Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine how Thailand responds to disaster risks. When a disaster strikes and destroys assets and sources of livelihoods, the almost inevitable response of poor households is the use of coping strategies that are harmful to children, to save money on food and to reduce investments in children's health and education. What is required, therefore, is well-designed social protection that can play a key role in enabling households to avoid negative coping strategies and mitigate disaster impact. Disaster-sensitive social protection provides post-disaster relief and rehabilitation that helps households proactively adapt to the threat of natural disasters. By reviewing the contribution of social protection for protecting vulnerable households from the impact of natural disasters, this can contribute to the development of more effective disaster-sensitive social protection programmes in Thailand. This is especially in building household resilience and mitigating disaster risks in scenarios such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

While Thailand has developed a social protection system based on a rights-based approach, that considers different types of risks found in the different generations within the population, past social protection schemes have largely been designed to address normal situations, but not crisis situation. Hence, a mix of both proactive and reactive social protection is necessary in facing the challenges of future risks. The need to expand functional equivalents that support livelihood diversification, whilst rendering extensive support for vulnerable people, allows for a complementary approach that addresses not only protection against risks associated with certain events, but for building upon adaptive capacities so that the most vulnerable can sustain their livelihood. In moving forward, assessment of risks needs to consider sudden impacts of change such as those found during a pandemic outbreak or sudden financial crisis. A review of new types of social risks is necessary in the context of expanding the coverage of social protection schemes towards the country's most vulnerable. Furthermore, there is a need to translate resilience objectives into the design of social protection programmes and consider social protection as an important tool in managing risks that can reduce the impact of variability and extremes of new social risks.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and its Impact

The outbreak of the COVID-19 coronavirus from late 2019 transformed, in many ways, the order of many things in our lives. This pandemic was a major global health challenge in the twenty-first century that has so far been unrivalled in scale and impact. Many lives were lost during the first two years due to its potentially dangerous effects on the human body, particularly among the physically and economically vulnerable. Although Southeast Asia had encountered earlier epidemics such as SARS and MERS in previous years, nothing quite prepared the countries in this region for the social and economic fallout that resulted from not just the disease, but also its corresponding effects on the infrastructural aspects of a country. This included the healthcare system, the education system, the transport system, entertainment industries, and even the capacity for residents of a country to access public spaces. Dubbed a “new normal”, such a challenging experience obviously changed the lives of many in various societies throughout Southeast Asia. Apart from the tragedy of those who succumbed to the pandemic, the ones who survived it will likely carry the burden of coming to terms with its consequences and the changes it has incorporated into everyday living.

Many will recall that during its initial months, governments around the world and even the media tended to regard it as an epidemic that was largely limited to a single country, China. Although it was in China where most researchers today would admit where the COVID-19 coronavirus first emerged, it was presumed that sealing the country's borders might contain the situation. Alarmingly, waves of outbreaks spread in varying intensity around the globe. Its rapid spread in a matter of months to almost every continent via a global network of travel and migration appeared to be inevitable. In the case of South Korea, for example, the city of Daegu recorded a cluster infection in a local church, starting a string of transmissions that would spin out of control. While the traditional approach of testing and contact tracing had initially worked well (Kim 2020), the scale of infection eventually spread everywhere. Finally, it became apparent that the COVID-19 coronavirus would become a full-blown pandemic that would exceed the severity of SARS and MERS, exhibiting similar characteristics to the influenza pandemic of 1918 also known as the ‘Spanish Flu’.

