In writing this book, I have benefited greatly from numerous discussions that I have had with many friends and scholars over the last 20 years. I have also profited from various seminars on Indonesia’s foreign affairs given by Indonesian officials, diplomats and academics. Many of these seminars and talks were behind closed doors or off the record, and therefore they cannot be cited. Nonetheless, they have had a strong influence on my study.

Many friends in Indonesia have shared their expertise with me, and in doing so have enriched my understanding of both Indonesia’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Their names are too many to be mentioned here but I would like to offer all of them my sincere thanks.

A significant portion of the study was conducted between 1988 and 1989 during my sabbatical leave in three institutions: the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore (ISEAS), Ohio University and Cornell University. Each possesses an excellent library, and I am grateful to the staff of those libraries for assisting me in my research.

A few friends have read the early version of my manuscript, either in part or in full. I would like in particular to thank Chin Kin Wah, N. Ganesan, Michael Leifer, Jamie Mackie and Nancy Viviani for their useful suggestions. I am also grateful to Triena Ong who has given me editorial advice. Nevertheless, for any mistakes and shortcomings which still exist in this book, I am alone responsible.

Leo Suryadinata

July 1995

Singapore

This section analyses the relationship between the usage of a particular fintech app and individual user socioeconomic and psychological factors. We use logistic regression to empirically verify the factors affecting personal decisions to use fintech. Table A1 shows a list of dichotomous dependent variables used in the model. Y1–Y5 are dependent variables concerning usage of different fintech platforms, i.e., M-banking, E-wallet, lending, investment, and donation. Y6–Y7 are dependent variables concerning fintech usage for social activities and expanding one’s network. Finally, Y8–Y9 are dependent variables concerning one’s perception of data security and fraud related to fintech usage.Table A2 shows a list of independent variables used in the estimation. It covers individual-specific characteristics such as age, gender, income, job type, and residential area. It also covers some psychological factors, such as feeling in control, being afraid of data leaks or fraud, and being worried about being extravagant or trapped in unsustainable debt, among others.Overall, the estimation results show that having many choices for the needed financial services (KAT_CHOICE) and feeling in control (KAT_ TAKE_CONTROL) make people like to use various types of fintech applications. These variables are statistically significant and positive in all model estimations (Table A3).Table A3 shows that men tend to like investment apps, while women tend to like E-wallet and lending apps (KAT_GENDER). Younger people (Generations Y and Z) tend to like E-wallet and investment apps (KAT_ AGE). Those with higher education (post senior high school) tend to use fintech more, especially M-banking, investment apps and donation apps (KAT_EDUC), compared to those with lower education. And people who have full-time jobs tend to like fintech, i.e., M-banking and investment apps (KAT_JOB). Finally, lower-income groups tend to like E-wallet apps (KAT_SES), while the higher income groups tend to like M-banking apps.Location variable (KAT_AREA) stands out as significant in all estimations (Table A3). It shows that those living in the Jabodetabek area have a higher probability of using fintech platforms than those outside Jabodetabek. Later we re-estimate the model using the Jabodetabek sample to check the robustness of the estimation results.Table A4 indicates that fintech use is not associated with expanding social networks (KAT_BROADEN NETWORK). However, people who use fintech for social activities (KAT_SOCIAL_ACT) tend to install E-wallet, donation and investment apps.

The remarkable negative shift in American policy against China dominates US policy in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific region, one of two top policy arenas of acute US rivalry with China. The other is competition for dominance in the high-technology industries determining which country will be the world’s economic and military leader. In both critical policy areas, the United States seeks to counter Chinese challenges and prevent feared Chinese dominance and its negative impact on American security and well-being.

President Joseph Biden entered office in January 2021 with clear priorities focused on countering the pandemic that ravaged the country amid the national government’s mismanagement, reviving and making more competitive the stalled economy in ways beneficial to American workers, reducing partisan divides that have caused government gridlock and mass protests that undermine the democratic process, and protecting minority rights against unjust law enforcement. Foreign policy was secondary. There was a strong emphasis on a return to close cooperation with allies and partners; cooperation with international groups seeking multilateral solutions to salient global issues involving public health, climate change and nuclear non-proliferation; and a priority on Asia as the most important region for American security, economic and political interests.

