Such usage confuses rather than clarifies matters. Many Muslims would be puzzled by what is meant by “Islams”. From a conceptual and empirical point of view, as well, it would be wrong to refer to Islam in the plural. Muslims understand from the Qur’an that there is only one din or religion of Islam. By this is meant that there are certain basic beliefs and practices common to all Muslims that neither change from space to space nor time to time. This is not an ideal but a reality.

What does change, however, are the material, cultural and ideological expressions of Muslims. For example, the cuisine of Muslims, their music and dance forms, their art and literature continuously develop in different directions. So do the ideologies; that is, the Muslims’ orientations to the political, economic and social worlds. The ideologies of Muslims do draw upon the sources of Islam, such as the Qur’an, the Sunnah or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the intellectual heritage of the Muslims that developed from the early days of Islam. But they also incorporate interpretations and experiences that are space-time bound and, therefore, continuously change. We can, therefore, speak of multiplicity and plurality when we speak of Islam at these levels. The term din refers to Islam as revelation, while other terms such as sabil, shari‘a, tariqah and jama‘ah refer to Islam as interpretation and lived experience. At the level of din, Islam is unitary. The diversity appears at the levels of sabil, shari‘a, tariqah and jama‘ah. These are the historical and empirical levels at which the din is realized.

While there are no multiple Islams, there are a multitude of Muslim ideologies. They are often grouped under headings such as modernism, traditionalism, neo-modernism, fundamentalism and radicalism. Some Muslim ideologies are held to be in line with Islam as a religion, and some are not. Backward and extremist ideologies and orientations have always been held on to by a minority in Muslim societies. But that is enough to cause problems. As a result, the question as to what constitutes a progressive interpretation of Islam arises.

The emergence of modern Malay literature at the turn of the twentieth century came alongside the growing nationalistic and reformist consciousness clamouring for the Malays to address and confront the challenges of development. These challenges included the economy, education, culture, and religious and intellectual thought. Generally, progressive religious and cultural ideas in Malay society are largely expressed via the literary medium, which is more pronounced than mainstream religious discourse. Reformist ideas of the time were articulated and debated through novels, short stories and essays. The role and contribution of literature in Malay society cannot be underestimated. Thus, any study on Malay society that ignores the literary tradition will miss one of the important cultural and intellectual expressions of the Malays, be it in the past or the present.

This chapter does not seek to chart the development of Malay literature. The aim is to highlight that the literary realm is a creative and critical site where progressive ideas are articulated. Therefore, an appreciation of the historical and sociological dynamics, beyond dissecting texts, an approach that is often taken up in mainstream formalistic literary studies, is necessary. The literary realm can be viewed as contending sites where progressive writers apply the literary medium to annunciate and denunciate ideas in society, inasmuch as regressive and problematic ideas have found their way into literary works too.

By progressive writers, we mean those who have articulated and advocated reformist ideas against religious traditionalism and obscurantism, while recognizing the primacy of human reason, human dignity and rights, political and social freedom, economic and social justice, intellectual and cultural creativity and the overall sense of humanity and rootedness in history and society. Not all of these attributes can be found in any single writer among those whom we classify as “progressive”. In reality these ideas had been articulated by a number of writers, with some articulating them more consistently and persistently than others. In some cases reformist writers also express conservative ideas, reflecting competing streams of ideas in society.

A number of scholars, such as Deliar Noer and Abdul Mukti Ali, have argued that the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia have had no significant influence on Islamic revivalism in the early twentieth century. Others, such as Federspiel, perceive that the Ahmadiyah have contributed to the revival of Islam in the country to a degree disproportionate to the group's small size. “[T]he Ahmadiyah groups in Indonesia remained relatively small and isolated throughout the era and probably received more attention from the modernist Muslim organizations than was warranted by their size and influence”, states Federspiel. Challenging the above views, Margaret Blood stated, “If Ahmadiyah is discussed simply as one organization among many Islamic based organizations in Indonesia in the early twentieth century we must conclude that its importance within the Muslim community of Indonesia is insignificant. This is most true of the Qadiani branch which is primarily a sectarian organization, and as such, can be best evaluated in terms of its membership.” However, Blood continues, if one evaluates the Ahmadiyah on the quality of the group's membership, then the Ahmadiyah, particularly the Lahore branch, “has of course quite a large reverberation for even those Muslims who are reluctant to associate with the sect from Pakistan”. Blood agrees with Justus M. van der Kroef, who believes that the Ahmadiyah have “contributed greatly to a modernistic religious quickening among younger western schooled Indonesians”.

