COVID-19 triggered an economic shock in Myanmar and the world over. The pandemic disrupted the economy of many countries, affecting not only their domestic environment, but also their connections with other countries through trade, foreign investment and aid, migration, and remittances. Travel bans and border controls, supply chain disruptions, and economic slowdown in many outward investing countries has blocked trade and production, causing economic turmoil. This matters for livelihoods in the short- and long-term: not only does international trade, investment and aid support job creation and income generation, but earning foreign exchange is also crucial to managing debt and stimulating economic recovery. As such, countries’ connection to the global economy can shape their prospects for recovery. This can take different forms: it can bring the country back to its pre-pandemic path, for a ‘business as usual’ approach; or it can aim to build the foundations of a more resilient, climate-compatible, gendersensitive and transformative growth.

Consider the case of Myanmar. While the official number of recorded cases of COVID-19 was small compared to surrounding nations,1 the country experienced great economic damage due to the disruption to its international linkages, in particular through the impact on trade, investment and development finance (Turnell 2020). Moreover, on 1 February 2021, the military overthrew the country's elected government. The junta remains in power at the time of writing, generating political and economic instability and substantially undermining any prospects for recovery.

This study examines the impact of COVID-19 and the coup on the Myanmar economy through the country's international economic linkages, while also assessing its prospects for recovery. Rather than assessing the overall impact of the pandemic, it focuses on international trade, investment, aid and migration as transmission channels for the impact of COVID-19 and the coup. Therefore, this study does not aim to be a comprehensive assessment of the impact of these challenges, but rather to highlight some key areas that the international community can contribute to.

The study relies on analysis based on secondary data provided by national and international sources and on grey literature. The authors worked on the Myanmar economy, in particular on economic transformation, foreign direct investment and manufacturing, prior to the military coup.

The 1 February 2021 military coup in Myanmar ended a decade of political liberalisation and triggered a near-countrywide popular uprising, which soon turned into armed resistance and ultimately all-out civil war. Nearly two years later, the Tatmadaw1 is locked in an existential struggle for the soul of the country with an array of resistance forces, while the state and economy are collapsing, and tens of millions of people face a deepening humanitarian emergency.

The coup followed months of escalating tensions between the military and the civilian government over the 7 November 2020 elections, which delivered a landslide victory to the incumbent National League for Democracy (NLD), but were already mired in controversy before the polls. The military challenged the results, alleging widespread fraud, and sought to delay the convening of the new parliament until its concerns could be addressed, calling first for a special sitting of parliament and later for a meeting of the National Defence and Security Council. Its demands, however, were flatly refused by the civilian authorities, and after last-minute negotiations between representatives of the NLD and the military failed to resolve the brewing constitutional crisis, Commanderin- Chief Min Aung Hlaing at 16:00 on Sunday afternoon, 31 of January, issued a fateful order to his troops to stop the convening of parliament by force.2 In the early morning of the next day, just hours before the new parliament was set to convene, the military thus once again took control of the capital, arrested the country's elected leaders, and declared a state of emergency. The initial takeover was quick and bloodless, but the coup triggered a conflict that has cost thousands of lives and fundamentally changed the face of Myanmar politics.

In the present chapter, I set out to do three things.3 I start by outlining the main contours of Myanmar's post-coup politics. I then try to answer two key questions that have been the focus of much of the post-coup commentary and analysis: What were the reasons for the coup, and what is the likely outcome of the resultant political crisis? The main thrust of the analysis is pessimistic, but the conclusion entertains a few more hopeful possibilities.

Since its establishment as a sovereign state, Myanmar has demonstrated a firm commitment to a neutral and non-aligned foreign policy, capable of preventing the country's gradual tilt under the orbit of a great power or bloc of powers (Passeri 2020, 8–14). As such, the preservation of independence and freedom of action in the global arena has always embodied the paramount goal of Myanmar's diplomacy, pushing various generations of Burmese leaders to shy away from bilateral and multilateral security arrangements which could potentially jeopardise its non-aligned, “go alone” stance (Trager 1956; Silverstein 1982; Steinberg 2018; Passeri and Marston 2022). This is not to say, however, that Myanmar's diplomatic playbook has endured for more than seven decades without major twists and turns. On the contrary, even a cursory glance at the country's history reveals that Burmese diplomacy has constantly swung between two opposite archetypes of non-alignment, following an oscillating trend that has persisted up to present days. In a nutshell, this dilemma has revolved around the desire to implement a positive, dynamic, and proactive blend of non-alignment, aimed at expanding and diversifying Myanmar's international partnerships, and, on the other hand, the temptation of resorting to a more inwardlooking, reactive, and torpid practice of ‘negative neutralism’, conducive to a gradual retrenchment from the international dimension and to the assertion of autonomy through self-aloofness.

Unsurprisingly, the same puzzle experienced by Myanmar in selecting the most appropriate prototype of non-alignment has traditionally complicated the strategic calculus of many other small powers across the globe, pushing scholars to theorise different variants of what could be considered a neutral or non-aligned behaviour in the global arena. According to Khalid I. Babaa and Cecil V. Crabb (1965, 11–12), for example, the doctrine of ‘positive non-alignment’ entails a clear refusal to join tight and formal alignment links (e.g. alliances, stationing of foreign troops inside the national territory) with great powers, together with a deep-felt commitment to play an independent, constructive, and cooperative role in global affairs through good offices or bridge-building efforts. As such, this positive form of neutralism is often infused with moral and ethical considerations based on an active contribution to peaceful coexistence, coupled by an equally strong rejection of colonialism, imperialism, power politics, and foreign intrusions in the domestic dimension (Goetschel 1999, 120–121).

Since the February 2021 coup, the Myanmar junta, known as the State Administrative Council (SAC), has tried to embed its government and exert control over the population through administration, organised violence, and warfare (Callahan 2004). In response, a revolutionary movement has emerged contesting the military's legitimacy at national levels and resisting their authority at sub-national levels using violent and non-violent tactics.

This paper provides a contemporary snapshot of contested military rule in Myanmar more than a year after the coup d’etat, using evidence up to August 2022. First, it charts Myanmar's reordered political context. Second, it analyses overlapping realms of national contest over who has the legitimacy to govern between the junta and parallel National Unity Government (NUG), and the historically contested structure of the Myanmar state with new movements for democratic federalism. Third, it analyses the mix of new and old conflict dynamics, including waves of guerrilla warfare across once-peaceful areas in the Bamar heartland. Fourth, it introduces new evidence to examine changes to subnational contests for authority, including new practices of local governance by resistance forces, the post-coup expansion of territory for ethnic resistance organisations (EROs), and contested administration by the junta.

In this disrupted era, resistance to military rule and coercion has a new cast of characters and multi-ethnic alliances. While the military has consolidated and restructured control over the central state apparatus, this paper argues that subnational and local authority has become more complex and contested than ever before, including in the Bamar heartland. The post-coup political landscape is one of altered power struggles, revolutionary contests, civil disobedience, and increased conflict intensity which shows no signs of abating.

METHODOLOGY

The new realities of Myanmar's post-coup environment provide unique security challenges for international and local researchers. This paper draws on new qualitative research conducted in Yangon Region, Sagaing Region, Rakhine State, Mon State, and Northern Shan State by Myanmar researchers between November 2021 and February 2022. A template of case study questions was prepared and shared with researchers who conducted semi-structured key informant interviews in Myanmar language with known contacts in different sites. Much of the research was done through safe electronic practices to avoid meeting in public places. For their safety, the researchers are anonymous.

On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared that COVID-19 was a global pandemic. Neighbouring the world's two most populous countries, many feared the potential impacts to people in Myanmar with its limited public resources, health infrastructure and hospitals. Initially, there was some cautious optimism, as the country was able to avoid the high case-positive loads seen in nearby India, Indonesia and the Philippines. However, with its high levels of poverty and associated inequality, concerns about the economic repercussions of the global pandemic, as well as the impact of lockdown restrictions on ordinary people's livelihoods, soon became a more paramount concern.

Amidst the global health and economic crisis, Myanmar's people were gearing up for a general election, the second held since 2011 when the military junta begun to make space for a period of social and political change (Cheesman et al. 2014; Egreteau & Robinne 2015). While the country's State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi campaigned on her unique ability to see the country through the pandemic as the ‘mother of the nation’, many people did not view the election or the government as playing a significant role in influencing their survival of the pandemic. The government's COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan (CERP) was widely criticised for its inability to reach the most vulnerable households, especially those in rural areas and the large number of people who work in the informal sector (see Mi Chan 2020). And yet, despite these criticisms and ongoing concerns about the difficulties of holding an election in the midst of a global pandemic, more than seventy per cent of the population came out to vote. While more than ninety parties competed in the election, people overwhelmingly endorsed Suu Kyi and the NLD in a landslide victory that was even greater than 2015 (Lidauer & Saphy 2021).

Less than three months later, on the day that Suu Kyi and other parliamentarians were to take their seats for a second term of government, Myanmar's democratic process and era of reform was brought to an abrupt end by a military coup d’etat.

At the turn of the new decade, Myanmar was on a pathway towards a more robust economy with prospects for sustained aggregate growth, increased employment opportunities in labour-intensive sectors such as manufacturing, and further economic policy and institutional reforms under an elected civilian government. In 2020 and 2021, this trajectory was disrupted by two profoundly destabilising crises that caused immense economic damage and human misery. First, in early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic hit hard, with workers and the poor especially hurt by lockdowns, enterprise closures and job losses. Then, in February 2021, the misery caused by the pandemic was compounded and intensified by a coup staged by the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), which has profoundly destabilised both politics and economic life.

The political implications of these events are explored elsewhere in this volume, whereas in this chapter, we will provide a summation and perspective on the economic damage done. Nonetheless, the military's brutal and violent suppression of pro-democracy protests, persistent violations of fundamental human rights, and disruption of Myanmar's incomplete journey towards democratic governance demonstrate that politics cannot be separated from economics because damage to the latter has clearly flowed from the destabilisation of politics after the coup.

The coup, as we will explore in a later section of this chapter, may have a profound and long-term impact on Myanmar's international investment environment and economic integration, inclusive of the effects of international sanctions. However, the most significant and immediate economic impacts were driven by internal rather than external factors. Widespread protests and the civil disobedience movement (CDM) impacted both public and private sector industries, with government, healthcare, finance, banking, and transport workers participating in great numbers to push for a restoration of democracy. They rejected the legitimacy of the military junta to govern and effectively shut down most sections of the domestic economy in the early phase of resistance. The military junta, largely via coercion, pushed for a resumption of economic and industrial activity over the course of 2021. Still, most sectors have continued to be impacted by ongoing CDM activity, protest actions, financial crisis, and later by armed resistance and conflict.