After three decades of Doi Moi (Renovation), Vietnam's role in the region has been remarkably strengthened, particularly after its accession to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and diplomatic normalization with the United States in 1995. Vietnam's foreign policy has been restructured, readjusted and reoriented in response to the fast-changing global and regional geostrategic and economic landscape. With its growing economic and geopolitical weight, Vietnam is gradually becoming an important strategic actor in Southeast Asia as well as the Asia Pacific.

Available studies on Vietnam's foreign policy mainly focus on Hanoi's relations with the major powers, such as China, the United States, Japan and Russia, and its foreign policy towards regional institutions, especially ASEAN. Few studies have been conducted on Vietnam's relations with its smaller neighbours. To fill the gap, this chapter aims to examine Vietnam's foreign policy towards Cambodia and the Lao People's Democratic Republic under Doi Moi.

The chapter argues that Vietnam is incrementally asserting its leadership role in the Mekong subregion by tightening its traditional ties with the two neighbours through comprehensive engagement with a multi-pronged and multi-layered approach, including strengthening political and security cooperation, economic integration, and socio-cultural exchanges. As long as Vietnam can secure its presence and influence in Cambodia and Laos, its foreign policy, especially its hedging strategy against China, will provide better outcomes with greater returns and fewer risks.

The chapter starts by reviewing Vietnam's foreign policy, objectives and approaches towards Cambodia and Laos within the context of Hanoi's foreign policy reforms and its pursuit of regional integration under Doi Moi. It then analyses the achievements, challenges, and remaining issues in Vietnam's relations with the two neighbours.

Vietnam's Foreign Policy: An Overview

Doi Moi, which was introduced in 1986, marked a critical turning point in Vietnam's foreign policy. The end of the Cold War enabled Vietnam to enlarge its strategic space through the normalization and cementing of ties with all major powers, particularly with China in 1991 and the United States in 1995. Vietnam also gained membership in key regional and global institutions, most notably ASEAN in 1995, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998, and World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007. Vietnam has since adopted a robust regional integration strategy in tandem with its domestic economic reforms and bureaucratic capacity building.

International economic integration has been the centrepiece of Vietnam's reform programme under Doi Moi. Vietnam has evolved from a centrally-planned and mostly close economy before 1986 into one of the most open economies in the region. The country is now signatory or member of more than ten bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs). The foreign-invested sector has become a major source of Vietnam's exports and economic growth, while its degree of openness measured by the share of exports and imports to GDP is around 160 per cent (WTO 2015).

This chapter reviews Vietnam's economic integration process by examining the contextual and ideological drivers behind its integration policy changes, as well as the issues facing Vietnam in the coming years. The chapter argues that due to its background as a command economy, Vietnam's international economic integration has been a dual process in which the integration happened alongside Vietnam's domestic transformation from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy. During this process, the economic thinking of the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has gradually evolved to adapt to changes in the internal and external conditions, while maximizing the benefits that international integration could contribute to the Party's domestic agenda of political stability and economic prosperity.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first reviews the trajectory of Vietnam's international economic integration over the past thirty years, focusing on how the evolution in the CPV's thinking on international integration has led to corresponding policy changes. The second analyses the impacts of international economic integration on Vietnam, and the third discusses the new policy challenges for the country in its next phrase of expanded and deepened international integration.

In the early twentieth century, Singapore was a hub for intellectual exchanges. Modernist ideas from Egypt, particularly transmitted from the likes of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, made their way to Southeast Asia via Singapore. One of the key modernist thinkers who was then living in Singapore was Syed Shaikh al-Hadi. Inspired by the modernist movement in Egypt, al-Hadi became active through the magazine al-Imam (the leader), which drew inspiration from the Egyptian al-Manar (the Beacon). Al-Imam promoted ideas critical of the traditional religious establishment. Pieces from al-Manar were also translated into al-Imam, and the slant and angle also followed the Egyptian journal. Al-Hadi travelled widely during his younger days. When he went to perform the haj, he took the opportunity to study under many ulama in Mecca and Egypt, and among those whom he studied under was Abduh. He was particularly interested in Abduh's reformist ideas and wanted to apply them to Singapore's context (Firdaus, Wan Hussein and Mohd Raman 2010, pp. 25–26).

