The ASEM institution reveals some characteristics of the relations between ASEM and Southeast Asian countries. ASEM has emerged as an interregional meeting forum espousing the principles of equality and informality, and is non-binding. These characteristics are very likely influenced by ASEAN member countries in ASEM. The informal characteristic has been highlighted in ASEM documents since the early period and seems to be sustained throughout ASEM discourse. The informality not only reflects the need of ASEM partners to avoid legal and formal institutions but also mirrors one of ASEM's purposes, to bridge the differences among ASEM partners and accommodate their varying interests. A number of interviewees raised the issue of the informality of the ASEM institution during in-depth interviews conducted for this study, and two participants’ observations in ASEF workshops revealed the merits of these informal interactions among the participants. The data indicate that the informality can help ASEM to accommodate the diversity of its partners and to circumvent the complexity of the inter-regional relations, whereas a formal institution may decompose such inter-regional relations. The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the influence of ASEAN in the ASEM institution and the contribution of the informality and non-binding characteristic to ASEM's longevity.

This chapter argues that the ASEM institution has been built in accordance with the needs of the Southeast Asian countries, that is, inter-regional relations managed by an informality and non-binding principle. Those characteristics mirror the influence of ASEAN countries on the ASEM institution. Indeed, ASEM seems to tolerate the Southeast Asian countries to bring in their “ASEAN way”, which means consensus-based, informal decision-making, and non-binding. These circumstances, however, have helped to maintain ASEM's longevity in two ways. First, the accommodation of the ASEAN institutional style into the ASEM institution encourages the Southeast Asian countries to accept and support ASEM. Second, the informality of ASEM institution creates flexibility while the non-binding principle seems to reduce the cost of maintaining cooperation while opening up opportunities for the ASEM partners to develop different kinds of strategic relations.

This chapter argues that, contrary to some criticism of its role, ASEM has actually been quite useful in enhancing foreign policy advantage, at least for some Asian countries, and especially for the ASEAN countries and China. This chapter presents empirical data that show the way in which ASEAN countries and China have been able to make use of ASEM to advance their foreign policy goals. To undertake this task, this chapter uses the case of Myanmar's accession to ASEM in 2004. The case study of Myanmar was chosen for two reasons. First, the disagreement between the Asian countries and the EU countries over Myanmar's membership of ASEM created the most critical point in ASEM's history, degrading the relations between the Asians and the Europeans to their lowest point. Yet both sides managed to agree to a compromise solution to the crisis. Second, human rights is the most difficult and sensitive political issue between Asian and European states. It reflects not only the most serious difference between the two regions but also the biggest obstacle to harmonious inter-regional relations.

ASEM has been maintained because it fulfils certain interests of ASEAN and China. As the Myanmar case study will reveal, ASEAN member countries and China were able to take advantage of the ASEM enlargement in 2004, at least in this instance, to gain political advantage in their relations with the EU countries. The argument is built on the results of the interviews about the common Asian position in supporting Myanmar's accession to ASEM in 2004. The in-depth interview data as well as documentary and news studies are analysed by using the framework of traditional power games among states to pursue interests through international institutions.

This chapter investigates the advancement of foreign policy by states, a focus that has been traditionally observed by realism. Realists perceive international relations as an arena wherein states, or other international actors, pursue their interests.

There is already a very large literature on regional institutions. Why should Evi Fitriani's new book, Southeast Asians and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): State's Interests and Institution's Longevity, merit the attention of readers? In my view, there are two core reasons why this book deserves attention and, indeed, is quite likely to win attention.

One is the volume's distinctive focus. Fitriani examines one of the least explored and least appreciated of the major regional bodies — the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) — and she brings to it a self-consciously Southeast Asian perspective. ASEM has received relatively less attention than the other high-profile regional groupings in part because its trans-regional nature has been seen by many as having an inherent implausibility about it. Could a body that aimed to link two very large and very different regions — each of which is highly heterogeneous — really amount to anything, or even sustain high-level political engagement for more than a brief period?

