INTRODUCTION

All political parties in Malaysia—whether Muslim majority ones or otherwise— cannot escape discussing Islam's role in public policy. No Malaysian politician can ignore Islam's significance in defining the country's political landscape. But when it comes to “political Islam”, the political party that is most frequently studied and cited is the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). Established in 1951, PAS has a long-standing history in the country. Over the years, PAS faced its fair share of factionalism and splintering, with the latest split occurred in 2015, when a sizeable number of its national leaders and activists left the party to form Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah). This chapter explores the evolution of political Islamism in Malaysia by looking at PAS as a case study. It examines the party's past internal conflicts with a special focus on the 2015 incident which eventually led to the formation of Amanah.

There are different ideological camps in PAS. It started off as a conservative party in the early 1950s. In the late 1950s and 1960s, prominent leftists and radical nationalist figures joined the party in large numbers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the party welcomed pan-Islamists into its fold, and later, during the reformasi era of the late 1990s and 2000s, party membership opened to individuals who did not have any clear ideological leanings.

During the 2000s, PAS was distinguished by two schools of thought: the conservative Islamists and the progressive Islamists (Wan Saiful 2017, pp. 3–5). The conservative faction has been commonly referred to as the “ulama” camp, though nonreligious scholars are also part of this group. This camp includes those who are not trained in the Islamic sciences. Still, when it comes to politics, this faction generally adheres to a conservative interpretation of Islam, arguing that Islam should be incorporated into public policy. Often, they focus on the legal aspects of Islam, calling for immediate implementation of the Islamic Shariah law or hudud (punitive Islamic laws that include stoning, amputation, and whipping as modes of punishment). They also hold an exclusivist view when it comes to dealing with non-Muslims, believing that major policy decisions affecting Islam—be it at party or government levels—must be mainly, if not solely, in the hands of Muslims.

This is an observer's attempt to shed some light on the impact of glo¬balisation on Indonesian companies, and on their responses to shifts in trends. I will start by describing the trends in globalisation during the formative years of the Sukarno era (1945–66), then in the development-focused Suharto period (1966–98) and finally during the current period of reformasi (1998–). The Indonesian economy was closed to the world during the Sukarno era but gradually and often reluctantly opened up during the subsequent two periods. Indonesia's globalisation journey has not been a smooth one, with more than its share of fits and starts. The overall direc¬tion, however, has been an unavoidable opening trend.

In the first section of this chapter I will discuss the impact of globalisa¬tion on the corporate landscape, especially the financial sector. During the Sukarno era, the relatively open shutters of the colonial economy began to close with the nationalisation of large Dutch companies. The economy gradually began to reopen during Suharto's New Order era, with the impact varying depending on the sector, the state of development and preparedness to compete of individual companies, and the nature of the government's regulatory oversight. In both the Suharto and reformasi peri¬ods, the most common response of sectors and companies to globalisation was to call for protection, and then to prolong that protection for as long as possible in order to capture domestic market share. This was easier than innovating and improving efficiency to better compete globally.

Even with the country's protectionist bias, however, the disruptive impact of globalisation could not be avoided. Industry players and regula¬tory authorities struggled to adapt to heightened competition and to the rapid changes in technology and business models. Globalisation helped bring about deforestation, pollution and the devastating 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Local companies have had to cope with rising working, environmental and product quality standards, whether they liked it or not. Government regulatory oversight has become tighter and more com¬plex, raising the cost of corporate compliance. On the other hand, the Indonesian consumer has benefited from having more options and better-quality products.

In 1961, many students from Malaya (before it was named Malaysia) enrolled into the newly established Islamic University of Madinah (Saudi Arabia) to pursue an Islamic studies degree. Fifty years later, more than 500 Malaysians have graduated from this university (Mohammed 2014). Scholars have argued that the Islamic University of Madinah is the primary exporter of Wahhabi ideology, and has produced Salafi-inclined theologians, who later promoted the ideology throughout the world. This chapter examines the extent of Saudi involvement in Malaysia's religous education. It argues that the Saudis have pumped in huge amounts of resources, and this comes at a cost to the country's religious discourse: the promotion of Wahhabi-Salafi ideas, which are puritan, and not in-sync with how Islam is understood in Malay society for centuries. To examine this Wahhabi Islam influence on Malaysian religious discourse I will apply the forensic theology approach. This approach will be elaborated later.

Among the famous graduates from the Islamic University of Madinah are Azwira Abd Aziz, currently Head of the Al-Quran and Sunnah Department in the National University of Malaysia, and Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, an executive committee member in UMNO's youth wing (Malaysiakini 2009; Al-Ghari 2011b, pp. 139–40; Bernama 2013a).