These differing perceptions need to be examined by looking at the history of the arrival of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, the circumstances at that time, and how Muslims perceived the group. This article, therefore, intends to study the role of the Ahmadiyah in Islamic revivalism in Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century by first looking at the circumstances in the country at that time. Second, the article aims to describe the linguistic divide among Indonesian intelligentsia—i.e., between the Arab-educated and the Dutch-educated Muslims—in accessing information and knowledge from foreign countries. Lastly, it will elaborate the appeals of the Ahmadiyah to the Muslim intelligentsia and the role of this movement in Islamic revivalism.

In 1987, academic and political observer Chandra Muzaffar published a seminal work, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, analysing the rise of religiosity in Malaysian society and its impact on Malaysian social, economic and political life. The community's outlook was undergoing change: more urban dwellers wanted to be in touch with religious values, and this meant embracing conservative teachings. Chandra defined Islamic resurgence to mean “the endeavour to establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to re-create an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order, at the vortex of which is the Islamic human being, guided by the Quran and Sunnah.” The causes were multifold. Malaysia was undergoing political and economic changes with Mahathir Mohamad taking over as the country's prime minister in 1981. The country was also undergoing rapid urbanization and industrialization, and those from the working class sought to strengthen their religious values so that they could have some form of spirituality to fall back on. Second, international events that seemingly oppressed the Islamic world—such as Arab wars, the Palestinian issue and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979—led to Malaysian Muslims wanting to be part of the global ummah and to stand up against imperialists. Islamist literature is used to strengthen anti-colonial sentiments. The Iranian revolution of 1979 was also significant because it inspired many Muslims to believe the leadership of the ulama (Islamic religious elites) could generate social change. The Iranian revolution sparked interest in many Islamic societies, including Malaysia, because they saw Islam as a force to unite fragmented societies against the West and oppression. This also meant the ulama could lead a revolution and provide the necessary leadership to mitigate their hardships.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic institutions were built and expanded. While the Malaysian government intended to out-Islamize PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia)—which was also undergoing reforms after infighting in the 1970s—some of these institutions supported Mahathir's procapitalistic, industrialization and development models. It was during this period that the state began to support Islamic finance, banking and the halal economy.

The discourse promoted by the Muslim resurgence glosses over past cleavages between the traditionalists and modernists. For centuries the two camps have not been able to settle differences over rituals.

Malaysia has an estimated population of 31.7 million, of which 28.4 million are citizens. While the country is seen as multi-ethnic, the dominant ethnic group is made up of Malays/Bumiputras (68.6 per cent) who are predominantly Sunni Muslims and considered the original settlers of the land. Malaysia is composed of thirteen states and operates within a constitutional monarchy under a Westminster-style parliamentary system. The Federal government controls most policies and decision-making, with religion and some limited matters left to the state level. The respective ruler—the sultan—heads all religious matters for each state, assisted by the state religious department.

Malaysia has always been viewed as one of the more stable countries in Southeast Asia, having had uninterrupted democratic elections since independence. The country is relatively secular and has experienced positive economic growth. In 1958 more than 60 per cent of Malaysians lived in poverty, a stark difference from the situation in 2016, when only 0.6 per cent lived below the poverty line. Today, Malaysia is a highly open upper-middle-income country, providing universal access to twelve years of basic education and to healthcare. In terms of gender equality, Malaysia is doing relatively well, with women accounting for the majority of students in public universities, and with nearly 32.3 per cent of decision-making positions in public service held by women.

However, despite the country's economic successes, media reports, both national and international, have constantly published news, articles and opinion pieces on how racism has become rampant in Malaysia. IMAN—a Malaysian independent research centre that looks at how society, beliefs and perceptions impact and influence a nation and the region—has reviewed statements made by leaders and commenters as reported in the conservative Malay newspaper Utusan Melayu over the Selangor state's decision in 2010 to allow the building of an Indian temple in a Malay-majority neighbourhood of Shah Alam. Conservatives have used the decision to play up racial sentiments, claiming that Islam is “under attack” and that the Selangor chief minister was trying to deny Islam its position as the official state religion. They also consider the move an attempt at making all religions equal and to disrupt racial harmony. The rising tempers culminated in a demonstration outside the Selangor State Administrative Building, where demonstrators stepped on the severed head of a cow in front of the building's gate. The actions of the protesters received wide condemnation.

