• • The COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and US-China trade disputes, and the Russia-Ukraine war have increased the risk of global value chain (GVC) disruptions and forced firms to strengthen resilience in their supply chains and operations.

• • MNCs have diversified suppliers, established new production sites, and shifted production closer to consumers. ASEAN countries are becoming increasingly attractive destinations for foreign investors.

• • This paper gauges the position of ASEAN in GVCs and assesses the risks and opportunities of GVC reconfiguration for ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries are increasing their participation in GVCs and raising domestic value-added. The relocation of production sites from China to ASEAN countries could enhance their participation in GVCs. Should MNCs increase the concentration of supplier and buyer markets, ASEAN countries could become more vulnerable to external shocks.

• • In addition, this paper assesses the risk of thirty-five sectors of GVCs in ASEAN countries using value-added trade data from ADB’s multi-region input-output tables (MRIO).

• • Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Thailand face significant risks of both supplier and buyer market concentrations. The remaining ASEAN countries face the risk of either supplier market concentration or buyer market concentration.

• • Any restrictions on the use of intermediate inputs from the US or China to manufacture goods in ASEAN can cause substantial disruption to ASEAN GVCs. The upstream and downstream GVCs in ASEAN countries are dominated by the US, China and Japan.

• • Extraregional trade integration could be enhanced by linking key suppliers and buyers in China, the US, and Japan to producers in ASEAN countries.

• • Trade policy measures to strengthen ASEAN GVCs should focus on a faster release of perishable goods and intermediate inputs at border checkpoints, accelerating the cross-border paperless trade reforms, promoting the utilization of rules of origins under RCEP, streamlining non-tariff measures, and digitalizing ASEAN GVCs.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Islamic Religious Practices

This subsection looks into the influence of Islam on society, especially in the context of Indonesia being a Muslim-majority country. Muslims constitute 91.1 per cent of the sample, and their responses are what we examine here.

The majority of Muslim respondents “often” or “always” carry out their obligatory acts of worship, such as fasting during the month of Ramadan (93 per cent), performing the obligatory daily prayers (80.2 per cent), and observing Friday prayers (47 per cent, but if we only consider men, the figure rises to 83.7 per cent). Meanwhile, in terms of paying tithe (zakat mal) and giving alms, 53.8 per cent and 70.9 per cent “often” or “always” observe these practices respectively. In contrast, due to the high cost of performing the haj and umrah, more than 90 per cent of Muslim respondents have never performed these pilgrimages.

The majority of Muslim respondents (69.8 per cent) are of the opinion that all Muslim women should wear the Islamic headscarf or hijab, while 22.3 per cent leave the decision to the individuals, and 8 per cent feel that Muslim women do not have to wear the hijab. Interestingly, the view that Muslim women must wear the hijab is slightly more likely to be held by female than male respondents, and by rural respondents and respondents of low and medium income (Figure 21).

In terms of practice, 61.9 per cent of Muslim women respondents claim that they usually wear the hijab, while 34.9 per cent wear the hijab depending on the situation, and only 3.3 per cent do not wear the hijab (Figure 22).

The majority of Muslim respondents (88.6 per cent) agree that implementing Islamic law will bring benefits to society, especially in terms of strengthening moral values (62.5 per cent), although this latter figure has dropped from 67.2 per cent as per the INSP2017 (Figure 23). Other perceived benefits, such as the spread of Islam (11.8 per cent), increasing public security (8.9 per cent), and helping to eradicate corruption (5.4 per cent), approximate the level of responses for the INSP2017. Meanwhile, 11.4 per cent of respondents are convinced that the application of Islamic law brings very little or no benefit.

Summary:

• ■ Baguio City receives substantial amounts of rainfall every year but its residents are water insecure.

• ■ As a result of rapid population growth, the demand for water in Baguio City has outpaced the capacity of the Baguio Water District (BWD), a government-owned and controlled corporation, to supply the water requirements of residents.

