Like many countries around the world, Cambodia continued to be hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. Socio-economic impacts resulting from the pandemic and from the government’s responses to it, combined with rising Sino-US geostrategic competition, provided an opportunity for the banned opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) to reactivate its cells inside Cambodia and lobby Western governments in an effort to have the CNRP reinstated as a legal political party. In foreign relations, while 2021 saw ever closer Sino-Cambodian relations, tensions grew between the country and the United States. This chapter analyses the aforementioned challenges in three sections. The first section discusses the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the government’s responses, and the subsequent effects on the economy. The second section analyses the efforts of the CNRP to stage a comeback and the ruling Cambodian People’s Party’s (CPP) reactions. The third section discusses Cambodia’s foreign relations, focusing on the ever-closer Sino-Cambodian relationship and its benefits for Cambodia, US pressure on Phnom Penh over its close ties with China and democratic backsliding, and Japan’s continued engagement to counterbalance Chinese influence in the country.

COVID-19 Pandemic, Government Responses, and Impacts

When COVID-19 infections were confirmed in Cambodia in early 2020, fear among the public mounted given COVID-19’s origins in China and the large numbers of Chinese travellers between the two countries. However, Cambodia was shielded from the pandemic until March 2021, when the number of infections and deaths began to surge. This forced the government to implement strict lockdowns, causing initial public panic and speculation over doomsday scenarios of a public healthcare system collapse. Government opponents claimed that the government’s policies of mandatory vaccination with mostly Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines was an experimentation with Cambodian lives. When these policies proved successful, many political pundits and government critics attributed the success to random luck.

The pandemic was the first crisis under the CPP’s hegemonic party authoritarianism that began in 2018 following the dissolution of the CNRP. Therefore, the efficacy of the government’s responses to the pandemic would have a significant impact on the CPP’s legitimacy. As such, the government systematically planned the nationwide mobilization of human and capital resources to combat COVID-19 with decisiveness and focus as though the country was at war.

Malaysia’s relations with the United States and China are characterized by asymmetry—that is, inequality in abilities, attention and actions. As the two powers vie for influence, they have at times displayed, intended or otherwise, their capabilities to help or harm the interests of weaker states. In recent years, US-China rivalry has mounted and system-wide uncertainties have deepened across the Indo-Pacific region. These trends will continue in the foreseeable future, with ramifications for weaker states in Southeast Asia and beyond, Malaysia included.

While these asymmetries and their consequences have been recurring themes in Malaysia’s relations with both powers, in 2021 they were amplified because of developments at global, regional and bilateral levels. Malaysia responded to these challenges and opportunities in an uneven fashion: prudent and pragmatic (albeit often low-profile) on some issues, while incoherent, inactive and even inappropriate on others. These mixed patterns were evident not only under the Muhyiddin Yassin–led Perikatan Nasional–plus regime, which took over from the Mahathir Mohamad–led Pakatan Harapan government in March 2020, but also under the current Ismail Sabri Yaakob–led ruling coalition that replaced the Muhyiddin government in August 2021.

We argue that Malaysia’s mixed responses are a result not only of concerns over the systemic action-reaction between the powers but also of domestic complexities that coincided with and were complicated by COVID-19 challenges. Chief among these complexities are the elites’ domestic preoccupations, policy indecisiveness, and bureaucratic inertia vis-à-vis the rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. The rationales of several policy positions were inadequately or ineffectively articulated, resulting in resentment internally and misinterpretations externally.

External asymmetries and uncertainties have intensified at a time when Malaysia faces unprecedented internal changes and challenges on multiple fronts. Following the 2018 general elections that ended the United Malays National Organisation–led Barisan Nastional’s sixty-one-year rule, Malaysia underwent three changes of government in three years, and there are still uncertainties ahead. For a country known for political stability, this is an unusual internal development. Since 2020, as the rest of Southeast Asia and the world fought the COVID-19 crisis, Malaysia’s successive ruling elites have not only been battling the pandemic and attempting to rebuild the economy, but have also been struggling for their political survival.

Introduction

The previous chapter examines prevalent types of Islamic education found in the religious educational landscape in the Muslim world. It highlights the dominance of the confessional type that has remained influential in religious teaching and learning. The salient traits of dominant modes of religious orientations evident in these institutions vis-a-vis competing ones, factors conditioning them and their ramifications on the nature of Islamic studies programmes were also examined.