President Biden and senior members of his administration came late in endorsing the dramatic negative turn in US policy towards China carried out by senior leaders of the Trump administration and bipartisan majorities in Congress beginning with the administration’s National Security Strategy in December 2017. Candidate Biden disparaged China’s ability to challenge US power. By early 2021, however, the president and senior aides repeatedly warned against major dangers posed by China’s challenges. Biden stressed that China had reached a stage, through predatory economic practices, where it challenged the United States for leadership in high-technology industries that provided the foundation for US economic and military leadership, thereby threatening US domination by China. Meanwhile, the president’s countering of Chinese expansionism in Asia showed repeatedly in his meetings with key allies and partners, giving high importance to the four-party Quad grouping involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States to advance US interests in the region in contrast to China’s ambitions for dominance and control.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Introduction

On 28 April 2021, President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) dissolved the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (Kemenristek-Dikti) and bestowed the authority to oversee research in the country upon the National Research and Innovation Agency (Badan Riset dan Inovasi Nasional, or BRIN). He also replaced Bambang Brodjonegoro as the head of BRIN, with Laksana T. Handoko, who was previously the head of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).

During his speech in front of Indonesian scientists in Busan, South Korea (25 November 2019), Jokowi stated that in the second term of his presidency, besides continuing the building of infrastructure, research and innovation would be his other focus and priority. He also revealed that he had established BRIN and that he hoped that it would become a “grand house” for national research.Research institutions and various research agencies in some ministries, including their budgets, will be consolidated into BRIN. Currently, Indonesia has in total a large budget for research and innovation, around Rp26 trillionor US$69 million per year.This is however “scattered” or distributed to several ministries and research agencies which sometimes conducted overlapping research.Indonesia is also considered as having a low level of innovation. Based on the Global Innovation Index, Indonesia ranks 85th out of 131 countries. In Southeast Asia, East Asia and Oceania, Indonesia ranks 14th out of 17 countries.This has been a cause for worry among its leaders; without effective research and innovation, Indonesia cannot compete in the global arena.

To overcome shortcomings in national research and innovation, Jokowi issued Presidential Decree No. 33 of 2021 (28 April 2021) and then revised it with Presidential Decree No. 78 of 2021 (24 August 2021) on BRIN. One point in the decree states that all research agencies, such as LIPI, the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT), the National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN), and the National Institute of Aeronautics and Space (LAPAN), and research agencies in some ministries will be merged, or “integrated”, to use the official term, into BRIN.

Following the dissolution of the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education (Kemenristek-Dikti) and the appointment of L.T. Handoko as the head of BRIN, there were some simultaneous discussions on the future of research and innovation in the country under the umbrella of BRIN.

The Chinese Indonesian Muslim community has been active again in recent years. The presence of Chinese Muslims in Indonesia is not new; there were Chinese Muslims prior to the coming of Cheng Ho (also spelled as Zheng He), a Muslim admiral during the Ming Dynasty, to Indonesia and the Chinese Muslim community was boosted in size with his visit (1405–33) but those Muslims who came then had been largely assimilated and merged into the local population. The present Chinese Muslims are relatively newer; some of them are new converts during the Suharto era and after. This chapter attempts to briefly examine the Muslim Chinese in Indonesia in terms of their origins and developments with special reference to the post-independence development. The chapter would also address the issue of Chinese-ness and Indonesian-ness among the Chinese Muslim communities.

Pre-Colonial Era

Prior to the arrival of Western colonialists, some Chinese Muslims had migrated to the Malay archipelagos. When Cheng Ho visited the areas which are now known as Indonesia, he discovered Chinese Muslim enclaves. Many argued that although Cheng Ho’s mission was not to spread Islam, but it is believed that as a Muslim, he was involved in spreading the religion. In addition to Chinese temples, he built many mosques. More researches in the spread of Islam in the Malay archipelagos during the Cheng Ho period are needed, but it is interesting to note that they are many Islamic legacies attributed to Admiral Cheng Ho. From historical records such as Lidai Bao’an (Ryukyu Kingdoms Records) and also Raffles’ History of Java, it was reported that some Chinese Muslims were engaged in spreading Islam in Sumatra and Java. The rise of Islamic kingdoms in Java has also been attributed to Chinese Muslims. Although some Muslim scholars doubted this as a historical fact, the historical legacies, including the architecture of mosques and Muslim tombs, and local legends pointed to the influence of China and the Chinese in Java. Many Chinese Muslims gradually integrated into local society and disappeared, and new Chinese migrants were mainly non-Muslims, giving rise to a different type of Chinese community. Nevertheless, there were still Chinese Muslim enclaves in Indonesia even after the coming of the Dutch.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2018, Credit Suisse’s Global Wealth Report 2018 made headlines in Thai media after a well-known financier publicized the report’s key findings on his Facebook page. The post subsequently became viral as his followers and the media shared it to wider audiences. The report placed Thailand among the most unequal countries in the world, thanks to a wealth concentration in a tiny fraction of wealthy families. This finding dealt a heavy blow to the junta-established government since it showed that inequality has worsened since the coup d’état of 2014. The report estimated that the top 1 per cent of population owns a staggering 66.9 per cent or two-thirds of total wealth in Thailand. This figure is up from the 2016 report which estimated that the richest 1 per cent held 58 per cent of the country’s wealth. As a result, Thailand ranked in the top four of the world most unequal countries in terms of wealth distribution.