• ■ The Baguio Water District has yet to successfully fulfill its mandate of providing adequate, safe, and affordable water to the city.

• ■ Addressing water insecurity in Baguio amidst the challenges of climate change will require the participation of all stakeholders such as government, private companies, city residents, and nongovernmental organizations.

INTRODUCTION

Baguio is a small highly-urbanized upland city located approximately 250 kilometres north of Manila, the Philippine capital, and 1,400 metres above sea level. With a land area of 57.5 square kilometres and an estimated population of 366,358 in May 2020 (PSA 2021), its population density is higher than most Philippine cities and towns. It is labelled the “summer capital” of the Philippines because of its cool highland climate, which draws foreign and local tourists who seek respite from the generally hot and humid Philippine weather, especially during the months of March, April and May. It usually experiences rainy weather for six months every year, from May to October, and dry weather for the rest of the year. The city receives more rainfall compared to other Philippine towns and cities. Baguio holds the Philippine record for receiving the highest annual rainfall (9,006 mm) in the country in 1910 (WWF-Philippines 2014, p. 13).

Established in the 1900s, Baguio was originally envisioned to serve as a rest and recreation site for American colonial administrators. Designed by American planners at the time to support a population of 25,000 (Morley 2018, p. 4), it had only 841 inhabitants in 1904 (Estoque and Murayama 2013, p. 246). By 2010, the city had an estimated day-time population of 700,000 and a night-time population of 318,676 (Estoque and Murayama 2012, p. 316). People residing in outskirt areas but working within the city account for the disparity in day-time and night-time populations. The city’s night-time population, which reflects Baguio’s real population, is predicted to double by 2045 (Opiña 2014).

Perceptions of Foreign Countries and ASEAN

Following the INSP2017, the INSP2022 also surveys Indonesians’ perceptions of other countries. However, considering the geopolitical situation and recent trends, the list of foreign countries/regions has been updated to include Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, European Union (EU), South Korea, India, and Vietnam (replacing Thailand). Regarding countries that respondents admire, Figure 18 shows that Muslim countries—Saudi Arabia (95.7 per cent) and Turkey (90.1 per cent)—top the list. With the addition of the Muslim countries, Singapore (89.1 per cent) is relegated to third place from first in 2017. In view of the ongoing armed conflict in Europe, it is notable that Russia (86.8 per cent) is more admired than the US (81.8 per cent) and EU (86.5 per cent). Among the reasons why Indonesians admire Russia more than the United States and European Union are anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, based on the perception that America and the West have treated Muslims unfairly, as evidenced in their foreign policy in the Middle East and with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast, Russia is viewed as more Muslim-friendly. As with the INSP2017, China (78.2 per cent) remains the least admired by respondents. In considering religion as a variable influencing respondents’ admiration for Muslim-majority countries, we find that there is no significant difference in the cases of Turkey and Malaysia. However, regarding Saudi Arabia, Muslims are more likely to express admiration (96.2 per cent) than non-Muslims/others (90.2 per cent).

Respondents are also asked which countries are important for Indonesia. In this regard, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Turkey and Japan are more likely to be considered important countries for Indonesia. Interestingly, ASEAN is considered less important than the EU but more important than the US, China and India.

China’s Impacts

In the context of the global rise of China, respondents are asked if they think the rise of China will have a positive or negative impact on neighbouring countries such as Indonesia. While the INSP2017 shows that those who think the rise of China will have a positive impact on Indonesia (41 per cent) are slightly more than those who think it will have a negative impact (39 per cent), the INSP2022 finds a reversal in the trend, wherein respondents who perceive a negative impact (34.1 per cent) exceed those who perceive a positive one (27.1 per cent) (Figure 19).

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

The survey covers a wide range of issues, from politics to the economy, foreign relations, and social issues such as the role of Islam and perceptions of Chinese Indonesians. Not all questions are reported in this article, but we have given an overview of the key initial findings.

President Jokowi has a high approval rating of 71.8 per cent, and this comes from almost every segment of the socio-demographic spectrum. Exceptions include the Minangkabau, Sundanese, Betawi, Bugis and Malay ethnic communities, which is unsurprising since they constituted the strong support base of Jokowi’s rival Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election.

Public trust in state institutions is also high. As is the prevailing trend in post-Reformasi Indonesia, the Armed Forces garner the highest level of trust (89.6 per cent). This is followed by Provincial Governments (83.1 per cent), District/City Governments (81 per cent), the Central Government (80.4 per cent), and the President (78.7 per cent). Indonesians tend to be active in participating in voting, where voting in Regional Heads elections, the Legislative Election and the Presidential Election range from 89.4 per cent to 91.5 per cent. Participation in other political activities is much more limited, ranging from 3.2 per cent to 16 per cent for participation in political campaigns, volunteering for candidates, participation in demonstrations or protests, and contributing to a candidate’s campaign, etc.

One of the hot-button issues in Indonesia currently is President Jokowi’s plan to build a new national capital (IKN). While respondents who are aware of the IKN development programme are large (80 per cent), only 41.9 per cent agree with the programme, and those who rate the programme as urgent are much fewer (28.6 per cent). This indicates that the timing of the project is a concern for Indonesians, especially since the Indonesian economy is still recovering from the impact of the pandemic.

In general, Indonesians are optimistic about the economy. More respondents are likely to think that the current economic condition is better compared to the previous year, and a majority (60.1 per cent) think that the outlook of the economy in one year’s time will be better.

Background of the Study

It has been more than two decades since the beginning of the Reformasi (Reform Movement) era marked by the fall of President Suharto. Experts are generally divided into two camps that hold sharply different views about Indonesia’s achievements during that period. The first scholarly camp holds a gloomier view, observing that the old corrupt political oligarchic forces have persisted in sabotaging the country’s democratic structural reforms, taking the country back to the practices of the New Order era when corruption, collusion and nepotism were the political and business order of the day. According to this group, there is hardly any significant difference between the New Order and Reform eras. Meanwhile, the other scholarly camp provides a rosier picture of the democratization process in Indonesia. Government officials have also repeatedly made claims that Indonesia has indeed taken big strides forward politically and economically since the end of the New Order.

But what is the public’s own perception of the reform achievements? We do not have information on public perceptions from the authoritarian era due to the political and academic restrictions on public opinion research at that time. What we can do is compare public opinion in the reform era from time to time to check how satisfied the public has been with ongoing developments in Indonesia. Moreover, in a democracy, public opinion surveys and the feedback they provide for public officials serve as one of the foremost methods for improving governance.

Back in 2017, the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS) commissioned the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) to undertake the first Indonesia National Survey Project (known as the INSP2017), which collected data on the attitudes and behaviour of Indonesians with respect to key issues in the economic, socio-cultural and political spheres. In this latest INSP undertaken in 2022 (INSP2022), besides retaining questions that continue to be relevant to issues in the three main areas, we have also adopted new issues and fielded the corresponding questions. This nationwide survey was conducted through face-to-face interviews with 1,620 respondents across all 34 provinces of Indonesia, from 21 to 28 July 2022.

Summary:

• ■ As the assistance requests for climate adaptation increase, donor-funded projects’ approaches will be essential to ensure sustainable and resilient communities.

• ■ Japan’s ODA strategy shifted from the “quantity” to “quality” of projects in the early 2000s to increase the competitiveness of Japanese infrastructure and expertise worldwide. But the inward-looking nature of Japan’s ODA which emphasizes priority on Japan’s economic growth is hampering the introduction of climate-progressive approaches.

• ■ Japan’s recent policy change towards infrastructure system export pushes Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) strategy to provide more technical and infrastructure-based projects in developing countries.

• ■ Integrating Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) in Japanese ODA projects will not only ensure the connection between the activities in biodiversity conservation and climate change, but also strengthen the outcomes of the assistance projects to build a sustainable and resilient society.

INTRODUCTION

As the global average temperature increases, natural disasters occur more frequently and intensely (IPCC 2021). In order to mitigate such negative impacts from global warming, it is essential to have appropriate and sustainable adaptation measures. How then are the adaptation measures and approaches determined, particularly in donor-funded assistance projects?

Japan, as one of the largest bilateral donors among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries, has been playing an important and influential role in aiding developing countries since it joined the Colombo plan in 1954. As a strategic international assistance policy, the first Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter was enacted in 1992, and it was further revised in 2003. The ODA Charter was again updated and revised as the Development Cooperation Charter in November 2015.

Globally, Japan continues to demonstrate its commitment to share its infrastructure capabilities. This commitment was further advanced by the former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s flagship assistance, the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future. Under such an initiative, Japan committed to provide US$110 billion in infrastructure assistance for Asian countries, including ASEAN. Japan has long been praised on its technical capabilities on infrastructure projects, but as the global community is increasingly concerned about climate change impacts on vulnerable communities in developing countries, it is critical for Japan to revisit the ODA Charter and its principles in incorporating climate change and cross-cutting environmental issues, in particular the climate adaptation aspect.

Even before climate change surfaced as a critical challenge for cities, the stresses of rapid and mass urbanization were already problems facing many countries, especially developing countries. The nexus between the climate crisis and urbanization is so distinct that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) prepared a regional fact sheet dedicated to the vulnerability of urban areas in its Sixth Assessment Report. The impacts of climate change are clearly exacerbated by urban characteristics such as the lack of vegetation, the abundance of dense concrete structures, and intense human and economic activities that raise temperatures, alter water cycles, and increase the risk of flooding. Coastal cities, in particular, face the added threat of rising sea levels (IPCC 2022). In a way, climate change has not only magnified the problems of urbanization but has also added another layer of complexities to the mounting challenges that cities face.

Southeast Asia is currently home to four major agglomerations or megacities (cities of over 10 million people); Jakarta, Manila, Bangkok, and Ho Chi Minh City (Citypopulation.de n.d.). The speed of urbanization in the region is particularly striking. In the 1960s, only a quarter of Southeast Asia’s population lived in urban areas, today more than half live in urban areas, and this number will increase to two-thirds by 2025 (Leggert 2015).

Southeast Asia is experiencing some of the world’s fastest changing demographics, and also one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. Three Southeast Asian countries; Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand are among top ten countries that have suffered the greatest economic damage and number of fatalities from climate disasters (Eckstein et al. 2019).

On the city scale, the region is also home to the most vulnerable cities to climate risks. A report by consultancy firm Verisk Maplecroft ranked urban centres worldwide based on their environmental and climate risk, revealing that 99 of the 100 most threatened cities are in Asia (Nichols 2021). Topping the list is Jakarta, which experiences land subsidence, heat stress, water scarcity, natural hazards and pollution due to a combination of climate change and human activity. Close behind are other Indonesian cities Surabaya and Bandung, which are similarly plagued with extreme levels of environmental risk.

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute has commissioned a second nationwide survey in Indonesia as a follow-up to the first similar project in 2017 called the Indonesia National Survey Project (INSP). Its broad aim is to enhance understanding of political, economic, and social developments in Indonesia. Its key findings are as follows:

• • The approval rating of President Joko Widodo hovers around 71.8 per cent, at least before the September 2022 announcement on the fuel subsidy cut. His major infrastructure push as his flagship development programme still garners the most positive assessment. However, poverty, unemployment and cost of living remain key flashpoints that the government should be concerned with.

• • While respondents are generally aware of the plan to relocate the national capital and are more likely to agree rather than disagree with it, most have reservations about its urgency and the financial burden that such an undertaking implies.

• • Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey are the most admired by Indonesians, followed by Singapore. In view of the ongoing armed conflict in Europe, it is notable that Russia is more admired than the US and EU.

• • Where the rise of China is concerned, respondents who perceive a negative impact exceed those who perceive a positive one, which is a reversal of the trend found in the 2017 survey. At the same time, negative opinions towards China’s Belt and Road Initiative is also more strongly evident than positive opinion.

• • While Indonesian Muslims are generally devout practising Muslims, the majority do not harbour aspirations to make Indonesia an Islamic state, preferring instead the cultural inclusiveness currently in place.

• • Reservations about the political role of Chinese Indonesians continue to persist, and a majority do not support members of this community taking up key political positions.

• • Respondents are largely aware of climate change, environment and energy transition issues, and support government policies addressing them. However, the major challenge is seen to be in the promotion of lifestyle changes that will reduce damage to the environment.

Summary:

• ■ The conventional conception of urban areas as non-food production centres needs to be challenged.

• ■ Food insecurity has become more alarming due to price instability and disruption of the supply chain. The COVID-19 pandemic has added further strain on community food security.

• ■ Agroecological principles in urban agriculture have the potential as an alternative for cities to achieve food security.

• ■ Through agroecology, the community co-creates farming knowledge and changes the food system to fit their needs and capacity thus they are able to improve their resilience in adapting to the climate impacts.

INTRODUCTION

In 2022, the state of global food security came under scrutiny due to developments in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The significant role that these two countries play in the global food system, specifically as major fertilizer and wheat producing countries, alarmed neighbouring countries in the region and other food importers. This situation certainly put more pressure on the global food system, which has already faced various challenges. Prior to the conflict, there was a continued rise in food production costs that placed more pressure on smallholder farmers and consumers. Add in the impact of climate change, and global food security has become more uncertain than ever, with increasingly likely food shortages and instability in the future.

On the other hand, the role of food production has been divorced from cities after waves of industrialization hit nations around the world. Cities have been transformed into administrative and industrial centres, and other economic activities are viewed as more capable of producing higher value output. The agricultural sector as a food producer is lagging (Mat et al. 2019). Similarly, in the context of the agricultural sector, driven by the argument of comparative advantage, countries have given more focus to several high-value crops while importing cheaper agrifood produce. As a result, farm-to-fork distances increased and the interdependency between countries intensified. This business-as-usual form of the food system is argued to be unsustainable in facing the unpredictability caused by climate change (IPES-Food and ETC Group 2021). Thus, agroecology is being tabled as a muchneeded alternative in the food system.

Summary:

• ■ There has been a proliferation of tools to monitor and measure the impacts of climate change, including the framework of the Task Force for Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which has been endorsed by leaders in the G7 summit recently calling on mandatory climate disclosures.

• ■ This chapter highlights the different elements within the TCFD, such as strategies, governance, risk management, metrics, and targets, to investigate further shortcomings in existing tools and their gaps in carbon reporting.

• ■ This chapter explores possible challenges in the Malaysian property and construction sector and proposes recommendations to address them.

• ■ A novel TCFD Index (TCI) is recommended to measure the degree of incorporation of four elements (strategy, governance, risk, metrics and targets). TCI will be helpful to both academicians and practitioners involved in city development who are exploring tools to integrate climate resilience.

INTRODUCTION

The impacts of climate change are global in scope and unprecedented, from shifting weather patterns which threaten food security to rising sea levels that increase the risk of catastrophic flooding (United Nations 2019; Wheeler and von Braun 2013). This phenomenon is caused by the release of heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs), primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), produced by a wide range of human activities (Nature Conservancy 2007). As populations, economies and standards of living continue to grow, so does the cumulative level of GHG emissions. The Fifth Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates the cumulative CO2 emissions since preindustrial times and provides a carbon budget for future emissions to limit temperature from increasing beyond 2 degrees Celsius (United Nations 2019). Given current ongoing emissions, it has been predicted that the global mean temperature will continue to rise above the preindustrial level. With polar ice cap melting and warmer oceans, average sea levels are estimated to rise from 24–30 cm by 2065 and 40–63 cm by 2100 relative to the reference point of 1986–2005 (ibid.). The reality is that the impacts of climate change will continue to persist for many centuries even when emissions have stopped.

Summary:

• ■ Global climate governance is shifting from a state-centric to polycentric mode. Cities and city networks play a central role in polycentric climate governance.

• ■ Cities and city networks cooperate in a symbiotic relationship in pursuing climate goals.

• ■ This study highlights that Jakarta directly benefits from its cooperation with the C40 Climate Leadership Group (C40), the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) and CityNet. At the same time, these city networks’ subsistence and relevance depend on their roles in fostering collaboration.

• ■ The question remains on how this cooperation can effectively assist the Government of Jakarta to achieve its climate change mitigation and adaptation targets and develop a more robust and effective climate action policy in the future.

INTRODUCTION

For decades, states were seen as the main actors in the concerted global effort to tackle climate change (Kern and Mol 2013). Countries engaged in multilateral forums such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) or the Group of 20 (G20) at the international level. Countries also participate in regional organizations such as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the Economic and Social Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the African Union, or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the regional level. However, scholars argued that state-centric and prolonged negotiation processes yield only incremental progress, if at all. Under the climate negotiation process, decisions were agreed upon at a slow pace (Hovi and Skodvin 2017; Downie 2012; Falkner et al. 2010); mistrust and contested issues exist, for example on differentiated responsibilities and capabilities between developed and developing countries (Dubash 2009; Wang and Gao 2018), and lack of legally binding and accountability mechanism lead to less ambitious commitment by countries (Hovi et al. 2016; Gupta et al. 2021).

Under the Paris Agreement, the climate regime has applied a combination of top-down and bottom-up systems based on participating country’s national and sectoral initiatives. The initiatives are translated to mitigation and adaptation measures adopted and implemented by networks of international, regional, national, and subnational public and private actors (Jordan et al. 2018; van der Heijden 2018).

Summary:

• ■ Historic urban landscapes are complex, dynamic, linear systems with infinite interconnections and relationships working with, alongside and against each other.

• ■ Floods or flash floods can be seen both as manifestation of disruptions across multiple intersections that comprise the urban environment and a consequence of the systems behaving exactly as they were designed to.

• ■ This chapter explores the possibility of using flood mitigation and management strategies and approaches, not just as a means to solve problems but as vehicles of systemic change by looking at flood mitigation and management practices in George Town, Chennai, India and George Town, Penang, Malaysia.

• ■ The official strategy towards flood mitigation and management in both George Towns has been a technology-centred approach focused on engineering resilience into existing systems to enable them to face perturbations and come back to equilibrium. There is a lack of acceptance of community knowledge and collective intelligences within flood mitigation measures.

• ■ The knowledge systems approach, envisaged as a five-phase cyclic dynamic feedback loop, recognizes the need to look beyond improving and collating existing knowledges, towards “co-creating” new knowledge systems.

INTRODUCTION

Cities are complex systems with “infinite interconnections” (Burns 2007), and contain systems and subsystems, working with, alongside and against each other (Flood 2010). Historical cultural landscapes connect complex knowledge systems, tangible and intangible, of the past in the present. Urban flooding is seen as a systemic problem and a manifestation of disruptions within these complex systems and their connections (Rehman et al. 2019). Article 6 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations 1992) enshrines the promotion and facilitation of “public participation in addressing climate change and its effects”. Mitigation and management of urban flooding demand multi-pronged solutions that include all parts of the government, civil society, media, public and private sector organization and all levels of the community. However, decision-making processes that do not recognize the subtleties and complexities of the social, cultural, political and economic patterns only pay lip service to the idea of the community engagement process. Such simplistic approaches to participatory decision-making has resulted in the exclusion of the economically and socially vulnerable frontliner, facing the brunt of urban climate change impacts from participating in the decision-making process.