I refer to the word “principle” as a concept that serves as a guide in the behaviour of a system, such as a regional organization like ASEAN. As mentioned, the need to maintain the centrality of ASEAN is enshrined in Article 1 of the ASEAN Charter. For me, this guiding principle should not just remain on paper; it has to be operationalized and employed actively in the daily conduct of ASEAN’s relations among Member States and with other partners, collectively covered by the word diplomacy.

The ultimate aim of diplomacy is to promote, defend and advance one’s own national interests in relations with other countries and at the same time, to pursue mutually beneficial ends with these countries by undertaking joint activities or championing mutually cherished values and principles. My instructions have always been clear according to this line, and I believe that my colleagues in the ASEAN family also had similar objectives. Now, in order for us to attain this objective, our brand of diplomacy requires mechanisms in which negotiations and discussions are to take place; these discussions should follow certain processes and procedures, its practitioners should employ a certain language or tone in relating with one another, and there should be a set of definite agenda and objectives to be accomplished. The permeating principle breathing into all these elements is ASEAN Centrality. As mentioned in my introduction, the mechanisms should be those led or created by ASEAN, the agenda should be that agreed upon by ASEAN, the participants should be those accepted by ASEAN, the processes and procedures should be those determined by ASEAN and the language or tone to be used should be that preferred by ASEAN. This view of ASEAN Centrality guided me in chairing ASEAN in 2017 and in participating in this Community throughout my tenure.

Conceptual Framework of the Jakarta Platform

For its conceptual framework, this book draws inspiration from proponents of analytical autoethnography, particularly that proposed by Leon Anderson (2006) who listed three characteristics of this conceptual framework whereby the researcher is a (i) a full member in the research group or setting; (ii) visible as such a member in published texts; and (iii) committed to developing theoretical understandings of broader social phenomena.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is not only one of the great challenges of this century for governments and individuals; it is also a major issue for the millions of micro-, small- and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) that exist across Southeast Asia.

The current level of knowledge about the impact of climate change on this sector is low. There are a number of important questions for which more evidence is needed: Do small business operators think climate change is an important issue? How are SMEs in the region attempting to reduce their emissions, if at all? What do they intend to do in future to deal with a warming climate? What obstacles do they face? And what effective assistance and advice are needed for them to deal with the issue?

This paper summarizes the results of a large-scale, multi-country quantitative assessment of these issues, focusing on SMEs in the five largest economies in ASEAN. The results are illuminating, and provide some guidelines for policymakers, governments, industry associations and climate change advocates as they grapple with the complex issue of helping SMEs work towards a low-emissions future economy.

CLIMATE CHANGE

As Table 1 indicates, every nation in ASEAN already contributes to some extent to the continuing global output of GHG-inducing emissions, such as CO2. Whilst some member states (such as Brunei and Cambodia) produce very low levels, others such as Indonesia are already amongst the biggest generators of emissions globally.

Climate change is already having a tangible impact on the region, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). A number of physical changes are already occurring in the climate and weather patterns of Southeast Asia. These include alterations to monsoon patterns; more heatwaves, cyclonic activity and droughts; rising sea levels; and more precipitation and flooding. The IPCC predicts that as temperatures continue to rise, these problems will be exacerbated, noting that “every additional 0.5°C of global warming causes clearly discernible increases in the intensity and frequency of hot extremes, including heatwaves, and heavy precipitation … There will be an increasing occurrence of some extreme events unprecedented in the observational record with additional global warming…” (IPCC 2021, p. SPM-19). Finally, sea level rises are also “virtually certain” and will threaten major metropolitan regions such as those in Manila, Bangkok and Jakarta (ASEAN 2021).

Inequality and exclusion prevail across Southeast Asia, in various forms and to different degrees from country to country. Patterns of distribution are shaped by structural factors, some of which are durable and some in flux, as well as policy measures, which also witness continuity and change over time. The forms and dimensions of inequality covered in the preceding chapters underscore the breadth of problems—and the value of interdisciplinary study on this subject. The contributions of this volume have also examined both the enduring and emerging features of inequality. As noted in the introduction, inequality is highly specific to each country. This premise has been underscored by the unique experiences of each Southeast Asian country unpacked in the chapters. Readers will make connections of their own between the countries. Nonetheless, some common themes that stand out to us merit a brief discussion. We conclude this book by unpacking some commonalities and differences that emerge in the preceding chapters.