Fitriani explores the reasons ASEM has endured despite widespread scepticism. She supplements her assessment of the scholarly literature with a valuable body of empirical evidence arising from an extensive range of interviews she conducted with key players across Southeast Asia. This offers a distinctive window onto the dynamics of ASEM that has not previously been available to us.

If one reason to pay attention to this book is the distinctive focus of the scholarship, a second — perhaps less immediately apparent — reason is what this author represents. Evi Fitriani is in the vanguard of a rising cohort of Indonesian social scientists who are not content to speak only to local debates inside Indonesia, but seek also to engage with global scholarly discourse. There is a determination and confidence in this cohort that cannot be overlooked.

This is an altogether welcome development. Indeed, international research ventures and funding bodies are now keen to engage with Fitriani and her cohort. We can all look forward to hearing more from this new wave of Indonesian scholarly voices, and Evi Fitriani's will be prominent among them.

As a social construction, Asian identity has not yet appeared as a solid single collective intention, but the process of interactive construction of identity has taken place among Asian elites and people in ASEM from 1996 up to 2008. ASEM took part in this process as a social arena for socialization among Asian participants. Nevertheless, since 2008 ASEM has experienced the second and third enlargements which change the Asian group in ASEM. In 2008, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia became new partners of ASEM, followed by Russia, Australia, and New Zealand in 2010 (see Map 2). These developments brought some consequences not only to ASEM as an inter-regional institution but also to the Asian group in ASEM and to the Southeast Asian countries.

First, the accession of India, another rising state in Asia, can provide another source and power to the Asian group in ASEM. Accordingly, the Asians’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the European counterparts could increase. Nevertheless, the involvement of India also creates challenges for the Southeast Asian countries since India has been perceived as a competitor to China and because the country has had strained relations with Pakistan. The Southeast Asian countries have to manage their relations with India in such a way in order not to jeopardize their relations with China and Pakistan. The consolidation of the Asian group in ASEM and the enhancement of their regional identity in ASEM are arguably even more complex and harder as the group now includes more countries and two distinctive cultures, China and India.

Second, the ASEM enlargement in 2010 that accepted the accession of Russia, Australia, and New Zealand also brings some other challenges. The challenges can be referred back to the research question in this thesis: Will ASEM still work for Asian countries after the 2010 enlargement? The challenges arise from two facts that Russia becomes the first non-EU country in ASEM and Australia has sometimes tried to identify itself as an Asian country, but the position of this country in the Asian group has been frequently questioned, not only by some Asian countries but also within its own domestic political debates.

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), established in 1996, to foster interregional relations between Asia and Europe, has attracted little attention in either of the two regions, so much so that the longevity of this institution poses a puzzle. On the one hand, the region-to-region relations between Asia and Europe in ASEM are suggestive of a new pattern of interactions in international relations, which may lead to different outcomes in global affairs as compared to traditional state-to-state relations. On the other hand, that ASEM exists at all is not generally known, and ASEM Summits have attracted little media coverage. ASEM has been criticized from inside and outside as being merely a “talk shop” that considers a variety of broad topics, but has no political will to bring the talk to reality, and lacks the capacity to implement its intentions. ASEM has, however, survived until today, and one of the most important reasons for this survival is the persistent attendance of Southeast Asian leaders and participants in the ASEM forums.

For Southeast Asian countries, the region-to-region relations between Asian and European countries in ASEM have some characteristics that are unusual in terms of their engagements in regional and global affairs. ASEM does not include the United States and it was initially expected to balance the United States-European Union (EU)-Asia triangle. In addition, ASEM is the first forum in which Southeast Asian countries have been able to meet and coordinate collectively with countries in Northeast Asia, namely Japan, China and South Korea vis-à-vis another partner, in this case Europe; it may therefore demonstrate the EU's influence in the formation process of (East) Asian regionalism. Moreover, the ASEM biannual Summit has a high profile as this is the only forum attended exclusively by heads of states and governments of Asian and EU countries. The climate for inter-regional discourse has also been changing.

HYBRID GROUPS AND HARMONY:LESSONS FROM THE PAST

The acculturation experiences of ethnic minorities covered in this book provide interesting insights into possibilities for improving ethnic relations in Malaysia. Firstly, their experiences demonstrate that Malaysians should not fear acculturation; it is possible to acculturate without being assimilated, without losing one's core religious beliefs, values and identities. These groups freely absorbed elements of language, cuisine, dress, music, performing arts and architecture from the Malay community and from each other. Today the hybrid heritage resulting from such inter–cultural fertilization remains, though the consciousness of its shared elements has been virtually forgotten. This book recalled some shared elements which have made these ethnic minorities an epitome of cross–cultural influences. Secondly, it illustrates the preconditions for acculturation. These include working, living, and schooling together, and the critical importance of Malay as a truly Malaysian language belonging to all communities.

However the experiences of these minorities indicate that acculturation is by itself an important but insufficient factor in fostering inter–ethnic harmony; a sense of belonging is equally essential. In the course of fieldwork for this book I was struck by the fact that despite their long settlement and deep acculturation, some among these minorities feel left out by an ethnic–based political party system where they are inhibited by the lack of a clear–cut identity and numerical strength. Believing that bumiputeras gain the most from affirmative action, they harness multiple identities, including an indigenous identity, hoping this will give them greater State cultural recognition and economic opportunity. They see this as an effective way to protect their land and housing, gain better educational, occupational and economic opportunities, and bolster their cultural pride. This yearning for an indigenous identity was an unexpected finding of my research, but it requires some elaboration since it is a recurring theme, with implications for ethnic relations.

YEARNING TO BELONG:HARNESSING MULTIPLE IDENTITIES

Unlike larger groups with more defined State categories, hybrid groups are able to develop new ethnic routes by drawing upon their multiple identities. All ethnic groups utilize multiple identities, but in a complex multi–ethnic society the pressure to harness such identities is often more intense among minorities, particularly if they perceive marginalization.

INTRODUCTION

Heritage Heartland: Chulia Street, Penang

To understand the story of the Indian Muslims I travel to George Town, Penang, and head for Chulia Street where Indian Muslim immigrants have lived for generations. The town–bus driver is a middle–aged Penang Indian Muslim who, reflecting Penang's ethnic diversity, speaks to his passengers in Malay, English, Tamil and Hokkien. The area is dominated by jewellers, money–changers, wholesale book traders, restaurants and superb examples of South Indian Muslim architecture, including the Nagore Shrine (1801) and the mid–nineteenth century Noordin Tomb. But the heart and soul of the community is reflected in its beautiful two–century old Kapitan Kling Mosque on nearby Pitt Street.

At the mosque entrance I am greeted by Akbar, a twenty–two–year–old Indian Muslim mosque official who is a preacher by day and trader by night (Interview, 5 April 2008). He offers me respite from the intense heat with a glass of susu bandung, a refreshing concoction of rose syrup, milk and crushed ice. Urbane, self–confident and knowledgeable, he reveals that his father is an immigrant Indian Muslim, his mother Malay. “Do you see yourself as Indian Muslim, or Malay?” I ask. He replies immediately, but in a slow, deliberate fashion, as if to obliterate all other definitions, “I…am… a…Muslim.” He appears to have solved that ambivalence — that inner tension which is often the lot of members of minorities who inhabit contested ethnic spaces — by defining himself in clear, unambiguous terms — in this case, purely as a Muslim rather than an Indian Muslim or Malay. He takes me on a tour of the mosque and invites me to observe the congregation in prayer. The diversity of its worshippers is striking — young and old, rich and poor, and from every corner of the Indian continent — but they all respond to the imam's call to prayer in harmony, as one community. It is a moving sight. Akbar hands me some reading material as I bid farewell. “Hope you find this interesting”, he says, smiling.

As I continue walking down Pitt Street I notice a Chinese man praying to a Hindu deity at a tree–shrine. I pass the Taoist Goddess of Mercy Temple (1801), St George's Church (1818) and the Hindu Mariamman Temple (1833). The world's four major religions are represented on this one street.

INTRODUCTION: GLIMPSES OF A FAST–DISAPPEARING HYBRID WORLD

Businessman Soh Teck Soon, 39, grew up in a mixed Malay–Chinese village, abstains from pork, is circumcised and speaks the local Malay dialect perfectly. “I also don't look typically Chinese, so when people meet me for the first time they assume I'm Terengganu Malay,” he says. (Interview, 18 March 2009). Koo Ong Jin, 60, a retired construction supervisor and leader of the Chinese in Kampung Tirok, a village located amidst Malay settlements outside the state capital Kuala Terengganu (KT), speaks the Terengganu Malay dialect fluently, enjoys Malay food with his fingers, and could easily pass off as Malay. His acculturation is a result of what sociologists refer to as “primary” links of friendship with Malays. “I have at least twenty very close Malay friends. We visit each other's homes and attend family weddings and funerals. They all attended my father's funeral. We are very close.” (Interview, 18–20 March 2009).

Both Soh and Koo are part of a long–settled but virtually unknown acculturated Chinese community in the east coast state of Terengganu. Unlike the better known west coast urban–based Peranakan Chinese of Malacca and Penang, little is known about this group. What is clear however, is that centuries of deep interaction with Malays via shared occupations, living spaces and schools shows itself in their adoption of Malay language, attire, cuisine, performing arts and Malay–style housing. Most of them live in rural pockets and small towns and are easily mistaken for Malays.

Terengganu Chinese like Soh and Koo are referred to as “Peranakantype” — despite Peranakan characteristics, they do not identify themselves as Peranakan but as Chinese, while making a cultural distinction between themselves and non–Peranakan Chinese (Tan 2002, pp. V, 1–3). This distinction is sometimes expressed through the use of the Malay term Cina Kampung (Village Chinese) to describe Chinese — particularly Peranakantypes — living in or near a Malay village. (Lua Yik Hor, Interviews, 2 and 5 April 2009).

The oldest acculturated Chinese settlement in Terengganu is the small village of Kampung Tirok, but the single largest concentration of Chinese, mostly non–Peranakans, is found in KT's Chinatown (Appendix 4.1).

INTRODUCTION: BAWEAN AND THE CULTURAL REPRODUCTION OF MALAY ETHNICITY

The Baweanese, popularly referred to as Orang Boyan, are a little–known people from the tiny island of Bawean, located in the Java Sea. The island has a population of only 65,000 but a diaspora at least ten times larger spanning the Asia–Pacific region, particularly Malaysia and Singapore, where they form an important component of the Malay community (Ali 1996, p. 3). Malaysia and Singapore are so well known on the isolated island that two roads on it are named after their ex–prime ministers Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Mr Goh Chok Tong (Abd Rahman and Omar 2007). Baweanese immigration, a small but unique stream of the broader Indonesian flow into Malaysia, is important in terms of its long history, sustainability, and its acculturation and assimilation strategies.

According to one scholar, in the mid–1990s Malaysia had an estimated 500,000 and Singapore between 50,000 and 80,000 “Malays” of Baweanese descent, whose forefathers had entered during colonial times (Ali 1996, p. 2). A smaller cohort of about 4,000 Baweanese entered Malaysia in 1975–85, arriving initially as single, male, temporary foreign workers, followed by full family formations. By 2010 these post–colonial immigrants, together with their children and grandchildren, were estimated to total 50,000 and were among the largest and most settled of the new Indonesian communities in squatter settlements in the Peninsula's west coast towns of Johor Bahru, Seremban, Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Rawang and Ipoh (Group Discussion, Baweanese Community Leaders, Gombak, 14 July 2010).

Unlike the other ethnic minorities described in this book who arrived and evolved as communities before the British colonial period, most Baweanese — like most Chinese and Indians — entered and settled during the British period. Despite being relatively recent immigrants, the Baweanese have not merely acculturated but have assimilated into the Malay community. The scholar Wang Gungwu refers to Malays of Indonesian ancestry and recent Indonesian foreign workers as “migrants of similarity”, who share a common religion, language (Malay) and customs with Malays. This is in contrast to Chinese and Indians whom he refers to as “migrants of difference”, with different cultural backgrounds (verbal comments, quoted in Miyazaki 2000, p. 77).

Given their similarities with Malays, the Baweanese experience of acculturation is different from that of non–Muslim ethnic minorities.