INTRODUCTION

Lately, scholars have noted the rise of “market Islam”, which refers to the middle class in many Muslim countries who associate consumption and wealth with Islamic piety (Haenni 2009; Rudnyckyj 2009; Jones 2007, 2010). Muslims have become passionate consumers and producers of “Islamized” products in the last two decades (Roy 2004; Njoto-Feillard 2004, 2012; Adas 2006; Fealy 2008; Nasr 2009; Haenni 2009; Rudnyckyj 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2014b; Hoesterey 2012, 2016). Advocates of market Islam typically have “more open attitudes toward Western management theory, popular psychology, and self-help industries” (Hefner 2012, p. 93). They consider Western management theories promoting self-sufficiency, discipline and entrepreneurship as in line with Islamic morals and ethics. Their encounter with Western management theories was significantly mediated by the massive development of self-help and popular management theory publications in Western countries. These books were then translated into various languages including Arabic and Indonesian (Thrift 1997, 2005; McGee 2005). Some popular Western management publications that were circulated in Muslim countries— including Indonesia—are Stephen R. Covey's 7 Habits of Highly Effective People, Dale Carnegie's Guide to Enjoying Your Life and Work and Robert Kiyosaki's Rich Dad, Poor Dad (Rudnyckyj 2010, 2014a; Hefner 2012; Kenney 2015).

The popularity of self-help and Western management theories cannot be separated from the role of Muslim televangelist-cum-management trainers who have wedded Western management theories with Islamic teachings. In Egypt, these popular Muslim televangelist-cum-management trainers include Amr Khaled, Khaled al-Gendy and Muhammad Abdel Gawad, and they have promoted the entrepreneur subject and self-sufficiency (Atia 2013; Jung, Juul Petersen and Lei Sparre 2014; Zaied 2008). In Saudi Arabia, there is a young trendy preacher, Ahmad Al-Shugairi, the host of a television show called Yalla Shabab (Hello Youth). The show encourages young people to become open-minded and tolerant (Nasr 2009, p. 182; Wright 2011, pp. 176–84). To be sure, one should not discount the influence of Western neo-Pentecostal Charismatic televangelism and self-help gurus have on Muslim preachers (Einstein 2008; Njoto-Feillard 2004, 2012; Thomas and Lee 2012; Rudnyckyj 2010, 2014b; Hoesterey 2012, 2016).

This edited volume comprises of specially commissioned chapters and selected papers from a 2015 workshop entitled “Islamic Developments in Southeast Asia”. The workshop was jointly organized by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). All selected papers from the conference have been revised to include any new developments related to Muslims living in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

This book would not have been possible without funding support from KAS. I also wish to thank the former Director of ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Mr Tan Chin Tiong, for initiating this project to understand contemporary issues in Southeast Asian Islam. The original aim of the project is to examine the Middle East impact on the region. Its scope has, however, been expanded to uncover regional and local dynamics in shaping Islamic discourses in the Malay-speaking world. I also wish to express my appreciation to Dr Terence Chong, Deputy Director of the Institute, for providing useful comments on the book concept. He was also the co-convenor for the 2015 workshop.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Ms Pearlyn Y. Pang for her editorial assistance. I am also grateful to the excellent work by the ISEAS Publishing team, particularly Mr Ng Kok Kiong, Ms Rahilah Yusuf, and Ms Sheryl Sin Bing Peng for providing useful feedback in the overall production of this book.

Finally, I wish to record my deepest appreciation to all contributors in this volume. May their efforts offer new insights on Islam in the region.

Over the last decade or so, as Indonesia has recovered from the blows of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, resumed economic growth and sta¬bilised as a successful democracy, a mood of assertive nationalism has entered the country's public discourse and domestic politics. Politicians, intellectuals, journalists, leaders of religious and social organisations, and many ordinary citizens frequently state publicly that foreign countries habitually insult, exploit and mistreat Indonesia, and do not accord it the respect it deserves as a great nation. From time to time, there are angry eruptions of public protest and media condemnation in response to alleged insults that other countries—usually neighbours such as Malaysia or Australia—have directed in Indonesia's direction. Candidates for politi¬cal office increasingly draw upon nationalist themes, and political leaders are increasingly moulding public policy to match the nationalist mood, with a host of measures to protect sectors of the Indonesian economy and restrict activities by foreigners. Though nationalist discourse and policy-making have featured in all post-Suharto governments, they are becoming even more prominent under President Joko Widodo, sworn into office in October 2014.

This chapter sketches core features of this new nationalism, analy¬ses its historical roots and identifies the factors driving its contemporary manifestation. The first section introduces the new nationalism, noting three key arenas of nationalist mobilisation: territorial, economic and cultural. The second section explains the historical sweep of Indonesian nationalism, in order to identify both the roots of the contemporary phe-nomenon and its novel characteristics. The next two sections focus on two features that define the contemporary nationalism: first, a sense of suspicion, sometimes bordering on paranoia, about the allegedly hostile intentions harboured by foreign countries; and second, an obsession with insults allegedly directed at Indonesia, and an overwhelming concern to defend Indonesia's ‘national dignity’.