Old Neighbours

Singaporeans and Malaysians share a common social-cultural and political past. In fact, the origins of their respective sovereignties are highly entwined with each other (Baker 2014; Shiraishi 2008). This is because from 1963, the two countries were part of the same nation for almost two years. However, due to increasing political differences and ethnic tensions, Singapore was accorded an independence from 1965 that was never entirely planned nor self-determined. Nevertheless, in spite of political separation, the ties that have bounded their citizens have continued in the areas of economy, culture and even sports (Little 2013, pp. 635–51). A tangible testimony to such ties is best revealed when one observes the porous nature of the borderlands connection (Chan and Womack 2016, pp. 95–103) between the two countries, where continuing flows of labour, income and resources have contributed to the subsequent growth and development of Singapore and Johor Bahru (Hampton 2010, pp. 239–53; Hutchinson and Rahman 2020), the closest Malaysian city to Singapore. Rather than existing simply as a boundary, the border checkpoints and the lands adjacent to them express varying levels of liminality (Kurki 2014, p. 1061). An essential component that has enabled this is the existence of two causeways, or bridges, which connect Singapore's much smaller island-state to the rest of the peninsula occupied by its larger neighbour, Malaysia.

These two causeways connect Singapore to the southern tip of Peninsula Malaysia via Johor Bahru across the Straits of Johor. They enable travel over a body of water that stretches from 1.5 kilometres to 4.8 kilometres at this widest point. While both causeways serve similar functions, they vary in terms of their relative age. The far older Woodlands Causeway first became accessible for cross-straits traffic on 1 October 1923, but was only officially opened the following year on 11 June 1924 after full completion (Chua 2009). Even till present times, it has been referred to as “The Causeway” or the “Woodlands Causeway” by locals on both sides of the border. The second and comparatively newer bridge, is better known as the “Tuas Second Link” and it officially began operating on 18 April 1998 as part of efforts to lessen the burgeoning human traffic at the older Woodlands Causeway (Lim Tin Seng 2020).

High Births and Hierarchies

The PAP government touted the Yang di-Pertuan Negara as an egalitarian symbol in spite of the pseudo-royal persona which had become inextricable in the performance of his duties. Returning to Yusof's swearing-in ceremony on 3 December 1959, Prime Minister Lee conveyed to the people of Singapore:

This rhetoric sought to bankrupt the idea of given privileges of birth, consecrating the office's significance as an egalitarian symbol in a new self-governing Singapore. Later during the ceremony, thousands of businessmen, unionists and students marched in unison to give salute to the titular embodiment of the state in a grand display of a socialist utopia.

Lee also alluded to the Yang di-Pertuan Negara's function as an emblem for the “commoner”. Pitched in rather condescending terms, the

prime minister asserted that the people were unable to fully comprehend abstract concepts like “the State” or “collective leadership”; a more physical symbol like the Yang di-Pertuan Negara was therefore more suited for their simple minds. The highest office in this new Singapore was therefore meant to connect intimately with ordinary people. The PAP leaders who were at the ceremony also donned their signature white shirts and slacks to keep to a socialist aesthetic, supposedly making them appear a little more down-to-earth. This was in sharp contrast to the haughty dress of opposition lawmakers and other dignitaries who were in their ties and business suits. In these symbolic displays of style, the Yang di-Pertuan Negara carried the PAP government's vision of a Singapore free from the stratifying practices of class distinctions.

The colonial order under British rule had entrenched the existence of hierarchies and class distinctions. Historian David Cannadine has argued that in their encounter with societies outside of Britain and Europe, British imperialists viewed other races and cultures not solely through the lens of difference but also through similarities. More specifically, they recognized that other forms of human communities also consisted of different social classes, not unlike British society back home.

Introduction

Singapore's population policy in the last three decades, given subreplacement fertility rates, has been to directly inject new blood into the local community. Skilled foreign professionals have been drawn mainly from so-called “indigenous sources”, namely China and India, undergirded by the assumption that an infusion of people from these two countries would be relatively painless for social and cultural assimilation since Singapore has an incumbent ethnic Chinese and Indian population. However, there is plenty of evidence that the process could be bumpier than policymakers expected. Schools, to a large extent directly mirroring national undercurrents, offer a window through which to examine the competitive dynamics emerging from a “replacement migration” of ethnically-similar but culturally-distinct people groups. The chapter examines critical aspects of education policy such as the admission of foreign-born students, the awarding of scholarships to foreign-born students and the recruitment of foreignborn teachers.

