INTRODUCTION

China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is expected to be the largest infrastructure development scheme of the twenty-first century. It involves over eighty countries, with overall investments estimated to be between US$1 trillion to US$8.5 trillion.

President Xi Jinping launched the BRI in 2013, describing the initiative as an exercise in “economic cooperation” with a focus on connectivityand trade. The primary goals are to create policy coordination between countries, increase cultural exchange, promote financial integration and cooperation, facilitate international trade, and increase connectivity through infrastructure development.

While the goal of improving the prospects of developing nations is laudable, scholars across the world have raised concerns around the potential environmental and social impacts of the BRI. Of the five goals, perhaps the most visible and worrying is infrastructure development, notably via six terrestrial infrastructure corridors, a marine economic route and a recently announced polar BRI. These routes are expected to connect more than half of the world's population. Infrastructure development will include mega projects to overcome geographic barriers to growth such as those seen in ASEAN members states.

Southeast Asia, with a population of 320 million, which is expected to grow to 526 million by 2050, represents huge opportunities for trade and is a focus of BRI investment. The economic effects of BRI investments could be transformational and could smooth out income inequalities within ASEAN where gross domestic product per capita varies from as little as US$3,645 in Cambodia to US$85,535 in Singapore.

The direct and secondary impacts associated with major infrastructure corridors have been identified as posing threats to biodiversity in an already ecologically vulnerable region. Infrastructure development could negatively affect the atmosphere, hydrosphere, geosphere, and biosphere. Southeast Asia is home to four out of thirty-four of the planet's biodiversity hotspots and to the Coral Triangle, also known as the Amazon of the ocean, which hosts 600 reef-building coral species.

In this review we provide a synoptic overview of the potential environmental impacts in the region. We start with an inventory of BRI projects in Southeast Asia, and then we describe the potential negative impacts of BRI from an environmental perspective.

HOW ISLAMIC STATE CHANGED TERRORISM IN INDONESIA

The emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) in 2014 saw a variety of Indonesian militant networks pledge allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. While the largest Indonesian jihadist group, Jemaah Islamiyah, remained loyal to its traditional allies in Al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra (later Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), a loose pro-ISIS coalition formed under the banner of Jamaah Anshorul Daulah (JAD). The rapid territorial gains of ISIS in Syria and Iraq greatly energized Indonesian jihadism, attracting radical youth and veteran militants alike. Former JI leader and icon of the old guard, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, surprised observers by shifting allegiance to IS from his prison cell. For a brief window, ISIS activists openly held group oaths of allegiance in prominent mosques and marched with black flags on the streets of Jakarta. Reflecting developments elsewhere in the world, Indonesian pro-ISIS activists carved out corners of the Internet for recruitment and propaganda, some of which they still inhabit to this day.

What the “Islamic State” movement lacked in terms of organizational structure in Indonesia it gained in an ability to surprise authorities with repeated small-to-medium scale attacks. In the ISIS era, the most prominent attacks in Indonesia were a bombing and shooting at a Starbucks and shopping mall in the centre of Jakarta in January 2016, multiple family-led suicide bombings of church and police targets in Surabaya in May 2018, and a knife attack on Indonesia's chief security minister, Wiranto, in October 2019. These incidents left over twenty dead and dozens injured. Above all, Indonesian authorities were caught off-guard by the tactical innovation of the attacks.

The primary focus of IS attacks, however, has been the national police (Polri). Militants have been locked in cycles of revenge with police—which they see as the main symbol of a tyrannical un-Islamic regime—overshadowing any motivation to attack Western targets. Following the police, religious minorities, especially Christians, have been the most prominent target, in a national context of increasing political polarization between Islamists and nationalists.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

List of Museums

Ashmolean Museum

Assam State Museum

Bangkok National Museum

British Museum

Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya

China National Silk Museum (CNSM)

Cleveland Museum of Art

Colombo National Museum

Indian Museum, Kolkata

Metropolitan Museum of Art

Mpu Tantular Museum

Museum Nasional Indonesia (MNI)

Museum Sonobudoyo

National Museum, New Delhi

Prambanan Museum

Ranggawarsita Museum

Rijksmusem Amsterdam

Santa Barbara Museum

State Hermitage Museum, St Petersberg (SHM)

Tropenmuseum Amsterdam

Trowulan Museum

Volkenkunde – National Museum of Ethnography, Leiden (RV)

Chinese Terms for Geographical Regions From Yijing, 635–718 CE

Fo-shih: Bhoga is mentioned in Tang history (618–906) as being on the south shore of the Strait of Malacca.