While the types and orientations of religious education have direct implications on conditioning the religious outlook of graduates with ramifications on the well-being of the community and larger society, there remains a lack of serious discourse shedding insights into why Singapore’s religious studies graduates have chosen to study religion in the selected universities abroad, the kinds of religious education which they have obtained from abroad, the impact of dominant religious orientations which permeate the culture of teaching and learning in the institutions they attended on the formation of their religious outlook and perspectives, the problems and challenges they encountered in the course of their learning and upon returning from abroad.

Yet, dominant discourse on religious studies graduates persistently reveal two major issues of concern: the need for asatizah to contextualize religious teachings to the condition of Singapore society and the imperative to professionalize them through upskilling training programmes that will equip them for employment relevant to the needs of the community and larger society. The rise of radicalism and terrorism in the name of Islam globally and in the region, which has generated much discourse on its potential adverse ramifications on social cohesion of the nation, underscores these concerns. President Halimah Yacob’s speech at the meeting with Singapore’s religious studies students studying in Kuwait while on an official visit there in November 2019 encapsulates these concerns. Her advice to asatizah to the effect that they must adapt what they had learnt in Kuwait to promote social cohesion in multiracial and multi-religious Singapore resonates with such concerns (Koh 2019, A12).

Though data on asatizah are pertinent in understanding current problems in religious education and planning for its progress that will serve the needs and conditions of the Muslim community and the country while improving asatizah’s development, these remain scarce, disparate and fragmented, not easily accessible.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on Indonesia’s relations with the two superpowers — the United States and the former Soviet Union — as well as the economic superpower, Japan. It examines the importance of Indonesia’s “economic dependence” on the United States and Japan during the early stage of the Suharto period and its impact on Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour. It also looks at the non-economic factors which affected Jakarta-Moscow relations before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the last section of this chapter, Indonesian relations with major powers regarding regional order and security are also addressed.

Indonesia-US Relations: Convergence of Interests?

Indonesian-American relations were established during the revolutionary period when Indonesia was still fighting for its independence. Active support for Indonesia by the United States was only given after the Madiun Affair in 1948 when the Indonesian Government was under a Communist threat.

During the period of Constitutional Democracy, when the Islamic party, Masyumi, was in power, Indonesian-American relations could be described as close. An agreement on military alliance with the United States was made but it was short- lived. When Indonesian domestic politics moved towards the left and the nation’s foreign policy became even more militant and nationalistic, Indonesian-American relations deteriorated. This was also partly due to such anti-Sukarno, anti-Communist rebel groups that gained the support of the United States in their efforts to topple the central Government. The rebellions were crushed, but, as a consequence, Indonesian-American relations suffered. Meanwhile, Sukarno moved further to the left and made a formal alliance with the PRC. The nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union also became closer. The military group in Indonesia was basically anti-Communist, however, and quietly received support from the United States.

When the 1965 coup failed and the military emerged as the victor in Indonesia, Indonesian-American relations improved. The Indonesian economy before and soon after the coup was on the brink of collapse. Inflation was out of control, reaching 650 per cent annually. It was reported that, in 1966, inflation was as high as 900 per cent. The newly formed Government was aware that in order to maintain political stability, there had to be economic rehabilitation. It was also recognized that stabilizing the economy would be a way to legitimize the Suharto Government.

Introduction

In 2006, the Asia Bookroom in Canberra posted a list of books, monographs and other works about Myanmar, written in English, on its website. This was partly to advertise its wares, but also in the hope that such a list would help those intending to visit Myanmar for the first time or who wished to familiarize themselves with particular aspects of the country before pursuing more in-depth studies. Over the next five years, as opportunity permitted, this list was updated and expanded, not only to reflect the much larger number of books, reports and other monographs being published on Myanmar, but also to cater to the widening range of Myanmar-related subjects in which the bookshop’s customers had expressed an interest. After 2012, successive versions of the list were published as appendices to the first three editions of this select bibliography, with brief annotations to assist readers in making their choices. The most recent iteration of the list follows below.

As noted in the introduction to this book, the guide is not meant to be either authoritative or exhaustive, although an attempt has been made to cover all the main subject areas in one way or another. Some shorter and more specialized studies have been included, but the essay focuses mainly on books and monographs that help provide a broad introduction to the country and its people and are likely to be readily available from good bookshops and libraries. Most can also be found on the websites of major online booksellers. Anyone wishing to delve more deeply into any of the subjects touched upon below or who wants to pursue particular interests is encouraged also to consult the more detailed and scholarly works listed in this bibliography, as well as the burgeoning literature on Myanmar found in academic and professional journals. There are also a number of specialist websites that list additional sources.The latter are often the best source of information on rapidly evolving issues, but they need to be approached with caution. As with other subjects of popular interest, the internet has become a platform for a great deal of inaccurate and tendentious material on contemporary Myanmar.

