Introduction

The fourth democratic election in post-Soeharto Indonesia was a display of interconnections between the old and the new. The 9 April legislative and 9 July presidential elections were the first that saw the maximum impact of the implementation of decentralization and direct elections, and the abolishment of the party-ranking list system. These new schemes have created more open and competitive polls for Parliament. The rise of Joko Widodo (Jokowi), first as Solo mayor, then Jakarta governor, and subsequently as Indonesia's president, is the strongest evidence of the possibilities that have been opened by direct local elections and disbursement of authority to the regions. These have now allowed local leaders to project their career to the highest administrative level. The effect of personalism and leaders’ charisma has strengthened alongside this trend, particularly as parties still lack clear ideological platforms and programmes.

Meanwhile, old campaign tactics and means have interacted with the new realities and challenges of these elections. The prevalence and evolution of money politics — particularly during the legislative round — was evidence of old tactics evolving to sophistication. At the same time, new trends and realities, such as the dominance of legislative candidates, the role of volunteers, and the extent of the utilisation of social media as a means to campaign in the presidential rounds — are new trends, some of which may well become permanent fixtures in the coming elections.

Contrasts between the two presidential candidates were the epitome of the “old versus new”. While Jokowi represented the new breed of leader offering a fresh start, the other candidate Prabowo Subianto, characterized the growth of the sense of longing to return to the old system. The intense campaigning and the results that ensued also demonstrated how divisive the polarizing differences have been.

Legislative Elections: Candidate-centred, Money Rules

The legislative election in April provided strong indications of the emergence of new trends in campaigning at the grass-roots level. Spurred by the abolishment of the party-ranking system introduced just before the 2009 elections, the authority and control of the campaign mechanism have shifted firmly to the candidates. In previous elections, parties controlled candidacy by determining where each candidate would be placed in the ranking list that appeared in ballot papers — the higher the ranking, the better chance to be elected.

Southeast Asia in 2014 presented a very mixed picture. The economies on the whole were more sluggish; political uncertainty in two key countries, Thailand and Malaysia, was higher; Islamic conservatism appeared to on the rise in Malaysia and Brunei; the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was a growing security concern, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia; geopolitical trends, particularly China's quest for leadership, were causing unease; and questions were raised about whether ASEAN would be able to rise up to the challenges it faced. On the other hand, more engagement with major powers also presented economic opportunities, foreign direct investment in Southeast Asia was increasing, Indonesia saw a successful transfer of power in democratic elections to a reformist President, and Myanmar continued on the path of reform and democratization, even though the rise of Buddhist nationalism and its implications for community relations was a matter of concern.

This Introduction highlights some of the salient themes in this volume.

Economic Trends

At an estimated aggregate growth rate of 4.6 per cent, Southeast Asia's economic performance was below the 5 per cent average of 2013, marking the second consecutive year of slowdown since 2012, though Malaysia and Myanmar had higher growth than in 2013. The sluggish recoveries in the advanced industrial countries, the slowdown in China and declines in growth of domestic consumption and investment contributed to the more anaemic growth. Arief Ramayandi and Megananda Suryana, in their economic survey of the region in this volume, argue that since these factors will not improve anytime soon, the short-term growth prospects for the Southeast Asian economies were not rosy. They also point to the risks of financial market volatilities when the U.S. Federal Reserve raises interest rates later in 2015 as asset prices in some of the large economies were inflated.

On the other hand, lower commodity prices were on balance positive for Southeast Asian economies and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) to the five largest regional economies had been increasing steadily. But to ensure that this trend continued, Southeast Asian countries needed to maintain their level of economic competitiveness. Ramayandi and Suryana note that while in China rising wages were accompanied by healthy growth in labour productivity, in three major Southeast Asian countries — Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand — wages have been outstripping productivity, thereby reducing labour productivity substantially.

