Many monolithic stone statues created during the Singhasāri period in the thirteenth century and some sculptures dated to the early fourteenth century were carved with a broad range of unique textile patterns. Almost all the statues were carved from a single piece of stone, either standing or seated against a backslab. This period in history gave rise to King Kṛtanāgara, the last of the Singhasāri kings. This extensive collection of statues was commissioned under his reign between 1269 and 1292 ce, the more significant part of which was placed at the Caṇḍi Singosari complex or at Caṇḍi Jago. This chapter illustrates all of the known sculptures that were carved with textile patterns. Where known, their places of origin are shown in map 4. These sculptures represent only a fraction, however, of all the sculptures made during this period—the remainder were generally of an inferior quality and exhibited no textile patterns.

There are little remains of importance from the Kediri period, from the mid-eleventh century to 1222 CE, except for the seated sculpture known as the Boro Gaṇeśa. This giant statue is arguably the sculpture that has been most frequently published in Southeast Asian textile and art history books. In my opinion, the Gaṇeśa does not fit into the Singosari style. This is evident from the position of the feet together and the rather stiff body. According to Edi Sedyawati, he fits more closely with the end of the Kediri period, or, as she puts it, “the long empty interval between the last known Kediri inscription and the first Singhasāri inscription” (1994, p. 116). This therefore is a Kediri “style” statue with a Singhasāri date, and it is categorized as “Kediri” along with the Arcā Leluhur at the MNI. The rough andesite stone of the Boro Gaṇeśa results in a cruder form of carving; this establishes that he was made in a different region at a different time to the rest of the Singosari style sculptures. In contrast, the Arcā Leluhur is carved from a smooth and beautiful white andesite stone known as tuff, and is of a very different texture and quality.

The position of East Java within the interregional trade during this period might aid in our consideration of how some of the textile patterns in this chapter arrived there.

Until the turn of the century, behavioural patterns controlling political systems and the economic model were fairly predictable. Political leaders and economic decision makers not only followed an analogous script but their actions were transparent and other players knew the game and the rules—including the unwritten ones—so surprises were few.

The new thing is that the game has become unpredictable. This is the case for globalization and domestic policies, making it hard to navigate them.

In the past, nation-states complied with the decisions and rulings of international institutions such as the Security Council of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization because they expected other nation-states to do the same. This is also the case with the question often asked as to why member states of the European Union (EU) comply with the rulings of the European Court of Justice when it is powerless to enforce its rulings.

The global system was in reality not global. It was a global projection of the salient elements of the American political system and economic model. The rest of the world acquiesced because the American model had proved its worth. It actually worked and worked well. The United States was the guardian of the system, ready to step in if needed to make sure it worked. The rule of law underpinning the system was American, and perhaps British, law. Economically, the United States and Britain in the early 1950s commanded close to half of global gross domestic product (GDP). Other nation-states had to acquiesce, as the alternative was that they would not get access to the markets of these two countries. From around 1991—when the Soviet empire collapsed— until the first decade of the twenty-first century, these two countries in reality took it upon themselves to force other countries to toe the line and to accept the existing global order. The two Iraq wars and the sanctions against Myanmar serve as examples of the posture of the United States and Britain as self-proclaimed defenders of globalization, which even justified military intervention against countries that did not respect the rules of the game. There was some expectation that Russia under Boris Yeltsin would join the global order, and some observers expected China also to move in the same direction.

It is not unusual with an art history publication of this nature, which analyses a corpus of medieval sculpture, for the sculptures addressed to be found in a single public or private collection, or even one archaeological site. The sculptures addressed in this publication, however, are presently located at numerous locations, both within Indonesia and across the world.

This book has attempted to include as many as possible of the accessible figurative sculptures that exhibit textile patterns on their dress. It does not assume to have located, from amongst all the reserve and private collections worldwide, all such sculptures. Many relevant sculptures identified during the course of the underlying research have also been omitted where they either represent a duplication of others included or where there exists any doubt as to their true provenance.

The sculptures addressed here vary in importance, from some that have become iconic images of their time and place, such as the Prajñāpāramitā in the Museum Nasional Indonesia, to others that are almost unknown and which may not have been published previously.

This book addresses seventy-three stone and metal sculptures originating from Java and Sumatra between the eighth and fifteenth centuries. Of these seventy-three, fifty-one remain in Java and Sumatra to this day, either on site or in museums, whilst twenty-one are now to be found elsewhere in the world. The location of one sculpture is presently unknown.

This diaspora of sculptures is indicated in map 5, which illustrates that over a quarter of these sculptures are to be found across eleven museums in nine countries. Within Indonesia, on the islands of Java and Sumatra, fourteen different museums, institutions and sites hold the remaining sculptures. Not included among this number is the single bronze for which the location is unknown. The most significant number of Central and East Javanese sculptures are to be found in Java, followed by those in three museums in Leiden and Amsterdam in the Netherlands.

A number of the sculptures found within Europe reveal fascinating “object stories”. From the early nineteenth to the early twentieth century, Dutch and English authorities were particularly involved in the relocation of several statues that now reside in European museum collections.

Since my last book, The Veil of Circumstance: Technology, Values, Dehumanization and the Future of Economics and Politics, published in 2016, the world has undergone dramatic changes. Digitalization has undermined and replaced well-known structures, forcing nation-states to develop new technology, to figure out how to use it, and to analyse the interactions with the established parameters of power. The power game is increasingly about gaining the technological edge.

The winner may not necessarily be the nation-state in possession of the “best” technology. The interaction between technology and human beings may be more important than the technology itself. How to mobilize and maximize the skills of people with the technology and how technology is used to rally people around a common purpose will be the crux. This is becoming increasingly difficult because of the diverse social networks and the diffusion of power.

The cocktail of “capitalism, technology and globalization” worked wonderfully for decades, but the number of social losers and disenfranchised people has grown, sowing discontent and frustration. A gap has opened up between the elite and the discontented. The global financial crisis disclosed the fragility of the existing economic model and political system. The negative side effects of globalization are becoming increasingly evident.

Statistics for economics, trade and investment show a tendency for stronger regionalization. The drive for the technological edge has pushed superpowers to look for partners in the region, with the result that countries in the region have been pushed towards a stronger link with the regional superpower. These superpowers have scaled down their commitments to the global system, as they are unable to offer the same level of “protection” as they had in previous decades.

In Asia this is visible in China's drive for its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and even more so in its tremendous efforts to be a global technological leader in such areas as artificial intelligence and 5G, and perhaps also biotechnology. As globalization fades, it will be difficult to thrive outside an economic space—impacting on technology, communication, energy, and possibly currency—defined by China. India, Japan and Southeast Asia may not be large enough to contest this development, but they are strong enough to prevent China from becoming too dominant—the dependency is not one way, as China needs them almost as much as they need China.

“Wicked problems” are problems that are complex, multidimensional, hard to solve and often harder to define (Rittel and Webber 1973). Contrasted against “tame problems” with straightforward solutions, wicked problems are dynamic, encompassing many issues and stakeholders, and evade straightforward, lasting solutions (Howes and Wyrwoll 2012).

Howes and Wyrwoll have argued that many of Asia's environmental problems are wicked in nature; a result of Asia's upward growth rate and one that will only worsen as Asia continues to grow. While growth will help make more resources available to direct at these problems, without effective environmental management, growth will simply “heighten the divergence across many facets of economic activity between private and social costs” (Howes and Wyrwoll 2012).

One such problem that they identify is transboundary haze. This problem has many sources (local incentives, institutional incapacity, decentralization, foreign demand of palm oil, and timber exports), which blurs problem formation: Is the central problem air pollution, sustainable resource use, biodiversity, or climate change? The impact of haze is distributed regionally (health costs from air pollution, atmospheric brown clouds) and globally (climate change), making the problem a highly interdependent one. The solution set is also particularly complex, as many potential solutions require another set of supporting solutions.

The wickedness of this problem is such that the effectiveness (or not) of haze governance at the regional level is interdependent on various other stakeholders and levels of governance, including political and businesselites, local agencies, smallholder villagers, multinational supply chains and even financing institutions.

Indeed, Indonesia has identified the strategic management of its carbonrich peatlands as the cornerstone of its Nationally Determined Contributions presented to the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 25 in 2019. But as Indonesia and the rest of Southeast Asia continue to develop, the trade-off between the social costs of clean air, the global costs of the climate and the private costs of profit and development become harder to reconcile.

The challenges to achieving a viable solution set to this problem are compounded by there being much that remains unknown at the ground level.

INTRODUCTION

The emergence of digital media in the Malaysia was due to the government's initiative to tap into the information and communications technology (ICT) sector in an effort to open up new economic frontiers. The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC) in 1996 was an attempt to lure world-class multinational technology companies into Malaysia to boost the local digital industry. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the digital economy, it also set off a chain of events that influenced the political and democratic process. Digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly of traditional media—print, television. and radio—by circulating news and information that challenged the official narrative. Furthermore, the MSC's Bill of Guarantees stated that the Malaysian government would not censor the Internet as part of its commitment to provide a conducive environment for the digital economy to develop.