The final section of the chapter considers factors driving the new nationalism. Indonesia's post-1998 democratisation, and the absence of strong policy or ideological differences between its major parties, provides a domestic political context strongly conducive to nationalist outbidding. The new nationalism is also moulded by insecurity about Indonesia's place in the world. The emphasis on national dignity, for example, derives largely from the anxieties attending Indonesia's transformation from a relatively poor and underdeveloped nation into a more successful eco¬nomic player, but one that still lags behind neighbouring countries.

INTRODUCTION

This is one of the famous metaphors, circulated widely in the form of meme, to describe the series of Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam Action), held in Jakarta on 14 October 2016, 4 November 2016, and 2 December 2016. In terms of scale, these religion-motivated rallies were unprecedented. It is comparable to the rallies before the fall of Suharto in 1998. The latter, however, is solely triggered by political issues. A similar instance, known as the alleged case of blasphemy by Martodharsono, created a series of rallies in 1918, when Martodharsono wrote an article about Islam in Djawi Hisworo. Subsequent rallies with the name “Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad” (TKNM) or “the Army of the Lord Prophet Muhammad” were organized by Sarekat Islam and attracted thousands of people (Alfan 2016; Agung DH 2016).

Fealy (2016) perceives the rallies as “further evidence of deepening conservatism in Indonesian Islam” or, in the view of Jones (2016), these are the precise reasons “why Indonesia has been ineffective in curbing extremism”. This chapter intends to show that this phenomenon can also be seen as a critical event to trace the development of religion in Indonesia, particularly on the issue of fragmentation and contestation of religious authority. Before the rally, the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Said Aqil Siradj, warned NU members against joining the third rally on 2 December 2016. Despite his advice, some NU members still supported Habib Rizieq Syihab, one of the leaders of the rally. Even the fatwa from the NU on the prohibition of conducting Friday prayer in the streets on 2 December 2016 was ignored by some of its members. A reflection of disobedience to the central leadership of the NU, some pesantren (religious boarding schools) in Jakarta and West Java, such as Ciamis and Tasikmalaya, even sent some of its students to join the rally in the National Monument Tower (Monas), Jakarta.

In the current digital era of rapid technological change, globalisation of labour markets deals with a much broader range of issues than simply the effects of international trade and investment on jobs. Historically a major concern of governments, international trade and investment played a major role in job creation across the globe until the global financial crisis of 2007–08. Since then, the links between computerisation and industrial development—or between cyber and physical systems—have intensified, leading to revolutionary changes in modes of service delivery (Baldwin 2016). These developments have changed the nature of the debate on the labour market consequences of globalisation in Indonesia.

The shift in focus away from the labour market effects of trade in goods is partly a result of the slowdown in world trade since the global finan¬cial crisis. This is likely to be exacerbated by the Trump administration's threat to turn its back on the multilateral and regional trading system that has evolved over the past half-century. In addition to the effects of trade, many countries are concerned about the impact of foreign investment on employment, the benefits and costs of international migration and, more generally, the effect of globalisation on inequality (IMF 2007; Helpman 2016). Analysts are increasingly debating the indirect effects of foreign trade and capital movements for the labour market, as well as the direct effects through migration to and from developing countries.

Indonesia became more wary of trade, capital and labour interactions with the world economy after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98. Restrictions that slowed the growth in trade and investment accelerated during the second term of the Yudhoyono administration (2009–14), as the boom in resource industries peaked and then came to an end (Hill 2015). At the same time, online shopping and other internet-based services spread rapidly in Indonesia, as in the rest of the world. In the Indonesian case, local start-ups such as app-based transport provider Go-Jek have expanded quickly, usually by gaining an initial foothold in Jakarta before moving quickly to other major cities. In the process they have created new job opportunities, while also threatening old ones (Ford and Honan 2017; Pangestu and Dewi 2017).

INTRODUCTION

Recent writings on Malaysia's religious elite show that the group as a whole is becoming more conservative, authoritarian and exclusive (Farish 2005; Norani, Zainah, and Zaitun 2005). By religious elite, I refer to Muslims who are trained in the religious sciences and they include muftis (state-appointed persons with religious authority), ulama (religious scholars), popular preachers, religious teachers and religious bureaucrats. The behaviour of the elite is necessarily a reflection of how the masses practise Islam. Of greater concern is that academics and human rights activists have associated the elite with the puritan version of “Middle East” Islam, namely Wahhabism/ Salafism (to be discussed later). For example, Marina Mahathir, a gender rights activist, opined that Malaysia is undergoing an Arabization of Islam because the way the Malays dress, behave, and think no longer reflect Malay identity. She claims that Malay women under the age of fifty no longer know how to tie the baju kurung (Malay costume). Similarly, Norani, Zainah and Zaitun make similar observations about the adoption of Islamic or Arabic-style dressing and lifestyle, which is displacing indigenous identity with that of the Arabs (Norani, Zainah, and Zaitun 2005, p. 80). Academic Syed Farid Alatas also argues that extremist ideas from the Middle East, which he refers to as Salafism, have influenced the ulama's way of thinking and behaviour. At a forum, he stated that the Malays show a lack of self-confidence in believing that they become more authentic Muslims through copying Arabs. The Sultan of Johor, Ibrahim Iskandar, also joined in to criticize the Malays for imitating the Arabs. He declared, “If there are some of you who wish to be an Arab and practise Arab culture, and do not wish to follow our Malay customs and traditions, that is up to you. I also welcome you to live in Saudi Arabia.”