Southeast Asian students studying at the Al-Azhar University also grew in numbers by the 1920s. They began to organize themselves based on common language, culture and homeland. In October 1925, Indonesian and Malay students in Cairo established the periodical Seruan Azhar (The Call of Al-Azhar) (Roff 1970). One of those who was active in running the journal was Ahmad’ Atta Allah Suhaimi. His brother, Muhammad Fadhlullah Suhaimi, was also a student at the Al-Azhar University between 1911 and 1916. Muhammad Fadhlullah struggled for women's equal access to education. In 1936, Muhammad Fadhlullah set up a madrasah for girls, called Madrasah Al-Maarif (Firdaus, Wan Hussein and Mohd Raman 2011, pp. 42–43). Al-Hadi and Muhammad Fadhlullah are examples showing how the Al-Azhar University impacted the Singapore religious discourse in a positive way in the early twentieth century.

By the early twentieth century, Singapore also became the centre for Islamic learning for the region. One school that attracted students pursuing religion is Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah, which was established in 1927. The school attracted students from Brunei and Malaya. For example, Bruneian Mohamad Zain Serudin was a graduate of the school and later became the Mufti of Brunei. The school continues to function as the premier institute of religious learning in Singapore, although Malaysians and Bruneians no longer send their children there. Still, the madrasah prepares most of its students to study at the Al-Azhar University.

In May 2017, an online British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) current affairs programme, Heart and Soul, scrutinized the Al-Azhar University's effectiveness in combating Islamic extremism and radicalism. The episode, entitled The Battle for Al-Azhar, questioned whether the mode of learning promoted by the university remains relevant in this modern day and age, especially when some scholars had described its curriculum to be antiquated and unreformed.1 They also asked if the university is doing enough to counter radical ideas promoted by groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda, given that individuals sympathetic to their struggle also referred to the classical texts taught by the university's professors. Some analysts posited that in tackling violence, Al-Azhar is the problem and not the solution.

Yet, the millennium-old Egyptian university remains the most popular destination for Singapore madrasah (Islamic religious schools) students seeking a degree in Islamic studies. Many Singapore Malay-Muslim parents consider the Al-Azhar as the centre of “moderate” Islam. The university is the standard bearer of Sunni Islam, and it teaches the Shafie School of jurisprudence, one of the four Sunni school of jurisprudence that Muslims in the Malay world generally adhere to. In fact, Al-Azhar remains the top choice for Southeast Asian Islamic studies students, even though there are other centres of Islamic learning offering better scholarships, such as the universities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Kuwait.

The Al-Azhar University is arguably the first university in the world, and it has been the centre of Islamic learning for centuries. Established in the tenth century, Al-Azhar is one of the earliest in the world to issue degrees to its students. Al-Azhar did shape the religious discourse not only in Arabia but also in Southeast Asia. For example, in the early twentieth century, returning students from Cairo brought back reform ideas to Singapore, which was then already a cosmopolitan British town. These returnees inspired the progressive movement in the Malay world, referred to as the Kaum Muda (young camp).

Over the past decade, territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea have become an issue of greater global significance. The disputes, which traditionally involve competing sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by littoral states, have now also encompassed aspects of the intensifying strategic competition between the major powers, especially China, the United States, and Japan. At the same time, the increasing militarization of the disputes by different parties also poses a serious risk to global peace and trading activities.

As one of the key claimant states, Vietnam has since 2007 experienced a new wave of tensions in the South China Sea, with China being the main security challenger. On the economic front, Beijing steps up its patrols in the South China Sea and tries to drive Vietnamese fishermen away from their traditional fishing grounds in the Paracels and the Spratlys. Incidents in which Chinese law enforcement vessels chase, capture, confiscate, or attack Vietnamese fishing boats are frequently reported in the Vietnamese media. Every year, dozens of Vietnamese fishermen are reportedly captured, beaten, or killed by Chinese law enforcement authorities (Tuan 2012). China also puts pressure on international oil companies that operate inside Vietnam's proclaimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ). More importantly, China has since 2014 reclaimed land and built seven artificial islands in the Spratlys. By the end of 2015, China had reclaimed seventeen times more land than the other claimants combined over the preceding forty years, accounting for about 95 per cent of all reclaimed land in the Spratlys (U.S. Department of Defence 2015, p. 16). China has also installed dual-purpose equipment, including helipads, airstrips, and surveillance radars, on its artificial islands.