Discourse on Islam in Indonesia has focused on the question of a “conservative turn” or rising intolerance. The question seems to be more pertinent in the wake of the 2 December 2016 rally called Defending Islam Act (“Aksi Bela Islam”, or more popularly the 212 rally) against the then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), for allegedly committing blasphemy. More recently, the appointment by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) general chairman Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the 2019 presidential election has made this question even more pressing. Ma’ruf was the one who signed MUI's “religious stance” stating that Ahok's remarks (he was Jokowi's vice governor in 2012–14) constituted blasphemy. He was also one of the expert witnesses during the trial, contributing to the judge's decision to imprison Ahok for two years. Unlike Ahok, Jokowi is a Muslim. He was still concerned however that the 2019 election would be about which candidate is more Islamic. He seems to have been vindicated in this regard by the issues raised during the campaign. Recent events have amplified the polarization within Indonesian society, which in many cases boils down to competition between pro-Jokowi and anti- Jokowi groups.

It is ironic that Indonesia's conservative turn occurred during the post-1998 democratization phase. It has also, directly or indirectly, caused many setbacks to the process. These setbacks can be seen in two forms: the agenda of the conservatives on the one hand, and the government's reaction to them, such as the move to limit their freedom, on the other. In a sense, there is a tension between maintaining pluralism as a rival to the conservative agenda and democracy. While this chapter looks at recent events taking place in Indonesia, including the issues raised during the 2019 presidential election campaign, the issue about the tension between pluralism, conservatism and democracy is not unique to today's Indonesia, but is also an issue even for established democracies.

This chapter begins with the question of how to characterize the situation of Indonesian Islam today. Has it become more conservative or intolerant? While the perception of increased religious conservatism is valid, this article argues for a nuanced understanding of what is now happening in Indonesia.

In the past, Southeast Asia has been regarded as the bastion of “moderate Islam”. Some argue it is the “smiling face of Islam” compared to Muslim societies in the Middle East, where Islam originated 1400 years ago. Southeast Asian Muslims have always shown respect for local beliefs, traditions and cultures while remaining committed to their faith. The ulama or religious elites of the past did not consider respecting local traditions as compromising their religion. However, events in the 1970s, known as the Islamic revivalist period, led to Muslims in Southeast Asia embracing more conservative interpretations of Islam. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have shown an “Islamist turn”, some say. Muslim religious elites are promoting traditionalist discourses that are holding the community back from progress and modernity.

Recent episodes in the three countries feed this narrative. Chief among them was the 2016 mass rallies in Indonesia that sought to challenge Chinese-Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok. He was campaigning for re-election to the Jakarta governorship in 2017 when one of the speeches he gave was interpreted as constituting blasphemy. Ahok later lost the Jakarta election and was sentenced to jail. The mass protests were led by ultra and firebrand conservative Habib Rizieq Shihab. Indonesian president Joko Widodo was also banking on the rising conservatism to stay in power. In the April 2019 presidential election, in which he sought re-election, he chose the conservative Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate, despite the latter's controversial position towards minority Shias, Ahmadis and liberals. Jokowi won the election, which means Ma’ruf will serve as his vice-president between 2019 and 2024. In 2005, Ma’ruf endorsed the SIPILIS fatwa—anti-secularism, pluralism and liberalism—when he was head of the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia) fatwa committee. Ma’ruf has also concurrently been the chairman of MUI and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) since 2015, making him the leader of the largest Muslim organization in the country. This book presents chapters on Indonesia that deal with issues pertaining to minority rights under the first Jokowi government. In the same vein, one chapter discusses the contribution of the Ahmadiyah to modernist Islamic discourse in the country, despite the group being seen as a deviant sect today. Another chapter addresses the debates surrounding the “conservative turn” in Indonesia and questions whether this is really taking place.

INTRODUCTION

Johor, Sabah and Sarawak were traditionally seen as Barisan Nasional's “safe deposits”, consistently delivering substantial numbers of parliamentarians and solid state-level majorities to the ruling coalition. Conventional wisdom held that should one or more of these fall, BN's hold on power would be seriously compromised. All three states were lost by BN in the aftermath of GE-14—albeit in different ways.

This chapter, for its part, will focus on Johor. With some 3.7 million citizens and residents, it is Malaysia's third largest state and has the second largest number of parliamentarians. Johor is ethnically mixed as—in addition to its bumiputra majority of 60 per cent—it has substantial numbers of Chinese and Indian voters, comprising 33 and 7 per cent of the state's citizens respectively (DOS 2017).

Johor's level of urbanization of 72 per cent closely mirrors the national average, meaning that many look to it as a bell-wether for national voting trends (DOS 2013). Of the state's twenty-six parliamentary constituencies, nine are urban or semi-urban and ethnically mixed. Many of these are in and around Johor Bahru and—due to long-established manufacturing operations as well as the more recent Iskandar Malaysia special economic zone—are relatively well-off. Conversely, the remaining seventeen constituencies are rural and mostly Malay-majority, grouped in the state's centre or on its coasts.