Our chapter is framed by a wider narrative on the government's long-standing policy of drawing in, in large numbers over the years, what it has termed “foreign talent”1 to augment the local workforce. For instance, it was reported in 2020 that Singaporeans made up about 43 per cent of senior management across the entire financial sector (Lam and Ng 2020). The official approach in justifying this move has been to help “grow the economic pie” for Singapore which is then expected to expand to benefit locals as well.

However, the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has brought about an official re-assessment of immigration policy. In a live televised debate during the July 2020 election campaign period, the Foreign Minister went so far as to state that

In the immediate aftermath of the elections, which saw the ruling People's Action Party losing two Group Representation Constituencies, the Manpower Ministry started to “shed ballast” by announcing that the minimum salary requirements for foreign PMETs working here will be raised. Thus, foreigners who apply for an Employment Pass (EP) will need to have a minimum monthly salary of $4,500, up from $3,900.

Introduction

Globalization often implies the increased flow of persons, goods and information across country borders. Consequently, labour migration between Southeast Asia and the rest of Asia is part of this trend. This is a unique phenomenon unlike migrant flows between the emerging economies of Asia and developed Western countries. This chapter, therefore, examines the reasons and policy issues surrounding the movement of unskilled migrant workers from Thailand and Vietnam to South Korea. The two countries are of great interest in this regard as they are two of the fastest ageing societies in Southeast Asia, with Vietnam having the youngest population in the region. But demographic numbers on fertility and mortality do not tell the full story, as it is important to examine the role of policies adopted by each country with South Korea's Employment Permit System (EPS), in influencing such flows. The reasons and patterns for such migration are based on empirical data drawn from field observations and interviews.

Methodology

The purpose of this study is to uncover the reasons surrounding the outgoing movement of unskilled migrant workers from Thailand and Vietnam to South Korea, and its impact on population change at the source of migrants. Therefore, the relationship of South Korea's EPS to such migration flows will be examined. This study entailed qualitative research consisting of key informant interviews and archival research. The key informant interviews were conducted in Seoul, Bangkok and Daegu. A Korean labour union, women's NGO, Thai labour migrant NGO as well as one Thai and one Vietnamese migrant worker were interviewed in 2018 and 2019. These interviews enabled the author to examine the situation of documented and undocumented workers in South Korea and the roles that migration intermediaries play in the process. All the interviews were conducted anonymously. For the archival research, censuses and labour migration reports of South Korea, Vietnam and Thailand were reviewed.

Reasons for Labour Migration

Existing migration theories seldom address the transnational movement of labour in connection to demographic factors. At a glance, developing countries with young populations tend to export their excess labour force. Classical push-pull discourse claims that labour surplus in the sending country and labour deficit at the destination trigger the flow in both ways (Lee 1966; Castles and Miller 2009).

Singapore Separated

Beneath the temporal layers of Yusof's swearing-in ceremony was Singapore's inextricable historical position as part of the Malay World. In 1819, 140 years before the coming of the Malayan-born Yang di- Pertuan Negara, the British East India Company enthroned Hussein Shah as sovereign ruler of Singapore. The island was at this time under the domain of the Johor-Riau Sultanate. As the eldest son of Sultan Mahmud Shah III, Hussein was in line to succeed his father but lost this claim due to a succession dispute. His younger brother, Abdul Rahman, received the backing of the Dutch and the Bugis chiefs and was instead crowned as sovereign. In exchange for recognition as sultan and a reasonable pension, Hussein gave his assent to an adventurer from the Company, Sir Stamford Raffles, the so-called “founder of modern Singapore”, to build a factory on the island.