Thus, the entry of digital media into Malaysia enhanced political competition and became a catalyst for political change because it provided alternative news and information. This was evident during the sacking of former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim and the Reformasi movement in the late 1990s, with the usage of emails and Usenet newsgroups. Short message service (SMS) was employed in the 2004 general election, while socio-political blogs dominated the 2008 general election. Facebook and other social media such as Twitter were the main forms of political communication in the 2013 general election; in 2018, it was Facebook Live and WhatsApp. Every new iteration of digital technology into the Malaysian ecosystem had an impact on communication in general election campaigns.

IMPACT OF DIGITAL MEDIATIZATION OF POLITICS

Digital mediatization of politics in Malaysia has several consequences, such as cyberattacks and cyberbullying, cybertroopers and propaganda, as well as fake news, disinformation and misinformation.

Cyberattacks and Cyberbullying

Interference with online access, especially to alternative news portals and opposition content, intensifies especially in the run-up to general elections. For example, during the 13th general election in 2013, independent news website Malaysiakini experienced a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack which affected its operations for a period of time. Cyberattacks also occurred in the 14th general election in 2018 when some political candidates found their mobile phones hacked and spammed by calls from the US and UK on polling day.

INTRODUCTION

The 1 February 2021 coup in Myanmar has forced a reckoning over how to build solidarity across difference, including across ethnic divides. Days after the coup, protesters thronged the streets of major cities. Although they were united by a desire to fell the State Administration Council (SAC) junta, their demands diverged in other respects. In predominantly Bamar areas such as Yangon and Mandalay, protesters wore red, symbolizing the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD). By contrast, many protesters in the ethnic states wore black, seeking to denounce the Tatmadaw without aligning themselves with the NLD. More than 750 protesters have since died at the hands of the military regime. Moreover, at the end of March, the Tatmadaw launched airstrikes in Karen State, on the Myanmar-Thailand border, displacing 30,000 civilians over two weeks. These strikes marked a new phase in the seven-decade-long conflict between the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Tatmadaw.

The coup regime is escalating armed violence on two fronts: against urban protesters and against ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) operating in Myanmar's contested borderlands. As a result, questions about how to build interethnic solidarity among a diverse set of anti-coup actors, including protesters, ousted NLD leaders, and EAOs are becoming increasingly pertinent. However, many international actors prefer to denounce the junta rather than recognize the existence of armed groups and ethnic diversity within the country. In other words, international actors tend to retain a focus on the central state, overlooking the violence suffered by people on the country's periphery. They thus also overlook significant opportunities for leverage against the coup regime. Chances of overthrowing that regime and securing a new, peaceful future for Myanmar are best improved through the forging of solidarity across entrenched differences.

A failure to see Myanmar's centre and periphery as relationally constituted has already had great costs. A decade of donor support for central government reforms has failed to resolve the grievances of the country's conflict-affected populations. To the contrary, the failure of the donor-funded peace process to reach a meaningful resolution has accentuated borderland populations’ mistrust of the Union government.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • The introduction of the Multimedia Super Corridor in 1996 was due to the Malaysian government's initiative to tap into the ICT sector. While this move spearheaded Malaysia into the knowledge economy, digital media enabled the opposition and civil society to compete and break the government's monopoly over information flows.

• • Digital mediatization of politics in Malaysia encouraged cyberattacks such as DDoS attacks, hacking and spamming. Cyberbullying on social media is also on the rise.

• • Information warfare is being perpetuated by organized teams of cybertroopers who disseminate propaganda, fake news, and disinformation in order to influence public opinion.

• • Digital mediatization of politics has opened up the public sphere and given ordinary citizens, especially youths, the opportunity to voice their opinions on the issues of the day. Social media campaigns, especially on Twitter, discuss the trending issues through the use of hashtags.

• • PN component parties have the incumbency advantage going into the next election. Its narrative is likely to be ethno-religious. The challenge for the opposition PH, therefore, is to provide an alternative message of inclusivity, unity and acceptance of diversity.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Building interethnic solidarity is crucial for the movement opposing the regime that took power in Myanmar's 1 February 2021 coup.

• • Analysing the coup as primarily a crisis of democracy underestimates the centrality of ethnic conflict to the Tatmadaw's role in Myanmar's national politics.

• • In the context of Myanmar's ethnic diversity, ethnic armed organizations may play a key role in harmonizing responses to the coup. Successive Myanmar governments have failed to meaningfully address ethnic conflict, thereby entrenching the Tatmadaw's dominance.