Ho-ling: Java.

Malayu: Seems to have existed for a long time. May also have been called Bhoga (the country). Lay on the southern shore of Malacca. Malayu covered the Southeast side of Sumatra, from the southern shores of Malacca to the city of Palembang.

Mo-lo-yu: Malayu, Shih-li-fo-shih, Srîbhoga.

San-bo-tsai: Land of the southern barbarians, between Cambodia, Chênla and Java, Shê-p’o. San-fo-Ch’i, in the History of Sung (960–1279) is probably Shih-li-fo-shih or Srîbhoga. Srîbhoga disappeared and was replaced with the term “Old Port” by the time of the last Chinese conquest in 1379 CE.

Sānfóqí: Was an important trading port where the people had embraced Buddhism but were of Hindu origin. The country was rich in gold. The inhabitants wore kan-man (sarongs). Sānfóqí was in Malayu Jambi and not in Palembang, thus references to Sānfóqí in the tenth and early eleventh centuries could relate to either Palembang or Jambi (Miksic and Goh 2017, p. 396).

Sarbaza: Used by Arab travellers in the ninth century; a corruption of Yavadvîpa.

Srîbhoga: Chin-chou, San-fo-Ch’i, and Golden Isle.

Yuán Shī: The historical works of the Yüan period; also known as Yuanshi. His written records contributed to our knowledge of Śrivijaya and the kingdoms that lay on the route between China and Nālandā (I-Tsing 1998: xli–xlvi).

Chinese Terms for Geographical Regions

From Zhufanzi, Twelfth to the Thirteenth Century

Chön-la: Cambodia

Chu-lién: Coromandel Coast, Chola Domain

Hu-ch’a-la: Gujarat, India

Kién-pi: Kampar, Eastern Sumatra

Ligor: Malay Peninsula

Nan-p’i: Malabar, India

Our Palm Oil Conundrum

First published in Diplomatic Voice, Volume 1 2017.

The latitude and tropical weather of Malaysia create the ideal conditions for the oil palm tree to flourish. The country is currently the world's secondlargest producer of this “golden crop”. Malaysia held the pole position until 2008, when Indonesia became the world's biggest producer, a position it still proudly holds today. Combined, Indonesia and Malaysia produce more than eighty per cent of the world's palm oil.

Palm oil is one of the most important type of oils, or fats, available in the world today. Its use is ubiquitous; palm oil is not only a common ingredient in foodstuffs but it is also widely used in the cosmetics industry and in cleaning products. It is also increasingly used as a biofuel.

The demand for this “green gold” has kept prices high on the commodity markets and has been credited with bringing about national development and improving standards of living across the board in producing countries. As the world population continues to increase, the demand for oils and fats is expected to continue to rise.

The oil palm is one of the most efficient oil crops for oils and fats. A relatively large amount of palm oil can be produced from quite a small area of land. For the same quantity, soya bean oil production would require almost ten times the land area. This means less land is exploited to produce a target amount of palm oil compared to any other vegetable oil.

Palm oil, unfortunately, has been linked to several environmentally unsustainable practices. These include deforestation, fires and hazepollution, habitat loss for endangered animals, and reduced biodiversity as a result of mono-cropping. Furthermore, some palm oil plantations have faced allegations of land grabs and human rights violations. The “healthiness” of palm oil for consumption had also been an issue in the past, but this has largely been debunked—palm oil's safety for consumption is no different than other widely available vegetable oils in the market.

Because of such perceived issues, there have been various campaigns in developed countries, especially in Europe and Australia, seeking to discourage consumers from buying products containing palm oil. These campaigns have been relatively successful, and some products have met with commercial success simply by promoting the fact they do not use palm oil.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • As an increasingly conservative wave of Islam engulfs the globe, literalist Salafi interpretations of the faith have become prevalent in Malaysia. While there are several Islamic schools of thought in the country, including those deemed “deviant”, the loudest voices are always the more extreme.

• • Over the past year, there has been increasing recognition of women's roles as recruiters, financiers and influencers for radical Islamic groups. More women have been arrested for their support for and involvement in the Islamic State (IS), but much of the focus has been on their desire to marry a jihadi soldier or channel funds to the cause. In Malaysia, these women (including returnees from IS) are seen to be followers, not decision-makers or active agents in extremist action.

• • While Malay-Muslim women were both economically and socially active prior to colonization, patriarchal norms are now commonplace because of Islamic and Western conventions, as well as increasing conservatism in society.

• • Women do have agency in the home, however, and exercise this power and centrality within the private sphere by wielding religion as a tool to exert influence over their spouse and children.

• • More attention needs to be paid to mothers as potential nurturers of extremist interpretations of Islam. Their actions in active support of non-violent extremism and intolerant exclusivity could have far-reaching effects given their unrivalled influence in the home. Their need to achieve social recognition through religion, coupled with increasing Salafi infiltration into mainstream Malaysian society and Islam, could be highly detrimental in multi-faith Malaysia. At the very least, these women may not report family members who intend to participate in terror; at the worst, they may encourage it and sanction jihadi theology and action.

The extant sculptures have been divided into three chapters covering three periods. The first from the ninth to the early eleventh century, followed by the thirteenth century, and the last covering the fourteenth to the early fifteenth century. Within these three chapters, sub-groups have been developed that enable the categorization of the many different textile patterns into “style” groups. The data gained from the different pattern groups has enabled the subsequent research into the transmission of patterns from textiles to sculptures. With this additional factor of the textile patterns, the datings of the sculptures, where possible, have been amended from those provided by the existing literature. These patterns have then been used as a basis to propose examples that highlight the relationship between South and Southeast Asia through the interregional textile trade.

The four sculptures originating from Sumatra portray textile patterns that are contiguous with the classical period in Java and which reflect some of the Javanese designs, clearly indicating the close trading links between Java and Sumatra during this period. There is also clear evidence of the transmission of textile patterns from foreign textile sources to sculptures on both the small bronzes and large stone statues. The peak of the variety of textiles on stone sculptures appears to have been between 1269 and 1292 ce during the reign of King Kṛtanāgara, in the last phase of the Singhasāri period. During the Central and early East Java period, many more sculptures were produced with textile patterns—a crosssection of which have been discussed in this volume—but the variety of designs does not match in any way the variation seen in the Singhasāri period. Hiram Woodward has said that “a fabric recreated in stone may tell us more than would actual textile fragments or impressions, for it documents the local response to the imported object” (Woodward 1977, p. 233)—the distinctive artistic traditions can be seen, therefore, as proof of the textile tradition at the time.

I have maintained that the fabrics represented on the dress of most of the bronze, gold and stone sculptures from the classical period in Java appear to document local responses to the successive arrivals of textiles via trade, and to subsequently reflect the local interpretations of these imported items.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration.

• • The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as “balancing” against Chinese power and “countering” the worst aspects of Beijing's policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable “competitive coexistence” in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing.

• • In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the “normalization” of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out “fit-for-purpose” existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones.

• • Establishment Democrats believe that the “America First” unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable “competitive coexistence” with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches.

• • Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings.

• • A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.

INTRODUCTION

After a lengthy hiatus, Myanmar's electoral politics resumed with the adoption of the country's 2008 Constitution, the re-emergence of political parties and the first election in two decades in 2010. A second round of national elections was held in 2015, with the next round intended to be held in the last quarter of 2020. Since 2010, many political parties have registered and engaged in the political process. There are currently ninety-four officially registered political parties—of which an estimated fifty-five are ethnic parties. Both Bamar-dominated national parties and non-Bamar ethnic parties cannot be easily positioned on a left/right continuum.6 In Myanmar, political dividing lines relate instead to either pro- or anti-democracy stances, pro- or anti-military stances or to historical attitudes towards reform/revolution. Furthermore, in addition to ethnic parties, there are proxy parties, splintered parties and rebranded parties, which condition party interactions and complicate Myanmar's democratic landscape.

