Unlike most other major bilateral relationships in East Asia, the Vietnam–Japan ties are generally “problem-free”. Although their official relationship was only established in 1973, Vietnam and Japan have a long history of people-to-people connections which date back to the eighth century, when a Vietnamese Buddhist monk named Phat Triet carried out his missionary works in Japan. In the sixteenth century, Japanese merchants set up “Japanese towns” in Hoi An and Pho Hien in central and northern Vietnam, where bilateral trade flourished. As the first Asian country to successfully transform itself into a major power and avoid Western colonization, Japan served as a source of inspiration and a regional hub where Vietnamese patriots would come to learn how to liberate their country from French colonization and to revive their nation. A primary example was the Dong Du Movement led by Phan Boi Chau.1 Although the movement was short-lived due to the adverse historical context at the time, Phan Boi Chau's famous quote that “Vietnamese and Japanese peoples share the same culture, same racial roots, and same continent” [đông văn, đông chung, đông châu] still rightly describe the closeness between the two peoples and societies to date. Despite Japan's military occupation of Indochina during World War II, Vietnam–Japan relations do not carry a historical baggage. Instead, the reconciliation and rapprochement between Hanoi and Tokyo since the restoration of their ties in 1992 have resulted in one of the most fruitful relationships in East Asia.

In 2009, Vietnam and Japan established their “strategic partnership” framework. Due to domestic and external constraints, this strategic partnership has until recently been confined to the economic domain. However, the changing regional geopolitical landscape due to China's rise and its increasing assertiveness in territorial and maritime disputes, the ambiguity of U.S. commitment to Asia, and the lack of effective multilateral frameworks for conflict prevention and management in the region, has made it necessary for Vietnam and Japan to strengthen their strategic partnership as a hedge against economic, security, and strategic challenges of mutual concern. Cooperation in security and strategic realms has been strengthened since 2011, and in March 2014, Hanoi and Tokyo decided to elevate their ties to the level of an “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”.

The Al-Azhar University has significantly impacted Islamic education around the world. The university has been referred to as Qiblatul ‘ilm (The Centre of Knowledge) because it offers a wide range of Islamic studies disciplines besides the study of the Quran and Hadith. The university offers an-nahwu was sorf (Arabic syntax and morphology), Arabic language, mantiq (logic), aqidah (belief), fiqh (jurisprudence), and tassawuf (Sufism). Many Islamic universities or Islamic departments emulate Al-Azhar's curriculum. For example, the Faculty of Shariah of the University of Damascus in Syria follows the teaching methods of the Al-Azhar University. Similarly, universities in Sudan have their Islamic curriculum modelled after the Al-Azhar University. Graduates from Al-Azhar have also been invited to teach in Malaysian universities, particularly in the Islamic departments. These academics also helped kick-start these departments during their formative years (in the 1970s) in order to improve students’ Arabic standards (Abaza 1994, p. 70). Many of the teachers lecturing at the Akademi Islam — today known as Islamic Studies Academy (Akademi Pengajian Islam, or API) — of the University of Malaya are Al-Azhar graduates. Graduates from the Al-Azhar University have headed the Faculties of Shariah (Islamic Law) and Usuluddin (theology) in Malaysian universities.

HISTORY OF AL-AZHAR

The formation of the Al-Azhar University dated back to more than 1,000 years ago. It was formed during the Fatimid Caliphate (909– 1171), a Shia-leaning government, in 972. The Fatimid Caliphate upheld the Shiite Ismailiyya school of thought. The rulers claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad's daughter, Fatimah. Interestingly, even though the rulers were Shias, Egypt was (and still is) a Sunni-majority country. When the Fatimids conquered Egypt, they did not oppress the Sunnis, and they were allowed to practise their beliefs freely (Dodge 1961, p. 10). Under the Fatimids, Jews, and Copts were also allowed to practise their faith without any oppression (Tignor 2010, p. 154). Al-Azhar was first constructed by a Fatimid general to serve as an “assembly mosque” for the masses. Al-Azhar was also a means to glorify the Caliphate, projecting its power and authority to its rival, mainly the Caliphs in Baghdad (modern-day Iraq) (Dodge 1961, pp. 1–2).

Since Vietnam launched its economic reforms under Doi Moi in 1986, foreign policy has been an essential tool for the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to facilitate the implementation of its domestic agenda. As the CPV considers foreign policies as the extension of domestic ones, the Party has consistently sought to make use of external relations to enhance the country's national security and prosperity, and, ultimately, to strengthen the Party's rule. Understanding Vietnam's foreign policy is therefore necessary for one to fully appreciate the transformations that Vietnam has undergone since the adoption of Doi Moi.

This chapter serves as a background for readers to understand the making of Vietnam's contemporary foreign policy before examining its various aspects in subsequent chapters. The chapter first provides an overview of key drivers, objectives, principles, and actors involved in the making of Vietnam's foreign policy. It then assesses transformations in Vietnam's foreign policy under Doi Moi by examining major political and policy documents released by the CPV and how these changes have been translated into actual developments of the country's foreign relations. Finally, the chapter discusses several contemporary foreign policy challenges that Vietnam is facing before providing a summary of the book's structure.