Against this backdrop, how to manage the disputes in order to protect its legitimate interests against rising threats while preserving peace and stability in the South China Sea has long been a major foreign policy challenge for Vietnam. This chapter examines this challenge and how Vietnam has handled it since 2007 when tensions in the South China Sea began to intensify. The chapter argues that Hanoi considers the South China Sea disputes as a highly complicated security issue that warrants a multi-faceted approach.

The current chapter aims to assess how the Government of Vietnam, as a norm recipient, responds to political, economic and social norms diffused through the European Union (EU)–Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (EUVFTA) negotiations.

As Manners (2009) suggests, the EU should be regarded as a normative power that works mainly through ideas and values rather than pure military or economic force. The notion of normative power in world politics indicates a separate form of engagement different from the conventional forms described by neo-realist and neo-liberal theories (Manners 2009). In this context, the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), which stems from a unique combination of “historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution” of the EU (Manners 2002, pp. 240–41), could be regarded as a working approach that grasps the Union's distinctive features, determines, guides and legitimizes its international role (Diez 2005). At the same time, some scholars argue that the EU's role as a normative power should be explored in the field of trade policy because trade is an important source of EU power, and trade policy is its oldest and most “communitarized” external policy area (see, for example, De Zutter and Toro 2008; Leeg 2014; Orbie 2011; Sicurelli 2015).

Since the NPE concept has mainly been developed in the field of EU studies, analyses of the EU's normative power tend to concentrate on norm makers in Brussels, which makes it “Euro-centric” (Gerrits 2009, p. 2). Some studies suggest that apart from the EU's limited material and coercive power and institutional complexity, other countries’ contexts and positions on European norms might also constrain the efficiency of European normative power (Börzel and Risse 2012; Garcia and Masselot 2015). However, these explanatory factors have been underresearched. According to Ringmar (2012, p. 19), the reaction of other countries is “far more important than the action itself and their reaction is what the exercise of power ultimately seeks to influence”.

Out of Vietnam's multiple major partners, Russia is perhaps the most ambiguous in terms of strategic value to Vietnam's current foreign strategy. The rich history of bilateral relations has created a profound basis for the current partnership, but apart from several traditional spheres of cooperation, Russia–Vietnam ties have not seen many breakthroughs in recent times. Moreover, as Vietnam develops its relations with various powers such as China, the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia and the European Union (EU), whether Russia can play a key role in Vietnam's foreign policy in the long run remains an open question.

After the Ukraine crisis broke out, Russia has seen its relations with the United States and European states deteriorate. This has provided Russia with new incentives to intensify its relations with Asia-Pacific countries (Lo 2014). While China has been the focus of such efforts (Gabuev 2015), the Russian leadership also acknowledges the need for diversification. Japan and South Korea, albeit important partners for Moscow, are both U.S. treaty allies, which creates impediments for Russia's diplomatic manoeuvring. Against this backdrop, Vietnam, as an increasingly important economic and strategic player in the region, has emerged as a promising target of Moscow's “pivot to Asia”.

This chapter examines Russia–Vietnam relations, their recent history, contemporary state and future prospects. The first section reviews the historical ties between Russia's predecessor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and Vietnam. The section accordingly examines how the bilateral Cold War ties have shaped certain aspects of Vietnam's current relations with Russia. The second section looks into the modern Russia–Vietnam relations, starting from Vladimir Putin's third presidency in 2012. Finally, the third section analyses how the substance of this partnership fits into the broader foreign policy of Russia and Vietnam, as well as its future prospects.

As the 1991 Paris Peace Accords brought an end to the Cambodian conflict, the normalization of Vietnam's relations with China appeared to be just a matter of time. Yet, China's seizure of the Paracels in 1974 and its encroachment into the Spratlys in 1988 continued to complicate the Sino–Vietnam relationship. Therefore, while trying to promote friendly relations with China, Vietnam remained vigilant and endeavoured to enhance its comprehensive national power to cope with the latter's territorial and maritime ambitions. Against this backdrop, some scholars argued that if Vietnam became an Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) member, Hanoi could improve its strategic position vis-à-vis China as Beijing would have to deal with not only Vietnam, but also ASEAN as a whole (Johnston 2003, p. 28; Tuan 1994). It was therefore possible that Hanoi did have China in mind while pursuing ASEAN membership, which seemed to be even more sensible given the rising “China threat” thesis in the early 1990s (Betts 1995; Betts and Christensen 2000; Brown 1997).