Introduction

Having garnered widespread acclaim for its reform efforts during the first three years in office, Myanmar's transitional government in 2014 found itself increasingly under attack from critics, both at home and abroad. Opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi whose approval of President Thein Sein's reform agenda in 2011 had done much to convince sceptics that Myanmar was truly turning a new leaf now publically complained that reforms had stalled. Over the course of the year, talk of backsliding became an increasingly common refrain among human rights groups and the media. Particular concern centred on the failure of the government to revise the constitution, crackdowns on the media and social protesters, armed clashes in ceasefire areas, growing anti-Muslim ferment, and major problems of land grabbing.

The critics did not have it all their own way. In a press conference in Yangon in November, U.S. President Barack Obama explicitly backed President Thein Sein, whom he had received in the White House during better days in 2012, arguing “Myanmar's democratisation process is real”. Echoing this sentiment, the International Crisis Group later the same week warned against overstating the significance of recent difficulties:

This more pragmatic view seemed to be reflected also in a number of opinion surveys conducted by Myanmar Egress, the International Republican Institute and the Asia Foundation in 2014, which all indicated that a majority of Myanmar people were positive about the country's political and economic prospects (although this was more apparent in the Burman heartland than in the ethnic states).

Yet, when it comes to shaping international perceptions, the media invariably have the upper hand and over the course of 2014, pressure grew on Western governments in particular, to reconsider their support of the Thein Sein government; some Western activists and parliamentarians even called for reintroducing sanctions, although Aung San Suu Kyi explicitly rejected such a dramatic step.

Introduction

On 8 November 2013, typhoon Yolanda (internationally referred to as Haiyan), the strongest recorded typhoon ever to make landfall hit central Philippines, with wind speeds of more than 300 km/hour and storm surges of over four metres. Yolanda's impact was massive. It passed through 171 cities and municipalities in fourteen provinces in the country leading to an estimated 6,300 deaths, over a thousand people missing, around 1.5 million families (around 7.5 million individuals) displaced, and in all affecting 3.4 million families (about 16 million people) and damaging or destroying a million homes.

Experts opine that in some ways the impact of Yolanda was greater than the Haiti earthquake in terms of shelter damage (affecting about 475,000 people in 95,000 households) or the 2004 tsunami in terms of total number of people affected (about 2.3 million). Yolanda's total economic impact, estimated to reach US$10 billion in damages, was considered one of the top two most destructive disasters in the world during 2013.

The enormity of the disaster overwhelmed the administration of President Benigno Aquino whose response during the first few days of the crisis was widely criticized. The local governments of most of the affected areas, particularly Tacloban City, which suffered the most devastation, were caught unaware and took some time to get back on their feet and start organizing relief response. Meanwhile, haunting images broadcast internationally by the global media galvanized an unprecedented international response for relief and aid. However, due to logistical challenges, aid items took time to reach the ground. The Philippine Government, in partnership with national and international humanitarian actors, led the massive efforts to clear the roads, re-establish power systems and provide a range of life-saving humanitarian support to millions of people.

While progress could be seen and the focus had shifted from relief to recovery and rehabilitation a year after the typhoon, much remained to be done in terms of infrastructure, social services, resettlement and livelihood. In fact as of November 2014, many of the affected still lived in temporary shelters as only about 2,000 of the 205,000 permanent homes needed had been built. Meanwhile, replanting of the 33 million coconut trees could not be done immediately because of the huge task of clearing debris. In short, the level of recovery and reconstruction tasks ahead is enormous.

In 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became the first Indonesian president to be elected directly by the people through free and peaceful democratic elections. In 2009, he was re-elected with impressive support of more than 61 per cent of the vote. Significantly, in both elections Yudhoyono enjoyed particularly high popularity among women voters. In 2009, for example, an exit poll conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI) found that 66 per cent of women, but only 55 per cent of men, had supported Yudhoyono, prompting LSI researcher Saiful Mujani to conclude that the president had been ‘saved by women voters’. Maeswera (2009: 81) echoed this view, noting that Yudhoyono was particularly popular with mature women, including married women and mothers (ibu-ibu), due to his handsome appearance and his image as a guitar-playing songwriter. (Yudhoyono would produce four albums during his presidency.)