FORMS OF INEQUALITY AND EXCLUSION: INCOME, CONSUMPTION, WEALTH, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Inequalities manifest in various forms, from income, the most widely referenced, to consumption, wealth and human development. The breadth and granularity of information depend on data disclosures, and hence differ across countries—but we also observe that more data have become available in recent years, as countries increasingly conduct household surveys. Happily, we have been able to meet this project’s goal of updating the empirical record into the 2010s.

Household income and expenditure surveys constitute the foremost resources for gauging the magnitude of inequality and exclusion and tracing patterns across time. Our chapters underscore the general trend, as captured in the Gini coefficient and overviewed in the Introduction, of stable or declining expenditure and income inequality from the mid-2000s to the mid- or late 2010s. However, the preceding trend of the early 2000s varies across the region, with Indonesia and Singapore registering rising inequality, while in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, the downward trend was already in motion. Vietnam’s inequality stays quite even throughout. Notwithstanding this progress, inequality levels remain high, with Gini of income exceeding 0.40 in Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and Gini of expenditure close to 0.40 in Indonesia. Additionally, concerns over the household surveys’ under-representation of high-income households continually raise questions about the reliability of these figures, specifically regarding income concentration at the top.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

Introduction

As the world’s third-largest democracy, Indonesia was once touted as a role model for democratization in Southeast Asia, especially after the reformist Joko Widodo (known as “Jokowi”) was elected president in 2014. However, recent studies show that Indonesia is becoming a “defective democracy”, following a series of “democratic setbacks” since the second half of Jokowi’s first term in office. A process of democratic regression has been deepening since, if not undergoing an all-out “authoritarian turn”. As Larry Diamond states, one of the key signs of democratic regression is a substantial decline of civil liberties. This has been apparent in Indonesia. In its 2020 Democracy Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit ranked Indonesia’s civil liberties among the worst in ASEAN (below Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Similarly, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance found that the deterioration of civic space indicates democratic backsliding in Indonesia. As Wijayanto argues, a clear indicator of that are growing threats to media freedom.

Against this backdrop, we turn our attention to Indonesia’s digital public sphere, where signs of democratic regression are also becoming clear. While digital media have long been hailed for their democratizing potential—providing civil societies with new means for political expression and action—studies show that digital media are no less amenable to illiberal practices or authoritarian uses. Cybersurveillance, Internet censorship, online repression, and digital propaganda and manipulation have increased in recent years. This is also apparent in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia. Our research found evidence of cyber troops being deployed by powerful actors to mobilize consensus for elite agendas and to neutralize dissent. Democratic regression, then, appears to go hand in hand with the rise of “digital authoritarianism”, or the use of digital media to enable and enhance authoritarian governance.

Indonesia’s Narrowing Cybersphere

The manipulation of public opinion on the Internet occurs in the context of an increasingly narrowing digital public sphere. In Indonesia as elsewhere, the Internet was long believed to provide a free public space for civil society groups to realize their agendas, raise public awareness of power abuses, and fight for civil and political rights. However, in the last decade, Indonesia’s cybersphere has been subjected to stricter cyber controls and growing online repression, which threatens to curb citizens’ freedom of online expression.

Introduction

Śaivism was the dominant Indic religious tradition in the ancient Khmer domains in the early mediaeval period (ca. 7th–13th century CE). The ideologies and ritual practices of its various currents, from the Atimārga or Pāśupata Śaivism (flourished ca. 3rd–8th century) to the Mantramārga or tantric Śaivism (flourished ca. 7th–13th century), inspired the extant corpus of Sanskrit and Old Khmer inscriptions as well as the regions’ temple architecture.

The Pāśupata movement was one of the earliest organized and widely distributed ascetic orders of Śaivism. The Brahmins of this sect left significant traces of their presence across the subcontinent and also secured a prominent position in the ancient Khmer, Cam, and Javanese domains. One of their most characteristic traits was the incorporation of song and dance into observance (vrata), both within and without temples. The key text Pāśupatasūtra indicates that the initial systematic inclusion of song and dance in ascetic observance can be traced to the Pāñcārthika tradition, whose earliest textual sources date back to ca. 4th or 5th centuries CE. An association with performance may also be detected among the various sub-traditions that sprung up within the Pāśupata fold, including the Lākulas and the Kāpālikas/Kālamukhas, as well as the elusive ‘Siddhas’, who appear to have taken up some of the antinomian behaviours of the Pāśupatas.

While the Pāñcārthika Pāśupata system was characterized by an ascetic character, early references to this sect in the epigraphical records document endowments for temples, and ‘refer to Pāśupatas as recipients for the performance of worship in the temples’ (Bisschop 2010: 485). It has, thus, become increasingly clear that, fairly soon in the history of the order, some Pāśupatas started to perform temple rituals, thereby obtaining royal support. The performing arts, including singing and dancing, seem to have played a role in their modes of worship. These may then have been carried forward and further developed by the Mantramārga throughout the mediaeval period in Śaiva temples and monasteries in both the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia.

This chapter documents and re-examines the Śaiva ritual practices enjoining performance in the mediaeval Khmer domains. It combines data mined from the Śaiva textual archive in Sanskrit and vernacular languages with hitherto neglected art historical material from the ancient Khmer domains, as well as insights from Campā, Java, and South India.

The year 2021 was the half-way point of the parliamentary term following the outcome of the 2019 general election, which had been (1) determined by an election formula favourable to Palang Pracharat, (2) monitored and enforced by the 2014–19 junta that Prayut had headed, (3) legitimized by an Election Commission that his junta had chosen, and (4) augmented by a junta-appointed Senate that helped select Prayut as prime minister. The cabinet was dominated by the same three personalities who had lorded over the country since the 2014 coup—Generals Prayut, Prawit Wongsuwan and Anupong Paochinda. Though Prayut was prime minister, he was not an elected member of parliament nor a member of any party. Prawit, deputy prime minister and defence minister under the junta, had taken only the deputy prime minister portfolio since 2019, though in June 2020 he also became Palang Pracharat party leader. Anupong was content with remaining only interior minister.

On 28 March, elections were held to select members of local municipal councils throughout the country. Then, on 28 November, there were elections for members of subdistrict councils within each province. The results of these elections, like those following the 20 December 2020 elections for Provincial Administrative Organization chairpersons and members, were favourable to traditional politicians connected to Palang Pracharat and Thaksin Shinawatra’s Pheu Thai, while unfavourable to the Progressive Movement of Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, a banned MP and former leader of the dissolved Future Forward party. The elections suggested that local rather than national politics were still prevalent among voters. But in March, Palang Pracharat won a by-election victory over the Democrats in a constituency considered a Democrat stronghold. Thus, Palang Pracharat seemed mostly on top of the political game.However, the party’s decision to even contest the poll—let alone its triumph—enraged the Democrats, given that the latter were Palang Pracharat’s coalition partner.

Meanwhile, on 17 March, nearly a year of attempts to amend the juntaenforced 2017 constitution were stopped when the draft bill to do so was rejected by parliament. This came after the Constitutional Court ruled that there needed to be a national referendum to legally amend the charter. In June parliament passed the Referendum Bill, facilitating future constitutional amendments.

Since the first version of this bibliography was released in 2012, the outpouring of books, reports and other publications about Burma (Myanmar) that was noted in earlier editions has continued. Indeed, over the past few years it seems to have picked up in both pace and range, although not always in quality. As one observer bluntly put it a few years ago, “There is a vast quantity of literature on Burma/Myanmar, some of it quite unreadable”.While many of these works have been posted online, and are only available in soft copy, most have been released in hard copy, and in English. Even if the print run was quite small, this has entitled them to a mention in this third and expanded edition. The newest works fall into a number of categories, which can easily be identified by comparing the contents pages above with those of earlier editions. Broadly speaking, they cover academic works, official reports, travelogues and tourist guides, books for the general reader, and older works that have been reprinted to meet a popular demand.

For example, the section on Burma’s politics and government continues to grow apace, a result at least in part of the close attention being paid to the country’s transition from a military dictatorship to a quasi-democratic administration. The advent of President Thein Sein’s reformist government in 2011 and the election of a National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2015 prompted a surge of publications on the country’s rapidly changing political, economic and social landscape. There have also been several new books about Burma’s once revered opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now the country’s de facto head of state.Given her government’s failure to meet unrealistically high popular expectations, and her dramatic fall from grace in the eyes of the international community (due mainly to her disappointing response to the so-called “Rohingya question”), it can be expected that more publications on the Nobel Peace laureate and her turbulent time in office will appear over the next few years.

Also, as Burma has opened up to foreign aid and investment, there has been an increase in the number of reports by governments, international organizations and consultants interested in Burma’s political reforms, economic growth and social development.