This chapter, based on Vietnam's diplomatic archive and interviews with Vietnamese foreign policymakers and diplomats, traces thoughts of policymakers in Hanoi as to whether, while considering to join ASEAN, they were serious about enlisting ASEAN's support to bolster Vietnam's position in the South China Sea disputes with China. The chapter also examines if Hanoi viewed its bid for ASEAN membership as a measure to improve ties with the United States, thereby gaining leverage vis-à-vis China in the South China Sea.

The chapter contends that although the South China Sea disputes became an increasingly central security concern for Vietnam in the 1990s, Hanoi did not seriously consider its prospective ASEAN membership as a strategic tool to counter China's expansion in the South China Sea.1 This was because Hanoi realized that ASEAN was indeed not a military organization, and ASEAN members, as well as the United States, did not want to antagonize China by supporting Vietnam in the South China Sea disputes.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first analyses shifts in Vietnam's perception of the China threat in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Vietnam was pursuing ASEAN membership.

The history of Vietnam–U.S. relations since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 is a long and oftentimes delicate journey of forging mutual trust, where none existed before. The end of the war ushered in a period of renewed hostility between the two countries, and prompted Washington to mobilize extensive international embargoes against Hanoi, especially after the latter sent its troops into Cambodia in late 1978. While some attempts to normalize bilateral relations were made within the first few years after the war ended, it was not until the start of Doi Moi in 1986 that Vietnamese leaders became more attuned to the impetus of resuming relations with its former enemy and adapting Vietnam's foreign policy to the new demands of its economic reforms.

In How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Charles Kupchan (2010) examines the process and conditions necessary for two states — irrespective of power dynamics — to make peace with one another and forge a relationship that can be considered institutionalized. Accordingly, while strategic necessity is needed to trigger either side to seek out the other, states must come to a point at which they view their bargaining as no longer taking place under “conditions of suspicion and competition”. In other words, “mutual confidence and trust” allow two states to “minimize the hindrances of uncertainty”. By the same token, states which cannot establish a degree of presumption about the other side's “benign character” do not succeed in reconciling and becoming friends (Kupchan 2010, pp. 389–91).

Given the history of their relations, the creation of the level of mutual trust necessary to rebuild ties was especially challenging, yet critical, for Hanoi and Washington. Despite the cooperation between Ho Chi Minh's revolutionary forces and the United States against the Japanese in the final months of World War II, interactions between the two sides turned precarious at the onset of the Cold War and quickly descended into intense hostility in subsequent decades as they found themselves on opposing sides of the ideological spectrum. As such, building — and reinforcing — trust becomes a prerequisite for not only the normalization but also the strengthening of their relationship.

Aspiring Southeast Asian religious teachers regard the Al-Azhar University as one of the best Islamic centres of learning in the world. Some of the current students posit that their parents encouraged them to pursue their education at the university. Some were inspired by their local teachers, who are also alumni of the university. Many young religious teachers I spoke to idolized the Al-Azhar University, and quite a number mentioned that it was their childhood dream to study there. Current Singapore Al-Azhar undergraduate, Abdul Malek, mentioned that the very first time he entered one of Al-Azhar's lecture halls, he recalled: “Oh! Syed Isa Semait used to sit here, and so did Dr Fatris Bakaram!”. Abdul Malek felt that his idols used to be students of the university, and many other Singapore Al-Azhar students will follow their trajectory and become religious scholars in Singapore. Others shared having some form of spiritual attachment to the university, claiming that “Al-Azhar is the land that gave birth to many prophets”. All these factors add up to the reasons why many Southeast Asian students, including those from Singapore madrasahs, aspire to study in Al-Azhar.

