One day Aunt Tam came home with a worried expression on her face. Her right eye hurt, and she had gone to see a doctor at a hospital in the nearby town of Binh Thuy, where she was told she had an eye disease and would have to undergo an operation the following week. The news spread quickly to her children, and that evening, members of the family, Fourth Sister and her husband, Fifth Sister and her husband, Eighth Brother and his wife, and Second Brother, came to the house to see her. Fourth Sister, Fifth Sister, and Second Brother lived in the same hamlet not too far from their mother's house and frequently visited her, but Eighth Brother lived near the town and came to visit the parents only once in a while, so his arrival that evening meant something important was happening. It was rare for so many members to assemble in the house, also signalling the significance of the mother's illness for the whole family. As Aunt Tam lay down on her wooden bed, the children asked how she felt and consoled her. A great concern for all the family members was not only Aunt Tam's condition, but also how to finance the operation, which would cost the family a lot. The children, while they discussed the matter, seemed unsure about what they could do.

Next morning, Aunt Tam, who usually got up earliest of all to work in the kitchen and greet other family members with a smile, stayed in bed. She was still discussing with Youngest Brother how they could collect the necessary money. When she got up a couple of hours later than usual, she started to gather and count the money they had in the house, including what they had made from the small tobacco shop they ran at home. Most of the bills she was counting were 200 dong (about 2 cents), 500 dong (5 cents) and 1,000 dong (10 cents) bills that obviously did not add up to a lot. At that time, I did not know how much the operation would cost, but I could easily see that the money she was counting would not be sufficient. Several weeks later, Aunt Tam had not yet undergone the operation, but she went to see the doctor regularly, and was getting medicine.

CAN THO CITY

In order to understand the life of farmers in the rural Mekong Delta, it would be useful to have a broad picture of the area. The village of Long Tuyen, where the research was done lies close to the city of Can Tho, which lies in the heart of the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. The Mekong River splits into several branches in the Delta after flowing from the Tibetan uplands through the countries of mainland Southeast Asia, and the water provided by the river, its small branches and canals throughout the area, and the tropical climate characterized by alternating rainy and dry seasons make the land suitable for the production of many kinds of food resources. Rice is one of them, for which the Mekong Delta is particularly well known.

The Mekong Delta has more than four million hectares of natural land, rich with natural resources. The Delta is the “rice bowl” of Vietnam, providing grain not only to its inhabitants, but also to the whole country. With rice being the main agricultural product, the area also produces a variety of tropical fruit, sold in the regional markets as well as in large towns and cities throughout the country. The province of Can Tho had a population of over 1,900 thousand in 1997, and 70 per cent of them were engaged in agriculture (Chi Cuc Thong Ke Kinh Te Tinh Can Tho 1998) (Can Tho Province was split into two administrative units, Can Tho City and Hau Giang Province, in 2004). The population comprises mainly of the Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese), the Khmer and the Chinese, the first being the majority.

On the bank of the Hau Giang River lies the city of Can Tho. The city serves as the political, economic, and commercial centre of the whole Mekong Delta region. It also serves as the educational centre of the Delta. In 1966, Can Tho University was founded; its most significant contributions have been to the field of agriculture. The commercial nature of the town is easily apparent at the big central market, where virtually everything is bought and sold: meat, fish, vegetables, fruits, rice, spices and other food products; kitchenware, furniture, hardware, fabrics, clothes — both new and used — shoes, hats, jewellery, and many other items.

When I first travelled to Can Tho in 1997, a province about 170 km from Ho Chi Minh City in southern Vietnam, the family life of farmers in the rural Mekong Delta was still hidden from me behind a veil. While I looked for a field site and waited in Can Tho City for permission from the local government to conduct research in a rural area of the province, I spoke with some college students at Can Tho University, the main educational institution of the Delta. These urbanites often believed that rural life was different from theirs. When asked about family life in Vietnam, many people would give answers that reflected these assumptions. For instance, explaining family structure, the students said, “traditionally, the family is extended, but now more families are nuclear. Things are changing. In the city, families are nuclear, but in the countryside, they still are extended.” Or, “in the city, people have only one or two children, but in the villages they have five to seven, or more”, “in urban areas, any child may take care of the old parents; in rural areas, they follow tradition, and the youngest son is especially responsible for supporting the parents when they are old”, and “in the city, women get married at twenty-four or twenty-five, but in the countryside they marry early, at around eighteen.”