The Making of Vietnam's Foreign Policy

Unlike democratic countries where government changes may lead to foreign policy shifts, Vietnam's foreign policy is fairly stable thanks to the continuity maintained under the country's one-party system. As “the force leading the state and society”, the CPV single-mindedly dictates Vietnam's foreign policy, and the country's foreign policy is therefore also the foreign policy of the Party. On the one hand, the stability and predictability in Vietnam's foreign policy lends it credibility, and thus the international community's confidence in its external commitments. On the other hand, the convergence of national interest with the CPV's interest in foreign policymaking renders it impossible to determine how much each weighs in the country's actual policies. In certain cases, the Party's ideological considerations and regime security concerns may interfere to dictate the country's foreign policy in ways that cannot be fully accounted for by national interests (see, for example, Co 2003; Hiep 2013a).

Bilateral ties between Hanoi and Delhi have been on the upswing in recent years with a focus on strategic cooperation and trade. While Vietnam sees India as a natural ally, India also treats Vietnam as one of its trusted and privileged partners. The strengthening of bilateral ties mainly results from changes in the two countries’ foreign policy agenda that aim to respond to shifts in the geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region.

The current chapter examines the drivers of the deepening partnership between India and Vietnam. It posits that the elevation of the India–Vietnam Strategic Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2016 is a natural outcome of the increasing convergence of the two countries’ strategic interests and can contribute positively to the regional stability and prosperity.

The chapter starts with an introduction of India's foreign policy under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, followed by a brief background of India–Vietnam relations. The chapter then analyses drivers of recent developments in bilateral ties and the various measures that both sides have taken to improve their relationship. Finally, the chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the deepening bilateral ties for the broader region.

India's Foreign Policy under Modi

As one of the fastest growing economies in an increasingly interdependent world, India has been pursuing an active international economic integration agenda, which has enabled the country to benefit from a wide range of economic engagements. At the same time, India's rising economic clout and diplomatic dynamism have uplifted its global status, bringing about remarkable transformations in the country's foreign policy. India now stands at a critical juncture, preparing itself to become a responsible stakeholder in the emerging global and regional economic and security architectures. The direction and key elements of Indian foreign policy are driven by both India's national interests and the political ideology of the party in power.

Introduction

Beyond the narrow circle of specialists, even among scholars of Southeast Asia, the very existence of a literature in a language called Old Javanese may come as a surprise, and so one should not automatically expect to find an appreciation of its special qualities. Yet it is undoubtedly part of the heritage of the people of Java and Bali who created it, and hence more generally of all Indonesians, constituting an element of their national culture.

At the same time, however, it has often been non-Indonesians who have taken an interest in Old Javanese, beginning with Dutch scholars in the colonial period, and continuing with others in various countries in the post-independence era. Such international attention suggests that the products of Old Javanese literature are by no means the exclusive possession of any one group, but are capable of taking their place among the treasures of world literature, which can be enjoyed by readers of any background. This is then the present writer's point of view.

The scholars who first came to the academic study of Old Javanese (as distinct from the traditional indigenous study) approached it from their understanding of the cultural history of the region, with its obvious links to Indian civilization — after all, the script used for writing and many of the themes could be traced to Indian origins. A knowledge of Sanskrit is understandably useful for reading Old Javanese. However, the spirit and the inspiration of many of these literary works, prose and poetry, is also plainly indigenous, so that we should not make the mistake of denying the Old Javanese authors due credit for their remarkable achievements.

The “Javanese” Presence in Malay Literature and Performance

It has long been noted by scholars that traditional literature and performance in Malay, as once practised throughout the archipelago, in an area ranging from the island of Java itself, particularly Batavia, up to Kedah and Kelantan in Malaysia, contains elements with explicit and strong Javanese associations. Settings, characters, objects, idioms, stories, texts, even entire genres are explicitly identified as “Javanese” or “from Java”. Certain Malay prose and verse narratives (hikayat and syair) are set at medieval Javanese courts, with Javanese protagonists. These works mostly tell stories about Prince Ino Kertapati (Panji) and his close relatives. Some are labelled as translations from the Javanese language or said to have been performed by narrators in or from Java. An often-discussed example is the Hikayat Andaken Penurat, but there are numerous others (Robson 1969, pp. 7–8; Koster 1997, pp. 55–56; Braginsky 2004, p. 159). There are also, of course, Malay texts with only a few episodes set in Java and with Javanese characters more as antagonists, including the celebrated Sejarah Melayu and Hikayat Hang Tuah. A genre of shadow-play named “Javanese” (wayang Jawa) used to be performed in a variety of Kelantan Malay with Panji and Pandawa narratives — stories about the heroes of the Mahabharata — for its repertoire (Sweeney 1972, pp. 3–25).

Introduction

It has been said that there are many Ramayanas, both in India and abroad, and “each reflects the social location and ideology of those who have appropriated it” (Richman 1991, p. 4). The same is, of course, true of the Mahabharata. There are many Mahabharatas and its multiple stories are variously read, recited, acted, danced, sculptured, filmed, drawn, and possibly recreated in many other ways as well, all reflecting the values and aesthetics of the time and place in which they are recreated. Sutjipto's Indonesian translation of the Old Javanese Kakawin Bharatayuddha describes the story of fratricidal violence as “cerita yang mengerikan ini”, this horrifying story (Sutjipto Wirjosuparto 1968, p. 360). Few sections of the epic are as horrifying as the death in battle of Abimanyu, the young son of Arjuna and Subadra.