The political role of the British-recognized sultan, however, withered after sovereignty over Singapore was later transferred to the British Crown in 1824. Hussein's descendants nevertheless continued to live within the premises of the Istana Kampung Glam, the palace compound belonging to the sultan located on the south-eastern end of the island. Under the

sovereign rule of Britain, Singapore gradually transformed into a colonial metropolis. It was later governed as part of the Straits Settlements, a collection of British-controlled port cities which included Penang and Melaka. From 1874, the British began to intervene in the polities of the Malay Peninsula due to increasing pressure from commercial interests who wanted greater stability in the Malay states. Through treaties and protectorate agreements, the Malay rulers gradually ceded authority over most of their affairs to colonial officials, resulting in the bureaucratization of these polities in line with “enlightened” European standards and the facilitation of a more efficient economic system to exploit labour and natural resources.

The colonial regime reordered the island of Singapore and the other peninsular polities under a loose (and at times contested) conglomeration of “British Malaya”. In Singapore, the British abolished Malay kingship in favour of direct colonial rule, but they opted for a different strategy in the peninsular states, choosing instead to strengthen the positions of the traditional elites and legitimize the sovereign status of the Malay rulers.

Singapore in the British World System

Six months after the PAP's electoral victory, Yusof was inaugurated as Yang di-Pertuan Negara. This moment was celebrated as the complete realization of the 1958 Constitution. The opening section of this book has recounted the subterranean tensions prickling the symbolic gestures of the Yusof's swearing-in ceremony. Even though both Lee and Yusof heralded a sense of emancipation from colonial rule, the procedures reinforced Singapore's position as a component of the British imperial system. Indeed, the appointment of the Malayan-born Yang di-Pertuan Negara was legitimized through familiar rituals which upheld the sovereign authority of Britain over Singapore. Yusof acceded to Royal Instructions from the Queen and also recited the pledge of allegiance to the British Crown. Meanwhile, imperial symbols like God Save the Queen were still given ceremonial deference.

In the global age of decolonization, Singapore had transformed into a layered political entity which met both the needs of colonial control and the growing demands of self-determination. The implementation of the 1958 Constitution conjured a graphic change in Singapore by replacing the British governor with the Yang di-Pertuan Negara. Designers of

the latter envisioned its appointee as a captivating ornamental figure, a personage who could signify the city-state's transition to self-government. But the imperial clothes of the governor's successor were not so easily shed. Paradoxes and perplexities interrupted attempts to make the Yang di-Pertuan Negara meaningful. These questions animate the story ahead: how did the office of Yang di-Pertuan Negara embody both a breakdown and an entrenchment of Singapore's colonial status? How was sovereignty performed to muddle the city-state's continued standing as a British colony?

To expose the contestations behind Singapore's colonial status, it may be helpful to retrace the steps of Singaporean leaders, taking a closer look at the granular details of the two constitutional talks in 1956 and 1957. During these negotiations, the British were firm in their stance to keep Singapore as a vassal state that was firmly within the ambit of the United Kingdom. The Singaporean delegations, uncomfortable with the prospects of perpetual colonial rule, sought to abate complete British hegemony over the city-state. With this aim in mind, the 1956 Marshall delegation proposed “dominion status” for Singapore.

Transnational migrants are vulnerable to homelessness and form a large proportion of the homeless population in many places (Crisis 2021; Parliament of Victoria 2021; Pleace 2010; Smith 2018, 2019). Their housing insecurity is associated with barriers to work, housing and welfare (Amundson 2017; Daly 1996; Djuve et al. 2015; Fitzpatrick et al. 2015; Mostowska 2013). They are often excluded from the formal labour market due to limited rights to work and restricted to the least desirable housing options because of the precarity of informal work. Access to housing and other welfare services is further hindered by poor understanding of local practices, language and bureaucratic barriers, and fear of repatriation or deportation. Most of the literature is concerned with the housing experiences of refugees and asylum seekers (Smith 2018), or labour migrants who relocate for economic reasons, instead of highly mobile transnational persons who make frequent and repeated border crossings (for exceptions, see Campbell and Lachica 2013; Järv et al. 2021).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, homelessness spiked in many countries due to an increase in unemployment, poverty and evictions (Benavides and Nukpezah 2020; Benfer et al. 2021). Persons sleeping in public spaces faced greater exposure to infection and other physical and mental health risks (Udechukwu et al. 2021; Wang et al. 2021). In response, governments introduced emergency food and shelter services; stepped up outreach, rental assistance and temporary housing; suspended evictions; distributed personal hygiene items; and provided health and safety information (Fitzpatrick et al. 2020; Honorato and Oliviera 2020; Kelleher and Norris 2020; OECD 2021; Parsell et al. 2020; Wilczek 2020). The impact of the pandemic was heightened for economically marginalized labour migrants whose livelihoods were disrupted by travel restrictions (Shahare 2021). While refugees were targeted with stricter lockdown measures in some cases (Spyratou 2020), governments in places like the United Kingdom and Germany lifted rules that normally excluded migrants from accessing housing and welfare support (Barbu et al. 2021).