These statements reveal the common assumption in urban areas that life in rural areas is more “traditional” than life in an urban setting. It is a widely shared view that rural life retains traditional patterns, family structures and relations, while life in the city is changing rapidly with modernization. Moden, or modern, is a word often used by contemporary Vietnamese, especially urban dwellers. The urbanites think of themselves as living in a time of transition from tradition to modernization, and perceive the world around them in terms of the contrasting framework of “modern vs. traditional”. Often, “modern” is associated with “western”, “foreign”, and “new”, while “traditional” refers to what is perceived as “Vietnamese”, “indigenous”, and “old”. The words “countryside” (nong thon) or “homeland” (que huong) are used with nostalgic feelings as a place where their old good life is still preserved. One interesting example I liked is packets of postcards sold at post offices in towns which are named “countryside” or “homeland” and have pictures of the rural life.

After a year of busy schedules as ASEAN Chair in 2013, Brunei Darussalam settled into its more routine national activities and concerns in 2014. It was also a year of reflection as it observed its thirtieth year of full sovereignty. As the year progressed it was evident that two main areas of national interest would preoccupy policymakers: the economy, and the recently gazetted Syariah law. In other areas of domestic and international affairs, the sultanate fared reasonably well in accordance with its projected policies.

Hauling the Economy Forward

Economy's Pillars

The long-term forward looking Wawasan 2035 (Vision 2035) continued to provide the national goals for economic and social development while the 10th Five Year Development Plan (2012–17) provided the more immediate targets in development. By 2035, Brunei aims to achieve a sustainable and dynamic economy, with a well-educated and skilled people enjoying a high quality of life. The integrated approach calls for strategic development in such areas as domestic business, education, environment, infrastructure, institutions and social security. Progressive and sustainable growth has been identified as vital in achieving the goals of Vision 2035. Some strategies seem to be working while others are still lagging. For instance, educational, infrastructural and institutional development have been given more emphasis, while economic development, as a result of structural inadequacies and external dependencies has not contributed to a comfortable growth rate. In a titah (speech), Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, Head of State and Government, announced the establishment of the Council for Vision 2035 (Majlis Wawasan 2035) to assess and ensure the targets of the Vision were realized. The national economy grew at a slow pace, reaching an average of about 1 per cent. According to the Department of Economic Planning and Development, Brunei's second quarter recorded a growth of 0.8 per cent. It noted that the prevailing conditions in the third and fourth quarters were not favourable to Brunei's GDP growth. A report from the OECD stated that ASEAN can expect an average of 5.6 per cent while Brunei is expected to average 1.6 per cent from 2015–19; that would be higher than the 0.9 per cent growth between 2011 and 2013.

JOBS OUTSIDE OF AGRICULTURE

Though family farming remains the main livelihood of the rural Mekong Delta, some people spend much of their everyday lives in jobs outside of agriculture. It is difficult for farmers to earn enough income from agricultural activities, so some members of their families seek jobs outside of agriculture to provide enough earnings for the present as well as the future. The inhabitants of Long Tuyen and the neighbouring villages are engaged in a variety of occupations outside of agriculture, which at first seemed a little surprising to me. Many are part-time or seasonal jobs that supplement agricultural activities, the main source of their income. There are also full-time jobs which serve as the primary occupation.

Jobs outside of agriculture have a significant meaning for family life, because in one sense, they constitute a life beyond the family. While agricultural activities are almost exclusively family-based (both nuclear and extended, including in-laws), jobs outside of agriculture are mostly conducted outside of the family sphere. They constitute a place in which people may experience other social relationships that affect family values. However, working outside of the family does not necessarily mean separation from the family. On the contrary, jobs are interconnected with family life in a number of ways. Most jobs create a social environment that incorporates members of the families.

The information I gathered on jobs outside of agriculture come from not only Long Tuyen Village, but also other villages, where these occupations are more common. I also visited a few workplaces in those villages.

SUPPLEMENTARY (PART-TIME) JOBS

One of the most popular part-time or seasonal jobs taken by Long Tuyen villagers is bricklaying (tho ho), a job that has been available to villagers for a long time. Those working as bricklayers are almost exclusively men. For example, one farmer has been working as a bricklayer since 1968. In order to be a bricklayer, he served his apprenticeship with another bricklayer for over three years and was trained before he started to work independently. He says it is not very difficult to become a bricklayer, because the job does not require a lot of education. In his opinion, “Whether you can become a bricklayer or not depends on determination. If you are determined to become one and work hard, you can be a layer.”

