EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Southeast Asia's Internet users are far more diverse than usually reported. They range from the urban youth with laptops and high-speed Wi-Fi, to the older generation semi-rural and rural users with affordable mobile phones for Facebook and WhatsApp.

• • Southeast Asians generally trust social media platforms more than in Western societies. This trust in social media reflects a lack of trust in local mainstream media and official sources of information.

• • What campaign information (and disinformation) is being spread and which ones are most successful are essential for understanding how voters in Southeast Asia use and trust social media.

• • Social media platforms and Southeast Asia's “app industry” need clearer and enforced regulation on their use of data and the extent to which they can sell data to advertisers. These advertisers include, but are not limited to, politicians and political parties.

• • Since the future of social media usage will likely lie in closed groups, the role of big data analyses that have dominated research on social media over the past ten years, is likely to regress. Instead, ethnographic scholars who can access these groups and engage with their particular interests and identities are more likely to be useful in understanding the digital sphere in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of the previous decade, the term “Trump Derangement Syndrome” (TDS) became part of common parlance in American opinion pages. For supporters of Donald Trump, the term refers to a tendency by progressive elites and media organizations to view everything the President does as destructive to American leadership and institutions because these elites and organizations have never come to terms with the victory of Donald Trump over Hilary Clinton in the 2017 presidential elections. For detractors of the President, TDS represents an outrageous coinage by Trump's supporters to deflect what are legitimate and serious charges against the President's exercise of his powers.

The temptation to treat the Trump's administration's policies as being irretrievably tied to the character and whims of America's historically most unconventional commander-in-chief is strong, the embedded implication being that a different President in the White House will lead to a very different suite of external policies.

However, allowing TDS to define what American approaches to regional policy might look like over the next four years—with or in the absence of a change of administration—would be a mistake. To be sure, every President has their own idiosyncrasies, the current one more than others, while every administration has their own approach. But overemphasis on the uniqueness of Trump is the wrong place to begin. Some aspects of his presidency might well be an aberration but many more are not, either because the current administration represents an evolution or synthesis in pre-existing thinking or else because Trump has deeply changed the policy dial on many issues. Getting the balance of factors and mindsets right is crucial when it comes to understanding the future of frameworks such as the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and the grouping of the United States, Japan, India and Australia known as the Quad.

This article does not attempt to predict specific policies that a secondterm Trump administration or a first-term Democrat one will pursue. Specific policies are mostly shaped by empirical events and by the responses of senior individuals in the administration. Especially in the case of a possible Democrat White House, it is impossible to know these factors ahead of time.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Party mergers are a new development in Myanmar politics. Given that such mergers often assist the consolidation of new democratic regimes, some broader system-wide effects may also occur. Myanmar's ethnic parties consistently choose merger strategies over other forms of pre-electoral coalition. This highlights a transition from a focus on questions of authoritarianism and democracy to one on the creation of a federal system of government with a stronger cleavage between competing Bamar and ethnic nationalisms.

• • Despite cooperation among political parties outside the electoral process, pre-electoral coalitions such as constituency-sharing or campaigning for allies have generally not been successful. Five of the six mergers among ethnic parties attempted prior to the 2015 general election failed. However, between 2017 and 2019, five mergers involving parties representing the Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon ethnicities, achieved success.

• • The successful mergers were motivated not only by desires for electoral success in 2020 but also by shared federal aims, which involve ethnic parties in Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin or Karen, and Mon states forming a strong local party in their respective regions to strive for ethnic equality and self-determination.

• • The mergers are between parties with markedly different platforms and their success is conditioned by their preferences for particular kinds of federalism. Mergers cannot guarantee electoral success. And other pre-electoral coalitions, such as avoiding competition for the same constituencies, also proved successful in the 2018 by-elections. But what mergers can uniquely do is respond to public demand for parties to unite and make the resulting party stronger in terms of resources and public support.

• • In general, mergers can reduce system fragmentation, avoid vote wastage and lead to the formation of stable parties. Ethnic party mergers also simplify party labels for voters and make it easier for them to vote on the basis of ethnic preferences. In addition, mergers can increase public interest and political participation among members of ethnic communities.

• • Three common factors behind the five successful mergers are previous electoral losses, public pressure and shared federal aims. The durability of these mergers depends on continuous party building, negotiations and equality among party members. Meanwhile, a greater number of new parties will form and continue to exist under the multi-party democracy principle granted in Myanmar's 2008 Constitution.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi BERSATU Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition.

• • The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power.

• • PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government.

• • Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister.

• • BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15.

• • This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH.

• • Following Mahathir's sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS.

• • The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.

Literary References: Evidence of Statue Production and Textile Terminology

In the Old Javanese language, there is a term pande, meaning “skilled worker, or smith” (Zoetmulder 1982). A goldsmith is referred to as pande-mas, and bronze or copper are referred to as tambaga. Whilst we have the knowledge of these terms, there does not appear to be any reference to the manufacture of bronze statuettes. It is most likely that a bronzesmith would have been a simple craftsman who worked in a small unit of apprentices (Lunsingh Scheurleer and Klokke 1988b, pp. 13–14). It has also been suggested, however, that the images cast in bronze far outnumber those made in gold or silver. This does not necessarily mean there was an imbalance in the numbers of different types of sculptures cast, but only that the gold and silver statues could have been used to pay local taxes and could also have been melted down. On close analysis, the quality of the statues in gold and silver often appears to be of a subtler nature to that of the bronze figures, which are often rougher in execution. The greatest achievement of the bronze caster of the Central Javanese period was in the highest artistic expression achieved in the “introspective spirituality and the nobility of expression, epitomised by the highest ideals of Buddhism, in a convincing manner such as no Indian sculptor ever achieved” (Fontein, Soekmono and Suleiman 1971, p. 41).

The majority of the bronzes were cast using the lost-wax process, whereas a number of the gold plaques were made by repoussé, with hammered patterns from the front. The smooth surface allowed the craftsmen to hammer in tiny details of the textile patterns. The stone statues, on the other hand, are of varying qualities and colours. The stone used in the thirteenth century ranged from an exceptional pale-grey stone to an almost white stone, in which detailed carvings of patterns were possible. In contrast, the stone employed in the earlier ninth and tenth centuries ranged from dark grey to black; it was rough to the touch, making intricate details such as textile patterns challenging to execute. It is quite evident that the availability and quality of stone depended on the location of the workshops in different periods in history. Unfortunately, there does not appear to be any reference in the Old Javanese literature to the processes of the selection of materials or the execution of the statues.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• This article traces China's foreign policy transformation from 2013 to the present. It also examines Deng Xiaoping's doctrinal response to the political crises of 1989–91 and compares it to current Chinese foreign policy doctrines.

• From the early 1980s until the 2010s, China's foreign policy has generally focused on keeping a low profile. Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui foreign policy doctrine is characterized by its “No’s”, while Xi Jinping's Xin Xing is marked by its “New’s”. The move from Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xin Xing is a major doctrinal shift in China's foreign policy.

• Since the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi's “new” narratives have seemingly dominated Chinese foreign policy. However, old principles, particularly that of “non-interference” or “no hegemony”, are still alive, albeit in a different form.

• This transformation is driven by three forces, which this paper describes in the 3As framework: China's Ambition to be a “great country” and a “non-hegemon” in a changing world; its provision of Alternatives to fill the gaps in regional and global governance structures; and its Adaptation to what it deems as “unprecedented major changes in a century” (Da Bian Ju).

• As China undergoes this foreign policy transformation, contradictions and dilemmas inevitably emerge.

• While China's foreign policy transformation is currently being disrupted by the coronavirus crisis, there have been adjustments which were already apparent before the crisis. The ambitious “One Belt and One Road” strategy, for instance, was replaced by the “Belt and Road Initiative”; “constructive intervention” was replaced by “constructive role”; and “common destiny” was replaced by “shared future”. Looking ahead, China's foreign policy transformation could include more strategic or, at least, tactical adjustments.