Al-Azhar has produced many ulama in the region, trained in theology, exegesis, jurisprudence, Hadith (narrations by the Prophet Muhammad) and morality from Al-Azhar. Despite graduating from the same institution, the religious outlook of Al-Azhar former students varies from one to another. There is no one “Al-Azhar school of thought” that graduates suggest. When asked what studying in the university entails, the graduates would say: Al-Azhar teaches moderate Islam or wasatiyyah. What the students hope to achieve at Al-Azhar may not necessarily be accomplished. As discussed in Chapter 3, upon returning to their country of origins, Al-Azhar graduates ventured into different fields; most came back as religious teachers, while others joined the bureaucracy, started their own businesses, and went into politics. For those who went into politics, they may even join opposing camps.

Would the political turmoil in the Middle East deter parents from sending their children to study in Al-Azhar University? Is Al-Azhar education suited for the modern world? Al-Azhar has been the centre for Islamic education in the world since its inception in the tenth century. The university has produced prominent ulama in the Malay world, and some made their mark as the countries’ Islamic intellectuals and thinkers. They have contributed in scholarship, led Islamic bureaucracy, and most importantly, became the voice of conscience to the community.

Prominent Al-Azhar graduates from Singapore include the former Mufti, Shaikh Syed Isa Semait and the current Mufti, Dr Muhammad Fatris Bakaram. Some of these Al-Azhar graduates ended up as judges in the Shariah court, but most of them serve in the local mosques and teach in local madrasahs. Al-Azhar remains the popular destination for Singapore religious studies students because of the closeness in terms of religious orientation between Singapore and Egypt, in which both communities largely follow the Shafie school of thought. Even though Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states offer Singapore students lucrative scholarships, and also close proximity to Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, Al-Azhar remains Singaporean Muslims’ top choice. The other popular destination for students would be Malaysia, but the universities in the country also modelled their curriculum after the Al-Azhar University.

Through my conversations with Al-Azhar graduates from different cohorts, I find that there is not much generational divide in terms of experience of students studying in Al-Azhar. Their style of learning continues to emphasize on memorizing, even though, increasingly, there has been more emphasis on critical thinking. Some students complain that they would learn more if they are given more assignments because that would bring them closer to reading materials, where they would have to source for books not assigned by their lecturers. This has been the practice in modern universities. Moreover, classes in the Al-Azhar University are not compulsory for the students, and they need to be motivated and disciplined in order to come to campus, even though the system has penalties for students who skip classes regularly: they will not be able to pass their exams well if they miss classes often, because they are not familiar with the issues raised in class.

This chapter presents a broad overview of the evolution of Vietnamese diplomacy from 1986 to the present. This thirty-year timeframe is divided into three parts. The first part highlights the seismic shifts in Vietnam's foreign policy after its adoption of Doi Moi in late 1986 until 1990. The second part assesses the implementation of Vietnam's foreign policy of “diversifying and multilateralizing” [đa dạng hóa, đa phương hóa] its external relations and becoming “a friend and reliable partner” [bạn bè và đối tác đáng tin cậy] to all countries during the period 1991–2005. The third part analyses Vietnam's proactive international integration, including the pursuit of strategic partnerships with the major powers and regional states, in the period 2006–16. This chapter concludes by noting that Vietnam has been able to make successful major strategic adjustments in its foreign policy to safeguard its sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity over the past three decades.

Vietnam Joins the International Community, 1986–90

The year 1986 was a pivotal year in the evolution of Vietnam's domestic and foreign policy. Up until 1986, Vietnam had always regarded its relations with the Soviet Union and membership in the socialist camp as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Two major factors influenced Vietnam's decision to jettison outmoded Marxist–Leninist conceptions embodied in the “two world theory” that international relations were shaped and determined by the antagonistic contradictions between socialism and capitalism, or, more prosaically, as a struggle between friends and enemies and “who will triumph over whom” [ai thắng ai]. The first factor was Vietnam's mounting domestic socioeconomic crisis due to the breakdown of its Soviet-styled central planning system. The second factor was external and arose from the “new political thinking” emanating from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (Palmujoki 1997; Thakur and Thayer 1987).

Due to the confluence of these domestic and external factors, Vietnam turned from a foreign policy structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy framework that placed greater emphasis on national interest and pragmatic diplomacy. Vietnamese analysts now stressed global economic forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology as key determinants of international relations (Cam 1995; Khoan 1995). Vietnam's changed worldview emerged gradually and nested with remnants of Leninist ideology.