In 2014 the government made a number of new political appointments and signalled that it was preparing the country for the fourth generation political leadership. It also acted on concerns about the cost of housing and medical fees, especially for the older pioneer generation that had helped build Singapore. In regional relations there were a few hiccups with Malaysia over toll charges for vehicles crossing the common causeway and unhappiness with the Indonesian decision to name a warship after two Indonesian marines who were tried and executed in Singapore for a terrorist act during Indonesia's Confrontation against Malaysia. Singapore also initiated a number of ventures that appear to signal a greater leadership role in arbitration and disaster management.

Political and Legal Developments

In domestic politics the most significant development was the PAP government's announcement in April that two members of the Cabinet had been made full ministers. They are Tan Chuan Jin who was made Manpower Minister, and Lawrence Wong who was made Minister for Culture, Community and Youth. The government announced that together with two other earlier appointees — Education Minister Heng Swee Keat and Social and Family Development Minister Chan Chun Sing, the appointments also reflected future priorities for the government during an important period of transition that will require emphasis on social and manpower issues. These appointments appear to have consolidated a group of younger ministers who are likely to be identified with a fourth generation leadership. Importantly, Tan Chuan Jin and Chan Chun Sing's appointments are well in line with having a core pool of Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) scholars within the Cabinet. The current pool also includes Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean and Trade and Industry Minister Lim Hng Kiang.

In other political news, former presidential candidate Tan Jee Say announced the formation of a new political party called “Singaporeans First”. It is likely that this development is closely related to seemingly high levels of dissatisfaction among locals with the high percentage of foreigners in the domestic population. There are constant complaints among locals that infrastructure facilities and services are being stretched on account of the new arrivals. Additionally, there is also a segment within the population that regards foreigners as responsible for taking away jobs from the locals.

FAMILY LIFE

Much of the life of the residents of Binh Thuong B Hamlet revolves around the family. With the aim of illustrating how family members spend their everyday life together and interact with each other in daily activities, I follow a day in the life of my host family. Of course, every day is different, but the day introduced here is a typical one. In this family the father and mother are over seventy and the children are in their late twenties to early forties. The oldest grandchild is over twenty and the youngest are infants and babies. The head of the family is Uncle Bay, and he lives with his wife Aunt Tam and Youngest Brother, their youngest son who is single. The other six children live separately. Most of them are married except for Second Brother who is divorced, and four of them (Second Brother, Third Brother, Fourth Sister and Fifth Sister) live in the same hamlet.

Morning in the village starts early, when it is still dark outside and stars are sparkling in the sky around the disc of the moon. When cocks start crowing, shortly after four, Aunt Tam gets up before anyone else in the house is awake and makes a wood fire in the kitchen hearth. Some mornings when the electricity is off, as in other houses in the village that have no electricity, the mother lights a kerosene lamp, which gives the small house a dim yellow glow. While waiting for the wood to start crackling quietly and steadily, she pumps water from the well for the kettle which she then places over the fire, which is producing red flames by now. In most other houses where they cannot afford water pumps, they boil the water they fetched from the river days before so the mud would settle. When the water boils, Aunt Tam makes a pot of tea, the first of many in the upcoming day.

Around five, other members of the family, Uncle Bay, Youngest Brother, and a grandchild (son of Second Brother) who stays in the house every night, get up, and the day's activity begins. After washing their faces in the river, the family members clean the pig hut, and sweep the house and the front garden.

Political and security developments in Southeast Asia in 2014 reflect efforts on the part of Southeast Asian countries as well as ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to adjust and adapt to the conditions and circumstances of a “new normal” in the wider Asia-Pacific region: a rapidly changing regional strategic environment where emerging powers display greater assertiveness and assurance of their newfound status, whilst established powers experience relative decline and seek to rebalance against the growing power and influence of their rivals. China's rising power and influence appears to have grown from strength to strength, notwithstanding putative efforts by the United States, Japan and others to balance against it partly through rallying Southeast Asian partners in support of their cause. Adding to the growing prospect of regional instability and turbulence was Russia's annexation of Crimea in March, which raised fears among some Southeast Asians over the prospective emulation of Russia's action by more powerful claimant states over the South China Sea region.

At the same time within Southeast Asia, a number of states and societies underwent political transition. Indonesia conducted a successful presidential election in July which saw a popular non-establishment figure, the then Jakarta Governor Joko Widodo (or “Jokowi”), win the presidency. It remains unclear at this point what Jokowi's foreign policy will look like. However, there are early hints that Indonesia might not be as fixated with ASEAN as in the past. Going beyond the “Indo-Pacific” idea advanced by the Yudhoyono administration, the Jokowi administration's vision for Indonesia is as a global maritime fulcrum connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Known as “PACINDO”, the area of engagement envisioned here is ostensibly geographically more extensive than the Indo-Pacific region the Yudhoyono administration had in mind. To that end, India and the Gulf states have been identified as countries with whom Jokowi would engage more deeply. As a foreign policy adviser to Jokowi has declared: “We used to say ASEAN is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Now we change it to a cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

After considerable unrest in Thailand caused by the rift between the so-called “Red Shirts” and their “Yellow” rivals, senior officers of the Thai military launched a bloodless coup in May which brought temporary relief but left many questions unanswered.

Introduction

2014 will be remembered as a year in which the whole Malaysian nation came together in the wake of the double tragedy involving the national carrier Malaysian Airlines, namely the disappearance of MH370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing on 8 March, and the shooting down of MH17 over Ukrainian airspace on 17 July, killing all 298 passengers. The two mishaps, while bringing politics to a temporary halt, were not devoid of uncanny political circumstances. The MH370 mystery, in particular, took place on exactly the sixth anniversary of the 12th General Elections (GE12) on 8 March 2008, which changed the course of Malaysian politics when the Anwar Ibrahim-led People's Pact (PR: Pakatan Rakyat) opposition alliance denied the ruling National Front (BN: Barisan Nasional) its coveted two-thirds parliamentary majority and added Penang, Selangor, Kedah and Perak to the list of states it controlled; Kelantan having already been under an Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS: Parti Islam SeMalaysia)-led government since 1990. The loss of flight MH370 also came immediately following the Court of Appeal's verdict finding Anwar Ibrahim guilty of the charge of sodomizing his former aide Mohd. Saiful Bukhari Azlan. This momentous ruling overturned Anwar's acquittal by the High Court in January 2012, and has had significant implications for Anwar's and PR's political plans for the rest of the year.

The fractious bickering among politicians over the role of Islam, which has been constitutionally designated as the “religion of the Federation” or as many put it, the country's “official religion”, has continued to dominate the political scene since the end of Malaysia's 13th General Elections (GE13) in May 2013. GE13 had witnessed the ruling National Front (BN) coalition losing further ground to PR. Although BN managed to recapture the state of Kedah and legitimize its hold on Perak which it snatched from PR through defections in February 2009, BN's share of parliamentary seats declined from 140 to 133, besides losing the popular vote tally with only 47 per cent of votes as compared to PR's 51 per cent.

Results of GE13 propelled Islam to the forefront of national politics in more ways than one. On the one hand, as a major signifier of Malay ethnicity as formalized in the Federal Constitution, Islam held symbolic value for United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the archetypal party of Malay nationalism.

Introduction

The defining event of 2014 was the crisis between Vietnam and China relating to the activities of a Chinese drilling rig in areas to the west of the Paracel archipelago. The crisis and related tension lasted from early May to mid-July. Although differences relating to disputes in the South China Sea do cause periodic tension between the two countries, a crisis of this scale has not occurred since the 1990s and no previous crisis has such ramifications within Vietnam, both in terms of popular protests against China and through riots targeting foreign companies in May. This overview of Vietnam in 2014 will examine these keys developments in the context of Vietnam's domestic developments as well as its foreign relations.

Crisis with China and Its Repercussions

The relationship with China continues to be of paramount importance to Vietnam in terms of both a multifaceted collaboration in various fields and the geo-strategic challenge posed by China, in particular regarding the South China Sea. The disputes with China in the South China Sea, that is, overlapping sovereignty claims to the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos as well as to maritime areas between the Vietnamese coast and the two archipelagos within the “ninedash line” claimed by China, continued to pose a major challenge in bilateral relations in 2014. This was highlighted by the crisis and tensions caused by the dispatch of drilling rig HD-981 to areas west of the Paracel archipelago by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation on 2 May. The crisis and related tension lasted until mid-July when China announced the withdrawal of the drilling rig. Prior to the crisis, there had been no tension between Vietnam and China since mid-2013. The period from mid-2013 to April 2014 was characterized by deepened bilateral cooperation and by a seemingly successful bilateral dispute management approach relating to the disputes in the South China Sea.

Vietnam's and China's Viewpoints and Actions during the Crisis

Vietnam denounced the stationing of the drilling rig as illegal and demanded its withdrawal. In addition Vietnam claimed that the rig's area of operation was within Vietnam's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf as measured from its coastline; it also reasserted its claim of sovereignty to both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. Vietnam further accused China of using force against its ships in the waters near the Paracel archipelago and of arresting Vietnamese fishermen.

FAMILY FARMING

It is mid-February 2000 and the rice of Uncle Bay's farm is ready for harvest. One morning the father's children gather to harvest rice on his farm, the first crop of the year. Around six in the morning, Second Brother, Fourth Brother-in-Law, Fifth Brother-in-Law, and Youngest Brother meet in front of Second Brother's thatched house. They take a muddy path through Second Brother's orchards (vuon) and other people's rice fields (ruong) to the field of Uncle Bay and Aunt Tam. There, the four brothers begin to reap the rice rhythmically, holding a bunch of rice in their left hands and a crescent-shaped sickle in their right. A couple of hours later, about a fourth of the whole rice field has been cut in this manner. The sun is already intense by midmorning and the brothers climb onto the dike and drink a few cups of water brought from home while sitting under lemon trees to avoid the sun. When the brothers resume working, Fifth Sister-in-Law, who just returned from the market, joins them. Because of the heat in the open rice fields, the brothers wear Western-style caps and long-sleeved shirts, while the sister wears a Vietnamese conical hat and a long-sleeved blouse. In the afternoon, after the brothers and sister return home for lunch, Uncle Bay joins them to supervise the field. Aunt Tam also puts on her conical hat and comes out to the rice field to help for a few hours. This is a job the whole family takes part in. Around four o'clock in the afternoon, after a day's work all the rice from Uncle Bay's four thousand square metre rice field has been reaped.

The reaped rice is left in the field for two or three days to dry. When the rice is dried, the same family members spend another morning collecting it. A few bundles of rice are first gathered into larger bundles, which the brothers and sisters then carry on their shoulders to the centre of the rice field. When all the rice has been gathered there, they wrap it in plastic sheets and take each wrapping to the gardens in front of their homes, again on their shoulders.

Introduction

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a pair of initiatives that aims to restructure the economy and geopolitics of Eurasia. The Silk Road Economic Belt announced by Xi Jinping in September 2013 during a tour of Central Asian neighbours is a programme to build land transportation corridors that connect China to Europe and all other major Eurasian subregions, including Indochina, South Asia, and Southwest Asia. Then in October 2013, Xi visited Indonesia and announced the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is a port development initiative to broaden Chinese trade channels targetting the maritime regions of Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, East Africa, and the Mediterranean. Xi Jinping's two Silk Road programmes are a package called the “One Belt — One Road” [yidai-yilu] initiative.

Both Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang spent great effort in the year 2014 launching concrete measures to advance the silk roads agenda of Eurasian connectivity and regional cooperation. They hope to build a comprehensive trans- Eurasian network of economic corridors that could sustain China's economic growth and strengthen China's political leverage for decades to come. The consequence would be to draw the countries of Eurasia into China's economic orbit to form what Xi Jinping calls a “community of shared destiny”. Members’ fortunes would rise as China's own rise continued. A culturally and politically diverse but economically integrated division of labour harmoniously organized by China's trade and financial interests is what China promises. If this vision is fully realized, China's silk roads vision will help realize “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the “China Dream” of a wealthy society grounded on Chinese values.

It should be noted that this yidai — yilu agenda is a work in progress rather than a fully drawn up master plan. That is, as previous Chinese leaders have done, Xi Jinping is providing a grand strategic vision or agenda for China. The Chinese Communist Party and government must work to realize this agenda to the best of their ability. So, for the rest of Xi Jinping's years in power — expected to last until 2022 — we will hear about the two Silk Roads at every meeting that Xi Jinping or Li Keqiang attends in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.