Summary:

• ■ Ho Chi Minh City is a prime example of urban climate risk, with one of the highest assessed levels of (future) risk of all coastal cities worldwide.

• ■ The city’s urban expansion into low-lying flood plains reduces flood detention and retention capacity, thus increasing flood risks.

• ■ Various climate risks to the city have been assessed in the past. However, previous assessments were often limited to purely future scenarios of climatic hazards and undertaken at a city-wide scale, neglecting the distinct finer, structural, and socio-economic heterogeneity that characterizes the city.

• ■ Traditional environmental protection approaches such as climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction, and flood governance need to be integrated in a local or more precise “block-scale” planning.

INTRODUCTION

Concern for climate change impacts to the cities and urban regions of Vietnam is rapidly increasing due to the compounding effects of natural hazards, climate change and strong urbanization. Unprecedented changes to its cities and regions have played a key role in the country’s economic growth, modernization and poverty reduction strategies. However, disasters and climate change increasingly challenge the sustainable development trajectory not only for the cities themselves, but also of the national and regional economic system.

The emerging megacity of Ho Chi Minh City (10°49´ N, 106°37` E), formerly known as Saigon and often abbreviated as HCMC, is characterized by rapid environmental and socio-economic transformations. As Vietnam’s largest city, HCMC suffers from frequent and chronic flooding. Flood events occur individually, but more commonly in combination with high tides and fluvial flow events. Tides along with overburdened or blocked drainage and sewage systems and channel encroachments exacerbate flood risk. The occurrence of localized urban flash and pluvial flooding, a condition where water not being able to enter the drainage system or ejected from the drainage system, following high intensity or prolonged heavy rainfall leading to overland flow and ponding, is a common occurrence on many of the city’s streets. While the city has a long tradition of living and coping with small floods and has built up a certain degree of resilience, events still cause injury, damage to property and infrastructure, as well as interruption of essential services and business supply chains.

The varied and contextual experiences of each Southeast Asian city in addressing climate challenges detailed in this compendium are all unique in their own ways. It may be difficult to generalize these experiences but the examination of these cities’ experiences in addressing climate change suggests three principles that are well worth bearing in mind for future research and policymaking.

First, understanding the implications of climate change at the local community level is essential. Cities often face financial, administrative, and decision-making constraints in implementing decisions that are adopted by national governments in international climate agreements. Yet non-state actors can and must play a critical role in helping national governments meet international obligations. Hence, it is critical for cities in the region to identify their most pressing needs and priorities to mobilize concerted actions.

However, cities in the region also have their unique adaptive capacity to manage various urban issues through their community cohesion, local networks, and localized knowledge. Throughout the years, these assets have provided Baguio, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, Georgetown, and Hue with the capacity to moderate potential damage and cope with the consequences of natural hazards.

Second, urban planning and city governance play an essential role in shaping cities’ development agendas and embedding environmentally conscious practices in city-making. Through building codes, masterplans, spatial management, and organizational approaches between central, federal, provincial and local agencies, cities can push for new and innovative developments in building climate resilient infrastructure and creative funding to improve adaptation and mitigation actions. Multi-level governance and mutually reinforcing climate networks can form powerful approaches to dealing with complex issues.

Third, collaboration among and between different groups of stakeholders is vital to facilitate transformation. While it is true that national governments are expected to direct climate agendas in cities, they often have limited capacity, knowledge, and technical knowhow to identify solutions. The private sector’s support to invest in bankable projects for climate resilience, donors’ assistance in defining project phasing and resource mobilization, and civil society’s role in providing input on impact assessment will advance collaboration across disciplines and realize pragmatic solutions.

Climate change causes severe risks to ecosystems, human health, and urban growth.

Summary:

• ■ The Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) has long struggled to balance environmental protection and economic growth. The problem of flooding in the metropolitan area has been linked to several factors such as urban development, land-use changes and natural disasters.

• ■ This study examines to what extent Nature-Based Solution (NBS) infrastructure, a cost-efficient intervention to assist cities prevent floods, can reduce flood occurrence in the JMA.

• ■ This study suggests the importance of hygiene behaviour and NBS infrastructure as well as a potential correlation between economic performance and disaster in the JMA.