The textile patterns appearing on Javanese free-standing sculptures is a little-known subject. These patterns came to the attention of the author after a visit as a student to the Volkenkunde, Leiden (RV) in 1998. The museum contains large andesite stone statues decorated with many different forms of dress, with each part sporting a different pattern. The carvings are so clear and precise that the sculptor had to be replicating a particular pattern, as it is unlikely he invented the complex designs himself. These patterns then presented an unanswered question: what was the inspiration for this multitude of different textile patterns, and where did it originate? Images of lotus flowers with an abundance of scrolling vines evoke Chinese sensibilities and the following of Buddhism. Perfectly cut rosette flowers appear in many different guises, highlighting the appeal of the karahana, the Tang rosette flower motif that appeared to be so popular between the end of the seventh and the first quarter of the eighth centuries. A pattern that seems to have evolved from similar designs is used in Sogdiana and Panjikent in Central Asia. This pattern later developed to be a particularly popular motif in the Malay weaving of songket—silk fabric with a supplementary weft of gold threads. Statues from the thirteenth century display a short sleeveless upper-body jacket with a pattern that is quite possibly a template for the songket patterns we see today. One statue of Gaṇeśa does not have the typical attributes of the much-loved figure from the Hindu pantheon but instead displays specific esoteric attributes and depictions of skulls and stylized kāla-heads (fig. 1) on the textile patterns carved on his trousers. What was the symbolic meaning of these textile patterns? Why were these particular East Javanese sculptures, which dated from the late thirteenth century, carved in such an explosion of designs? What was the inspiration behind the patterns and where did this inspiration come from? To answer these questions, a stylistic evaluation and a study of the textiles portrayed on all the statues is necessary.

The “stylistic evaluation” aids in the study and identification of a sculpture and furthers our understanding of the inspiration behind the textile patterns. It became apparent that the transference from Central to early East Java showed a shift in the stylistic evolution of Mahāyāna Buddhist bronze statues.

There exist numerous free-standing figurative sculptures produced in Java between the eighth and fifteenth centuries that feature dress displaying detailed textile patterns. This surviving body of sculpture, carved in stone and cast in metal, varying in both size and condition, remain in archaeological sites and museums in Indonesia and worldwide. The equatorial climate of Java has precluded any textiles from this period surviving. This book argues, therefore, that the textiles represented on these sculptures offer a unique insight into the patterned splendour of the textiles in circulation during this period. Hence, this publication will contribute to our knowledge of the textiles in circulation at that time by including the first comprehensive record of this body of sculpture, together with their textile patterns classified into a typology of styles.

Because of the limited number of inscriptions and texts from this period, it has proved necessary to conduct the research for this book by utilizing empirical methods to examine all the sculptures. The discussion of each statue is supported by photographs and original line-drawings of their textile designs. A close analysis of these drawings establishes that during a brief period in the late thirteenth century the textile patterns carved on the sculptures reached their greatest diversity and complexity.

In considering supporting evidence from Persia, India, Central Asia and China, this book explores the origins of the medieval textile patterns depicted on these sculptures. It also provides some analysis of specific motifs, such as those representing esoteric iconography. As this research necessitated a detailed analysis of all the sculptures representing textiles, it also contributes significantly to other related aspects of concurrent apparel and ornamentation. It is my intention that this catalogue of textile patterns be utilized by future students and scholars in the stylistic dating of sculptures from Java between the eighth and fifteenth centuries.

Note that this publication addresses only the repeat patterns presented on free-standing figurative sculpture that evidentially reflect pliant textiles adorning a human form in the round. The publication does not address the repeat patterns evident on stone temples or architectural features within sculptures, where the rigid patterns may be understood to represent decorative surface elements.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • China's influence over economic and political affairs in Cambodia is undisputed. It is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017, especially into real estate development, the garment industry and the tourism sector.

• • For Phnom Penh's SMEs, “new” Chinese migrants are an increasingly important clientele, and raw materials, machinery, consumer goods and capital from Greater China have been vital resources. At the same time, they face competition from entrepreneurs from China entering the Cambodian market.

• • For Cambodia's elite entrepreneurs, known as oknha, China is an export destination for Cambodian timber and cash crops, and “new” Chinese investments provide business opportunities in the form of construction contracts and joint ventures in real estate and tourism development, industrial parks or the energy sector.

• • Recent Chinese investments and migrants have reinforced Cambodia's established politico-economic order, which is characterized by ethnic Chinese economic dominance as well as a divide between the business-state elite and the general population.

INTRODUCTION

Southeast Asians with Internet access are ranked as some of the world's most ubiquitous users of social media platforms. Yet, it is true that in Southeast Asia as elsewhere, scholars, analysts and governments are still trying to understand how “the informational underpinning of democracy have eroded”. In this article, I assess the kinds of information society that are emerging in the digital public sphere in Southeast Asia. To comprehend social media's impact, we need to think more about the different ways through which citizens access the Internet, and the circumstances under which they engage with certain social media platforms. We also need to understand the historical and cultural backgrounds that shaped the way digitalization has entered the existing public sphere. Finally, we need to take note of the political context and reasons for the spread of digital media material. I examine these three aspects of social media adoption in three Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