To be sure, the behaviour of the religious elite, including the muftis, contradicts the way Malaysian Prime Ministers Abdullah Badawi (2003–9) and Najib Razak (2009–present) had sought to portray the country's brand of Islam: that Malaysia practises Islam Hadhari (progressive and civilizational Islam) and Islam Wasatiyyah (moderate Islam).

The global mining boom, occurring roughly between 2003 and 2013, caused a frenzy of mineral extraction across Indonesia's resource-rich regions, such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra. During the boom years, Indonesia's central and regional governments enjoyed a huge boost in revenues as demand from China sent commodity prices soaring. But many policy-makers, activists and politicians became concerned that Indonesia's finite resources were being shipped overseas too quickly and too cheaply, and that not enough Indonesians were feeling the economic benefits of the minerals boom.

In response, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration (2004–14) introduced Law No. 4/2009 on Mineral and Coal Mining (the 2009 Mining Law), which stated that mining companies must begin adding value to their mineral ores within five years of the law's enactment. The government's goal was to kick-start a downstream mineral-processing industry by forcing companies to smelt or refine their ores domestically. Then, in January 2014, the government went ahead and banned the export of unprocessed minerals (Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Regu¬lation No. 1/2014). According to the regulation, value-adding activities in the mining sector would help to ‘increase the benefits of minerals for the people and for regional development’. Indonesia could then transition away from extracting and exporting cheap primary commodities, and instead produce and export higher-value mineral products.

The policy was primarily justified in nationalist terms. Without policies like the export ban, so the argument went, Indonesia would just continue selling cheap primary commodities to richer, more industrialised nations, and never move up the global value chain. The policy contributed to Indonesia's reputation as a country marked by ‘resource nationalism’, a term that describes the various ways in which state and non-state actors attempt to extract more value from, and exert more ownership over, their natural resource endowments. Conventional market-cycle theories sug¬gest that resource nationalism emerges in response to commodity booms, and then fades as commodity prices cool and resource-rich governments come under financial pressure (Wilson 2015).

INTRODUCTION

Before Indonesia's independence in 1945, Muslim elites in the country learned about Islamic reformism through their experience in modern schools, which were heavily influenced by religious renewers in the Middle East. Their enrollment in these schools awakened their political awareness. Similar borrowing of intellectual and political ideas also happened among Muslim student activists in Indonesian campuses today. This phenomenon, which I refer to as “campus Islam” gained traction after the 1998 reformasi era. The number of Islamic movements and study groups in university campuses grew, and they thrived not only in Islamic universities, but in secular ones as well. Their growth in many secular campuses can be attributed to the influence of transnational Islamic movements. In fact, these student groups are not merely incorporating ideas from their Middle Eastern counterparts, but are actively involved in the movements’ activities (Anwar 2009, p. 350). In Indonesia, Middle East ideologies transmitted through these movements and organizations include Shi'ism (Iran), Ikhwanul Muslimin (Egypt), Salafi (Saudi), Hizbut Tahrir (Palestine) and Hizmet (Turkey).

I refer to individuals involved in these transnational Islamic groups as “global santris” (Machmudi 2008, p. 48). They are defined as devout Muslims who are not only promoting ideas of the Middle East movements and organizations, but are also calibrating and designing their societies to mirror the established movements and organizations there. Conflicts between these new global santri movements and Indonesia's mainstream Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are bound to happen. To counter these global movements in Indonesia, both NU (traditionalist) and Muhammadiyah (modernist) introduced the terms Islam Nusantara and Islam Berkemajuan respectively. The purpose of Islam Nusantara is to make the local traditions of the past an essential part of how Islam is understood. On the other hand, Islam Berkemajuan emphasizes on modernity and advancement.

This chapter discusses how several global Islamic movements originating from the Middle East mould contemporary Indonesian Islam, particularly how their Indonesian chapters responded to the political developments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria, and especially the Arab Spring in 2011. Political turmoil in the Middle East have elicited varying responses from these transnational movements in Indonesia which were active in the campuses.