Recognising his standing with female voters, Yudhoyono made lofty promises to women's rights activists towards the end of his first term. Speaking at a national event in 2009 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the founding of the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komisi Nasional Anti Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan, Komnas Perempuan), Yudhoyono emphatically declared that the state should immediately implement its responsibilities to protect women from violence and injustice and empower women in all aspects of life, giving them greater choice and access to full participation in public life:

Towards the end of his second term, however, it was clear that these promises were nowhere near being realised.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presided over a critical period in Indonesia's modern history. During his decade in power, between 2004 and 2014, Indonesia's new democracy stabilised. Not only was Yudhoyono able to serve out his two full terms without experiencing any major political crisis or disruption to his government, but he also managed to implement democratic reforms initiated before he took office, such as popular elections of heads of provinces, cities and districts. Democratic elections were generally well run and the military kept out of day-to-day political affairs. The new Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) began to make inroads into the elite-level corruption that had bedevilled the country. While the 1998–2004 transition from the authoritarian rule of long-time president Suharto had been marked by significant ethnic, religious and other forms of violent conflict, the Yudhoyono years were far more peaceful, symbolised by the signing of the Aceh peace agreement in 2005. Indonesia maintained an impressive rate of economic growth averaging over 5 per cent, paid off the debts it had accrued to the International Monetary Fund during the 1997–98 economic crisis and succeeded in reducing the official poverty rate from 16.7 per cent in 2004 to 11.5 per cent in 2013. Moreover, it seemed to be playing a major role in world affairs, with the country gaining entry to the G20 club of major economies, and with the president touting Indonesia's international leadership role as a modern Muslim democracy.

However, Yudhoyono's record of success was far from being unadulterated. As we shall show in this chapter and throughout this book, every time the president or his supporters pointed to an achievement, his critics were ready to identify a contradiction, failing or shortcoming. With regard to his democratic record, for example, some observers have characterised the Yudhoyono period as being marked by stagnation rather than progress (Tomsa 2010; Fealy 2011; Mietzner 2012; McRae 2013). In the economic field, Yudhoyono was widely criticised for being reluctant to push through major structural reforms (such as the full elimination of costly fuel subsidies) that would have freed funds for much-needed investments in infrastructure, education and other fields.

Under the Yudhoyono presidency, the environment featured in Indonesia's national and international politics with a prominence it had never previously achieved. It was not just the slew of new policies and initiatives; President Yudhoyono himself seemed to take the issue more seriously than any previous Indonesian president. This was most dramatically demonstrated at the G20 conference in Pittsburgh in 2009 when he announced to the world that, by itself, Indonesia would reduce its carbon emissions below business-as-usual projections by 26 per cent by 2020, and by 41 per cent if the country received international support. With some 80 per cent of Indonesia's emissions the result of forestry and land-use change, in 2010 Yudhoyono issued a two-year moratorium on the issuing of new permits to develop primary forests and peatlands, a proscription that covered 74 million hectares of forest land and that was subsequently extended until 2015. At a conference in 2011 he promised to ‘dedicate the last three years of my term as President to deliver enduring results that will sustain and enhance the environment and forests of Indonesia’ (Lang 2011). In 2013 he established a national agency for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. For these and other reasons, Yudhoyono has sometimes been lauded at home and abroad for his environmental commitments and achievements. Upon stepping down as Indonesian president, he goes on to become the chair and president of the Global Green Growth Institute, an international organisation with a mission to promote environmentally sustainable economic development.

This chapter assesses Yudhoyono's environmental record by considering two major initiatives that took place during his time in office: the passage and implementation of a new environmental law, and the introduction of plans for climate change mitigation. The new Environment Law, the aim of which was to provide environmental protection and management for the benefit of all citizens, resulted from the efforts of a broad coalition in parliament, including Yudhoyono's party, and created big opportunities to improve environmental management. Addressing climate change was very much Yudhoyono's own issue, which he promoted at home and especially abroad. The president and his government were able to bring in new environmental and climate policies and link them to public participation and anti-corruption efforts.

Conventional understandings of the Yudhoyono years have long been framed in terms of personal leadership. This focus on personal leadership has been abundantly evident in journalistic treatments of Indonesian politics, and in everyday commentaries, comparisons and counterfactual musings about the strengths and weaknesses of Susilo Bambang Yudho-yono's presidency. There is also a long history of academic preoccupation with questions of leadership in Indonesian politics, dating back to Herbert Feith's account of the tensions and conflicts between ‘solidarity-makers’ and ‘problem-solvers’ in the decline of constitutional democracy in the 1950s and extending into the writings of William Liddle over the long rule of the Suharto regime (Feith 1962; Liddle 1996). Recent years, moreover, have seen a wide range of institutions and authors in the so-called development industry emphasising and extolling leadership as a (if not the) crucial ingredient in enacting economic reforms, enhancing good governance and otherwise promoting development (see, for example, Grindle 2007).

This tendency to emphasise—and essentialise—leadership as a personal quality of individuals has almost always served as a substitute, rather than a starting point, for serious analysis of Indonesian politics. It is often said that Presidents B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid were mercurial and erratic; President Megawati Sukarnoputri was staid and standoffish; and President Yudhoyono was indecisive and conflict-averse. In lieu of references to traditional Javanese culture and jargon from the heyday of modernisation theory, today's political analysis simply uses the language of personality tests, pop psychology, pulp fiction and the tabloids. Indonesian presidents, it is assumed, have different personalities that explain the different politics they pursue and produce. Thus, after the July 2014 presidential elections, leading commentators on Indonesian politics breathed a collective sigh of relief that the hot-headed, ill-tempered, violence-prone Prabowo Subianto had lost his presidential bid and would not be subjecting Indonesian society to his authoritarian personality disorder and childish antics for the next five years, and that the appealingly approachable, earnest, easygoing and apparently incorruptible Joko Widodo (Jokowi) had been cast in the leading role in Indonesia's political drama instead (Mietzner 2014).

If this kind of individualised ‘great man’/personality-based approach to Indonesian politics is ultimately unhelpful, inaccurate and obfuscatory, a comparative perspective on presidential leadership in Indonesia may prove more illuminating instead.

When Susilo Bambang Yudhyono was sworn into office in October 2004, he was stepping into a set of constitutional arrangements and political circumstances that was without historical precedent in Indonesia. Following the constitutional reforms of 1999–2002, Yudhoyono faced the task of managing new and untested relationships among the major institutions of state, especially between the presidency and the parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR). But while Yudhoyono was Indonesia's first directly elected president, popular and elite views of the office of the presidency were characterised by a sense of continuity rather than difference. There was a widespread, if unspoken, assumption that Yudhoyono was occupying the same office as his predecessors, just doing so in a democratic environment. Echoing this default view, Anies Baswedan (2007: 232) explained that ‘an important and enduring feature of Indonesian politics has been the dominance of the president. … Indonesia's first two presidents set a precedent for the role and stature of their successors’. Clearly, the towering figures of Sukarno and Suharto had stamped an indelible impression on the minds of Indonesians that the president was the most powerful personage in the land.

This left a legacy of expectations for Yudhoyono about the supposedly superior role and power of the presidency. Thus, when the parliament, with its new constitutional powers and popular legitimacy, asserted itself on a number of occasions during his presidency, some observers believed that the relative powers of the executive and legislative branches had become unbalanced and, even more importantly, that the DPR was attempting to usurp the powers of the president (Susanti 2006; Indrayana 2008: 274–5). Common arguments were that Indonesia had moved from an ‘executive-heavy’ system under Suharto to a ‘legislative-heavy’ system in the democratic era and that Yudhoyono's reform agenda had been obstructed by reactionary forces in the DPR (Perdana and Friawan 2007: 19; Purnomo 2008). However, there have been few scholarly studies to test such assumptions.

This chapter discusses the ways in which Yudhoyono managed the relationships between key state institutions in Indonesia's reformed presidential system. The first section shows that Yudhoyono inherited a presidency whose relationships with other parts of government, especially the legislature, were still in the process of redefinition.

Managing internal security affairs is one of the most vital policy portfolios for any president, especially in countries with a long history of communal, political and separatist violence. For Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, this area should have been his primary area of expertise, given his military background and his many years as the key government minister in charge of security affairs. Nevertheless, his commitment to find solutions was not always accompanied by direct personal involvement or the necessary expenditure of political capital. Three of the biggest internal security problems confronting Yudhoyono when he took office in 2004 were the insurgency in Aceh, violence in Papua and terrorism. Generally, he has been given high marks on the first and the third, and credit for at least trying on the second (MacIntyre and Ramage 2008). On all three, however, he could have done much more. He was generally reactive rather than proactive, letting external events force policy changes rather than providing clear strategic direction. He liked setting intellectual guidelines, but rarely did any of the heavy lifting himself. The opposite of a micromanager, he was happy to leave implementation to subordinates. He was often more interested in form than in substance, using the creation of new institutions as proof of commitment without the necessary follow-up to ensure they actually worked. At no point during his two terms was there any attempt to step back and look at security policy in a way that assessed overall needs and developed capabilities accordingly.

Yudhoyono has received the most praise on Aceh, not only for the 2005 peace agreement but for also ensuring that the peace was main tained. Indeed, his first vice-president, Jusuf Kalla, had for some time been actively seeking contact with the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). Yudhoyono, as president, was open to pursuing international mediation, and it could be argued that he was proactive during his first few months in office. But without the 26 December 2004 tsunami to give peace-making a new impetus and urgency, Yudhoyono's habitual dithering would almost certainly have led to endless discussions without a clear resolution. Instead, with Kalla in charge of the government negotiating team, an agreement was signed in Helsinki in August 2005 after just five formal meetings.

As an insider in both the Habibie and Yudhoyono–Boediono administrations, and an academic who does not shy away from expressing candid opinions, I have been asked to evaluate the performance of the Yudhoyono government from both an internal and a comparative perspective. It is indeed difficult to get a clear picture of what is happening in Indonesia if one simply relies on media reports. Reading news or commentaries in Indonesian newspapers, or watching talk shows on Indonesian television, would give one the impression that the country is a basket case. Indonesia is at times portrayed as a failed state, or one that is very close to failing, with a huge number of people still living in poverty, crumbling infrastructure, widespread social conflict and a high level of corruption. Moreover, many Indonesians are critical of the government's perceived weakness vis-à-vis the outside world. Listening to the rhetoric during the 2014 presidential race between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, one would be left with the impression that Indonesia is a weak state, powerless in the face of external machinations bent on controlling the country's natural resources; an object rather than a subject in international relations; and a country lacking the wherewithal to stand up for itself and, by implication, be counted in an increasingly competitive and uncertain global era.

In contrast, reporting in the foreign media has mostly been complimentary towards Indonesia in recent years. Differing sharply from the negative image projected onto the world stage in the immediate post-Suharto years, Indonesia is now generally seen as a success story. The country's success in peacefully managing its democratic transition has received international plaudits, particularly when so many other countries have failed dismally. Indonesia's economic recovery, its status as a newly emerging economy and its constructive role in the Southeast Asian region have drawn praise. Far from being regarded as a failed or failing state, Indonesia is regarded as a model for countries embarking on a democratic transition, whether in the predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa or within Southeast Asia.

Obviously, official speeches by Indonesian government officials have emphasised this favourable narrative while glossing over Indonesia's many remaining shortcomings. As is so often the case, however, the truth lies somewhere in between. Indonesia is neither a failed state nor an unmitigated success story.

When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became president of Indonesia in 2004, he took charge of a country whose international reputation had been shaped primarily by political instability, economic hardship and security threats such as terrorism and secessionism. In addition, Indonesia's foreign policy had been devastated by the separation of Timor-Leste and the loss of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia following a decision in the International Court of Justice in 2002. Restoring the country's badly tarnished image became a key priority of Yudhoyono's presidency. At the same time, he aspired for Indonesia to play a more prominent role in international organisations such as the United Nations, the G20 and ASEAN. By the time he left office in 2014, it appeared that Indonesia had indeed defied the inauspicious circumstances at the beginning of Yudhoyono's term in office and re-emerged as a respected player on the global map of international affairs. This remarkable transformation has prompted some observers to describe Indonesia as a rising or emerging power.

This chapter seeks to assess the merits of these claims and analyse Yudhoyono's role in shaping Indonesia's foreign policy during the ten years of his presidency, paying particular attention to an apparent paradox. On the one hand, Indonesia's growing international reputation as a rising or emerging power is often attributed to its successful democratisation and its image as a model Muslim democracy (Acharya 2014). Western governments in particular have not tired of praising Indonesia's achievements under Yudhoyono's leadership (Leahy 2014; Santi 2014). On the other hand, however, both the media and academic observers of Indonesian domestic politics have increasingly questioned whether the country really deserves this praise (Harsono 2012). In this chapter, I argue that this seeming paradox is explained in part by Yudhoyono's approach to foreign policy. As I will demonstrate, the president's personality heavily shaped Indonesia's approach to foreign affairs, especially during his second term when he made the narrative of a successful Muslim democracy a cornerstone of his foreign policy. Building on the appeal of this narrative, Yudhoyono brought Indonesia back into the community of nations, restoring its visibility in the eyes of the international community. It would be premature, however, to consider Indonesia a rising power.

When Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became Indonesia's first directly elected president in 2004, human rights were already a central element of the Indonesian state's political profile. After the fall of Suharto's authoritarian New Order regime, the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyarawatan Rakyat, MPR) had enshrined the key tenets of human rights into Indonesia's Constitution through a series of amendments between 1999 and 2002 (Butt and Lindsey 2012: 22). In 1999, the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) had also passed Law 39/1999 on Human Rights, which continues to function as the key piece of legislation for the protection of human rights. Indonesia had also acceded to a number of important international human rights treaties, including the Convention against Torture and Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatments or Punishments in 1998, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1999. Thus, with the basic framework for the protection of human rights largely in place at the time of Yudhoyono's inauguration, domestic and international observers expected the new president not only to consolidate these reforms, but also to push for the further deepening of human rights protections.

Opinion is divided on whether Yudhoyono fulfilled these expectations during his decade in power. In recent years, starkly differing assessments have emerged over whether human rights in Indonesia improved, stagnated or even worsened during his time in office. Some assessments, particularly those of foreign diplomats and media commentators, portrayed Yudhoyono's Indonesia as an increasingly open and plural society where human rights were largely protected. Others, especially those of local human rights activists, frequently suggested that the protection of civil and political rights stagnated, and in some areas even declined, during the president's ten-year reign. In light of such a lack of consensus on Yudhoyono's achievements and failures, this chapter aims to critically assess his legacy in the field of human rights, with a particular focus on his personal role and influence in this field.

A number of previous studies have attempted to locate the key factors driving human rights reform in post-New Order Indonesia. Hadiprayitno (2010: 397), for example, examined the international dimension of Indonesia's increasing adoption of human rights frameworks, concluding pessimistically that ‘Indonesia's primary motivation throughout accepting international commitments has been merely to pre-empt international action’.