SOUTHEAST ASIA's SHIFTING INFORMATION SOCIETY

There are some common mistakes that analysts make when writing about social media usage in Southeast Asia. The first mistake is overstating Internet access in the region. We often think of the “digital divide” as a clear distinction between those who have access to the Internet and those who have no access at all. In this frame, surveys show that some 64 per cent of Indonesians, 65 per cent of Filipinos and 75 per cent of Malaysians have regular access to the Internet. But these statistics are often beset with erroneous conclusions––for example, many citizens answer “yes” to having Facebook, but “no” to having Internet access when answering professional surveys. Some digital surveys, such as WeAreSocial, often only collect information on people who have Internet access. Others, such as AC Nielson, only examine responses from citizens in large cities where Internet signals are strong and where wealth is greater. These surveys only scratch the surface of the vast disparity in how Southeast Asians access the Internet. As Elizabeth Pisani wrote: “Millions of Indonesians are on US$2 a day and are on Facebook.” So the number could be skewed but more importantly, these percentages do not tell us the disparity within Internet usage. The millions of Southeast Asians “on the digital divide”, who have minimal access to the Internet, are generally understudied.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The emergence of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Indonesia in 2014 re-energized violent extremism in Indonesia. As a result of effective counterterrorism policing, however, IS networks have been decimated and the structure of jihadism in Indonesia has shifted from organizations to autonomous networks and cells, increasingly organized via the Internet.

• • Although support for violent extremism in Indonesia remains marginal, cells of IS followers maintain a low-level capacity to conduct lethal attacks against civilian and government targets.

• • Most IS operations in Indonesia are sporadic and low-level attacks against the Indonesian police. Religious minorities have also been high-profile targets, as in the Surabaya church suicide bombings of 13 May 2018. There are some indications, however, of militants’ renewed interest in attacking foreign targets, such as tourists on the resort island of Bali.

• • IS returnees from the Middle East have begun to play a role in recent attacks. The presence of this population in Indonesia raises the risk of militant capabilities being enhanced above their current relatively low level. Most returnees are women and children, and the increasing involvement of this cohort in IS attacks promises to complicate counterterrorism operations. The rise of pro-IS charities in Indonesia, poised to service returnees and reintegrate them into Indonesia's jihadist community, further exacerbates this problem.

• • The overall threat of terrorism to the Indonesian state and to the stability of the Joko Widodo administration remains low. Surprise attacks by unknown cells, however, have the potential to shock the Indonesian political system, provoking government repression of Islamists and exacerbating political polarization and community tensions.

INTRODUCTION

Ever since Hun Sen's state visit to Beijing in 1996, ties between Cambodia and China—or more accurately, between Hun Sen's ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—have only grown stronger. The state visit was a watershed moment. The Chinese had supported the Khmer Rouge regime (1975–78), while Hun Sen came to power under the auspices of China's rival, the Vietnamese, who had pushed the Khmer Rouge forces towards the Thai border, and founded the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (1979–89). The 1996 state visit not only signalled a rapprochement between China and Cambodia, but also China's confidence that Hun Sen was Cambodia's strongman in the making. The Chinese had invited Hun Sen but not Prince Rannaridh, whose Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC) had formed an unstable coalition government with the CPP after the 1993 elections organized by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Perhaps encouraged by China's backing, Hun Sen ousted Rannaridh in a coup de force in 1997. In June 2016, roughly two decades after Hun Sen's state visit and around US$3 billion in Chinese loans and grants later (Veasna 2016), warm ties were once again reaffirmed. Reportedly, as it had done in 2012, Cambodia demanded that ASEAN tone down its statement on China's disputed claim over the South China Sea, and a few days later China pledged another US$600 million in loans and grants (Hutt 2016a).

Political interdependencies have emerged alongside the influx of Chinese investments, businesses and economic migrants since the 1990s. Cambodia's infrastructural development, including the construction of bridges, roads and hydropower dams, is largely undertaken by Chinese state-owned companies and financed by Chinese banks (Sullivan 2011). The majority of Cambodia's garment factories, which account for over three-quarters of total exports, are owned and managed by Chinese from “Greater China” (i.e., mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) (Ear 2016). China is the biggest investor in Cambodia, adding nearly US$5.3 billion between 2013 and 2017 (Hin 2019), and Chinese firms currently hold over forty Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) allocated for tourism development or the cultivation of crops such as rubber, sugar and cassava (LICADHO 2019).