Johor's unique historical development, due to its lineage of dynamic traditional rulers, early exposure to commodity exports, and multiethnic character make the state important to Barisan Nasional (BN). The United Malays National Organization (UMNO) was founded in Johor in 1946, and the state produced a disproportionate number of the party's leaders and Cabinet members in the immediate postindependence period. For the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), the state's large Chinese population and economic importance have meant nearly all of the party's leaders have a connection with Johor, either living there or helming its state branch during their political careers.

Indeed, from the first elections in 1959 until 2013, BN never yielded more than one parliamentary seat or a handful of state seats to the opposition. And, relative to the national average, levels of support for BN in the state remained considerably higher. However, a rather less stellar performance in GE-13—along with unprecedented changes in the country's political context—heralded the beginning of a transformation.

INTRODUCTION

Despite solid macroeconomic data, power of incumbency and unlimited political funding, the coalition party that had ruled Malaysia for over six decades and was widely expected to win the 14th General Elections (GE-14), lost to a newly constituted opposition coalition led by a ninety-three-year-old former prime minister of the country. Various social, economic, political and psychological dynamics have been advanced to explain the surprise victory. A primary factor is the influence of the state of the economy and how voters perceive their economic well-being is being taken care of by the ruling government.

Public opinion polls had consistently identified economic issues, specifically the rising cost of living, as a key voting factor. However, positive macroeconomic conditions prevailed at the time of the election. The surprise election outcome seems at odds with what we would expect of economic voting—whereby voters reward the incumbents for bringing economic prosperity. The influence of economics on election outcomes in democratic countries has been found to be pervasive across countries and over different time periods although the relative importance of the economic variables such as income growth, inflation and unemployment may vary depending on the country's prevailing socio-economic conditions.

Were voters in Malaysia less concerned about how the economy performed? Could it be that the economic indicators such as national income, inflation and unemployment did not reflect on-the-ground realities? In other words, the country's positive overall economic indicators masked the variation in performance across industries, income groups and rural-urban divide. Or, could it be that economic issues are much more complex in relation to election outcomes?

This chapter will discuss these three themes to better understand the influence of the economy on voting behaviour, particularly the extent to which economic factors could have provided early indicators on vote swings that resulted in the unexpected change in government. Given the strength of the overall economy prevailing at the time when the ruling government called the election, a primary focus of the analysis is the extent to which unevenness in growth, income inequality and distributional issues have contributed to the divergence between the economic indicators and voters’ economic realities and discontent.

INTRODUCTION

In the May 2018 elections, the electoral monopoly of Barisan Nasional (BN) was broken for the first time in Malaysia's history. The erstwhile dominant coalition lost control of its stronghold states of Johor, Melaka and Negri Sembilan to the reconfigured opposition alliance, Pakatan Harapan (PH). However, while these states changed hands from BN to PH, Kelantan resisted the tide, with the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) retaining control of that state for the seventh consecutive time since 1990.

This development was unexpected as, in the run-up to the 14th General Elections (GE-14), many polls predicted that PAS would not retain control of the state. This was due to: a perceived erosion in support for the party; the expected effect that three-cornered fights would have on electoral outcomes; as well as the death of the party's spiritual leader, Nik Aziz Nik Mat. Furthermore, the party's internal schism and the subsequent founding of Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah)—which eventually joined PH—meant that PAS was stretched organizationally and no longer enjoyed a monopoly on religious appeals.

While the implications of three-cornered fights made electoral calculations difficult, opinion polls seemed to indicate that BN would make considerable incursions into the state. However, against prevailing expectations, PAS recorded a convincing victory in GE-14, winning nine out of fourteen parliamentary seats and thirty-seven out of forty-five state seats. BN won the remaining seats in Kelantan and, despite Amanah's seeming promise, the new coalition did not win a single seat in the state. Beyond Kelantan, PAS performed well in the peninsula's north and east, capturing Terengganu and winning fifteen out of thirty-six state seats in Kedah.

Yet, aside from these considerable achievements, PAS’ performance in GE-14 was mixed. While the number of popular votes for the party increased from 1.6 million in GE-13 to more than 2 million in GE-14, PAS’ seats in Parliament fell from twenty-one to eighteen. Furthermore, in west coast states such as Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Johor and Melaka, the party's footprint was substantially reduced. Consequently, the electoral result seen in Kelantan and its neighbouring regions could be the result of localized dynamics.