The report was quickly dismissed by the government, which argued that the wealth concentration indicators were estimated from inaccurate and outdated data. The government officials went further to claim that the current income distribution is much improved from the past. Meanwhile, the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC), a government think-tank, stepped forward to lend supporting evidence of reduced income and consumption inequality over the past years.

The debate between the government and its critics subsided as time passed but whether Thailand has become a more unequal nation remains a resonating question. Critics point to signs of wealth concentration, while the government rallies to its defence indicators of improved income and consumption distribution. Both sides need to be critically examined, but it is also possible that there is actually no conflict; opposing trends in wealth and income inequality can coexist. Underdeclaration of wealth-based income in household income and expenditure surveys, from which we derive income and consumption inequality, undercounts wealth ownership. Educational advancement and policy interventions such as minimum wage may foster reduced wage and income inequality, even while wealth concentration at the top increases.

This chapter unpacks the multiple facets of inequality, and engages with the debate.

Over the course of the last decade, Cambodia’s relations with China have gone from strength to strength, deepening across every field imaginable, and at a pace that gives new meaning to the phrase “breakneck speed”. While the COVID-19 pandemic slowed—and for a brief period entirely halted—the constant stream of official and business delegations from China, Phnom Penh has been expecting their rapid return (some more eagerly than others) when normalcy and regularly scheduled flights resume. The sheer scale of Chinese engagement with Cambodia was well encapsulated by one Cambodian official who noted to the author that the number of official visits to his department was so high they could barely keep up—with at least one group arriving every week. At the same time, the vast amount of Chinese aid and foreign direct investment is omnipresent—hundreds of miles of new roads (of varying quality) built under the ambit of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), new Phnom Penh skylines dominated by Chinesebuilt office buildings and condominiums, and once-sleepy provincial towns and suburbs packed to the gunwales with Chinese-owned factories and shophouses. A visit to the port city of Sihanoukville, constantly touted as the kingdom’s “New Shenzhen”, regularly yields the inevitable joke by Cambodian colleagues when entering the city: “Did you remember your passport? We’re in China now.”

While English remains the second language of choice for the kingdom’s elite, professional class and students, one can easily live and work in Cambodia fully ensconced in putonghua—a far cry from the early 2000s when “Chinese language” meant Chaozhou and Hokkien, and traditional rather than simplified characters on shop signs. Confucius Institutes abound, including branches at various ministries (including the Ministry of Defence), and the kingdom’s Chinese language media regularly trumpets in laudatory terms a daily drumbeat of new initiatives demonstrating the unbreakable ties of Sino-Cambodian friendship. The appointment of Chinese-born, naturalized Cambodian businessman Chen Zhi—chairman of the Prince Group conglomerate—as advisor to Prime Minister Hun Sen last year demonstrated to many observers the incredible depth and new reality of Sino-Cambodian relations.

Somdet Phra Srinagarindra Boromarajajonani (Sangwan; 1900–95)

In the history of Thailand or old Siam, no mother of any king played a more important role in national affairs than Somdet Phra Srinagarindra Boromarajajonani. She was the mother of two monarchs, King Ananda (1925–46) and King Bhumibol (1927–2016). A self-reliant, highly independent woman, she is among the most flamboyant characters of twentieth-century Thailand. Her strong willpower and resolve arguably played a role in a historic battle against the spectre of Communism in the Kingdom.

Best known as Somdet Ya, the Royal Grandmother, or Princess Mother, her original name as a commoner was Sangwan. By the middle of the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War in Asia, the Princess Mother had become a leading national figure.

In 1964, she returned from Switzerland to live permanently in Thailand. She was sixty-four years old, and her nation had become a staunch ally of the United States of America. In that same year, Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn strongly supported the US Congressional resolution on the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

The Gulf of Tonkin incident was an international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War. It involved a confrontation on 2 August 1964 and a claimed or presumed confrontation two days later between ships of North Vietnam and the United States in the waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. In this incident which occurred in a medium-sized gulf at the northwestern portion of the South China Sea, located off the coasts of Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and South China, the original American report blamed North Vietnam for both incidents.

Although later informed reports discounted the veracity of the second incident, it was used at the time by the US State Department and other government personnel to justify an escalation by the United States to a state of war against North Vietnam.

On Sunday, 2 August 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox claimed to have been attacked by North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats.