Generally, we can distinguish two types of Islamic studies as an academic discipline. One is the confessional-type of Islamic studies offered in various universities in the Muslim world; the second, the Islamic studies programmes offered in several universities in the West. The latter continues the colonial-orientalist tradition and its long history of Islamology. While there is a growing body of works that appraises the latter, critical evaluation of the former, specifically Islamic studies found in Muslim countries hardly exist, if at all. For the majority of Muslim students pursing basic degree in Islamic studies, the confessional approach is popular, and only a handful enrol into higher degree programmes in western institutions.

The nature, type and efficacy of Islamic studies are tied to various factors. Islamic studies programmes found in various institutions of higher learning have evolved differently in Muslim countries, and they are tied to the respective national education policies and dominant religious outlook of the country. Islamic studies programmes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, for instance, invariably have strong Salafi-Wahhabi imprint, unlike the Indonesian State Islamic Universities (UIN) in Jakarta, Jogjakarta and Surabaya. In these premier Indonesian state-funded Islamic universities, eclectic approaches to the study of Islam are evident, with social sciences and philosophy integrally incorporated and infused into the Islamic studies corpus. However, most Islamic studies programmes in Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent are modelled after the Al-Azhar University’s Islamic studies (in Cairo), deemed to be the paradigm for Sunni religious learning and scholarship.

Besides being taught in Islamic universities, Islamic studies are also offered in departments, faculties, or academies in many “secular” universities around the world, both in Muslim majority countries as well as in Muslim minority ones. The rise of public universities throughout the Muslim world has witnessed the emergence of various Islamic studies programme, apart from the full-fledged Islamic universities. The rise of modern universities in Malaysia, Jordan, Libya, Turkey, Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, has seen an expansion of Islamic studies, gradually incorporating various modern subjects within its purview, inasmuch as it retains traditional learning corpus. For example, the international Islamic universities in Pakistan and Malaysia are known for their Islamization of knowledge flagship, perceived to be an Islamic intellectual approach aligned to the Saudi-sponsored International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in Virginia, USA.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • This report presents findings from a nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,627 Malaysians between March and April 2021 regarding public perceptions on the Election Commission (EC) and on election management.

• • Malaysians by and large hold a cautious, moderate affirmation of the state of democracy in Malaysia, and of it having made notable progress over the past decade.

• • A quarter of respondents regard the 2018 general election to be very free or/and fair, while 43 per cent think that it was free/fair though not without problems. This perception appears to have been influenced by the fact that there was a change of federal government.

• • Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the election management process and the EC is weakly affirmative, as revealed by a majority expressing a lack of confidence in an eventual online voting system being handled transparently.

• • Urban residents generally have greater distrust in state institutions.

• • Some notable contrasts in regional trends:

  • – Sarawakians have a high level of trust in state institutions.

  • – Sabahans have the lowest appreciation for the progress made in the state of democracy in the country, the lowest satisfaction with civil liberty, or the lowest trust in state institutions except for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the EC.

  • – West Malaysians have the lowest level of trust in the MACC and EC but express the highest level of appreciation for the progress that have made in the state of democracy.

Introduction

Religious extremism among university students remains a cause for concern for Indonesian government officials, including President Joko Widodo. The president spoke publicly at least twice on the threat of religiously extremist groups that target university students for recruitment. On 13 September 2021, during a meeting with the Indonesian Rectors’ Council, the president reminded university rectors to remain vigilant against individuals or groups that introduce and inculcate extremist ideas among students. This statement echoed his request to Indonesian rectors four years ago for universities to play a greater role in tackling religious extremism among university students.

The former Chief of the National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, or BNPT), Suhardi Alius, has explained that radical groups often target new students to become members of their groups, through the mentorship scheme or by facilitating their entry into university life. In 2017, the Alvara Research Centre conducted a survey and provided comprehensive and elaborate data on rising religious extremism among university students. Hasanuddin Ali et al. found that 19.6 per cent of a total of 1,800 university students in the survey supported sharia bylaws (Hasanuddin Ali et al. 2017, p. 45). Some 17.8 per cent supported the establishment of an Islamic caliphate as a form of government in Indonesia. At the same time, as much as 23.4 per cent were “ready to perform jihad to establish Islamic caliphate in Indonesia” (Hasanuddin Ali et al. 2017, pp. 50–52).

This general trend parallels the recent increase in religious extremism in Indonesia noted in various studies. However, few of these works focused on the radicalization of university students in Indonesian campuses. While a substantial number of studies on Islam and extremism in Indonesia have focused on security and cultural paradigms (Saat 2021, p. 327), this article discusses Islamic extremism in Indonesian campuses through an organizational and institutional lens. It investigates religious extremism disseminated by student bodies and studies responses by rival extracampus student organizations. For example, while the student organization Gema Pembebasan supports the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, other student organizations support more moderate forms of Islam, such as the Indonesia Muslim Student Organization (HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Students Movement (PMII) and the Association of Muhammadiyah Students (IMM).

Ang Yan Goan. 2009. Memoar Ang Yan Goan. Jakarta: Yayasan Nabil and Hasta Mitra.

Anggraeni, Dewi. 2010. Mereka Bilang Aku China: Jalan Mendaki Menjadi Bagian Bangsa. Yogyakarta: Bentang Pustaka.

Chia, Ruth, Linda Kow and Soh Tiang Keng. 2019. Chia Ann Siang and Family: The Tides of Fortune. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International (Asia).

Dawis, Aimee. 2009. The Chinese of Indonesia and Their Search for Identity: The Relationship between Collective Memory and the Media. New York:

Cambria Press.

Go Tik Swan. 2008. Jawa Sejati: Otobiografi Go Tik Swan Hardjonagoro, Seperti yang dituturkan kepada Rustopo. Jakarta: Yayasan Nabil.

Jahja, Junus. 2009. Catatan Orang Indonesia. Jakarta: Kumunitas Bambu.

Julianto, Irwan (Penggagas). 2009. Peranakan Tionghoa di Indonesia: Sebuah Perjalanan Budaya. Jakarta: Lintas Budaya Indonesia and Intisari.

Jusuf, Tedy. 2015. Kacang Mencari Kulitnya: Seorang Tionghoa Anak Bangsa yang Menempuh Perjalanan Hidup sebagai Prajurit TNI. Jakarta: Privately published.

. 2021. Menggapai Kesetaraan: Kisah Terbentuknya PSMTI. Jakarta: No publisher.

Kee Ming-Yuet; Low Hock Seng. 2009. Peranakan Chinese Porcelain: Vibrant Festive Ware of the Straits Chinese. Singapore: Tuttle Publishing.

Knapp, Ronald. G. 2013. The Peranakan Chinese Home: Art Culture in Daily Life. Singapore: Tuttle Publishing.

Kusno, Abidin. 2016. Visual Cultures of the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

Lee, Peter H. 2014. Sarong Kebaya: Peranakan Fashion in an Interconnected World 1500–1950. Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum. (The electronic version was published by the Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Lev, Daniel S. 2011. No Concessions: The Life of Yap Thiam Hien, Indonesian human rights lawyer. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Ong Kiat Neo, Christine. 2019. Nyonya Kebaya Peranakan Heritage Fashion. London: Transnational Press.

Ooi Kee Beng. 2010. In Lieu of Ideology: An Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

. 2020. As Empires Fell: The Life and Times of Lee Hau-Shik. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

Pearson, Stuart. 2008. Bitter Sweet: The Memoir of a Chinese Indonesian Family in the Twentieth Century. Singapore: NUS Press

Post, Peter. 2018. The Kwee Family of Ciledug: Family, Status and the Modernity in Colonial Java. Edam, Netherlands: LM Publishers.

Salmon, Claudine. 2010. Sastra Indonesia Awal: Kontribusi Orang Tionghoa. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.

To discuss the integration of Indonesian Chinese into mainstream society is not as simple as it looks. It involves many aspects which have to be clarified prior to the discussion: What is “mainstream society”? Are Indonesian Chinese not yet integrated? In what ways are Indonesian Chinese considered to have been integrated?

Mainstream Society

In fact, “mainstream society” is not an academic term; it is often used in the mass media and in conversations. Some have interpreted it as the main ideology in a given society at a given time; others have used the term to mean “the majority group within a society”. The latter is used in conjunction with “a minority group within a society”. Even when the “mainstream society” is to mean “the majority group within a society”, there is no consensus on the composition of this group. Is this group ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous? Does this majority group share a common culture? There is no generally agreed concept on the above-mentioned issues.

Nonetheless, in a multi-ethnic society, people believe that there is a “mainstream society”. When referring to this society, people usually mean the ethnic group/groups which is/are the majority group. The non-mainstream society consists of an ethnic minority (or minorities).

Speaking of Indonesian society, it consists of many ethnic groups: ethnic Javanese form 42 per cent of the Indonesian population and is the largest ethnic group in the country; the rest are ethnic minorities such as Bugis, Sundanese, Madurese, Malays, and others. According to the 2000 population census, there were more than 100 ethnic minorities, many did not even make up one per cent of the Indonesian total population. Nevertheless, these minority groups occupy their own region, therefore they are considered as “regional minorities” or “homeland minorities”. As a matter of fact, there are a few “non-regional minorities” in Indonesia; ethnic Chinese is one of these minorities.

Indonesia is a young “nation-state” and it is still in the process of nation-building. “Unity in Diversity” (Bhinneka Tunggal Ika) has become the motto of nation-building. The Javanese have not regarded their ethnic group as the basis for the Indonesian nation; on the contrary, the Indonesian “nation” is based on the Indonesian language (formerly called Malay) which was a linga franca, and all ethnic minorities are allowed to preserve their own cultural identity.

Based on responses from survey questionnaires and in-depth interviews with graduates as far back as the 1960s, the previous chapter highlighted major factors conditioning their pursuance of Islamic studies in selected educational institutions abroad, the types of religious education received, their learning experiences as well as the major challenges they encountered upon their return. This chapter seeks to examine the extent to which these findings remain relevant to current religious studies undergraduates. Data was drawn from survey responses and focus group discussions with students from a diversity of religious institutions in neighbouring countries (Malaysia in particular) and the Middle East conducted between August 2017 and January 2020. Attention was given to their (a) motivations for pursuing religious studies in their universities of choice, (b) the modes of teaching and learning religion, (c) their interaction and relations with students and lecturers within and beyond the campuses, (d) the extent of support they received from relevant stakeholders in their educational journey and the challenges they are facing, and (e) their concerns regarding their future employment prospects. Generally, responses reveal that the Islamic studies landscape and its impact have generally remained unchanged over the decades.

Since 2000, amid growing concerns with the rise of religious radicalism in the Muslim world and the region, Islamic studies graduates as well as those currently studying abroad have been the focus of much national and community attention. Reports in the media consistently highlight efforts by Malay/Muslim politicians engaging current Islamic studies undergraduates and impressing upon them the imperative of contextualizing knowledge to the context of Singapore’s diverse and pluralistic society. Contextualizing Islamic knowledge underscores one of the main objectives of the PCICS (Postgraduate Certificate in Islam in Contemporary Societies). Introduced in April 2020 and mandated on all returning Islamic studies graduates who seek to teach religion in the country, the certification programme for fresh Islamic studies graduates is “designed to equip students with deep familiarity with the current and future contexts of Singapore society, Islam and Muslim communities in the Southeast Asian/ Nusantara region”. A committee to gather feedback and make recommendations to professionalize asatizah generally referred to as COFA (Committee of Future Asatizah) was also been formed under the leadership of Senior Minister of State Dr Mohamad Maliki Osman.

Executive Summary

• • Until approximately two decades ago, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) struggled to make inroads in Johor due to: (1) the unique historical developments in the state, which benefited its primary opponent Barisan Nasional (BN), and (2) the decentralized party structure in Johor with party branches serving as the main player responsible for grassroots mobilization and campaigning, which resulted in an underdeveloped and less cohesive state party structure.

• • Despite Lee Kaw playing a crucial leadership role for the nascent party to take root in the state, Johor remained in the periphery during the initial decades of the party’s establishment. The party managed to achieve some electoral success only in central Johor around the Kluang.

• • The party achieved a rare breakthrough in Johor during the 1990 General Election when numerous Chinese educationalists allied with the DAP under the call of then Dong Zong chairman Lim Fong Seng. However, the national alliance frayed soon after, with the DAP losing its momentum in Johor by the next general election.

• • Dr Boo Cheng Hau inherited the decentralized state leadership structure when he became the DAP Johor chairman in 2005. Under Dr Boo’s leadership the party prioritized welfare provision and constituency services in several state constituencies, particularly Skudai (in Gelang Patah) and Bentayan (in Bakri). The grassroots machinery was also strengthened while mechanisms were established to resolve intra-party conflicts in the lead-up to general elections.

• • In the 2008 General Election, these efforts paid off and DAP Johor achieved its (till then) best results by capturing four state constituencies—including Skudai and Bentayan—in addition to the Bakri parliamentary seat.

• • In the aftermath of GE2008, where DAP made unprecedented gains in Penang, Selangor and Perak, the national DAP leadership began to shift their attention towards Johor as the latter was perceived as the next frontline state. The party continued its upward swing and made unprecedented gains in the 2013 General Election.

• • As DAP maintained its momentum, coupled with the success of other Pakatan Harapan (PH) component parties in Johor during the 2018 General Election, the DAP under the PH coalition displaced BN as the Johor state government.

Introduction

It is important to understand the Peranakan Chinese community during the era of decolonization as it helps us understand their post-independence position. Much of the post-independence development, in fact, had its basis during the era of decolonization. Let us first look at the colonial period, primarily from the twentieth century towards the end of colonial rule.

Pre-World War II Peranakan Politics

Peranakan Chinese got involved in politics during the Dutch colonial period. However, initially there was only a rise of Chinese cultural nationalism rather than Chinese political nationalism. The latter was symbolized by the establishment of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK, 中华会馆), a pan-Chinese organization that aimed at reforming Chinese Peranakan customs through the teachings of Confucius. As some Chinese are required to understand Confucianism, THHK was first established in Jakarta and later in almost every town in Java and the Outer Islands. It was only later that Sun Yat Sen’s revolutionary movement impacted the Chinese in Indonesia through the organization of Soe Poh Sia (Shu Bao She, reading clubs, 书报社). The totoks were ardent supporters of the revolutionary movement but it was only later that the Peranakan Chinese were also influenced. Leading this Chinese nationalism was Sin Po, a Peranakan Chinese newspaper in Java which was first published in 1910. It later developed into a group which symbolized Chinese nationalism. It even organized the Peranakan Chinese to go against the Dutch subjectship (Nederlandsch Onderdaanschap) and Peranakan Chinese participation in the Volksraad (the colonial parliament which had very limited power). Basically, the Sin Po group was against Dutch colonialism.

However, the increasing number of Dutch-educated Peranakans led to the formation of Chung Hwa Hui (CHH, a Chinese organization) in 1928 in Semarang, a town that was Dutch East Indies-oriented. Politically, the CHH was also oriented towards the colonial power. Semarang at that time was the headquarters of Oei Tiong Ham, the largest Chinese company in Indonesia then. Other Peranakans, many of them journalists and lawyers, disagreed with the political stand of the CHH, eventually established Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI) in Surabaya in 1932 that supported Indonesia’s independence.

The twelfth-century Chinese historian Zheng Qiao once wrote of the benefits of mingling textual and pictorial descriptions of landscape, describing the images as the warp threads and the written words as the weft.This prompts the thought that any list of books about a relatively unknown country like Myanmar would benefit from a short accompanying list of maps that can be consulted by readers should they wish to find a particular place, orient themselves or seek what has become known as “ground truth”. In this regard, Myanmar-watchers have not always been well served, but the picture is gradually changing as more and more people travel to Myanmar or read books about it.

Maps and charts of Myanmar (or Burma, Burmah, Pegu, Ava or Aracan, depending on the date and source), its near neighbours and surrounding seas have a long history. In European terms alone, they can be traced back at least to the sixteenth century. In this regard, an excellent resource is the monumental Comprehensive Atlas of the Dutch East India Company, published between 2006 and 2010.The final volume includes several maps of the Burmese coastline and river ports like Syriam and Pegu. Anyone interested in looking closer at this early period is also referred to Kay Shelton’s article on the maps of Myanmar made by European cartographers and currently held in the special collections of Northern Illinois University. The article was published in the Bulletin of the Burma Studies Group in 2003.Shelton compiled a bibliography of maps for the same issue.Another important reference is Tin Naing Win’s study of early Burmese maps, with its focus on folding paper parabaik and old cloth maps, most dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.Ten beautiful old maps of Myanmar, most dating from the eighteenth century, have been posted on the website of the Burma Boating Company.

After the British began their three-stage conquest of Myanmar in 1824, first the Honourable East India Company and then the British government made a major effort to map the country, the better to bring it under their control, administer it and, it must be said, to exploit its natural resources. As the years passed, these works were updated and expanded using data, drawings and photographs provided by assorted officials, soldiers, explorers, missionaries and adventurers.A local pundit was employed to help find the source of the Irrawaddy River.

The form of Amoghapāśa that has one face and eight arms is generally regarded as part of the Indian pantheon, but the depictions from the subcontinent only began to appear after the downfall of Indian Buddhism in the early 13th century. A thorough survey of the artistic corpus and the salient textual material, which is undertaken here for the first time, shows that this form of the bodhisattva was already widespread throughout the Malayo-Javanese world half a millennium earlier. The eight-armed Amoghapāśa thereby appears to have originated in the Malay Archipelago, and to have spread from there to East Asia and the Khmer Empire. Its South Asian debut came much later, in the monasteries housing foreign monks in the Kathmandu Valley, especially the Vikramaśīla branch monastery in the district of Thamel. Then, in the late 13th century, the eight-armed form finally reappeared in Sumatra and Java, taking centre stage during the Javanese Siṅhasāri dynasty’s occupation of Melayu. The Siṅhasāri images of the bodhisattva show signs of direct input from the subcontinent, which can be linked circumstantially to exiles such as the paṇḍita Gautamaśrībhadra. By this time, the bodhisattva had undergone many transmigrations, from a seafaring deity who saves devotees from the eight great fears to a bodhisattva who stands at the gateway to advanced tantric practice.

The Eight-Armed Avalokiteśvaras From Śrīvijaya

The eight-armed, single-faced form of Avalokiteśvara, who is usually identified as Amoghapāśa, is well represented in the art of the Malay Archipelago. More than twenty sculptures of this form, dated to between the 7th and early 11th centuries on the basis of their style, have been discovered there. An inventory of early depictions originating from this region is provided in Appendix 2.1. Only the two-and four-armed forms of Avalokiteśvara are more frequently represented in the period corpus than the eight-armed form. What has been overlooked so far is the fact that no sculptures of the standing eight-armed form have been found in India; all such examples from the subcontinent are Nepalese. Furthermore, the many written descriptions of this form produced on the subcontinent are also much later than the period of initial diffusion in the Archipelago, and also, it seems, the Nepalese depictions.

The ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (hereinafter referred to as “the Institute”) shall be established under Provision B.2.2.i of the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint. As a follow-up to the ASEAN Leaders’ Joint Statement on the Establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation adopted on 8 May 2011, the Institute shall be an entity associated with ASEAN under Article 16 of the ASEAN Charter.

The Institute shall operate in accordance with the following Terms of Reference (TOR):

1. Headquarters

The headquarters of the Institute shall be in the Republic of Indonesia, hereinafter referred to as “the Host Country”, and shall be based in Jakarta.

2. Legal Personality

The legal personality of the Institute shall be established under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Host Country and the Institute.

3. Principles

The Institute would operate in accordance with the ASEAN Charter and be guided by the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, inter alia:

• a. respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all ASEAN Member States;

• b. shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity; and

• c. non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN Member States.

4. Mandate and Functions

4.1. Mandate

The Institute shall be the ASEAN institution for research activities on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution, as requested by ASEAN Member States. The Institute’s work will include, inter alia, promotion of those activities agreed in the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint and additional activities as agreed by ASEAN Member States.

4.2. Functions

The Institute may undertake, among others, the following activities:

Research

• • Undertake research and compile ASEAN’s experiences and best practices on peace, conflict management and conflict resolution as well as post-conflict peace-building, with the view to providing appropriate recommendations, upon request by ASEAN Member States, to ASEAN bodies;

• • Undertake studies to promote gender mainstreaming in peace building, peace process and conflict resolution; and

• • Study and analyse existing dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN with a view to enhancing regional mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes.

Introduction

The polities of Campā along the coast of central Vietnam were not politically united, but the Cams appear to have participated in temple and courtly culture, as can be seen through their inscriptions and image making. A 16th-century Spanish account of the customs in Campā mentions at least five courtly festivals held annually by the Cam king, including feasts, plays, public races, and celebrations of elephant and tiger hunts (Souza and Turley 2016: 677–680). In addition, Chinese histories describe the Cam kings performing public processions with elephants, parasols, drums, and conches. These observations indicate a public display suggesting that the Cam polities shared political and cultural expression of power and religion. This chapter explores the extent to which the Cams incorporated themselves into the international political and economic sphere in the 9th–10th centuries by projecting onto their artistic productions a complex and creative military and courtly culture.

One of the most well-known sacred epics in South and Southeast Asia is the Rāmāyaṇa, the life story of Rāma, an avatar of Viṣṇu. Using textual sources, visual evidence, and recent scholarship, this chapter analyses the colossal Trà Kiệu pedestal within the context of the Rāmāyaṇa in Khmer and Javanese cultures during the 9th–10th centuries. Visual evidence includes the Rāmāyaṇa sandstone reliefs preserved at the Đà Nẵng Museum of Cam Sculpture and imagery from three central Vietnam archaeological sites: Khương Mỹ, Chiên Đàn, and Chánh Lộ. The visual evidence shows three shared iconographic elements: archers with bows, architectural features, and dancing apsarases found in Campā, East Java, and Cambodia. I suggest that the Rāmāyaṇa reliefs reveal that the Trà Kiệu pedestal found in a temple context also promoted courtly culture with close relationships to the art and cultures of Cambodia, East Java, and China in the 9th–10th centuries. I define courtly culture as comprising ceremonial, celebratory, and martial activities with an emphasis on symbols of power, hierarchy, and etiquette for political motivations. Within the sacred sphere, the stone Trà Kiệu pedestal also commemorates royal-divine interactions through the narrative of the Rāmāyaṇa.

History Of The Trà Kiệu Pedestal

The colossal Trà Kiệu pedestal and the liṅga-yoni were discovered in the 19th century in Trà Kiệu village of Quảng Nam province in central Vietnam.

The year 2021 marked another tumultuous one for Malaysia. There was a third regime change in less than four years, combined with state elections in Melaka (Malacca) and Sarawak, while Malaysian society and the economy continued to struggle under the COVID-19 pandemic. By year’s end there was continued political instability caused by divisions in the Malay political class. The political tussle between the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (Bersatu) meant that, while the government was on paper a Malay-centric administration pursuing a Malay-First policy, there were deep-seated tensions as to which Malay party was the dominant one.

Fall of Muhyiddin and Rise of Ismail Sabri

On 15 August, the Perikatan Nasional (PN) government under Bersatu’s Muhyiddin Yassin fell when UMNO pulled its support from the coalition. The PN had survived for a mere seventeen months. The origins of its fall lay in the way the PN came to power. In the 2018 elections, Bersatu was part of the Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition, which successfully removed the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN) from power. In February 2020, however, in what was dubbed the Sheraton Move, Muhyiddin led a Bersatu breakaway from the then-ruling PH government. Muhyiddin’s Bersatu faction then formed the Malay-centric PN government with UMNO and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). The major incentives for UMNO to prop up the PN was that Zahid Hamidi, UMNO’s current party president, and Najib Razak, Malaysia’s former premier and Zahid’s predecessor, were both on trial for corruption, money laundering and other charges. In addition, half a dozen other UMNO leaders had also been charged during the PH administration. This group, commonly known as the “court cluster”, were probably of the opinion that should UMNO become part of the new government many of these criminal charges would be set aside or dropped. Under Malaysian law the attorney general can offer discharge not amounting to an acquittal (DNAA). In December 2020, a member of the “court cluster”, former minister Tengku Adnam, was given a DNAA in his corruption trial. Muhyiddin had claimed in August 2021, during the twilight days of his premiership, that he had refused to bow to pressure from certain politicians to intervene in their ongoing court cases.

Compiling a list of songs and tunes with Myanmar-related titles and themes is no easy task, even if it is confined to the colonial period (1824–1948).Some compositions were so ephemeral that they appear never to have been published or recorded. Some were only produced in small numbers. Most of them soon passed from the musical scene and a number appear to have been lost forever. Others, like the musical settings inspired by Kipling’s ballad “Mandalay”, were so popular that they themselves spawned a wide range of melodies, arrangements and lyrics. Many had the same or similar titles, usually involving signature words like “Burma” (or “Burmah”), “Mandalay” and, to a lesser extent, “Rangoon”. Copyright lists, collections of sheet music and old recordings held by libraries and sound archives are helpful in identifying such works, but until an authoritative list can be compiled, the following must be considered provisional only.

The following list does not include works that only refer to Myanmar (or related places like Rangoon or Mandalay) in passing; for example, as a brief mention in a song about something else. Nor does this list include different arrangements of the same tune or song unless it differs significantly from other versions; for example, the various musical settings of the poem “Mandalay”. Also absent are the different arrangements of particular songs and tunes recorded by bands and singers after the development of gramophone records. Most hymns and soldiers’ songs have been left out on the grounds that, despite their wide use in Myanmar for certain periods, they were not ‘popular’ in the usual sense of the word, and often did not refer specifically to the country. In any case, only works that have a direct connection to Myanmar have been included.

All musical compositions have been listed in chronological order by first publication or original recording. Where those details are not known, they are listed according to the date of their first mention in published sources. Songs and tunes that appear never to have been published have been listed according to the date on which copyright was first granted as shown in the annual catalogue of copyright entries for musical compositions by the US Library of Congress.Where any information is not available or is unreliable, this is shown by the use of question marks in the appropriate place.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat