INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores the irrigation agency's bureaucratic identity, and how it is sustained and reproduced by core policy actors' interests and strategies (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith for a definition of core policy actors). It describes the agency's main attributes, which are its orientation towards infrastructure development and its focus on bureaucratic rent-seeking. These mutually reinforcing drivers of agency behaviour are translated into specific management rules and procedures in and around the project development approach. This chapter also analyses how the agency's identity was contested by the shift in international policy trends in the late 1980s and again with the Indonesian political reform of 1998, and, finally, how its identity was affected by the major changes in its organizational structure when the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Development (Kimbangwil) was formed in November 1999, to replace the Ministry of Public Works (MPW), in directing irrigation sector development.

I discuss the irrigation agency's bureaucratic identity as the product of “bureaucratic capitalism” (Section I), and illustrate how the agency's organizational foundation is based on infrastructure-oriented irrigation development (i.e. construction and rehabilitation) and how its bureaucratic mechanisms are shaped by the practice of bureaucratic rent-seeking (Section II). This chapter goes on to clarify how rent-seeking rules are established in the actual management of project funds (Section III). Details are given on how the policy shifts in irrigation systems management — from infrastructure to system operation and maintenance (O&M) and farmer empowerment, and later to irrigation management transfer (IMT) — were hampered by core policy actors’ resistance to change (Section IV). This chapter ends with how these same actors’ bureaucratic powers were diminished with the abolition of the MPW and the establishment of Kimbangwil in 1999, which were later restored with the transition into Kimpraswil in 2001 (Section V).

SECTION I: THE IRRIGATION AGENCY'S BUREAUCRATIC IDENTITY

I define the irrigation agency's bureaucratic identity as the product of accelerated bureaucratization or what Evers calls “run-away bureaucratization” (p. 666). According to Evers, the process of bureaucratization in Indonesia resulted in retarded Weberian bureaucracy, where the rapid growth in government personnel was not accompanied by a growth in its ability to perform the assigned bureaucratic tasks.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on how the irrigation agency at different administrative levels coped with the internal contradictions that developed when implementing Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) after passage of the Water Act. It explains the strategies used by provincial and district governments to undertake the IMT policy changes that occurred with the new Water Act. It illustrates how IMT implementation under Water Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL) was shaped by the project development approach both before and after the IMT policy struggles.

This chapter is divided into six sections. Section I highlights Kimpraswil's Participatory Irrigation Program (PIP) after the passage of the Water Act on 19 February 2004. In Section II, I discuss the provincial governments’ general position on IMT, and then in Section III, I dissect how the irrigation agency in the Kulon Progo district, in particular, dealt with the WATSAL IMT programme. Section IV analyses how WATSAL policy-makers’ attempt to use the stimulant fund as a tool to eradicate rent-seeking practices in the irrigation sector backfired. In Section V, target-oriented IMT implementation and Federation of Water Users Associations (FWUA) organizational development is discussed, while Section VI explains how the implementation of the WATSAL IMT programme was overwhelmed by project procedures and mechanisms.

SECTION I: KIMPRASWIL AND ITS NEW PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION PROGRAM

In the aftermath of the IMT policy infighting in 2003 and early 2004, Kimpraswil promoted its new IMT policy under its PIP, in which farmers’ involvement was limited to the tertiary level. At the national level two workshops were held, on 11 March and 18 April 2004 at the National Development Planning Agency (NDPA), to inform regional government representatives about the recent passage of the Water Act and the need to halt WATSAL IMT implementation. Present at these workshops were officials from Kimpraswil, the NDPA, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), and regional government representatives from the twenty-nine provinces in Indonesia. At the regional level, Kimpraswil also introduced its new programme through seminars and workshops. For example, in Yogyakarta, a workshop was conducted on the cultural aspects of irrigation management.

Formally, Kimpraswil did not have any authority to direct regional governments’ policy on IMT. In 2001, regional governments had been authorized to define their own development programmes within the overall application of regional autonomy.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives further insights on how interdependencies and alliances at the central government ministries contested ideas and contradictions in Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), as incorporated in the Water Sector Adjustment Loan (WATSAL) IMT programme.

This chapter, organized into ten sections, analyses the political wranglings in chronological order and maps the evolution of coalitions in the overall promulgation process of the new Water Act. Section I analyses the conflicting policy frames in Indonesian irrigation development. The prelude to the IMT policy struggles on the principles of management transfer is examined in Section II. Kimpraswil's controversial revised clauses of the new Water Act, from those originally formulated by Working Team IV in the WATSAL Task Force (WTF), are discussed in Section III, while Section IV details both Kimpraswil's moratorium and its relationship with the other ministries. In Section V, I show how Kimpraswil and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) each designed specific actions to legitimize their positions on the WATSAL IMT programme. The parliamentary network and networking at each stage of the Water Act promulgation process are then discussed: Section VI covers the emergence of a Kimpraswil–PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan) coalition that wanted to retain power over the IMT process; Section VII covers the emergence of a counter-alliance that sought to give the farmers and Water Users Associations (WUAs) more control; and Section VIII discusses the reoccurrence of bureaucratic conflicts between the National Development Planning Agency (NDPA) and Kimpraswil. Section IX discusses actions various actors took after the draft Water Act was returned to parliament, and Section X rounds out the chapter with an analysis of the Kimpraswil–World Bank relationship.

SECTION I: CONFLICTING POLICY FRAMES IN INDONESIAN IMT

IMT policy renewal under WATSAL symbolized the attempt of the new Indonesian government (or some segments of it) to reform irrigation sector development as part of the country's 1998 political reform. In the early 2000s, however, the national government's position towards political reform was divided between those who wanted the reform to continue and those who did not. In the irrigation sector, these political differences became the battleground of various ministries fighting for decision-making power and control of the budget.

EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN MODERN TIMES

OKB: May I suggest that we continue discussing Southeast Asia as a concept?

WGW: As I mentioned earlier, the term really came out of World War II, from the Mountbatten Command in Colombo, which was called the South East Asia Command. The term stuck, and it did so because of the advent of decolonization. The British and the Americans found it useful, and I think the French and Dutch followed thereafter. Decolonization made them think of the region's future, which they feared would be similar to what had become of the Balkans — fragmented, and in effect a power vacuum. European experiences were transposed on to the region, and the notion was that, where there is fragmentation, big powers would intervene. So a quick look around showed an independent but fragile India on one side, and on the other, Communist China, one of the five powers in the United Nations Security Council.

The strategic planners saw a potential political vacuum, and to get down to work they needed a coordinated bigger picture. Identifying Southeast Asia as one region helped them visualize the future. This didn't happen immediately, by the way. The Americans took some time to accept it because they thought in terms of East Asia, or the Western Pacific. They never looked at South Asia much, the way the British and the French did. On their side, Europeans saw India and they saw China; and they saw the region in between as a residue. So the French used the term “Indochine”, which is very interesting because it showed that the French had understood the area to be a bit of China and a bit of India. For Western powers that had been moving eastwards, this area would have indeed been orientated through references to India and China.

OKB: In the early days, the British were denoting the region as “Farther India”.

WGW: Farther India, yes. They were thinking in terms of the projection of British power out of India, an extension into the Malay Peninsula and into Burma. Burma was actually managed as a province of India, a tail end of India; something the Burmese have never forgiven them for. So their view was always India-centred.

ADAPTING TO THE WORLD ORDER

OKB: We are now in a situation where the eastern edge of the Europe-Asia landmass meets the western edge. It would be interesting at this point to discuss China again. Perhaps we can start with an article you wrote a while ago on China trying hard to adjust to a world order it had no part in creating.

That is in fact the process that China has been going through for a long time, starting with the Opium War, followed by the fall of the imperial system, then the rise of the Kuomintang, and then the triumph of Mao. It was Deng Xiaoping's reforms after 1978 that finally brought remarkable economic growth to the country. All this took a hundred and seventy years. But now, in its new position of power and influence, functioning well at the global level in all areas becomes extremely important for China. There is also a fall in confidence in the West, which in a way opens up space for the Chinese to actually tweak the world order wherever they can. This begs the question: to what extent is Confucianism — or Confucian thinking — still at play here? After all, in the bigger scheme of things, communism will probably just be seen as an anomaly.

You told me the other day that you see yourself as a Confucian, and that you were raised that way. I'm one of those who believe that the contribution that Confucian thinking can bring to modern life is actually quite enormous. But because of colonialism and the rise of Western science and technology, whatever knowledge that was not Western was pushed aside as being essentially misguided. I am hoping to hear your views on that.

Also, China is now ranked the second-largest economy, and aiming to be first. But we know for a fact that the American system is much more stable, and even if it should someday rank only second in terms of certain statistical figures, it's got strong institutions and it's got impressive unity in ideology. On the Chinese side, things are rather chaotic and fragile.

DISTORTED IMAGES OF EACH OTHER

OKB: The western edge and the eastern edge of the Eurasian landmass historically viewed each other across a threatening cultural and geographical expanse, and would therefore have conjured in each of their minds a messy mix of diverse phenomena about the other. “The Other” would have been perceived by each through a highly distorting filter of in-between cultures.

WGW: It is very significant that both these edges — Western Europe and China — saw each other from afar, across a continental mass. “The Other”, for both of them, was everything on the other side. Being fringes, they had not been in direct contact with each other. Now, in the global age, both sides still exhibit residual thinking from earlier times. We still talk about the East and the West, and the West still entertains notions of “The West versus the Rest”.

But all this should also remind us about how important the core was to them. The core both filtered and coloured at the same time everything that was on the other side. Today, all that has changed; the world is now effectively round. The Americas have made all the difference. The Americas include Europe, but also East Asia. We have the North Atlantic world, and we have the APEC world, for example. The continental fringes have met each other, and perspectives have changed. The edges now hold the global initiative.

What I wanted to point out when I wrote my article about the Two-Ocean Mediterranean was that the Mediterranean expanded into the Atlantic, and made that the second Mediterranean. Europe and America controlled this Mediterranean, and this Mediterranean came to control the world, spreading into the Indian Ocean and then the Pacific Ocean. This expansion now lines all these up, until the other end of the continent is reached. A maritime linkage is made, bordering China, Russia … and maybe India. India is not quite sure whether it is part of the maritime world or part of the continental world.

China is quite clearly continental in nature. To survive a maritime global world, it has to have a navy.

SOUTHEAST ASIA ON THE PERIPHERY

OKB: Let's talk about Southeast Asia as a phenomenon. Modern nation building in the region can to an extent be seen as a defence strategy inherited by the region's peoples as a postcolonial contingency. ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations founded in 1967, would then be understood as a collective attempt in that direction. Elsewhere, you have drawn some parallels between the Mediterranean and archipelagic Southeast Asia. Can we continue our discussion in that direction?

WGW: One must acknowledge that Southeast Asia was very much peripheral to the main action in world history for a long, long time. And one of the reasons for this was because the main action was between powers that were essentially continental ones, land powers.

To what extent the peculiar features of the Mediterranean acted as a trigger for civilization is arguable. Egypt's civilization or the Babylonian civilization didn't actually depend on the Mediterranean. They were riverine civilizations, and the urban conditions that rose out of the two great river systems of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates didn't have much directly to do with the Mediterranean, although they — the Egyptian one particularly — had an impact on the Mediterranean development later on. The entire struggle to define themselves as peoples, as economies, ultimately as states, was done mainly on land, except for the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean story is fascinating to me because that was the only place in ancient times where they fought at sea. Everywhere else the fighting was on land. In the Indian Ocean there was virtually no fighting at sea. No naval warfare, or at least no record of such. And on the China side, very little as well; just some minor conflicts along the coast with Japan and Korea, but all quite negligible. So the only real fighting on water was in the Mediterranean, and it has a special resonance for me because the creation of modern civilization really came out of the fact that land and water conditions were combined for a particular system of political governance.

CHINESE ENTRY INTO THE GLOBAL AGE

OOI KEE BENG: Professor Wang, let's start with the idea of China as a nation state. China becoming a republic in 1911 must have been earth-shattering for many Chinese. It certainly signified the crumbling of a world view that had lasted for millennia. Within forty years of that event, a form of communism would take over instead to dictate the national paradigm.

WANG GUNGWU: To be exact, that shift was precipitated by a nationalist paradigm more than a communist paradigm. China becoming a nation state was definitely very unfamiliar to most Chinese intellectuals, requiring as it did of them to shift away from their tradition of an Imperial China and from the ideals of Confucius and other historical thinkers, in order to adapt to what was a new and revolutionary idea. In that sense, the revolution in China was not a communist one to start with, but a nationalist one.

In moving from empire to nation state, they had to go through a period wherein they turned away from the past in order to look at China afresh, and to imagine a new kind of state. And I must say that the early groups of scholars from the end of the nineteenth century down to 1949 were admirably adventurous in exploring other traditions. In other words, they took the West very seriously indeed. We tend to forget them now because they lost out after 1949, but the truth is a lot of them actually did a lot of studies on world history. They were looking particularly at Western history — why was the West so successful? They wanted an explanation, and quickly noticed how different Western history was from Chinese or East Asian history.

So what is the underlying difference? I think that when translating Plato, Aristotle, the Greeks and other European classics into Chinese, they already noticed that there was no world history as such. It was only European history writ large that they were reading, translating and reinterpreting for their Chinese audience. But they were also gaining a certain idea, a very important one in fact.

HUMAN HISTORY WAS CONTINENTAL HISTORY

To my mind, World History is an emergent subject made possible by the recent passing of the unipolar political world of colonial times and by the even more recent closing of the bipolarizing Cold War. The ideas found in this book should be taken as a cogent contribution towards the development of global perspectives that are at once inclusive of and sympathetic to the endless struggles of civilizations, against themselves and against each other.

Allow me here to simplify the content of this book, whose basic aim is to recognize and acknowledge a forgotten key actor in world history. With the traditional fetish for dividing the world into East and West — where for the West, the East started at its very doorstep; and for the East, the West was a much vaguer concept — the most important factor connecting these was often ignored, or was treated as a supplementary story. This is Central Asia.

The human dynamics exploding out of the Eurasian geographic core throughout the centuries did indeed configure the nature of the many civilizations settled around its edges. This is obvious to anyone knowledgeable about Chinese history, where the importance of Central Asia was testified to by the occasional successful conquest of imperial lands by nomadic groupings. For India, endless streams of conquerors would flow in from the north through the narrow passes of Afghanistan. It is undeniable that the history of Western civilization is strongly coloured by struggles against Eastern invaders, be they Persian troops, Arab horsemen, Turkish armies, or the hordes of the Huns and the Mongols.

The imperative for civilizations at the edges of the Euroasian landmass to resist military threats from within the depths of the continent has left dramatic legacies for modern man to observe. On physical landscapes, the elements, given enough time, clearly distinguish major terrestrial fault lines from minor ones. And so, rift valleys, volcanic cracks, grand canyons and growing mountain ranges reveal to us the persistent pressures that the Earth has to suffer. Human history does the same, conjuring over time political and cultural fault lines that express the tensions between peoples and reiterate the obstinacy of these conditions.

REVISITING THE PRESENT

A history of the world, when cogent, holds substantive significance for how the reader is to revisit the present. Furthermore, while a good approach to describing the past may seek to avoid outright predictions, it cannot help but insinuate lines of development into the future.

The discussions I had with Professor Wang Gungwu generally did not go into details specific to each of the regions we touched on. The originality of his ideas certainly reignited my childhood interest in humanity's past. In the months following the completion of the manuscript, I found myself searching red-eyed for history books to deepen my understanding of the issues he brought to my attention and to satisfy the curiosity he so recently reawakened. I now appreciate more than ever how great an impact the past — when properly explained — has on our take on current circumstances.

To summarize, the dialogues revolved around several key points of knowledge. The main argument is that a major actor has often been missing from most understandings of world history, whose impact on human history this side of the Ice Age has been enormous. This is Central Asia, of course, with its particular type of dynamism found in its sustained steppe-based societies.

Civilizational histories have most often been written separately, by largely unconnected peoples found at the Eurasian peripheries, and so it is not strange that they do not always complement each other as narratives. It is through bold perspectives like Professor Wang's, that younger scholars like me are reminded that the parts are not unrelated at all. In fact they are dynamically linked, even if not always in a direct and obvious fashion. Before the global age, global histories were not really possible for want of an empirically global perspective. Even in recent times, most attempts at a global history have been either ideologically or ethnocentrically constructed. By revolving mankind's political history around Central Asian innovativeness and expansionism, Professor Wang weaves a dynamic tapestry upon which events over millennia are easily followed. The didactic power of this approach, to my mind, is simply stunning. The principle of Occam's razor — which prefers the scientific approach that assumes the least complexity — has been well applied by him.