It is possible to find other lists of recommended books online. A few have been compiled by experienced Myanmar-watchers, such as Bertil Lintner, Emma Larkin, Wendy Law-Yone and Sean Turnell.

• a. ASEAN Declaration to Prevent and Combat Cybercrime

• b. ASEAN Declaration on Innovation

• c. Action Agenda on Mainstreaming Women’s Economic Empowerment in ASEAN

• d. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR): Combating AMR through One Health Approach

• e. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Disaster Health Management

• f. ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Ending All Forms of Malnutrition

• g. ASEAN Declaration on the Adoption of the ASEAN Youth Development Index

• h. ASEAN Declaration on ‘Culture of Prevention’ for a Peaceful, Inclusive, Resilient, Healthy and Harmonious Society

• i. ASEAN Declaration on the Gender-Responsive Implementation of the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and Sustainable Development Goals

• j. ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to the 23rd Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC COP-23)

• k. Joint Statement on Promoting Women, Peace and Security in ASEAN

• l. ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Cross Border Transport of Passengers by Road Vehicles

In addition, the following documents were also either issued, signed or adopted:

APT documents

• • Manila Declaration on the 20th Anniversary of the ASEAN Plus Three

• • ASEAN Plus Three Leaders’ Statement on Food Security Cooperation

• • ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action 2018–2022

ASEAN+1 documents

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 5th ASEAN-U.S. Summit to Commemorate the 40th Anniversary of ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations

• • Co-Chairs’ Press Statement of the ASEAN-Canada Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-Canada Dialogue Relations

• • Press Statement of the ASEAN-EU Commemorative Summit on the Occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations

• • Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN-China 20th Summit

EAS documents

• • Manila Plan of Action to advance the Phnom Penh Declaration on the East Asia Summit Development Initiative (2018–2022)

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 12th East Asia Summit, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Chemical Weapons, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Cooperation in Poverty Alleviation, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Countering Ideological Challenges of Terrorism and Terrorist Narratives and Propaganda, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • East Asia Summit Leaders’ Statement on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism, Manila, 14 November 2017

• • Chairman’s Statement of the 7th East Asia Summit Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Manila, 7 August 2017

The Four Periods

Dr Tan Ta Sen, President of the International Zheng He Society (Singapore), gave a speech to the Peranakan Chinese Association in Melaka in 2013, arguing that the “Peranakan [Chinese] community was born during the Cheng Ho [Zheng He] and Western colonial eras. Their main characteristics was at first being localized (indigenized-Malay or Indonesian), then Westernized during the colonial era, and re-Sinicized at the present national stage”.

He divided the Chinese migrations to Melaka and Southeast Asia into “four periods”, the first of which being the “Cheng Ho and [early] colonial period”. Although he did not mention the years of this specific period, I believe he refers to 1405–1643. That is because 1405 was Zheng He’s first voyage while 1643 was the end of the Ming dynasty. He also argued that this was the period when the Peranakan Chinese community came into being in Southeast Asia, and the characteristic of this period is the “localization” of the Chinese. However, the Zheng He period in fact was very brief, i.e. 1405–33. After the demise of Zheng He, the Ming dynasty abandoned the expeditions and China began to be inward looking again. From the post-Zheng He period up to 1643, the Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch came to colonize maritime Southeast Asia.

The second period in Dr Tan’s speech was from 1644 (the beginning of the Qing or Manchu dynasty) to 1840 (the eruption of the Opium War in China). During this period, i.e. between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, Southeast Asia countries were colonized by the West. Many Chinese who did not want to live under the Manchu rule left for Southeast Asia; some took refuge in Melaka and became the Peranakans. Dr Tan argued that the Peranakan Chinese culture was in fact a fusion of the “Chinese, Western and Malay cultures”.

The third period, still in the nineteenth century, was after the Opium War (1840). China was then in turmoil and the Chinese came to Southeast Asia in large numbers for better economic opportunity. The number of Chinese new migrants outnumbered the Peranakans, and the Peranakans began to be “re-Sinicized”.

The fourth period started since World War II and lasted until now. Dr Tan argued that the re-Sinicization process which characterized this period remained till the present day. But the process was interrupted by the nation-building projects which took place after the war.