INTRODUCTION

The Jakarta Metropolitan Area (JMA) has long struggled to balance environmental protection and economic growth. The term JMA (Sadewo et al. 2021; Rukmana and Ramadhani 2021) (6°10‘30”S 106°49‘43’E) is used in this study to analyse the relationship between urban expansion and flooding in nine cities and municipalities. The problem of flooding in the metropolitan area has been linked with several factors such as urban development, land-use change and natural disasters (Wihanesta et al. 2021; Budiyono et al. 2015; Mishra et al. 2018). The decentralization of authorities at the district level has brought further complexity, with variations in interest and policy leading to different environment management strategies between districts within the JMA.

The complexity of environmental management in the JMA begins with the industry re-allocation towards neighbouring districts such as Bekasi and Tangerang regencies in the 1990s. The following figure depicts the JMA region with its core (cities in Jakarta province) and peripherals (several cities and regencies surrounding the core), West Java and Banten provinces, and non-JMA regions (see Figure 9.1). Currently, peripheral districts in the region have the highest employment and value-added shares in Indonesia, whilst the metropolitan cores have declining firm and employment densities (Hudalah and Aritenang 2017). The JMA can be seen as the main economic driver of the country with more than 56 per cent of multilocational industry headquarters located in the metropolitan area, especially in three sectors: electronics; automotive and transportation; and food and beverage.

There are limited studies examining the impact of floods on different parts of the metropolitan area and the extent of infrastructure variations that determine these impacts.

Summary:

• ■ The Philippines Climate Change Act 2009 mandates local government units (LGUs) to plan and prepare for climate change by developing a local climate change action plan (LCCAP).

• ■ This study examines the planned climate change adaptation (CCA) and mitigation (CCM) activities of selected cities in the Philippines as reflected in their LCCAPs.

• ■ The study has shown that the LCCAPs of selected cities have substantially addressed the priority areas identified in the national climate change adaptation plan (NCCAP).

• ■ There is a clear commonality among the policy areas to address water sufficiency and knowledge and capacity development to combat climate change. On the other hand, actions related to ensuring sustainable energy were the least consistent among the reviewed local governments.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change has significant impacts on urban life. Rising global temperatures cause sea levels to rise, increase the number of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts and storms, and increase the spread of tropical diseases. In the 2014 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, expansion of urban areas was estimated to be on average twice as fast as the growth of the urban population. Consequently, the expected increase in urban land cover during the first three decades of the twenty-first century will be greater than the cumulative urban expansion in history with more than half of the global population residing in urban areas, compared to only 13 per cent in 1900 (Arias et al. 2021; Seto et al. 2014).

This anticipated growth in urban population and development entails exponential growth of urban infrastructure, which directly stimulates the increase of emissions across multiple sectors. As noted above, the average per capita CO2 emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized countries is five times larger than those in developing countries.

The Philippine’s archipelagic nature and geographic location have made its cities highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, natural hazards, and environmental degradation. Metro Manila, the national capital region, is at high risk from extreme weather events such as typhoons and floods, as it has exposure and vulnerability. Metro Davao, the largest urban agglomeration in the island of Mindanao, as well as the cities of Cebu, Tacloban, and Iloilo in the Visayas, are likewise exposed to climate change impacts (HUDCC 2016).

Approval Rating of President Joko Widodo

Around 71.8 per cent of respondents are quite or very satisfied with the performance of President Jokowi, which is slightly higher than the 68 per cent that was recorded for the INSP2017. This is despite many criticisms about authoritarian tendencies and democratic regression under Jokowi. The majority across almost every socio-demographic group and region are quite or very satisfied with Jokowi, except for the Minangkabau ethnic group (Figure 1). Notably, Jokowi’s approval rating among non-Muslim respondents is very high at 91.6 per cent, which indicates his ability to unite non-Muslims as a voting bloc. Unsurprisingly, the majority of those who voted for the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a conservative Islamic party, and the Prabowo-Sandiaga pair in the 2019 parliamentary and presidential elections respectively, disapprove of Jokowi’s performance (Figure 2).

Trust in Institutions

Respondents are asked how much they trust different institutions in Indonesia. Their answers show that the Armed Forces (TNI) remains the most trusted (89.6 per cent), followed by Provincial Governments (83.1 per cent), District/City Governments (81 per cent), the Central Government (80.4 per cent), and the President (78.7 per cent). Comparing with the INSP2017, we note that the level of trust has dropped slightly for the Armed Forces, Central Government, and General Elections Commission. The level of trust in the Provincial and District/City Governments has improved slightly along with Civil Service, while trust in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has decreased significantly from 83.1 to 72.7 per cent (Figure 3). The decline in public trust in the KPK is inextricably linked to revisions to the KPK Law passed in 2019, which weakened the KPK and reduced its independence, as well as KPK leaders’ involvement in scandals. Another interesting observation is the significant improvement in the trust level towards Parliament (DPR) and political parties from 55.4 per cent to 62.6 per cent and 45.8 per cent to 54.6 per cent respectively when compared to INSP2017 data, albeit these two institutions still rank at the bottom of the list.

Political Participation

Citizens generally do participate in elections. When asked if they ever participated in elections, the reported rate is 91.5 per cent for Regional Head elections, 90.4 per cent for the Legislative Election, and 89.4 per cent for the Presidential Election.

Summary:

• ■ Climate change has profoundly impacted many heritage sites on Vietnam’s central coast, notably the Complex of Hue Monuments.

• ■ Heritage conservation has been acknowledged in more recent climate policies. In particular, Vietnam’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement in 2020 realized that the loss of cultural heritage and local knowledge is among the significant impacts caused by climate change.

• ■ However, measures tackling climate change at the national level are too broad; hence it is challenging to apply them to particular cases, such as the Complex of Hue Monuments.

• ■ Vietnamese authorities, including central and local governments, have put different policies and measures into practice to safeguard precious cultural heritage. Existing legislative frameworks might not be enough to support the implementation. Therefore, more detailed technical frameworks are needed.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change has recently become a common concern for the international community due to its profound impacts on socio-economic growth at the global, regional and local scales (Orr et al. 2021, p. 1; Dastgerdi et al. 2019, p. 4). Given their importance in accelerating economic development, cities can play a crucial role in shaping policies for advancing climate ambitions (Jones 2018, p. 63). According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), cities are regarded as drivers of transformative actions because of their ability to handle sectoral, demographic, spatial and ecological challenges of climate change as well as disaster risks (Bartlett and Satterthwaite 2016, p. xxv). Also, cities are increasingly active in promoting and fulfilling agreements such as the Paris Agreement (2015) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Sustainable Development Goals (Paris Agreement 2015). These frameworks highlight the importance of urban communities in responding to climate change.

Many nations expend significant efforts in creating policies that help to support the most vulnerable social groups and regions (Phuong et al. 2018, p. 518). Many countries have actively fostered knowledge exchange, produced training and educational programmes, promoted social networks and bridged administrative levels and scales in responding to climate change (Armitage et al. 2011, p. 996). One example is through heritage preservation.

Climate Change, Environment, and Energy Transition

As climate change and environmental issues take the spotlight globally, Indonesians have also become increasingly aware of them. The INSP2022 added a series of questions related to awareness and knowledge of climate change and environmental issues, as well as attitudes towards energy transition as a means of addressing these issues.

Respondents are asked for their perception of the frequency of certain environment-related events that have an impact on their lives, and the majority observe that extreme weather (72.6 per cent), crop failure (66 per cent), floods (63.6 per cent) and pollution (57.3 per cent) have become more frequent in recent years (Figure 29).

In terms of attribution, certain events are more likely to be considered by the majority to be natural occurrences, such as extreme weather (70.2 per cent), erosion (68.2 per cent), and crop failure (63.4 per cent) (Figure 30). Events that are more likely to be considered wholly or partially man-made by the majority of respondents include pollution (72.6 per cent), floods (68.2 per cent) and difficulty in hunting or fishing (55 per cent). Notably, none of the events is considered by a majority of respondents as being wholly man-made. Even where pollution is concerned, only 30.5 per cent of respondents consider that to be entirely caused by human actions.

The majority of respondents (85.2 per cent) consider climate and environmental problems as urgent problems that need solving. They think that the main parties who should be responsible are the national government, business industry and individual citizens. For this reason, the majority of respondents agree or strongly agree with the government’s efforts to overcome climate and environmental problems by requiring private companies to participate in funding the solution to environmental problems (85.7 per cent) and imposing a single-use plastic tax (60.8 per cent).

The survey also finds that the majority of respondents support measures that can address climate and environmental problems. These include using cleaner energy sources (75.5 per cent), the use of electric vehicles (63.0 per cent), using solar power instead of electricity generated by the State-owned Electricity Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara, PLN) (61.9 per cent), and reducing the use of fossil fuels (57.2 per cent) (Table 5).

Evaluation of the Economy

It is important to note that responses related to the evaluation of economic conditions, based on the survey taking place at the end of July 2022, were made in the context of an economy still recovering from the impact of COVID-19, but before the September 2022 announcement of fuel subsidy cuts by President Jokowi, which resulted in increases in fuel price and consequently, inflationary pressure on the price of goods all over the country. In this context, respondents were asked to evaluate the current condition of the Indonesian economy, the condition of the economy as compared to the previous year, and the expected condition of the economy in one year’s time. The data show that 41.5 per cent of respondents perceive the current economic condition as average, 33.4 per cent perceive it as bad, while only 25.1 per cent perceive it as good. However, 38.7 per cent of respondents think that the current economic condition is better compared to the previous year, exceeding those who think that there has been no change (28.8 per cent) and those who think that it is worse (32.4 per cent). When asked about the outlook for the economy in one year’s time, 60.1 per cent think that it will be better, exceeding by a large margin those who think that there will be no change (27.5 per cent) and those who think that it will be worse (12.3 per cent) (Figure 9). Thus, while respondents may seem slightly pessimistic about the current state of the economy, they are more optimistic in comparing the economy to the previous year when the COVID-19 pandemic was hitting the global economy hard, including Indonesia, and when forecasting the performance of the economy for the year to come.

The survey also asked respondents to evaluate their current household economic condition, compare it to the previous year, and give their forecast for the year to come. Overall, their responses are more optimistic than their assessment of the national economy. The survey found that 29.9 per cent of respondents perceive their current household economic condition to be good, higher than those who perceive their household economic condition to be bad (22 per cent).

Summary:

• ■ The world’s megacities are vulnerable to climate risks; hence investing in climate adaptation is critical.

• ■ Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia, also has a growing need for adaptation finance, but it cannot always rely on public finance’s political uncertainty and inefficiency.

• ■ This study examines Jakarta’s current public finance situation for climate adaptation and suggests practical recommendations for leveraging the city’s public finance to spur private investments in urban adaptation projects.

• ■ Jakarta can increase its capacity to meet its urban adaptation goals by leveraging de-risking instruments and creating bankable project pipelines to stimulate private finance for climate adaptation projects in the city.

• ■ Jakarta should investigate various de-risking mechanisms such as low-cost lending instruments, fiscal incentives, performance-based instruments, risk insurance, and technical assistance.

INTRODUCTION

Megacities are pivotal for a country’s innovation and overall economic progress. Meanwhile, cities are often confronted with problems such as rapid population growth and increasing environmental risk. Jakarta, the largest megacity in Southeast Asia and the capital of Indonesia, is no exception. It is one of the most vulnerable megacities to climate change. Located in a low-lying coastal area, it faces a range of climate-related impacts such as flooding, sea-level rise, and storm surges (Varrani and Nones 2018; Mario 2011). Low adaptive capacity further exacerbates these impacts, affecting the country’s emerging economy. Looking at one of the worst floods on record that struck Jakarta in February 2007, the disaster displaced over 200,000 people, affected 60 per cent of the territory and incurred an estimated US$1 billion in damage (Akmalah and Grigg 2011; Texier 2008). This phenomenon raises the question of whether urban management strategies and financing for Jakarta’s urban adaptation are adequate against a long-term changing climate and its rapidly growing economy.

For a climate-vulnerable urban area such as Jakarta, there is not enough data or evidence to highlight the latest trends in domestic public or private finance flows for financing adaptation efforts. At the country level, however, data suggests that adaptation finance is relatively low—a decade of data from 2009 to 2018 shows that only 2 per cent of development finance in Indonesia flows to adaptationrelated efforts (Atteridge et al. 2019).

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

• • There is a growing policy trend that in addressing climate change, various trade measures must be implemented to enhance the sustainable practices of global stakeholders.

• • As a response to level up the playing field of global trade partners in enhancing sustainability, the EU recently introduced the European Union (EU) Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which will impose a carbon price on certain imports, namely, electricity, aluminium, cement, iron and steel, and fertilizer, to the EU.

• • The EU CBAM may, however, cause trade disputes among World Trade Organization (WTO) members.

• • EU and ASEAN trade relations are currently on an upswing trajectory, and there are therefore some risks involved in implementing the EU CBAM in the ASEAN region.

• • At the same time, despite the perceived adverse effects, there is room for improvement in communicating EU CBAM implementation in ASEAN.

• • The EU should introduce more calibrated approaches to implementing the EU CBAM in ASEAN, particularly considering the political and strategic risks, economic development and capacity, and climate ambitions of individual ASEAN countries.