• • Redressing the grievances of non-Bamar groups is crucial to ensuring national and regional stability. Conversely, strategies that mistakenly assume national unity will lead to short-term solutions may cycle back into violence and conflict.

• • There is little evidence that the Tatmadaw is willing to negotiate with ethnic armed organizations or the National Unity Government. These organizations require support in coordinating anti-coup efforts and material resources to enhance their leverage against the post-coup regime.

• • The anti-coup movement's relationship with Myanmar's ethnic groups has moved through three broad phases: (1) diversity without coordinated demands; (2) visions of a federal future; and (3) agitating for change.

• • The movement is at a critical juncture. Its success depends on its ability to transform existing centre-periphery relations. The role of ethnic armed organizations and civil society organizations needs to be recognized rather than sidelined in favour of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw or the National Unity Government.

• • Previous missed opportunities for transforming centre-periphery relations are instructive for actors seeking to support the anti-coup movement. Three aspects of the anti-coup movement have historical precedents in Karen State: (1) refuge; (2) non-state social services; and (3) shared experiences of violence. In previous iterations of each, a failure in relational thinking has entrenched the centralization of power in Myanmar.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Series Editor:

Editorial Committee:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• • Vietnamese nationalism has a strong undercurrent of anti-China sentiments, and Vietnam's leaders have regularly tapped into such sentiments to shore up their legitimacy and boost Vietnamese nationalism.

• • Over the last decade, the helter-skelter growth of social media has bred new popular actors in Vietnamese cybersphere, who are deeply nationalistic but who pursue entirely different political and social agendas. In sum, they give rise to a new nationalistic narrative, one that paints the Vietnam Communist Party as being often too meek and subservient to China, and calls for drastic reforms to the political system—regime change not excluded—to deal with Chinese threats.

• • An examination of prominent cases of online Vietnamese nationalism shows that anti-China sentiments have been a recurrent theme and a consistent trigger. The online nationalistic movements have been mostly instigated by popular figures, with state actors playing a facilitating role in stoking and harnessing them for their own ends.

• • Manifestations of online nationalism, especially those centred on anti-China and sovereignty issues, may hold serious consequences, including violence and deadly riots. In some instances, online nationalistic campaigns both galvanize and dissipate relatively quickly once state and popular actors have somehow managed to achieve their aims.

• • The growing salience of online Vietnamese nationalism has posed serious challenges and dilemmas for the regime. The authorities have had to encourage nationalistic patriotism without letting Sinophobia spiral out of control or turn against the regime.

INTRODUCTION

Sabah and Sarawak formed the Malaysian Federation together with Malaya and Singapore in 1963. Instrumental to the formation of the new Federation was an international treaty called the Malaysia Agreement 1963, signed in London by the British and Malayan Federation governments, and political representatives from Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore. The Malaysian Agreement guaranteed a special position as demanded by the East Malaysian political elites in the areas of religion and language, finance and tax, judiciary and immigration.

In the early stages, there was huge expectation that joining the Malaysian Federation would elevate East Malaysia's economic growth and bring adequate development to these vastly rural states. Substantial oil and gas discoveries in the early 1970s further prompted demands for meaningful economic development in Sabah and Sarawak.

The ruling federal government under Barisan Nasional (BN), while acknowledging the lagging economic conditions in East Malaysia, failed to meet expected levels of development and poverty reduction. At the same time, Peninsular Malaysia was systematically developed as one of the world's fast-growing economies. Sabah's and Sarawak's special position in the federation, especially various safeguards related to economic well-being, were eroded over time through legislative amendment and political manoeuvring that strengthened Peninsular power over East Malaysia.

The unprecedented win for Pakatan Harapan (PH) in the 2018 Malaysian General Election, however, revitalized demands for the restoration of East Malaysia's special position in the Malaysian Federation. A Special Cabinet Committee on MA63 was created and headed by the Prime Minister to oversee the restoration of the spirit of the initial Malaysia Agreement. These efforts were spearheaded by the PH-aligned Sabah state government, helmed by Chief Minister Shafie Apdal. By 2019, this Committee had amicably resolved seventeen out of twenty-one matters tabled by the East Malaysian states. It even proposed a constitutional amendment to recognize Sabah, Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia as equal partners in the Malaysian Federation.

This initiative unfortunately failed to get the required two-thirds parliamentary majority. The collapse of PH in February–March 2020 and the rise of a Perikatan Nasional (PN) federal administration created uncertainty regarding the proposed restoration of East Malaysian rights. In fact, the previous report written by the MA63 Special Cabinet committee has been placed under the Official Secrets Act (OSA) by PN.