In Southeast Asia, the pandemic also affected migration and transnational populations. Within the region, migrants typically move from Myanmar to Thailand, from Indonesia to Malaysia, and from Malaysia to Singapore (Lian et al. 2016). The corridor between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia sees particularly heavy migration flows (Testaverde et al. 2017).

Introduction

The outbreak of COVID-19 in 2019 has affected the quality of life of individuals all over the world. The direct effects include being infected by the virus, whether asymptomatic, pre-symptomatic, or being severely ill and even loss their life. Family suffering, financial loss, and the inability of health facilities to accommodate the rapidly rising cases have aggravated the misery of those being exposed to the virus.

The indirect effects are experienced through various health protocols, including restrictions on population mobility and universal face masking to limit the spread of the virus. These indirect effects may influence people's livelihood, day-to-day behaviour, and mental health. The vulnerable groups (such as the poor, older persons, pregnant women, and persons with disabilities) may suffer much more, facing difficult choices between being exposed to the virus by continuing their usual daily activities or going hungry by staying at home and losing their income.

Among these vulnerable groups, older persons with a hearing disability may suffer more. Policies to curb the spread of infection bring difficulties in face-to-face communication for persons with hearing disabilities (Sher et al. 2020). The mask muddles sound and hides the movement of the lip (Trecca et al. 2020; Huzlen and Fabry 2020). Physical distancing also prevents people with hearing disabilities from communicating well with others as distance reduces the clarity of voice (Huzlen and Fabry 2020). Furthermore, restriction on meeting other persons physically results in having fewer opportunities to obtain assistance in daily conversation.

Therefore, older persons with hearing disabilities are much more precarious, vulnerable and marginalized than others during the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenges are accentuated in the absence of affordable effective hearing aids and limited or even non-existence of sign language.

Nevertheless, hearing disability during the pandemic is one of the most often neglected topics in research and policymaking, although the disability has far-reaching consequences on the quality of life (Nuesse et al. 2021), prosperity of the community, and government policies (WHO 2021; McDaida et al. 2021). This study examines the magnitude and prevalence of hearing disability among older persons, their demographic diversity and hearing disability impacts on the quality of life.

Breaking Racial Divides

The durability of class privileges in Singapore and the Federation was not totally divorced from the imprints of race. Upon Yusof's appointment as the Yang di-Pertuan Negara, the PAP government trumpeted the idea that he was to be a symbol of unity for all of Singapore, not a parochial figure for any racial community. During the installation ceremony, Lee emphatically broadcasted to the residents and citizens of Singapore that Yusof as Yang di-Pertuan Negara “symbolises all of us”. The Yang di-Pertuan Negara, as a national symbol, was therefore meant to transcend race. It is important to note that in the historical context, the difference between race or the physical colour of one's skin, and ethnicity, which connotes the cultural practices beyond the biological referent, was not a relevant distinction. As a legacy of colonial knowledge, the historical actors in late colonial Singapore viewed race as a marker which carried social meaning and was a signifier of cultural attributes. It was also an opaque cloak which obscured deeper structural issues stemming from class contentions, or the social relations of economic production.

This message of transcending racial divisions subdued the status quo of colonial society in two ways. The first could be characterized

by a “horizontal” movement. Under colonial rule, the British governed racial communities of Malaya separately, resulting in racialized division of labour and disparate socio-economic outcomes between different racial communities. British officials hardly gave any consideration to the formation of a post-racial sense of fraternity to bond their colonial subjects, at least before the Second World War. The Malayan-born Yang di-Pertuan Negara was thus a corporeal symbol of transition into a more cohesive society. In his speech during Yusof's installation ceremony, the Singaporean prime minister was mindful of how class issues had become potently racialized:

The PAP government aimed to eradicate communalism in Singapore. It recognized that the gulf between the socio-economic realities of Singapore’s racial communities turned the already visible racial divides material.

The study of Malay political culture has always fascinated me. This is somewhat an awkward situation: the rajas, along with their attendant pomp and pageantry, kindle and tickle the imagination of this individual of middle-class background who has spent almost his entire life in a republic. As I have come to comprehend, the notion of hierarchy, subordination and deference occurs everywhere and subjects everyone, from the family institution to the grandest platforms of international politics. Such is the condition of human society.

When I was a student in the Departments of History and Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore (NUS), I had the opportunity to critically explore this human condition. I delved into research on the political culture in Singapore and Malaysia, unpacking the creative efforts to resurrect precolonial kerajaan elements to serve the interests of imperial and post-imperial regimes. This led to an earlier iteration of this book in the form of my Master of Arts thesis in 2019. That year also coincided with two milestone anniversaries in Singapore: the bicentennial commemoration of the island's “founding” by Sir Stamford Raffles and the 60-year mark of the PAP's rise to power. Officials urged Singaporeans to treat 2019 as an opportune moment to assess the nation's journey and contemplate on its future. The thesis was a response to those calls.

Since then, the thesis has been augmented, enhanced and refined into this monograph, having benefitted from further research undertaken during my time as a PhD candidate in History at the University of Cambridge. Recent historiographical debates on decolonization and the Commonwealth have also enriched this project. With these additions, this book has become more than just an account of Singapore's national history—it is a critical analysis of international hierarchies, class divisions and racial inequalities during the global age of decolonization. These issues continue to haunt contemporary life today, and thus this book contains the reflections of one historian about his own present.

The origins of this edited volume stem from a two-day online webinar series on Managing Demographic Change in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Issues amidst the ‘New Normal’, which was held from 19–20 November 2020 and hosted by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute.

At that time, the COVID-19 coronavirus had already spread throughout many parts of the world, and the situation declared a pandemic. It was something that many people had not experienced before, especially its wide-reaching global nature. Few communities, if any, were spared the impact of the pandemic. Within the span of a year, the pandemic not only claimed thousands of lives, but also closed international borders, disrupted air travel between countries and devastated the livelihood of countless others in societies all around the world.

The abovementioned workshop, therefore, not only provided a timely and important platform for a dialogue on the complex and multifaceted demographic issues emerging across Southeast Asia, but also connected them to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic on various communities and the lived experiences of many persons living in the region.

By 2022, however, it seems that the pandemic has been gradually receding. With increasing numbers of persons having been vaccinated against the COVID-19 coronavirus, many countries are gradually reopening with the resumption of international travel. Although there is more progress to be made in the fight against the pandemic, there has been a growing but cautious sense of hope that perhaps the worst is over. Many countries in Southeast Asia have reopened their borders with the recognition that the virus is considered “endemic” as part of a broader narrative of the “new normal” in a post-COVID-19 world.

This edited volume is, then, an important scholarly response to discussing the outcomes and potential futures that will result from such a “new normal”. Combining selected papers from the abovementioned webinar series, along with invited authors, a key theme that has emerged is the concept of precarity and its relationship with various populations throughout Southeast Asia. With the ongoing realities of social inequality and cultural diversity that many societies face, the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the uncertainties that many encounter in all aspects of everyday life.