These party categorizations relate to the fact that electoral and party politics occur in a wider political context. In Myanmar there is an ongoing peace process, initiated soon after democratic reforms in 2011, which attempts to resolve long-standing conflicts between the (majority Bamar) army known as the Tatmadaw and the actors who identify as ethnic political entities or ethnic armed organizations. A grievance underlying this conflict relates to the dominance of the central government in designated ethnic minority territories and the insubstantial say that ethnic groups have in their own affairs. The previous military government used multi-party elections to induce ethnic armed organizations to engage in politics rather than armed conflict. Despite differences among individual ethnic populations—small or large, with or without states named after their ethnic group—the overall ethnic population shares certain common goals: ethnic equality, self-determination and a federal system of governance. To achieve these ends, most ethnic groups have engaged in a two-track process: through ethnic armed organizations, which operate outside the formal political system and the 2008 Constitution, and ethnic political parties, which pursue change within the system. Myanmar's party system reflects these twin processes of democratization and the peace process. It has two major cleavages—Burman nationalism versus ethnic nationalism and authoritarian rule versus democratic rule.

As Singapore clocked its first handful of coronavirus cases in late January 2020, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, while on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Switzerland, issued an appeal for the public to remain calm. This appeal bore some similarities with China's former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's Tao Guang Yang Hui (韬光养晦) foreign policy doctrine—to calmly observe, hold one's ground, react firmly, act but keep a low profile (冷静观察、稳住阵脚、沉着应付、韬光养晦、有所作为: leng jing guan cha, wen zhu zhen jiao, chen zhuo ying fu, tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei).

Drawing inspiration from PM Lee's call for “calm” and its similarities with Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui, this article discusses the evolution of China's foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping, as well as the implications of this foreign policy transformation for Southeast Asia. Methodologically, this paper compares Deng Xiaoping's and Xi Jinping's foreign policy doctrines through an analysis of state narratives—namely the evolution from Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui to Xi's Xin Xing (新型). This shift has largely been interpreted as the most important shift in China's foreign policy.

This paper will address three questions: Was Deng's Tao Guang Yang Hui, characterized by the “No’s” (不: bu), really replaced? What is new about Xi's Xin Xing? And whither China's foreign policy?

UNPACKING TAO GUANG YANG HUI

Tao Guang Yang Hui, coined and formulated by Deng between 1989 and 1991, functioned as the core doctrine of China's foreign policy against the backdrop of the Tiananmen incident, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. With Tao Guang Yang Hui, Deng relaunched China's “reform and opening up” with his well-known Southern Tour of 1992, and successfully froze China's internal debate on the “-isms”—i.e., socialism or capitalism—and re-embraced US-led globalization.

Today, “Deng Xiaoping Theory”, which encompasses elements of Tao Guang Yang Hui, is enshrined in the People's Republic of China's Constitution, and accorded the same ideological standing as “Mao Zedong Thought” and “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” as China's “guiding principles”.

China Versus the US Regional Powers

An objective of superpower grand strategy is to be seen as strong enough to win a major war, thus precluding the need to actually fight. To make such a policy credible in the eyes of rivals and challengers, the financial strength of the power needs to be solid enough to sustain a protracted war. This includes keeping trade routes open, as a superpower cannot rely over the long term on its domestic resources and production capacity alone. China and the United States have pursued grand strategies that are similar in purpose, but the economic structures, geography and financial constraints limit the global ambitions for each.

Economically, China is much more dependent on access to the global economy than the United States is. China cannot feed itself— the United States is a net exporter of food. China is the largest net importer of fossil fuel—in a couple of years the United States will be a net exporter. China's share of exports/imports to GDP is around 18 per cent—for the United States the figure is around 12–14 per cent (on account of the deficit in the balance of payments, the figure is higher for imports than for exports). According to the OECD, China's outward FDI stands at 14 per cent of GDP and its inward FDI at 21 per cent—the corresponding figures for the United States are 32 per cent and 36 per cent. The United States has been a global investor (outward and inward) for more than a hundred years—China has only participated in this for a couple of decades, which illustrates how quickly China has been building an international investment position.

Geography requires that continental and maritime superpowers react differently to this quandary. A continental superpower, like the former Soviet Union, relies on its neighbours for overland transport links— railways or trucks. A maritime superpower may operate independently of adjacent countries, but it must keep sea lanes open, doing so by naval power.

History does not have any examples of a successful continental superpower operating on a global scale. The closest would be the Roman Empire, extending from present-day Iraq to Portugal and North Africa to the lower Rhine in AD 117.